Burggraaf v. Burggraaf, 2019 UT App 195

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Facts

Marriage, Education, and Employment

• Joseph and Carol married and had five children. During the marriage, Joseph pursued a medical degree, and the family relocated to Colorado for his studies. Carol was primarily a stay-at-home mother who occasionally taught piano lessons; the family’s frequent moves made it difficult for her to maintain a consistent client base.
• Joseph has a learning disability that hinders his ability to process new information. He required testing accommodations and attended an Illinois tutoring program multiple times, at an estimated cost of $4,000 per visit. He graduated with a medical degree and approximately $260,000 in student loan debt. The parties dispute whether Joseph’s student loans or the medical school paid for the tutoring program; Joseph offered no evidence that the medical school covered the cost.
• During medical school and residency, the family relied on government assistance and charitable donations to cover living expenses. Carol earned approximately $1,100 per month at the time of trial.
• After medical school, Joseph failed to obtain a permanent residency. He held a temporary position in Washington but was not retained, was unemployed for one year, and was fired from a temporary Georgia residency after thirteen months. He failed the final medical board exam and ultimately decided he would not likely pass, at which point the trial court found he had chosen to abandon his pursuit of a medical career.
• Joseph’s post-medical-school employment was sporadic: substitute teaching at $82 per day, a short-lived business funded by a $16,500 loan from his father (recouped but with no profit), seasonal contracting work ($1,863–$2,900/month for six months), insurance sales ($900 in his best month), and at the time of trial, work at a river tubing business earning $1,200 per month. He was also attending school pursuing a master’s degree, keeping his student loans in deferment.

Separation, Domestic Violence, and Criminal Conviction

• The parties separated following a domestic violence incident. Carol was granted temporary custody of their five children. Joseph later pled no contest to criminal charges and was convicted of a class B misdemeanor. Joseph contends this conviction prevents him from obtaining meaningful employment; the trial court found otherwise.
• Approximately six months after separation, Joseph began voluntarily paying Carol $200 per month in child support, an amount he calculated on his own without a court order and without taking into account the statutory joint physical custody threshold for any of the children.

Trial Court Rulings

• Income Imputation: The trial court found Joseph willfully underemployed and imputed a monthly income of $3,421 based on his earnings during his business ownership and contracting work. The court declined to impute a physician’s salary as too speculative. Carol’s income was imputed at $1,750 per month based on three years of tax returns.
• Child Custody and Support: The court awarded joint legal and physical custody but used the sole custody worksheet because only two of the five children actually spent more than 30% of overnights with Joseph. Joseph’s obligation was set at $1,138 per month. Given his $200 voluntary payments, the court found he owed Carol over $40,000 in unpaid child support retroactive to the filing of the divorce petition.
• Student Loans: The court found the majority of the $260,000 in student loan debt to be Joseph’s separate obligation, with the exception of $3,308 he had deposited into the parties’ joint account. The court found Joseph’s testimony that $200,000 of his loans was used for family expenses not credible.
• Alimony: After adjusting both parties’ budgets to remove discretionary expenses, the court determined Carol had a monthly shortfall of $86. Joseph’s claimed $1,500 in current educational expenses was excluded for lack of documentation; no line item was given for his student loan debt because it was in deferment. The court awarded Carol $86 per month in ongoing alimony and $5,580 in retroactive alimony deducted from Joseph’s share of the house proceeds.
• Property Distribution: The marital home sold prior to divorce for $205,374.05. The court divided proceeds equally, used offsets for disputed personal property, and assigned Joseph additional separate debts: the $16,500 father’s loan and $4,000 in criminal defense attorney fees charged to the joint credit card. Remaining marital debts were split equally.

Issues of the Case

• Child Support – Income Imputation

  • Claim on Appeal: Joseph argued the trial court erred in three respects: (a) it used his highest-earning months rather than averaging multiple years of income; (b) it failed to subtract necessary business expenses from gross receipts when imputing self-employment income; and (c) it failed to properly apply the ten mandatory statutory imputation factors, including those relating to his learning disability, criminal record, and limited employment opportunities.
  • Holding: Because Joseph held no consistent job and failed to provide financial account records, proof of current income deposits, or tax documents, the court was permitted under the “when possible” language of § 78B-12-203(5)(a) to use his highest-earning periods as the most credible evidence of earning potential. The court also considered all ten statutory factors; they simply did not weigh in Joseph’s favor.
  • Statutory Authority:
    • Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(5)(a) — Courts must compute income on an annual basis “when possible.” The “when possible” qualifier gave the court flexibility to depart from multi-year averaging when adequate documentation was unavailable due to Joseph’s own financial concealment.
    • Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(4)(a) — For self-employed individuals, courts must subtract necessary expenses from gross receipts. Joseph provided no documentation of business expenses; the court used gross receipts as a “high water mark” of earning potential.
    • Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(8)(a) and (b) — Requires a hearing and factual findings as the basis for imputation in contested cases; the court “shall” consider ten factors including employment opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, educational attainment, literacy, age, health, criminal record, other employment barriers, and prevailing earnings in the community.
  • Standards of Review:
    • Correctness — Interpretation of statutory requirements.
    • Abuse of discretion — The ultimate income imputation.
  • Controlling Cases:
    • Pulham v. Kirsling, 2019 UT 18, ¶ 41, 443 P.3d 1217 — Established the abuse-of-discretion standard for imputation decisions.
    • Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App 19, ¶ 19, 414 P.3d 1069 — Imputation is not erroneous if it does not reflect a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law.
    • Dole v. Dole, 2018 UT App 195, ¶ 7, 437 P.3d 464 — Imputation upheld where actual income is impossible to determine due to dishonesty and unaccountable income.
    • Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, ¶ 7, 272 P.3d 748 — Correctness standard for statutory interpretation.
    • Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 17, 379 P.3d 890; Tobler v. Tobler, 2014 UT App 239, ¶¶ 8, 28, 337 P.3d 296; Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT App 373, ¶ 2, 294 P.3d 591 — Cited for the common practice of multi-year income averaging.
  • Why It Matters: The “when possible” language in § 78B-12-203(5)(a) is not a technicality — it is a genuine carve-out permitting departure from multi-year averaging when a party’s own financial evasion has made complete documentation impossible. Courts are also not required to credit unsupported employment barrier claims when the record demonstrates broader employability. Financial concealment carries severe consequences in imputation proceedings.

   

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Plura pertinentia mox sequentur. Quaeso, redi mox.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Case Cited

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor:

The following case characteristics are most likely to produce reversal under Burggraaf:

• The trial court assigned substantial separate debt to the payor spouse but omitted that debt from the payor’s budget when calculating alimony capacity.
• The trial court’s written findings do not address one or more of the seven mandatory alimony factors under § 30-3-5(8)(a) (now § 81-4-502).
• The court applied the sole custody worksheet despite a joint custody designation, without per-child overnight analysis, where some children do not meet the 30% threshold.
• The court imputed income using highest-earning periods without a finding that multi-year averaging was impossible, in a case where the party had actually provided adequate financial documentation.

Mandatory Factor Checklist:

Income Imputation (§ 78B-12-203, now § 81-6-203):

• Hearing and findings of fact as the evidentiary basis for imputation in all contested cases.
• Consideration of all ten statutory factors to the extent known.
• If departing from multi-year annual averaging, a finding that multi-year averaging was not “possible” under the circumstances.
• If imputing self-employment income, a finding on necessary business expenses.

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile):

An appeal from a divorce involving professional education debt and alimony presents elevated reversal potential under Burggraaf where:

• The trial court assigned the majority of student loan or professional education debt to the payor spouse and also awarded alimony, but the alimony budget contains no line item for that debt.
• The payor spouse’s budget surplus as calculated by the trial court is modest and would be eliminated or reversed by a budget line item for the assigned debt.
• The trial court’s findings expressly list the alimony factors considered but omit “ability of the payor spouse to provide support.”
• The custody order designates joint physical custody, but the actual overnight schedule for some children does not meet the 30% threshold, and the court used the joint worksheet.

Strategy Insight:

Burggraaf offers a clear appellate strategy lesson: the path to reversal in Utah divorce cases runs through mandatory factor omissions and internal inconsistencies in the trial court’s financial analysis — not through re-arguing credibility determinations or factual findings. All four affirmed issues involved credibility disputes and discretionary judgments fully supported by the record. The single vacated issue — alimony — was reversed not because the court got the facts wrong about Joseph’s expenses, but because its two financial rulings (debt assignment and alimony capacity) were logically incompatible as a matter of law.

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence:

This opinion relies exclusively on Utah authority. Every case cited — from the income imputation standard in Pulham v. Kirsling to the property division framework in Dahl v. Dahl to the alimony review standard in Osborne v. Osborne — is a Utah appellate or supreme court decision. The statutory framework is drawn entirely from Utah Code titles 30, 78B, and 81. There is no resort to out-of-state authority, federal law, or secondary sources.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court):

• Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79: Cited twice — for the no-fixed-formula rule in debt division (Issue 3) and the presumption of validity / considerable discretion standard in property distribution (Issue 5). Noteworthy: the opinion flags that Dahl carries no parallel P.3d citation despite being four years old at the time of Burggraaf.
• Pulham v. Kirsling, 2019 UT 18, 443 P.3d 1217: The controlling Utah Supreme Court authority establishing abuse of discretion as the standard for income imputation. Issued the same year as Burggraaf.
• Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987): The foundational Utah Supreme Court rule that property distribution must be assessed holistically, not through isolated debt-to-asset ratios. Critical to rejecting Joseph’s percentage-based property distribution argument.

The Most Important Holding — Internal Consistency Between Debt Assignment and Alimony Capacity:

The most doctrinally significant holding in Burggraaf is the vacatur of the alimony award on grounds of internal inconsistency: a trial court that assigns a large debt solely to one spouse cannot then ignore that debt when assessing that spouse’s ability to pay alimony. The court found it could not see on the record how Joseph would not be entitled to a line item for either student loan payments or tuition payments — particularly where even half of his requested educational expenses would eliminate his $446 budget surplus, making the alimony obligation he was ordered to pay effectively impossible to sustain.

This holding has broad application beyond student loans. Any time a trial court makes two interconnected financial determinations — (1) assigning a substantial debt obligation to a payor spouse, and (2) calculating that spouse’s alimony capacity — the determinations must be internally consistent. A deferred obligation is still an obligation; the court must make some provision for it in the budget.

Reversal Based on Legal Error — Omission of a Mandatory Statutory Factor:

The vacatur on Issue 4 was not based on a factual disagreement but on the court’s failure to consider a mandatory statutory factor — the payor’s ability to provide support under Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(a)(iii) (now § 81-4-502). Failure to consider a mandatory factor is a legal error that constitutes a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. This is legally distinct from an argument that the court weighed the factors incorrectly, and it is far more likely to succeed on appeal. All four affirmed issues involved factual findings and discretionary judgments supported by the trial record. The pattern is consistent: factual and discretionary outcomes survive review; omission of a mandatory legal factor does not.

The Sole Custody Worksheet in Split-Sibling Families:

Burggraaf establishes that in families where siblings have materially different overnight arrangements with each parent, the joint-versus-sole custody classification must be determined on a per-child basis using actual overnights rather than the label applied to the order as a whole. Here, three of five children spent more than 70% of nights with Carol; only two met the 30% threshold for joint physical custody with Joseph. The court used the sole custody worksheet for all five and the court of appeals affirmed. Practitioners in cases with multiple children should conduct a per-child overnight analysis before agreeing to any custody label that might be assumed to dictate the worksheet.

Student Loan Debt — When Professional Degree Debt Becomes Separate:

Burggraaf provides a concrete set of circumstances under which student loan debt incurred during a marriage for professional education can be classified as the educated spouse’s separate obligation:

• The educated spouse unilaterally abandoned the professional field, foreclosing any marital benefit from the degree.
• Loan funds were kept in a separate account inaccessible to the other spouse.
• The educated spouse failed to produce credible documentary evidence that loan proceeds were used for family expenses.
• The other spouse credibly testified the family relied on government assistance and charitable donations rather than loan proceeds.

The broader equitable principle: when one spouse bears all the benefits of a professional education (the degree, credentials, and future earning potential) while the other spouse bore the opportunity costs (foregone employment, relocations, sole childcare), equity may support assigning the debt to the benefiting spouse — especially where that spouse later voluntarily abandons the field.

Financial Concealment — Compounding Consequences:

Joseph’s financial opacity had compounding adverse effects across multiple issues:

• It permitted the court to use highest-earning months rather than multi-year averaging for income imputation.
• It permitted gross business receipts to serve as a proxy for self-employment earning capacity because no expense documentation was produced.
• It supported the credibility finding that Carol’s testimony about the student loan proceeds was more believable than Joseph’s.
• It supported the court’s overall finding that Joseph had deliberately attempted to minimize his financial obligations.

Financial evasion in divorce proceedings is not a neutral litigation strategy. Courts respond to concealment by expanding the range of permissible imputation methodologies and discounting the concealing party’s testimony across all financial issues in the case.

Alimony (§ 30-3-5(8), now § 81-4-502):

• (i) Financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse.
• (ii) Earning capacity of the recipient, including impact of diminished workplace experience from childcare.
• (iii) Ability of the payor to provide support — including any separate debt obligations assigned to the payor. ← The factor omitted in Burggraaf.
• (iv) Length of the marriage.
• (v) Whether the recipient has custody of minor children requiring support.
• (vii) Whether the recipient contributed to the payor’s educational attainment by enabling school attendance during the marriage.

Child Support Worksheet Selection:

• Per-child determination of actual overnight percentage with each parent.
• For each child meeting the 30%+ overnight threshold, confirmation that both parents also contribute to the child’s expenses above child support.

Practitioner Takeaways

Trial Lawyers:

• When a court assigns substantial separate debt to a payor spouse, immediately request a corresponding line item in the alimony budget. Do not allow the court to omit the obligation on the theory that no current payments are being made — a deferred debt is still a debt, and the payor’s ability to pay must account for it.
• In split-sibling families, conduct a per-child overnight analysis before stipulating to any custody label. A stipulation to “joint physical custody” does not mean all children meet the 30% threshold, and it does not guarantee the joint custody worksheet will be used.
• Build a comprehensive record of an opposing party’s financial evasion: missing accounts, missing tax records, inconsistent testimony. Courts are afforded broader latitude in imputation methodology when the target’s concealment has made full documentation impossible.
• Document all business expenses in real time. Failure to produce expense records leaves the court free to treat gross receipts as an income proxy — a predictably adverse outcome.

Appellate Lawyers:

• Build alimony appeals around mandatory statutory factor omissions, not disagreements with how the court weighed the factors it did consider. Burggraaf demonstrates that identifying the one mandatory factor the court entirely omitted is a legal error with no deference barrier.
• Look for internal inconsistencies between interconnected financial rulings. A court that assigns $260,000 in debt to the payor and then calculates a $446 monthly surplus without any debt line item has created a reversible internal contradiction.
• When the opposing party has been financially evasive, preserve the full record of that evasion. On appeal, it supports the deference owed to the trial court’s credibility findings and imputation methodology choices.

Self-Employed Individuals and Business Owners:

• Maintain contemporaneous records of all business expenses. In contested divorce proceedings, the failure to document expenses results in courts imputing income based on gross receipts, which overstates actual earning capacity.
• Transparency about financial accounts is not optional. Courts treat concealment as grounds for adverse inferences that affect every financial issue in the divorce.

 

2019 UT App 195
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CAROL BURGGRAAF,
Appellee,

v.

BRIAN JOSEPH BURGGRAAF,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20180405-CA
Filed November 29, 2019
Second District Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Camille L. Neider
No. 154902227
Julie J. Nelson, Erin B. Hull, and Benjamin G. Larsen,
Attorneys for Appellant
Suzanne Marelius, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE KATE APPLEBY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.
APPLEBY, Judge:
¶1In April 2018, Brian Joseph Burggraaf and Carol Burggraaf divorced after nearly twenty-two years of marriage.
Following a bench trial, the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and granted a decree of divorce. Joseph1 contends the court erred when it (1) imputed income to him for the purpose of calculating child support and alimony, (2) determined he owed unpaid child support, (3) found the 1. Because both parties share a last name, we use their given names “with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.” Smith v. Smith, 2017 UT App 40, ¶ 2 n.1, 392 P.3d 985. majority of his student loans to be separate debt, and (4) set his
budget for the purpose of calculating alimony. Joseph also contends the court’s overall property distribution was
inequitable. We affirm in large part but vacate the modest alimony award.

BACKGROUND2
Education and Work History
¶2
Joseph and Carol married and had five children. A few years into the marriage, Joseph decided to pursue a medical degree and the family moved to Colorado for his studies. Joseph has a learning disability that hinders his ability to “process[] new information,” and as a result he struggled academically during medical school. With testing accommodations, he was able to pass the first two medical board exams, but only after attending
a tutoring program in Illinois. The parties agree that it cost approximately $4,000 each time Joseph attended the program, but they disagree as to whether the medical school or Joseph’s student loans paid for it, though Joseph offered no evidence to show the medical school had paid for the program. Joseph graduated with a medical degree and approximately $260,000 in student loan debt.
¶3
After graduating from medical school, Joseph did not obtain a full-time residency but was able to secure a temporary position in the state of Washington. He was not offered a 2. “On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the [district] court’s findings, and therefore recite the facts consistent with that standard” and “present conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to clarify the issues raised on appeal.” Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT App 26, n.1, 321 P.3d 200 (quotation simplified).

permanent position there and was unemployed for one year. Joseph returned to the Illinois tutoring program as a preemptive measure for the third and final board exam, passage of which is required to become a licensed practicing physician. Although he finished the tutoring program, Joseph did not immediately take
the exam. Instead, he obtained another temporary residency in Georgia but was fired after thirteen months. Joseph then took the final board exam and failed. He returned to Illinois for the tutoring program but ultimately did not retake the exam because he decided he “would not likely pass.” After considering these facts, the district court determined Joseph “chose to abandon his pursuit of work in the medical field.”
¶4
During Joseph’s medical school and residency pursuits, Carol was “mostly a stay at home mother” who occasionally taught piano lessons to earn extra money. At trial she testified that the family’s frequent moves made it difficult for her to maintain a consistent client base for these lessons. While Joseph was in medical school and residency, the family received government and charitable assistance to make ends meet. At the
time of trial, Carol earned approximately $1,100 per month.
¶5
Since deciding to forgo becoming a licensed physician, Joseph’s employment history was sporadic. He was a substitute teacher earning $82 per day for a short time before starting his own business funded by a $16,500 loan from his father. The business failed after a few months; Joseph recouped the investment, but he earned nothing more. He then took seasonal contracting work, earning between $1,863 and $2,900 per month
for six months. After that, he sold insurance for a few months; in his “best month” he earned about $900. At the time of trial, Joseph was earning $1,200 per month at a river “tubing” business, working ten-to-twenty hours per week during the off-season and seventy-to-eighty hours per week in the summer. Joseph testified that he also was attending school in pursuit of a master’s degree, which put his student loans in deferment.

The Divorce
¶6
The parties separated following a domestic violence incident, and Carol was granted temporary custody of their five children. Joseph later pled no contest to the criminal charges and was convicted of a class B misdemeanor.3 Approximately six months later, Joseph began paying Carol $200 per month for child support, which he calculated on his own without a court order.
¶7
The divorce was finalized three years after the date of separation following a four-day bench trial. After hearing
evidence from both parties, the court determined Joseph was willfully underemployed and imputed his income for the purposes of calculating child support and alimony, granted Joseph and Carol joint physical and joint legal custody of the children, determined Joseph owed Carol unpaid child support, found the majority of Joseph’s student loans to be separate debt, and awarded Carol alimony. The court also distributed the marital property and debts, accounting for offsets and credits as necessary.

Income Imputation
¶8
Both parties asked the district court to impute the other’s income because each claimed the other was willfully
underemployed and his or her claimed income did not reflect his or her employment potential.
¶9
The court determined Carol was not willfully underemployed and, using her previous three years’ tax returns,
imputed to her a monthly salary of $1,750. But the court found Joseph was willfully underemployed and had “substantially 3. Joseph denies the allegation and claims the conviction prevents him from obtaining meaningful employment.

4

undermined the financial stability” of the family. The court noted Joseph’s history of being secretive about his finances and said he had “lacked candor with [Carol] and the Court.” The court found it significant that Joseph did not “pursue[] employment associated with his medical degree” and that his “choices of employment [were] significantly different, without believable explanation, depending on if the parties were together
or separated.” Further, Joseph did not provide the court with information about “all of his financial accounts” and “ha[d] been untruthful about the true nature of his income and assets.” Joseph also failed to provide evidence of “his current paycheck being deposited.”

¶10 Although Carol asked the court to impute a medical doctor’s salary to Joseph, the court declined to do so, as it was too speculative. Because neither party presented evidence to show what a person in Joseph’s situation—holding a medical degree but not being a licensed physician—could earn in the local area, the court was left to cobble together an average monthly income using Joseph’s earnings when he owned his business and did contracting work as “the most credible evidence of [his] potential income.” The court found it “equitable and just to impute” to Joseph a monthly income of $3,421.

Child Support and Child Custody
¶11 The district court granted Carol and Joseph joint physical and joint legal custody of their five children. In its order, the court gave the two eldest children “broad discretion to exercise parent time in whatever amount they fe[lt was] appropriate with either parent,” although they were “not obligated to exercise said parent time.” The court also recommended the three eldest children “participate in reunification therapy” with Joseph, which they “may attend if they so desire but will not be forced.” With regard to the three youngest children, the court gave

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Burggraaf v. Burggraaf
Joseph overnight parent-time every other weekend and one weeknight every other week and, during the other weeks, one non-overnight midweek visit. Carol was given “all other regular parent time not awarded to” Joseph, with the parties sharing statutorily prescribed holiday time and summer vacation.
¶12 In determining Joseph’s child support obligation, the court acknowledged the parties stipulated to joint physical custody but noted Carol was in reality the “primary custodial parent” and thus “responsible for all of the day-to-day out-of pocket expenses for the children while they are with [her].” Joseph also testified he never had more than every other weekend with the two eldest children and Carol testified their middle child “often chose[] to do other things” than stay with him. Although Joseph calculated his child support obligation on his own to arrive at his $200 monthly figure, he failed to take into account the fact that only the two youngest children were
with him for 142 nights, or more than thirty percent of the year.4 Because of this, the court used the sole custody worksheet to determine Joseph’s child support obligation. ¶13 The court gave Joseph credit for paying $200 per month (a total of $4,847.50) but, because it decided Joseph’s child support obligation was actually $1,138 per month during that period, he owed Carol more than $40,000 in unpaid child support.
Student Loans
¶14 At trial, Joseph argued his student loans, which were “in excess of $260,000,” should be considered a marital debt. He 4. “‘Joint physical custody’ means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-102(15) (LexisNexis 2018).

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claimed only $59,551.34 of the money was used for medical school tuition and the rest was used for family expenses. He testified that the medical school paid for all books, laboratory coats, and equipment, such as stethoscopes. Carol denied this and testified that not only was the family using government assistance and charitable donations to pay their living expenses,
but Joseph kept the money from his student loans in a separate
account to which Carol had no access. Evidence also showed
Joseph incurred “extra costs” such as “equipment, study aids,
tutoring resources and [the Illinois] preparation course based on
his perceived need due to his processing/learning disorder that
were above and beyond the tuition expenses.” To dispute this,
Joseph offered into evidence bank statements from two months
showing a total of $3,308 in student loan money was deposited
into the couple’s joint account, which was used for “living
expenses, to pay the rent . . . utility bills . . . [and] kid expenses.”
¶15 The district court determined Joseph’s student loan debt
was his separate obligation, with the exception of the $3,308
deposit into the joint checking account. In making this
determination, the court found Joseph was not “credible in his
representation that of $260,000 in student loans, only 25% was
needed for actual school related costs.” The court noted Joseph
“is the only one that may ever receive any benefit of his medical
degree if he ever chooses to utilize it” and that he “solely
decided to abandon his plans to be a licensed medical doctor.”
Because of this, the court concluded “it would be unjust to
require” Carol to share in the responsibility for the student
loans.
Alimony
¶16 In preparation for trial, Carol and Joseph each submitted
to the court estimated monthly budgets. Joseph’s total monthly
budget was $4,706 and included a line item for “education (self)”
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of $1,500. Carol’s monthly budget was $5,476, including a line
item for “extra-curricular activities (children)” of $850.
¶17 Each testified extensively about their monthly expenses.
Joseph did not produce documentation to support his contention
that he paid $1,500 per month for his current educational
pursuits. But he testified that his medical school student loans
were in deferment because he was attending school. The parties
each testified that, during the marriage, they struggled
financially. At one time, they lived with Joseph’s parents, and
they often received institutional charity, government aid, and
help from their families.
¶18 In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district
court adjusted Carol’s budget and removed anything it found to
be “discretionary and not reasonable necessary expenses,”
including the children’s extra-curricular activities. The court
determined Carol’s reasonable monthly budget to be $2,855,
which, after calculating child support and her imputed income,
left “her with a shortfall of $86 per month.”
¶19 The court declined to give Joseph a line item for his
student loans because they were in deferment and he was not
making payments on them. He also did not get a line item for his
current educational expenses. The court said it omitted these
items from Joseph’s submitted budget as discretionary and
unnecessary “[b]ased on the testimony of the parties and the
verifying documents presented at trial,” noting “none of
[Joseph’s] documents reflect any student-aid, loans[,] or other
assistance or expenses related to his current course of study” and
Joseph “claimed to be paying approximately $1,500 per month in
educational expenses for himself . . . with no documentation.”
¶20 In determining Joseph owed Carol alimony, the court
considered:
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Burggraaf v. Burggraaf
[T]he financial condition and needs of [Carol], [her]
earning capacity or ability to produce income,
including the impact of diminished workplace
experience resulting from primarily caring for the
children, the length of the marriage, whether [she]
has custody of the minor children requiring
support, and whether [she] directly contributed to
any increase in [Joseph’s] skill by enabling [him] to
attend school during the marriage.
The court found each factor supported an award of alimony. The
court also noted “there was credible evidence that [Joseph]
knowingly and intentionally caused physical harm to [Carol]
and [Joseph] substantially undermined the financial stability of”
the family, which the court said further supported the alimony
award. Because the court imputed a monthly income of $3,421 to
Joseph, after subtracting what it deemed his reasonable monthly
expenses, the court determined he had an excess of $446 per
month.
¶21 Using the budgets the court set and the parties’ imputed
income, the court determined Joseph had an unpaid alimony
obligation of $5,580, to be deducted from his share of the
proceeds generated from the sale of their house, a marital asset.
The court also determined Joseph’s ongoing alimony obligation
to Carol would be $86 per month to account for her shortfall.
Property Distribution
¶22 Joseph and Carol had a marital home that they sold
before the divorce for $205,374.05, the proceeds of which were
kept in a trust account. The district court began the property
division by allocating half of the proceeds to each party. It then
determined the value of certain items of disputed property and
to whom the items should be awarded. As it did this, the court
gave the non-receiving party an offset from the recipient’s house
proceeds. For example, Carol was awarded a grand piano,
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Burggraaf v. Burggraaf
valued at $11,907, and Joseph was thus awarded a $5,953.50
offset from Carol’s share of the house proceeds. The court used
this same method to divide the marital debts and to reimburse
Carol for half of the children’s medical, dental, and orthodontic
bills she had incurred on her own. Because the court found
Joseph owed Carol unpaid child support and unpaid alimony,
those amounts also were deducted from his share of the house
proceeds. In addition to his student loan debt, Joseph was
deemed solely responsible for the $16,500 loan from his father
and $4,000 he had charged on the joint credit card for attorney
fees related to his criminal case. The court divided the remaining
debts equally.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶23 Joseph raises five issues on appeal. First, he claims the
district court’s imputation of his income to calculate his child
support and alimony obligations was in error because the court
failed to apply the statutory guidelines. “We review the [district]
court’s interpretation of statutory requirements for correctness.”
Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, ¶ 7, 272 P.3d 748. The court’s
ultimate imputation of income is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Pulham v. Kirsling, 2019 UT 18, ¶ 41, 443 P.3d 1217.
¶24 Second, Joseph contends the district court erred when it
calculated his child support obligation and found he owed
unpaid child support. “Because [district] courts have broad
discretion to award child support, we will not disturb such
decisions absent an abuse of discretion.” Reller v. Argenziano,
2015 UT App 241, ¶ 15, 360 P.3d 768 (quotation simplified).
¶25 Third, Joseph contends the district court erred when it
determined the majority of his student loan debt to be his
separate obligation. “There is no fixed formula for determining
the division of debts in a divorce action. We require only that the
district court’s allocation of debt be based on adequate factual
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findings. And we will not disturb those findings absent an abuse
of discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 139 (quotation
simplified).5
¶26 Fourth, Joseph alleges the district court erred when it set
his budget for the alimony calculation. District “courts have
considerable
discretion
in
determining
alimony
and
determinations of alimony will be upheld on appeal unless a
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.”
Osborne v. Osborne, 2016 UT App 29, ¶ 25, 367 P.3d 1036
(quotation simplified).
¶27 Finally, Joseph claims the district court’s overall
distribution of property is inequitable. District courts have
“considerable discretion” in this area as well, and we will
uphold the district court’s decision concerning property
distribution “unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is
demonstrated.” Gerwe v. Gerwe, 2018 UT App 75, ¶ 8, 424 P.3d
1113 (quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS
I. Income Imputation
¶28 Joseph contends the district court erred when it imputed
his income, alleging the court did not follow Utah Code section
78B-12-203 regarding
(1)
gross
annual
income,
(2) self-employment income, and (3) the factors for imputing
income. Income may be imputed to a party if, “in contested
cases, a hearing is held and the judge . . . enters findings of fact
5. Our practice is to provide a parallel citation to reported Utah
appellate opinions. For reasons unknown, this opinion has not
found its way into the Pacific Reporter, third series, in the four
years since it was issued.
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as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-12-203(8)(a) (LexisNexis 2018).6 Because the parties each
wanted the other’s income imputed, the district court heard
evidence related to their incomes.
A.
Gross Annual Income
¶29 Utah Code section 78B-12-203 establishes the method by
which district courts may impute gross income. Section
78B-12-203(5)(a) directs courts, “[w]hen possible,” to compute
income “on an annual basis and then recalculate[] to determine
the average gross monthly income.” As Joseph points out,
“courts frequently average several years of income.” (Citing Taft
v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 17, 379 P.3d 890; Tobler v. Tobler, 2014
UT App 239, ¶¶ 8, 28, 337 P.3d 296; Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT
App 373, ¶ 2, 294 P.3d 591.) He claims the court erred because it
took his “few highest earnings months out of the last several
years and made that the imputation number.” (Quotation
simplified.) But this does not necessarily constitute error. The
statute says courts must compute an annual income “when
possible.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(5)(a) (emphasis added).
Because Joseph had not held a consistent job and failed to
provide “copies of all of his financial accounts,” proof of his
current income being deposited, or his tax documents (even after
the court requested them), it was well within the court’s
discretion, under the circumstances, to impute Joseph’s income
as it did, and doing so did not constitute a “misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law.” Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App
19, ¶ 19, 414 P.3d 1069 (quotation simplified); see also Dole v. Dole,
6. Although this statute “addresses imputation for the purposes
of child support, it is also relevant to imputation in the alimony
context.” Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292, ¶ 14 n.5, 242 P.3d 787.
Because the material provisions cited have not changed, we cite
the current version of the Utah Code.
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2018 UT App 195, ¶ 7, 437 P.3d 464 (upholding imputation when
“the actual income of [a spouse] is impossible to determine due
to [his or her] dishonesty to [the district court], to [his or her]
unaccountable income, and to his [or her] failure and refusal to
obtain traditional employment” (quotation simplified)). Thus,
we do not disturb the court’s imputation of Joseph’s income by
averaging his monthly income from owning his own business
and performing contracting work.
B.
Self-Employment Income
¶30 Joseph next argues the district court failed to follow
statutory procedures for imputing income for a self-employed
individual. If a party is self-employed or operates his or her own
business, Utah law directs courts to “subtract[] necessary
expenses required for self-employment or business operation
from gross receipts.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(4)(a). Joseph
started his own business with a $16,500 loan and operated it for
three months, during which time he recouped the investment
but earned nothing more. When imputing his income, the
district court divided $16,500 by three and determined Joseph
was capable of earning $5,500 per month. Joseph argues this was
in error because he “earned nothing” during that period after
subtracting necessary business expenses, which he identified as
a computer, scanner, insurance, and travel. But Joseph did not
provide any evidence of business expenses, and the court
recognized his history of being “secretive about his finances”
and his lack of candor. The court merely used this figure as a
“high water mark” as evidence of his “potential income.” In
these circumstances, the court’s decision was not an abuse of
discretion.
C.
Statutory Factors
¶31 Finally, Joseph asserts the district court failed to follow
the factors identified in Utah Code section 78B-12-203(8)(b). A
court may not impute income to a party in contested cases unless
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“a hearing is held and the judge . . . enters findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.” Id. § 78B-12-203(8)(a).
The court “shall” base the imputation on ten factors, “to the
extent known.” Id. § 78B-12-203(8)(b). These factors are
“(i) employment opportunities; (ii) work history; (iii) occupation
qualifications; (iv) educational attainment; (v) literacy; (vi) age;
(vii) health; (viii) criminal record; (ix) other employment barriers
and background factors; and (x) prevailing earnings and job
availability for persons of similar backgrounds in the
community.” Id.
¶32 Joseph claims the district court “failed to acknowledge the
factors that are most important here,” namely employment
opportunities, work history, health, criminal record, other
employment barriers and background factors, and prevailing
earnings and job availability for persons of similar backgrounds
in the community. But the record is clear that the court did
consider these factors; the factors simply did not weigh in
Joseph’s favor. For instance, Joseph argues the court should have
considered his learning disability and criminal record, which it
did. The court found Joseph “still very employable even
considering those obstacles” and pointed to Joseph’s own
testimony, which “emphasized his ability to work hard, long
hours and across many fields of employment.” Joseph did not
provide support for his assertion that his class B misdemeanor
was the reason he could not obtain more lucrative employment.
The court also considered Joseph’s work history. It noted his
“choices of employment have been significantly different,
without believable explanation, depending on if the parties were
together or separated” and found that “his current and historical
income during the parties’ separation is a deliberate attempt to
minimize his financial obligations.” It also found it incredible
that Joseph—an individual with a medical degree—was earning
“barely more than minimum wage.” Thus, the record shows the
court considered the statutory factors, and the conclusions it
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drew from its consideration of them were therefore well within
its broad discretion.
II. Child Support
¶33 Joseph next argues the district court erred when it
(1) used the sole custody worksheet to calculate his child
support obligation and (2) determined he owed Carol unpaid
child support. For the reasons detailed below, these arguments
fail.
A.
Sole Custody Worksheet
¶34 In Utah, “child support obligations are generally
calculated using a worksheet in cases of joint physical custody.
Moreover, for purposes of calculating child support, the
designation of ‘joint physical custody’ or ‘sole physical custody’
is not as important as whether the custody arrangement exceeds
the statutory threshold for joint physical custody.” Stephens v.
Stephens, 2018 UT App 196, ¶ 29, 437 P.3d 445 (quotation
simplified). District courts are given broad discretion in
decisions regarding child support. Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT
App 19, ¶ 21, 414 P.3d 1069. If a court deviates from the statutory
guidelines, it must make a finding that following them “would
be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child.”
Gore v. Grant, 2015 UT App 113, ¶ 13, 349 P.3d 779 (quotation
simplified).
¶35 The district court noted Carol and Joseph had agreed
upon joint physical custody, but it nevertheless used the sole
custody worksheet to determine Joseph’s child support
obligation. The court supported its determination by making
findings that Carol actually had the three eldest children
overnight at her house for more than 70% of the time. Joseph’s
own testimony supports this determination: only the two
youngest children spent a standard parent time schedule with
him. Thus, Carol had sole physical custody—defined in terms of
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overnights, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-102(15) (LexisNexis
2018)—of three of the children, and the parties shared joint
physical custody of two of the children. Under these unique
circumstances, we see no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s decision to apply the sole custody worksheet.
B.
Unpaid Child Support
¶36 Joseph also claims the district court erred when it found
he owed thirty-six months’ worth of unpaid child support, based
upon his imputed income, dating back to the filing of the divorce
petition. He argues the court was without authority to ascribe
unpaid support to him retroactively because Carol never asked
the district court to enter a temporary order establishing the
appropriate amount of child support to be paid during the
pendency of the divorce case. But Joseph has not identified any
statute or caselaw to support his position. See Osborne v. Osborne,
2016 UT App 29, ¶ 21, 367 P.3d 1036 (“Where the contentions on
appeal are asserted without the support of legal reasoning or
authority, this court will not assume the appellant’s burden of
argument and research.” (quotation simplified)). Moreover,
“child support is a basic and unalienable right vested in the
minor,” Anderson, 2018 UT App 19, ¶ 39 (quotation simplified),
and “[e]very child is presumed to be in need of the support of
the child’s mother and father. Every mother and father shall
support their children,” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-105(1)
(LexisNexis 2018). Joseph was aware of his duty to support his
children, as evidenced by his $200 monthly payments to Carol.
Simply because he chose an arbitrary—and low—amount does
not absolve him of the responsibility to fully support his five
children.
¶37 Because Joseph failed to point us to statutory or other
authority to instruct us otherwise, we decline to conclude that
the district court abused its discretion in awarding Carol unpaid
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child support, dating back to the date the divorce petition was
filed, even in the absence of a temporary order.
III. Student Loans
¶38 Joseph challenges the district court’s determination that
the majority of the student loan debt was his separate obligation.
“Neither spouse is personally liable for the separate debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the other . . . contracted or incurred
during the marriage, except family expenses.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-2-5 (LexisNexis 2018). “There is no fixed formula for
determining the division of debts in a divorce action. We require
only that the district court’s allocation of debt be based on
adequate factual findings. And we will not disturb those
findings absent an abuse of discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79,
¶ 139 (quotation simplified).
¶39 We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s finding that,
in these unique circumstances, the majority of the student loan
debt should be considered Joseph’s separate obligation. The
court determined that Joseph alone had made the decision to
“abandon his plans to be a licensed medical doctor” and that he
should therefore be responsible for repaying the vast majority of
the student loans associated with obtaining his medical degree.
The court supported its conclusion by reviewing the parties’
testimonies about the loans and determining Carol to be the
most credible. “Credibility determinations are within the
province of the [district] judge, who is uniquely equipped to
make factual findings based exclusively on oral testimony due to
his or her opportunity to view the witnesses firsthand, to assess
their demeanor and to reconsider their testimonies in the context
of the proceeding as a whole.” Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT App 26,
¶ 34, 321 P.3d 200 (quotation simplified).
¶40 The court did not find Joseph’s testimony about using
approximately $200,000 of his student loans for family expenses
credible. Joseph provided no evidence to support his claim,
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Burggraaf v. Burggraaf
other than two bank statements showing $3,308 was deposited
into their joint account; the rest was kept in a separate account to
which Carol had no access. Conversely, the court found Carol’s
testimony “about the resources she utilized from teaching piano
lessons, welfare from the parties’ church, family help and
government assistance . . . credible and believable.” The court
also noted Joseph’s testimony about “the extras that he needed
in order to successfully complete medical school course work
and the licensing tests,” but indicated Joseph “did not
acknowledge any were above and beyond the tuition amount.”
In these circumstances, the court’s findings were not an abuse of
its broad discretion.
IV. Alimony
¶41 Joseph argues the budget the district court set for him in
calculating his alimony was arbitrarily low, because it (1) failed
to give him a line item for either his student loan debt or his
current educational expenses, (2) failed to calculate his alimony
obligation using the marital standard of living, and
(3) supported its alimony award by finding Joseph at fault.
District “courts have considerable discretion in determining
alimony and determinations of alimony will be upheld on
appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is
demonstrated.” Osborne v. Osborne, 2016 UT App 29, ¶ 25, 367
P.3d 1036 (quotation simplified). Because we agree with Joseph
that the district court should have given him a line item in his
budget for either his student loan debt or tuition payments to
keep the loan in deferral, we do not address the marital standard
of living or fault arguments.
¶42 When deciding whether to award alimony, a district court
must consider seven statutory factors, including “the ability of
the payor spouse to provide support.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5(8)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019). In determining
Joseph’s alimony obligation, the court took each party’s
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Burggraaf v. Burggraaf
proposed monthly budget and adjusted it to remove
discretionary expenses. It did not include a line item for Joseph’s
claimed $1,500 in educational expenses for himself. The court
also declined to give him a line item for his student loan debt,
because it was in deferment and he was not currently making
payments on it. Although the court weighed statutory factors
such as “the financial condition and needs of [Carol]; [her]
earning capacity or ability to produce income, including the
impact of diminished workplace experience resulting from
primarily caring for the children, the length of the marriage,
whether [Carol] ha[d] custody of the minor children requiring
support, and whether [she] directly contributed to any increase
in [Joseph’s] skill by enabling [him] to attend school during the
marriage,” see id. § 30-3-5(8)(i), (ii), (iv), (v), (vii), the court failed
to consider an additional mandatory factor, namely Joseph’s
ability to pay, id. § 30-3-5(8)(iii).
¶43 We conclude the court’s failure to consider Joseph’s
ability to pay alimony was a “clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion.” Osborne, 2016 UT App 29, ¶ 25 (quotation
simplified). Because the district court found the majority of
Joseph’s student loan debt to be his sole obligation, it should
have included a line item in his budget either for his student
loan payments or for tuition payments that would keep the loan
repayment in deferral. We acknowledge Joseph is not currently
making student loan payments, but because he was found solely
responsible for the loan debt and his share of the house proceeds
are insufficient to pay off that debt, we cannot see on this record
how he would not be entitled to a line item in his budget to
account for either student loan payments or tuition payments.7
7. It is theoretically possible that Joseph could be the recipient of
a scholarship or other financial aid that would allow him to
attend school and thereby keep the student loan debt in
deferment without actually making any out-of-pocket payment.
(continued…)
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Although Joseph has a $446 excess in his court-determined
budget, a line item for even half of his requested educational
expenses would eliminate said excess. This would certainly
affect his ability to pay the most modest alimony award. We
therefore vacate the award of alimony.
V. Property Distribution
¶44 Finally, Joseph argues the district court’s overall property
distribution was inequitable. “Generally, district courts have
considerable discretion concerning property distribution in a
divorce proceeding and their determinations enjoy a
presumption of validity. Thus, we will uphold the decision of
the district court on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse
of discretion is demonstrated.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 119,
(quotation simplified). Joseph contends he received “93% of the
total debt [but only] 25% of the liquid assets.” But as he points
out, we cannot “consider[] the property division in a vacuum.”
(Quoting Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 n.1 (Utah
1987).) Because the debt division Joseph cites includes both his
student loan debt, the majority of which the court found was not
marital debt, and the loan Joseph received from his father, which
the court also found to be separate debt, the percentages he cites
are artificially inflated. In reality, the court split the marital debts
(…continued)
But there was no such evidence presented at trial, and the
district court made no findings to this effect. Joseph’s testimony
that he paid $1,500 per month to finance his current education
stands unrefuted. And such a situation would in any event be
relatively temporary; at some point in the near future, Joseph
will be compelled to begin making payments on $260,000 of
student loan debt that the district court assigned solely to him.
Some provision must be made in Joseph’s budget to account for
this expense.
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equally and did the same with the house proceeds. This does not
constitute “a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.” Dahl,
2015 UT 79, ¶ 119 (quotation simplified).
CONCLUSION
¶45 Because the district court did not exceed its considerable
discretion in imputing Joseph’s income, calculating child
support, finding the student loans to be separate debt, and in its
overall property distribution, we affirm its decisions on those
points. But we vacate the modest alimony award because Joseph
does not have the ability to pay it in light of his student loan
debt.
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1. Case Metadata
2. Short Case Summary

• Relevant Facts

1. Issues on Appeal
2. Rule of Law Map (cases, statutes, rules)
3. Case Conclusion, Insights, Trends & Practitioner Takeaways

 

1. Case Metadata

• Case Name: Burggraaf v. Burggraaf
• Official Citation: 2019 UT App 195, 455 P.3d 1071
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: November 29, 2019
• Trial Court: Second District Court, Ogden Department
• Trial Judge: Hon. Camille L. Neider
• Domestic Relations Commissioner: Domestic Relations Commissioner (name not specified in opinion)
• Panel: Judge Kate Appleby, Judge Gregory K. Orme, Judge Ryan M. Harris
• Opinion Author: Judge Kate Appleby
• Dissenting Opinion: None
• Concurring Opinion: None.
• Attorneys for Appellant: Julie J. Nelson, Erin B. Hull, Benjamin G. Larsen
• Attorney for Appellee: Suzanne Marelius

 

1. Short Case Summary

After a 22-year marriage and five children, Brian and Carol Burggraaf divorced following a four-day bench trial. The district court imputed income to Joseph, found him willfully underemployed, assigned most of his $260,000 student loan debt to him as separate debt, awarded Carol child support and modest alimony, and divided the marital estate using house-sale proceeds and offsets. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decisions on imputation, child support, student loans, and property division, but vacated the alimony award because the court failed to consider Joseph’s ability to pay in light of his student loan obligations.

• Relevant Facts

• The long-term marriage lasted nearly 22 years; the parties had five children.
• Joseph obtained a medical degree, but never became a licensed, practicing physician.
• He incurred more than $260,000 in student loan debt, largely associated with medical school and related tutoring/preparation programs.
• Employment history was sporadic: temporary residencies, seasonal work, insurance sales, and work at a river tubing business.
• Carol was primarily a stay-at-home parent, with intermittent income from teaching piano lessons.
• Parties struggled financially, using church welfare, government assistance, and family help.
• There was a domestic violence incident; Joseph pled no contest to a class B misdemeanor.
• At trial, the court found Joseph willfully underemployed, lacking candor, and secretive about finances.
• The court imputed income to Joseph at $3,421/month and found more than $40,000 in unpaid child support.
• The court treated most student loan debt as Joseph’s separate obligation, awarded Carol modest alimony ($86/month), and divided the marital estate using a house-sale proceeds trust with offsets.

1. Issues on Appeal

On appeal, the appellant challenged five issues arising from the district court’s divorce decree:

1. Imputation of Income
2. Child Support & Retroactive Arrears
3. Student Loan Debt Classification
4. Alimony / Ability to Pay
5. Property Distribution

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on Issues 1, 2, 3, and 5, and vacated and remanded Issue 4 (alimony) for failure to consider a mandatory statutory factor.

 

Issue 1: Imputation of Income

Claim on Appeal: The district court improperly imputed income to Joseph because it misapplied Utah Code § 78B-12-203, failed to average income correctly, and did not properly consider self-employment deductions or imputation factors.

Holding — Affirmed.  The district court correctly applied Utah Code § 78B-12-203, relied on available evidence, and acted within its discretion when imputing income at $3,421/month.

Statutory Authority.  Utah Code § 78B-12-203 (imputation factors, gross income determination, annual averaging “when possible”)

Standard of Review

• Abuse of discretion — imputation method and outcome
• Correctness — interpretation of the statute

Controlling Cases

• Pulham v. Kirsling, 2019 UT 18 (abuse of discretion governs imputation)
• Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16 (statutory interpretation reviewed for correctness)
• Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App 19 (imputation permissible when financial evidence is incomplete)
• Dole v. Dole, 2018 UT App 195 (imputation supported when income unverifiable)
• Taft / Tobler / Dobson (averaging income permissible “when possible” under Utah Code § 78B-12-203)

Why It Matters: Appellant needed to show either a misreading of Utah § 78B-12-203 or no factual basis for the imputed amount. The court found neither.

 

Issue 2: Child Support & Retroactive Arrears

Claim

The district court erred by:

• Using the sole custody worksheet despite a “joint custody” stipulation.
• Awarding retroactive child support without temporary orders.

Holding — Affirmed. Use of the sole custody worksheet was correct because actual overnights showed Carol exercised >70% of time with most children. Retroactive arrears were proper because Utah Code imposes a statutory duty to support regardless of temporary orders.

Statutory Authority

• Utah Code § 78B-12-105(1) (duty of parental support; arrears can be ordered retroactively)
• Utah Code § 78B-12-102(15) (definition of joint physical custody – >30% overnights)

Standard of Review

• Abuse of discretion

Controlling Cases

• Reller v. Argenziano, 2015 UT App 241 (child support awards given broad discretion)
• Stephens v. Stephens, 2018 UT App 196 (overnights—not labels—control worksheet selection)
• Gore v. Grant, 2015 UT App 113 (deviation requires findings; no deviation here)

Why It Matters

This case reinforces worksheet logic: child support is calculated based on overnights actually exercised, not custodial labels.

 

3. Student Loan Debt Classification

Claim. Joseph claimed the $260,000 in medical-school-related loans were marital debt, and the court erred by treating most of them as his separate obligation.

Holding — Affirmed. The student loans primarily benefitted Joseph, were kept separate during the marriage, and were correctly treated as separate debt under Utah Code.

Statutory Authority.  Utah Code § 30-2-5 (separate debts remain separate unless incurred for “family expenses”)

Standard of Review. Abuse of discretion, anchored in adequate factual findings

Controlling Cases

• Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 (debt distribution requires factual support; reviewed for abuse of discretion)
• Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT App 26 (trial courts receive deference on credibility findings)

Why It Matters

Shows how educational/professional debt related to personal advancement—not family benefit—can remain the debtor’s separate responsibility.

 

4. Alimony / Spousal Support

Claim

The district court:

• Set Joseph’s budget improperly low
• Failed to include line items for student loans or education needed to keep loans in deferment
• Ignored his ability to pay, a mandatory statutory factor

Holding — Vacated & Remanded. The trial court failed to consider the payor’s ability to pay, violating the mandatory factors of Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(a). Even a modest award ($86/month) must be justified by findings.

Statutory Authority. Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(a) (mandatory alimony factors, including ability to pay)

Standard of Review

• Abuse of discretion, except:
• Reversible legal error when statutory factors are ignored

Controlling Cases

• Osborne v. Osborne, 2016 UT App 29 (alimony upheld unless clear, prejudicial abuse of discretion)

Why It Matters

Missing even one mandatory statutory factor converts discretion into legal error. This is why alimony was the only reversed issue.

 

5. Property Distribution

Claim

Joseph argued the division was inequitable, claiming he received ~93% of total debt and only a quarter of the liquid assets.

Holding — Affirmed. The 93% figure was inflated because it included separate debts (student loans + a loan from his father). Once separated debt was excluded, the distribution was equitable.

Statutory Authority. No specific statute; governed by Utah’s equitable-distribution doctrine.

Standard of Review

• Abuse of discretion
• Strong presumption of validity

Controlling Cases

• Gerwe v. Gerwe, 2018 UT App 75 (property division presumed valid)
• Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987) (property must be viewed in context, not “in a vacuum”)

Why It Matters

Appellate courts almost never overturn property division unless findings ignore evidence or misapply law.

 

Takeaways From Issues Addressed in Burggraf

• Four issues affirmed.
• One issue (alimony) reversed because the court omitted a mandatory statutory factor.
• Burggraaf is a prime example of:
  • heavy deference to trial courts,
  • credibility-driven decision-making,
  • strict compliance with statutory factors,
  • Utah-only precedent guiding family law.

 

1. Rule of Law Map: Statutes, Rules, Cases Cited by Panel in Burggraf
2. Utah Code

• Utah Code § 78B-12-203 (imputation of income; factors and annual income computation for child support and, by analogy, alimony)
• Utah Code § 78B-12-105(1) (duty of parental support; supports retroactive child support even without temporary orders)
• Utah Code § 78B-12-102(15) (definition of joint physical custody by >30% overnights; informs worksheet selection)
• Utah Code § 30-2-5 (separate debts and family expenses; used to classify student  loans as separate debt)
• Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(a) (mandatory alimony factors, including ability to pay; failure to consider ability to pay leads to reversal)

 

2. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

• Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (bench-trial findings of fact are given deference; appellate court reviews for clear error)
• Utah R. Civ. P. 26 (disclosure obligations; Joseph’s lack of financial documentation supports imputation and credibility concerns)

 

3. Utah Rules of Evidence

• Rule 401 (relevance; financial and budget evidence must matter to support/obligations)
• Rule 403 (exclusion of unsupported, speculative, or cumulative financial claims)
• Rule 611(b) (scope of cross-examination; open cross on employment history, credibility, and financial choices)
• Rules 702–703  (govern expert testimony; increasingly used for vocational and earning capacity experts in similar disputes)

 

4. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

• Utah R. App. P. 11 (appeal limited to the record; no new evidence on appeal)
• Utah R. App. P. 24 (arguments must be supported with legal authority; unsupported arguments may be rejected)

 

5. Cases Cited 

• Pulham v. Kirsling, 2019 UT 18 (sets abuse of discretion standard for imputation of income)
• Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16 (statutory interpretation reviewed for correctness)
• Reller v. Argenziano, 2015 UT App 241 (child support awards reviewed under broad discretion)
• Stephens v. Stephens, 2018 UT App 196 (child support worksheet choice driven by actual overnights, not custody labels)
• Gore v. Grant, 2015 UT App 113 (deviation from child support guidelines, requires findings)
• Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79 (debt division / allocation must be based on adequate factual findings; abuse-of-discretion review)
• Osborne v. Osborne, 2016 UT App 29 (alimony determinations upheld unless clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is shown)
• Gerwe v. Gerwe, 2018 UT App 75 (property division / distribution is presumed valid; reviewed for abuse of discretion)
• Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987) (property division / distribution cannot be evaluated “in a vacuum”; must be viewed in full context)
• Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT App 26 (trial court credibility findings receive strong deference)
• Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App 19 (imputation of income appropriate when income records are incomplete or unreliable)
• Dole v. Dole, 2018 UT App 195 (imputation of income allowed where income is concealed or unverifiable)
• Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135 (annual income averaging permissible “when possible” under Utah Code § 78B-12-203)
• Tobler v. Tobler, 2014 UT App 239 (supports multi-year income averaging in imputation)*
• Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT App 373 (income computation based on available financial data within court discretion)
• Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292 (imputation of income rules for child support inform alimony / spousal support , alimony / spousal support imputation of income)
• Smith v. Smith, 2017 UT App 40 (use of first names when parties share a surname; stylistic)

 

VI.Burggraf Insights & Trends

Burggraaf – Insights, Trends & Practitioner Takeaways

1. Utah-Only Jurisprudence

• Burggraaf cites no federal and no out-of-state law.
• The opinion is rooted entirely in Utah domestic-relations precedent, making it a clean doctrinal anchor for state practitioners.
• Reinforces Utah’s self-contained appellate ecosystem in divorce law.

 

1. Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)

The appellate court structures its analysis around three core Utah Supreme Court cases:

• Pulham v. Kirsling — governs imputation and sets abuse-of-discretion parameters.
• Dahl v. Dahl — establishes principles for debt allocation and factual support.
• Newmeyer v. Newmeyer — requires courts to evaluate property/equity holistically, not in isolation.

These operate as the structural backbone for all issues in Burggraaf: income imputation, debt division, and equity analysis.

 

III. Deference Dominates Utah Family Law Appeals

• Burggraaf cites 13+ cases reaffirming abuse of discretion as the default standard.
• Trial judges’ credibility findings are treated as nearly unassailable.
• The Court of Appeals defers heavily on:
  • income imputation,
  • child support worksheet selection,
  • student loan classification,
  • property division.
• A trial court’s decision will be disturbed only where mandatory statutory factors are omitted or findings lack evidentiary basis.

1. The One Reversal — A Hard Limit on Discretion

• The only reversal concerns alimony, because the trial court failed to consider a mandatory statutory factor:
  ability to pay under Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(a).
• Key insight:

When a mandatory statutory factor is omitted, discretion ends and error begins.

• Even a modest award ($86/month) must be vacated if missing a required factor.

 

1. Worksheet Logic Cemented

• The opinion reinforces that overnights, not the parties’ “joint custody” label, determine child support worksheet selection.
• Burggraaf solidifies the Utah rule:

Custody labels do not control — actual overnights do.

 

1. Student Loan & Educational Debt Treatment

• Even when incurred during the marriage, large educational debts tied to a spouse’s unrealized professional degree may be treated as separate debts where:
  • the benefit is primarily individual, and
  • funds were not shown to have supported the family.
• Credibility findings strongly drive how courts classify educational loans.

 

VII. Teaching Value – A Model Appellate Roadmap

Burggraaf is a template for how the appellate court expects divorce cases to be analyzed:

• Proper use of standards of review.
• Direct application of statutory factors.
• Heavy reliance on credibility deference.
• Emphasis on record-building at trial.
• Clear distinction between legal error vs. weight-of-evidence disagreements.

 

VIII. Practitioner Takeaways

Trial Lawyers

• Tie findings to all mandatory statutory factors (especially Utah § 30-3-5(8)(a) for alimony).
• Document income meticulously; missing paystubs or bank statements invite imputation.
• Treat student loans as a credibility-sensitive issue — document use of funds.
• Track overnights precisely; worksheet choice depends on them, not custody labels.
• Build a record with explicit findings to avoid appellate vulnerability.

Appellate Lawyers

• Frame issues explicitly around standards of review.
• Emphasize omissions of mandatory factors — appellate courts view these as legal errors.
• Focus on findings, not just conclusions; demonstrate lack of evidence or statutory misapplication.

Clients / Public

• Courts expect transparency; financial opacity almost always harms the party withholding information.
• A professional degree that never becomes a career may still result in non-marital debt.
• Child support may be retroactive even without temporary orders.

 

Reversal Predictor

• Cases are most vulnerable when:
  • the court recites statutory factors,
  • but does not operationalize them in the findings (e.g., ignoring ability to pay).
• Even minimal alimony amounts can be reversed when findings are incomplete.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

Burggraaf strongly supports developing a checklist for trial judges and attorneys:

• If a factor appears in statute → it must appear in findings.
• Particularly crucial in:
  • alimony (Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(a)),
  • best interest analyses (Utah Code § 30-3-10),
  • fault,
  • property division.

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

Appeals are more promising where three conditions appear together:

• Income imputation,
• High student-loan debt,
• Modest alimony with thin ability-to-pay findings.

Strategy Insight

Appeals succeed most often when framed as:

“The trial court ignored a mandatory factor” – clear error rather than, “The trial court weighed evidence incorrectly.” Abuse of discretion