Bonham v. Bonham, 2026 UT App 141

2026 UT App 141

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

EMILY CURTIS BONHAM, Appellee, v. BRANDON REYNOLDS BONHAM, Appellant.

Opinion No. 20240597-CA Filed September 11, 2026 Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Richard D. McKelvie The Honorable Coral Sanchez No. 194905447

Troy L. Booher and Taylor P. Webb, Attorneys for Appellant Julie J. Nelson, Michael J. Teter, and Bryant J. McConkie, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred. ORME, Judge:

¶1 Brandon Reynolds Bonham appeals from the district court’s decree of divorce dissolving his marriage to Emily Curtis Bonham. Brandon1 argues that the decree contained multiple errors—some introduced by Emily in her proposed findings of fact—in valuations and divisions of property and awards of 1. For convenience, we refer to the parties by their first names, with no disrespect intended. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 2 2026 UT App 141 attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND2 Petition for Divorce

¶2 Emily and Brandon married in July 1998 and separated in July 2019 after Brandon admitted to an extramarital affair that resulted in the birth of a child. Emily petitioned for divorce, citing irreconcilable differences and the affair. The parties had four children together, three of whom were minors at the time of Emily’s petition. They shared a large marital estate, including a home and a business, RMT Equipment (RMT).

¶3 Brandon moved for the entry of temporary orders on custody and financial issues. In a declaration in support of his motion, he stated that his father, Brent Bonham, was “purchasing a property in February 2020” that Brandon planned “on renting from him, with a plan to purchase the property from him after the divorce has been finalized.” Brent3 did purchase a house (the Haven Oaks house) around that time for Brandon to live in, and less than a year later—long before the divorce was finalized— Brandon bought it from Brent. 2. On appeal from a bench trial, “we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, and therefore recite the facts consistent with that standard,” presenting “conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to clarify the issues raised on appeal.” Mintz v. Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, n.3, 525 P.3d 534 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023). 3. We also refer to Brent by his first name, again with no disrespect intended. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 3 2026 UT App 141

¶4 The court entered a stipulated temporary order awarding Emily possession of the marital home and ordering Brandon to continue to operate RMT, while listing Emily as a general employee and paying her a salary of $2,000 per month. The court also ordered Brandon to pay Emily $4,000 per month as “family support,” which was “intended . . . to cover child support and spousal support.” The court also ordered him to pay Emily’s expenses for “fuel and maintenance on her automobile . . . in the same manner and to a similar degree as she has used it in the past.” Additionally, the court directed Brandon to pay Emily’s and the children’s health insurance costs. Each party was also “awarded their personal effects and personal items.” And the temporary order required the parties to “share equally the costs of the extracurricular activities the children are already participating in.”

¶5 Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that Brandon would pay $25,000 toward Emily’s attorney fees. Emily’s parents covered the fees she incurred beyond this amount as well as what the court later found amounted to $55,000 of her living expenses while the divorce was pending. Pretrial Disclosures

¶6 Before trial, the parties submitted financial disclosures. In his first disclosure, filed in December 2019, Brandon did not list the Haven Oaks house as he had not yet purchased it from Brent. But on May 13, 2022, he submitted a second financial disclosure, in which he did list the Haven Oaks house as his real property. He stated that he had purchased the house in November 2020. This second financial disclosure also listed two substantial debts: $700,000 RMT owed to Zions Bank in Brent’s name and $500,000 Brandon still owed to Brent for the purchase of RMT. In his third and final financial disclosure, Brandon listed a new house (the Rolling Brook house) as his real property, which he purchased in Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 4 2026 UT App 141 August 2022 using the equity from the sale of the Haven Oaks house.

¶7 As relevant here, Emily filed her second financial disclosure on the same day as Brandon’s second disclosure. As part of her income, she listed the $4,000 in “family support” and the $2,000 salary paid by RMT. But she claimed that, after taxes, she actually received “two deposits of $898 per month” from RMT. Emily also listed the Haven Oaks house as her real property, though she indicated that Brandon’s name was on the title. Her estimated value of the Haven Oaks house was “[b]ased on 2021 CMA and mortgage statement.” Trial

¶8 At a four-day bench trial held in August and September 2022, the parties presented extensive evidence regarding the marital estate. We summarize that evidence below, insofar as it is relevant to our analysis. Findings of Fact and Divorce Decree

¶9 At the close of the trial, the district court ordered each of the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in lieu of closing arguments. Of note, in his proposed findings, Brandon pointed out, with our emphasis, that he “testified he would be willing to purchase Emily’s interest in RMT for $1,500,000,” though he stated just a few lines later that he should be awarded the business at a “fair market value of $1,500,000.

¶10 The court largely adopted Emily’s proposed findings. The court ordered Brandon to pay Emily $1,926 per month in child support—an amount calculated to provide for the parties’ one child who remained a minor. The court also awarded Emily alimony. Regarding Emily’s need for alimony, although the court Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 5 2026 UT App 141 found that she “could potentially earn gross income between $1,950 and $3,089 per month,” the court also found that because she “was and still is a full-time homemaker and caretaker for the parties’ minor child, who requires special attention due to lingering medical issues,” and because she was also “pursuing educational opportunities,” she was “not voluntarily unemployed.” The court thus concluded that she should not be imputed any income. And the court found that her monthly need was $9,107.

¶11 In addressing Brandon’s ability to pay alimony, the court found that he “had the ability to earn $23,133.80 per month.” The court assumed a 20% tax rate on this income, reasoning that “Emily’s suggested rate of 10%” was “low,” while “Brandon’s estimate of 25%” did “not account for the fact that some of the income included in the calculation . . . (i.e., the personal expenses paid by the company)” was taxed under the business. And the court stated that Brandon’s claimed monthly expenses of “$14,137.69 (not counting expenses paid by his business) . . . appear to be inflated.” The court noted that Brandon’s claimed expenses “appear to include significant expenses for” his girlfriend and her four children, two of whom are also Brandon’s.

¶12 The court next listed several reductions that should be made to the claimed expenses. For instance, the court found that Brandon’s claimed childcare expense of $1,275 for the four other children “should be eliminated entirely.” But the court did not deduct the various reductions it listed or provide a specific number for what Brandon’s reasonable monthly expenses should be. The court found that “Brandon’s expenses are inflated by at least $4,000 per month” because he included as an expense the family support payments he made pursuant to the court’s temporary order. The court also determined that “Brandon inflated the expenses . . . for his mortgage, HOA fee, electricity, natural gas, water, sewer, garbage, paid television, and internet.” But the court did not say by how much. The court next held that Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 6 2026 UT App 141 “Brandon should not be permitted to claim marital money to spend on the children he had with [his girlfriend] as an expense where such reduces his ability to pay alimony.” For example, the court noted that Brandon’s claimed “$950 per month on food and household supplies” was inflated “[t]o the extent that [he] has claimed expenses associated with taking” his girlfriend and her children “out to dinner.” But the court did not say by how much. The court further stated that any expenses associated with clothing for the girlfriend’s children “should be eliminated entirely.” And the court stated that Brandon’s expenses for pet care and repairing the Haven Oaks house should be “reduced significantly.” But again, the court did not state by how much.

¶13 Despite not providing a specific figure for Brandon’s reasonable monthly expenses, the court did determine that subtracting the $1,926 in child support from Emily’s monthly needs left her with $7,181 in monthly expenses. The court ordered Brandon to pay this amount in alimony to Emily for 21 years, corresponding to the length of the parties’ marriage.

¶14 Next, the court addressed arrearages on the child support and alimony awards. The court found that pursuant to its temporary order, Brandon had paid Emily $228,000 in child support and alimony during the pendency of the divorce. This was based on the $4,000 per month in “family support” and the $2,000 monthly payment to her as a listed general employee of RMT. The court found that Emily received only about $1,500 per month from RMT after taxes. Overall, the court found that, accounting for the new amounts for child support and alimony, and accounting for the amount that Emily actually received, Brandon owed her $127,959 for past unpaid child support and alimony.

¶15 The court then awarded Emily the marital home and ordered that its equity be divided equally between Brandon and Emily. Addressing the Haven Oaks house, the court found that Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 7 2026 UT App 141 Brandon had “used marital money to upgrade and repair the home” and had purchased it from his father in November 2020 but did not disclose the purchase to Emily until April 2022. Brandon later sold the Haven Oaks house and purchased the Rolling Brook house using the Haven Oaks equity. Although Brandon claimed that Brent gifted him money to help with the purchase of the Rolling Brook house, the court concluded that the equity in the house should nevertheless be divided equally between the parties “as a sanction for Brandon’s failure to appropriately disclose his interest in the Haven Oaks home until more than 17 months after he had purchased it.”

¶16 The court awarded RMT to Brandon. The court determined that “the best evidence of the value of the business, which is supported in great part by [Emily’s expert’s] testimony, is Brandon’s evaluation as the owner.” Pointing to Brandon’s willingness to purchase Emily’s interest in RMT for $1.5 million, the court found that “Brandon’s own testimony and proposed findings suggest a value of” $3 million. The court reduced that valuation by the $500,000 debt Brandon owed Brent from the purchase of the business, making the total valuation $2.5 million. But the court declined to deduct from the valuation the alleged $700,000 debt RMT owed Zions Bank because “no documentation was provided verifying this debt and no payments were demonstrated.” Alternatively, the court gave Brandon the option of selling RMT and equally dividing the proceeds with Emily.

¶17 The court addressed other marital assets, including a piano, which the court valued at $15,000, and Brandon’s mountain bikes, which the court valued at $10,000. And in a spreadsheet attached to its findings, the court accounted for other marital assets, including 3 1/3 water shares, the total value of which the court found to be $10,000. The spreadsheet also listed Brandon’s membership in a professional organization, YPO, as having a $2,000 value. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 8 2026 UT App 141

¶18 The court noted that the “parties were subject to the injunction set forth in Rule 109 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,” which prevented them from disposing of any marital property without the consent of the other party. And the court noted that its temporary order indicated that “the parties may not dissipate or liquidate any marital assets.” But the court found that “Brandon intentionally violated the Rule 109 injunction and the Court’s temporary orders on multiple occasions.” The court found that “Brandon spent thousands of dollars on expensive toys, lavish gifts, vacations and other purchases during the litigation” and disclosed them only “after Emily independently discovered the purchases.” And the court found that he “has not provided a full accounting of marital funds used to purchase the items.”

¶19 The court found that Brandon dissipated “at least $367,599 from the marital estate and that he likely dissipated much more.” The court listed as dissipation a host of Brandon’s expenditures during the pendency of the divorce, including, as relevant here, an Airstream trailer, a BMW for one of the parties’ daughters, jewelry for each of the parties’ daughters, improvements to the Haven Oaks house, and paying off Emily’s Yukon.4

¶20 Thus, the court held Brandon “in contempt of court pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-6-3 et seq.” The court determined that sanctions were also appropriate under rule 26.1(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because Brandon failed to disclose these dissipated assets. Accordingly, the court ruled that rather than paying Emily one-half of the amount . . . , Brandon should pay Emily 75% of the determined value . . . as a sanction for intentionally violating the Rule 109 injunction on multiple 4. Emily concedes that this last expense should not have been included as dissipation. See infra note 8. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 9 2026 UT App 141 occasions, for intentionally violating the Court’s temporary orders on multiple occasions, and for failing to disclose information sufficient to accurately assess the marital estate or identify purchases that he made with marital funds.

¶21 Finally, the court determined that Emily was entitled to an award of attorney fees. The court found that except for the $25,000 Brandon stipulated to pay prior to trial, Emily’s parents had covered her legal fees for her. But the court found that Brandon had paid his attorney fees out of the marital estate and that Emily should have that same opportunity. In calculating the amount of her attorney fees award, the court again noted that Emily should not be imputed any income because she was caring for the parties’ remaining minor child, “who requires special attention due to lingering medical issues,” and because she was pursuing further education. Thus, the court found that “Emily lacked the financial resources necessary to pay her basic living expenses during the litigation” and she lacked the “resources necessary to pay the additional expense directly associated with litigation.”

¶22 In contrast, the court pointed out that Brandon had paid his attorney fees through RMT, “with marital funds using marital resources,” and thus, “Emily has in fact paid for one-half of Brandon’s costs and fees.” The court reasoned, “Emily should be permitted to pay her expert witness costs and attorney fees with marital funds using marital resources.” The court also found that “Brandon in fact has the ability to pay Emily’s fees and costs” as he would “have significant excess income each month even after he pays his child support and alimony obligations.” Therefore, the court concluded that “Emily should be allowed to pay her fees from the marital estate,” minus the $25,000 she had already received for fees.

¶23 The court then issued a decree of divorce memorializing its findings and conclusions. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 10 2026 UT App 141 Motions to Amend

¶24 Emily filed a motion urging the court to amend its findings of fact. As relevant here, she argued that the award for the child support arrearage accounted for only one child, though for at least part of the pendency of the divorce, more than one of the parties’ children were minors. As a result, she argued that the child support arrearage award and the total equalization payment would need to be increased.

¶25 Brandon filed his own motion asking the court to alter or amend its findings and the decree in several respects. First, he addressed the sanctions the court imposed. He argued that he had properly disclosed his purchase of the Haven Oaks house and so the sanction awarding Emily equity in the Rolling Brook house was improper. And he argued that he had disclosed much of what the court characterized as his dissipation—including the purchase of the Airstream trailer, a dirt bike, paying off Emily’s Yukon, and providing for his girlfriend and other children—making inappropriate the sanction of awarding 75% of the total dissipation to Emily. Brandon also argued that the court had set the wrong date from which retroactive alimony was to run. And he argued the court had not properly addressed his ability to pay alimony

. ¶26 Brandon further complained about the total arrearage the court had awarded to Emily. He argued that the line item for extracurricular activities for the parties’ remaining minor child should be reduced and that the court failed to account for the amounts he had paid for those extracurriculars, Emily’s health insurance, and her auto maintenance and fuel. And Brandon argued that the court had incorrectly found that Emily received only $1,500 of the $2,000 ordered to be paid from RMT because she had testified at trial that she received approximately $1,800 per month. Finally, he argued that “it would be error and double counting to require” him to repay what Emily’s parents paid for Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 11 2026 UT App 141 her living expenses when the court had “specifically calculated the arrears to reflect what Brandon legally owed Emily.”

¶27 Brandon also argued that the court “correctly accepted [his] valuation of RMT but utilized the incorrect number when it did so.” He urged that he had “repeatedly testified at trial that RMT had a value of $1.5 million” and “never once indicated the value was $3 million.” He argued that the court’s findings introduced the $3 million valuation and that it should amend that finding to align with his consistent trial testimony.

¶28 Brandon also argued that he did not owe Emily any money for attorney fees because Emily’s fees had been paid by her parents, who testified at trial that they intended it to be a gift to her. And he argued that the court had incorrectly calculated the amount he dissipated.

¶29 Brandon’s motion to amend also addressed the court’s $10,000 valuation of the water shares awarded to Emily, asserting that the shares were worth $10,000 each rather than in total. He asked the court to amend its findings to reflect this. He also argued that the court improperly “singled out” the piano, the mountain bikes, and his YPO membership in assigning them separate values. He argued that these items had already been awarded to him and should not be valued, but that even if they were, the court’s valuations were not supported by the evidence. And he asserted that the YPO membership should have been allocated to him as an expense rather than an asset.

¶30 In responding to Brandon’s motion to amend, Emily conceded that several of his claimed errors had merit. She agreed that the court should not have required Brandon to both pay the arrearage and reimburse Emily’s parents for the $55,000 they paid for her living expenses during the pendency of the divorce. She agreed that her after-tax income from RMT had been miscalculated and that Brandon should receive credit for paying Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 12 2026 UT App 141 for her auto fuel during this period. And she recognized that, based on Brandon’s testimony, the water shares should be valued at $10,000 each rather than $10,000 total, and she did “not object to the court making this edit.”

¶31 But the court did not address any of these conceded errors in its order on the parties’ motions to amend. The court agreed with Emily on several fronts. As relevant here, the court agreed that the child support arrearage should be increased to address the periods of time during the divorce when more than one of the parties’ children were minors. The court found that only one of Brandon’s claimed errors merited consideration: the retroactive start date for alimony. The court thus issued a supplemental divorce decree that clarified the date from which alimony should retroactively run. The court also corrected the amount of the support arrearage, finding that because Emily should have received a “child support and spousal support amount of $366,815,” and because she had received only $209,000 during the pendency of the divorce, Brandon owed her $157,815 rather than the initial award of $127,959. The court adjusted the total equalization payment accordingly. Post-Trial Attorney Fees5

¶32 As noted, the court awarded Emily attorney fees in the decree, reasoning that it was equitable to do so where Brandon had paid his legal fees from the marital estate. The court also later 5. At this point in the proceedings, Judge Richard D. McKelvie, who entered the original and amended divorce decrees retired and was replaced by Judge Coral Sanchez, who entered the post-trial attorney fees award. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 13 2026 UT App 141 awarded her attorney fees for litigating Brandon’s post-trial motion to amend. 6

¶33 The court stated that the post-trial award of fees was proper under rule 102 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows the court to grant attorney fees “to enable the moving party to prosecute or defend the action” where it finds, among other things, that “the moving party lacks the financial resources to pay the costs and fees,” “the nonmoving party has the financial resources to pay the costs and fees,” “the costs and fees are necessary for the proper prosecution or defense of the action,” and “the amount of the costs and fees is reasonable.” Utah R. Civ. P. 102(a)–(b). In addressing these factors, the court stated that “as was true during the pendency of the divorce,” Emily “currently cannot afford to pay the attorney fees” because she “continues to be a stay-at-home, full-time caretaker for the parties’ child, who requires special attention due to medical issues” and because she was “pursuing her educational opportunities and was unemployed.” The court also noted that Emily’s alimony award “was calculated to only meet her monthly needs” and that “her share of the marital estate was not done in one lump sum” but would be distributed “over a ten-year period.” In contrast, the court found that Brandon “has the entirety of his share of the marital estate at his disposal” and “continues to have the business.” And the court noted that Brandon had “not indicated that his financial condition has significantly changed” since the previous finding about his ability to pay attorney fees.

¶34 The court also found that the fees Emily incurred were necessary to allow her to defend against Brandon’s post-trial motion. And the court found that the affidavits filed by Emily’s counsel had “descriptive information associated with the entries,” that the fees were “appropriate given [her attorneys’] level of 6. Emily did not request fees incurred in connection with her own post-trial motion. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 14 2026 UT App 141 experience,” and that her counsels’ representation had resulted in “a favorable result on behalf of” Emily “given that the court fully denied” Brandon’s “motion except one point” conceded by Emily. The court stated that “in looking closely at his motion to alter or amend the judgment,” Brandon had “raised about two dozen separate issues and was unsuccessful in all but one, the length of alimony.” Thus, the court was “not persuaded that the only reason he filed his motion was to address some errors that were introduced by” Emily. The court later entered a judgment memorializing the post-trial award of fees to Emily

¶35 Brandon appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶36 Brandon first argues that the district court erred in not correcting several conceded calculation errors in its amended findings of fact and amended divorce decree. Because the parties agree on the propriety of a remand to remedy these errors, we grant the remand to allow the court to address these errors in the first instance.

¶37 Next, Brandon argues the court improperly sanctioned him by awarding Emily equity in the Rolling Brook house and 75% of the total value of the assets the court found he dissipated. We review the award of equity as a sanction based on rule 26.1(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for correctness. See Bailey v. Bailey, 2024 UT App 51, ¶ 21, 548 P.3d 519 (“A district court’s interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed for correctness. For this reason, a court’s decision regarding the adequacy of the party’s disclosures is reviewed for correctness.”) (quotation simplified). And we review the court’s dissipation determinations for an abuse of discretion, though “we cannot affirm its determination when the trial court abuses its discretion by failing to enter specific, detailed findings supporting its Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 15 2026 UT App 141 financial determinations.” Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 4, 316 P.3d 455 (quotation simplified).

¶38 Brandon challenges the court’s valuation of RMT and various other assets as well as the court’s awards of alimony and the support arrearage on several fronts. We afford the district court “considerable discretion” in its “valuation of the marital property, the manner in which it distributed that property, and its alimony determination.” Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2023 UT App 50, ¶ 33, 531 P.3d 225 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 537 P.3d 1011 (Utah 2023). The court exceeds the sound exercise of its discretion “only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court, that is, if a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulted in substantial and prejudicial error, if the court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous, or if the award is so seriously inequitable as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (quotation simplified).

¶39 Lastly, Brandon challenges the court’s awards of initial and post-trial attorney fees to Emily. “In divorce cases, both the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the trial court’s sound discretion.” Miner v. Miner, 2021 UT App 77, ¶ 108, 496 P.3d 242 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS I. Conceded Calculation Errors

¶40 Brandon argues that the district court failed to correct what amounted to “over $100,000” in calculation errors, which he partially faults Emily for introducing in her proposed findings. In particular, he argues that the court (1) erred in requiring him to both pay the arrearage and reimburse Emily’s parents for $55,000 of expenses they paid on her behalf during the pendency of the divorce, (2) miscalculated the amount of after-tax pay Emily Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 16 2026 UT App 141 received from RMT by $11,400, (3) failed to credit Brandon for $15,200 he paid for Emily’s auto fuel, and (4) undervalued the water shares Emily received by $23,000. Brandon faults the court for failing to correct these issues without explanation despite Emily’s post-trial concessions of error. He argues we should remand for the district court to do so now.

¶41 On appeal, Emily acknowledges that the “district court rejected [her] concessions but did not explain why.” And she “agrees the lack of factual findings” on these issues “is inadequate for appellate review and suggests this court remand.” Given the parties’ agreement, we remand to allow the district court to address these issues, making adequate findings in doing so. See Krajeski v. Krajeski, 2025 UT App 19, ¶ 30, 565 P.3d 544 (“There must be adequate factual findings to reveal how the court reached its conclusions and to establish that the court’s judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 574 P.3d 519 (Utah 2025).

II. Sanctions

¶42 The district court sanctioned Brandon by awarding Emily half of the equity in the Rolling Brook house and 75% of the value of assets it found he dissipated. We reverse both sanctions and remand for the district court to make further findings regarding both the Rolling Brook house and Brandon’s dissipation.

A. Equity in the Rolling Brook House

¶43 Based on Brent’s and Brandon’s testimony at trial, the district court found that Brent purchased the Haven Oaks house for Brandon in January 2020 and that Brandon purchased it from Brent in November 2020 but “did not disclose the fact that he had purchased the home to Emily until April of 2022.” The court also found that Brandon later sold the Haven Oaks house and used the equity to purchase the Rolling Brook house. Although Brandon Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 17 2026 UT App 141 asserted that a portion of the funds used to purchase the Rolling Brook house were a gift from Brent, the court stated that it “need not determine” the particulars of Brent’s gift or whether the Rolling Brook house “was Brandon’s separate property” because it was “appropriate to award” equity in the Rolling Brook house to Emily “as a sanction for Brandon’s failure to appropriately disclose his interest in the Haven Oaks house until more than 17 months after he had purchased it.”

¶44 The court relied on rule 26.1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires each party to “serve on all other parties a fully completed Financial Declaration,” along with “[d]ocuments verifying the value of all real estate in which the party has an interest.” Utah R. Civ. P. 26.1(c), (c)(5). And rule 26.1(f), which the court directly cited, provides that “[f]ailure to fully disclose all assets and income in the Financial Declaration . . . may subject the non-disclosing party to sanctions under Rule 37 including an award of non-disclosed assets to the other party, attorney’s fees, or other sanctions deemed appropriate by the court.”

¶45 Brandon argues that rule 26.1(f) does not provide a basis for awarding Emily equity in the Rolling Brook house. He points out that “an award of non-disclosed assets to the other party . . . or other sanctions deemed appropriate by the court”—the only potential bases for this sanction—are not actually listed as sanctions available under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as the language of rule 26.1(f) suggests. See id. R. 37(b). And he argues that even if the sanction imposed here was somehow drawn from rule 37, sanctions under that rule are available only “upon motion” based on a “violation of a specific court order”—neither of which were present here. Bailey v. Bailey, 2024 UT App 51, ¶ 27, 548 P.3d 519 (quotation simplified). See id. (“Rule 37 . . . is not self-executing: a party wishing to take advantage of its more expansive sanctions menu must first obtain a discovery order from the court.”); Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b) (“[T]he Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 18 2026 UT App 141 court, upon motion, may impose appropriate sanctions for the failure to follow its orders[.]”). We take Brandon’s point.7 But we need not answer the question posed by the rules because even assuming that awarding equity in the Rolling Brook house to Emily was a sanction available to the court under rule 26.1(f), it was improperly imposed here, where Brandon technically complied with the disclosure requirements of the rule.

¶46 When Brandon filed his first financial disclosure, he was not yet the owner of the Haven Oaks house and so did not disclose it. But by the time he filed his second financial disclosure, he was the owner of the house and he disclosed as much. To the extent that the court imposed this sanction out of concern for this disclosure’s tardiness, Emily was not harmed. Brandon filed his second disclosure on May 13, 2022, several months before trial. Emily’s second financial disclosure—filed on the same day as Brandon’s—included the Haven Oaks house. She argues she “could not have known that Brandon shifted from ‘renter’ to ‘owner’ without him saying so,” but logically speaking, she had to have had prior knowledge of Brandon’s interest in the Haven 7. Much of the parties’ briefing was devoted to highlighting the procedural problem with rule 26.1(f) and rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, namely, whether sanctions imposed under rule 26.1(f) must follow the procedure laid out in rule 37(b), despite rule 26.1(f)’s inclusion of sanctions not listed in the “expansive sanctions menu” under rule 37(b). Bailey v. Bailey, 2024 UT App 51, ¶ 27, 548 P.3d 519. See id. ¶ 31 n.7 (“[I]t is far from apparent to us that the language of rule 26.1(f) authorizes rule 37 sanctions in the absence of a court order[,] . . . especially given the plain language of rule 37(b) and our case law.”). Though we leave this procedural problem for another day, we urge the Utah Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure to address and clarify the interplay between these rules. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 19 2026 UT App 141 Oaks house to include it in her own disclosure. And the record indicates that she did. In his request for a temporary order, Brandon stated his intent to purchase the Haven Oaks house, albeit after the divorce was finalized. Emily’s listing of Brandon as the owner of the Haven Oaks house and valuing it “[b]ased on 2021 CMA and mortgage statement” shows that she anticipated Brandon following through with his plan.

¶47 Because Brandon disclosed his ownership of the Haven Oaks house, there was no basis to award Emily equity in the Rolling Brook house—which Brandon purchased during the divorce using, in part, his equity in the Haven Oaks house—as a sanction. We thus reverse and remand this issue for the district court to determine in the first instance whether the Rolling Brook house is Brandon’s separate property and to adjust its property distribution accordingly. See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 15, 176 P.3d 476 (stating that in making a property distribution, the district court must first “identify the property in dispute and determine whether each item is marital or separate property”).

B. Dissipation

¶48 The district court found that Brandon dissipated at least $367,599 from the marital estate, but it ordered that rather than paying Emily one-half of the amount . . . , Brandon should pay Emily 75% of the determined value . . . as a sanction for intentionally violating the Rule 109 injunction on multiple occasions, for intentionally violating the Court’s temporary orders on multiple occasions, and for failing to disclose information sufficient to accurately assess the marital estate or identify purchases that he made with marital funds. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 20 2026 UT App 141 Brandon asserts that several of the purchases he made during the pendency of the divorce—including the Airstream trailer, the BMW, jewelry for the parties’ daughters, improvements to the Haven Oaks house, and cars for him and his girlfriend—did not amount to dissipation in the first place. And he argues that using the dissipation award to impose this sanction was inappropriate.

¶49 In assessing whether dissipation occurred, courts should consider several factors: (1) how the money was spent, including whether funds were used to pay legitimate marital expenses or individual expenses; (2) the parties’ historical practices; (3) the magnitude of any depletion; (4) the timing of the challenged actions in relation to the separation and divorce; and (5) any obstructive efforts that hinder the valuation of the assets. Hillam v. Hillam, 2024 UT App 102, ¶ 46, 554 P.3d 1137 (quotation simplified). This is “a case-specific inquiry that’s best determined by the district court in the first instance.” Id. ¶ 64. And “its use must be supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the . . . court’s basis for such deviation” from the general rules regarding division of marital property. Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 21, 316 P.3d 455 (quotation simplified).

¶50 Here, the district court’s findings do not show that the court considered the above dissipation factors, other than Brandon’s “obstructive efforts that hinder[ed] the valuation of the assets.” Hillam, 2024 UT App 102, ¶ 46 (quotation simplified). And even in doing that, the court considered the obstructive efforts only as to certain expenditures. The court’s findings also do not “disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion” regarding the value of the various expenditures was reached. Krajeski v. Krajeski, 2025 UT App 19, ¶ 30, 565 P.3d 544 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 574 P.3d 519 (Utah 2025). For instance, the Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 21 2026 UT App 141 court found that Brandon dissipated $60,000 in buying the Airstream trailer. Elsewhere in its findings, the court concluded that, based on Brandon’s testimony, “he made $25,000 in profits from the sale of” the trailer. The court found that Emily should “be awarded $12,000 representing her interest in the Airstream” and stated that this “amount is incorporated into the $60,000 amount” of dissipated funds. But the court did not later discuss how it reached the $60,000 figure. Similarly, the court listed the cost of installing a cement pad and garage doors for the Haven Oaks house as $11,500 and $7,000 respectively. The court stated that these figures came from “Exhibit 37,” which we take to mean Emily’s trial exhibit. But in looking at that trial exhibit, there are different figures listed for the cement pad and garage door. The court did not explain why it chose these particular figures.

¶51 To be sure, “unstated findings can be implied if it is reasonable to assume that the trial court actually considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a finding to resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record the factual determination it made.” Cox v. Cox, 2023 UT App 62, ¶ 33, 532 P.3d 128 (quotation simplified). But “we will not imply any missing finding where there is a matrix of possible factual findings and we cannot ascertain the trial court’s actual findings.” Id. (quotation simplified). And “it is not our responsibility to comb the record” to do so. Prisbrey v. Prisbrey, 2026 UT App 39, ¶ 23, 588 P.3d 329.

¶52 This lack of detail requires a remand for the court to reconsider its dissipation determination, making adequate findings in doing so. See Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 23. But because the issue will arise again on remand, we address the propriety of the sanction the court chose: awarding Emily 75% of the total dissipation amount. See Young H2ORE v. J&M Transmission LLC, 2024 UT App 10, ¶ 48, 543 P.3d 1264 (offering “guidance” on “issues . . . certain to arise again on remand”). Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 22 2026 UT App 141

¶53 “Where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, in the exercise of its equitable powers . . . hold one party accountable to the other for the dissipation of marital assets.” Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 49, 299 P.3d 1079 (quotation simplified). “[W]hen the court conducts its equitable distribution of the marital property, the other spouse should receive a credit for his or her share of the assets that were dissipated.” Id. Because “marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing spouses,” “the amount of that credit . . . should ordinarily be half of the dissipated marital funds.” Ball v. Ball, 2025 UT App 200, ¶ 16, 584 P.3d 330 (quotation simplified). See Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 47 (“Generally, each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property.”) (emphasis added; quotation otherwise simplified). Thus, we conclude that awarding Emily 75% of the dissipation total as a sanction was improper—no matter the rule on which the award was premised.

¶54 On remand, after determining what dissipation occurred, the court should award Emily half of the total. 8 III. Property Valuations A. RMT

¶55 Brandon argues that the court “purported to accept” his $1.5 million valuation of RMT but mistakenly “used the wrong number”—$2.5 million—in its findings and decree. And he 8. Brandon conceded at trial that he dissipated $61,000. And on appeal, he appears not to challenge an additional $49,556 that the court found he dissipated. Emily also conceded post-trial and on appeal that the $40,000 Brandon paid on her Yukon should not have been included as dissipation. In reassessing its dissipation award, the court should account for these figures. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 23 2026 UT App 141 argues that this valuation should have accounted for the $700,000 debt RMT owed to Zions Bank through Brent. We disagree on both fronts.

¶56 The district court did not wholesale “accept[] Brandon’s valuation and reject[] Emily’s,” as Brandon argues. Because the court found that Brandon’s expert’s testimony about the value of the business was “unhelpful” and “unreliable,” it gave the testimony “little weight,” as was its prerogative. See Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 2022 UT App 28, ¶ 59, 507 P.3d 385, cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1259 (Utah 2022). On the other hand, the court found that Emily’s expert’s testimony was “helpful” and “credible,” though the court noted that “it can’t be said that any of the predictions are 100% accurate, and indeed are not held out to be.” Accordingly, the court found that “the best evidence of the value of the business, which is supported in great part by [Emily’s expert’s] testimony, is Brandon’s evaluation as the owner.”

¶57 But Brandon’s valuation was inconsistent. He testified at trial that RMT was worth $1.5 million. And in his proposed findings he stated that he “should be awarded RMT . . . for a fair market value of $1,500,000,” though he stated a few lines later in those same proposed findings, with our emphasis, that “he would be willing to purchase Emily’s interest in RMT for $1,500,000,” suggesting a value of $3 million if Emily’s share equates to $1.5 million. At oral argument before this court, Brandon’s counsel referred to this latter statement as an erroneous “one-off.” Yet the district court found that “Brandon’s own testimony and proposed findings suggest a value of” $3 million. And this comported with Emily’s expert’s valuation of $3,444,000. Accounting for the $500,000 debt the court found that RMT owed Brent, the $2.5 million valuation was “within the range of values established by all the testimony.” Id. ¶ 64 (quotation simplified). See Knowlton v. Knowlton, 2023 UT App 16, ¶ 60, 525 P.3d 898 (“Merely failing to accept one party’s proposed valuations does not constitute an Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 24 2026 UT App 141 abuse of discretion.”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023).

¶58 And it was reasonable for the court to exclude the claimed $700,000 debt from this valuation. The court found that the “unrebutted testimony and evidence at [t]rial” showed that Brandon owed Brent $500,000 for the purchase of RMT. The court pointed out that Brent “testified unequivocally that the $500,000 debt is a legitimate debt which he expects to be repaid” and was the remainder of what Brandon owed him. But the same could not be said for the $700,000 debt. The court found that “no documentation was provided verifying this debt and no payments were demonstrated.” Brandon argues that a Zions Bank representative’s trial testimony obviated the need for such documentation. But “[b]ecause determinations regarding the weight to be given to the testimony of witnesses . . . are within the province of the finder of fact, we will not second guess a court’s decisions about evidentiary weight and credibility if there is a reasonable basis in the record to support them.” Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, ¶ 6, 334 P.3d 994. And here the lack of any kind of documentation of a large debt owed to a bank was certainly a reasonable basis on which not to credit the representative’s testimony that such a debt existed.

¶59 Thus, the court did not exceed its discretion in valuing RMT.9

B. Brandon’s Personal Property

¶60 Brandon also argues the district court abused its discretion in “randomly assigning value” to several pieces of his personal 9. We note that had Brandon been of the view that the court was overvaluing RMT, he could have taken the court up on its alternative suggestion to sell the business and divide “all proceeds equally with Emily.” But he did not. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 25 2026 UT App 141 property—including the piano, mountain bikes, and his YPO membership—and allocating them to his share of the marital estate. He argues that the court’s temporary orders, which awarded the parties “their personal effects and personal items,” had already disposed of this property and thus there “was no basis to single out these items previously divided, nor was there evidentiary support for the assigned values.”

¶61 But the court did not improperly “single out” these assets to be valued. See Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 48, 299 P.3d 1079 (“The court is permitted to look at the marital property in its entirety and to apportion it in a manner that best facilitates a clean break between the parties and achieves a result that equitably divides the marital property as a whole.”) (quotation simplified). And temporary orders are just that—temporary. See Miner v. Miner, 2021 UT App 77, ¶ 101, 496 P.3d 242 (“An arrangement memorialized in a temporary order can of course be changed, in a final decree of divorce, after a court hears all of the evidence during a full trial.”).

¶62 There was also evidence to support at least the court’s valuations of the piano and the mountain bikes. Brandon testified at trial that the parties bought the piano from his parents for $10,000, while Emily testified that she thought it was worth “40 grand” and that Brandon’s parents had helped them pay for it. The court’s valuation of $15,000 was thus reasonable—more closely approximating Brandon’s estimate than Emily’s. As to the mountain bikes, in her proposed findings, Emily asserted that Brandon had two mountain bikes worth $5,000 each. The $10,000 value the court assigned to the bikes was thus reasonable, especially given Brandon’s silence on the matter. See Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 2022 UT App 28, ¶ 64, 507 P.3d 385 (“Generally, we will uphold a district court’s valuation of marital assets as long as the value is within the range of values established by all the testimony[.]”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1259 (Utah 2022). Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 26 2026 UT App 141

¶63 But we can discern no evidence in the record regarding the $2,000 value the court assigned to Brandon’s YPO membership. And “without findings from which we can ascertain how the . . . court categorized and valued the property, we cannot assess the merits of the challenges to its distribution.” Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 24, 176 P.3d 476. So, while we affirm the court’s valuation of the piano and the mountain bikes, we remand to the district court to make specific findings regarding the value of the YPO membership.

10 IV. Alimony and Support Arrearage

¶64 Brandon argues that the district court abused its discretion in its calculations of both alimony and the support arrearage owed to Emily. For the following reasons, we remand for the court to address both.

A. Alimony

¶65 “The appropriate amount of any alimony award is governed by a multi-factor inquiry, first articulated in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).” Miner v. Miner, 2021 UT App 77, ¶ 16, 496 P.3d 242. “The so-called Jones factors . . . require a court to examine (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income; and (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.” Id. (quotation simplified). “In all cases, the trial court must support its alimony determinations with adequate findings on all material issues.” Id. ¶ 17 (quotation simplified). Brandon 10. Brandon argues that the YPO membership should have been included as one of his expenses, rather than an asset. But because we cannot review how the court categorized the membership without adequate findings, the court may address this argument on remand. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 27 2026 UT App 141 argues the court’s findings did not adequately address two of the Jones factors—Emily’s need and his ability to pay.

1. Emily’s Need a. Imputed Income

¶66 Brandon argues that the court should have imputed income to Emily when determining her need for alimony. “Trial courts have broad discretion to select an appropriate method of assessing a spouse’s income, including determinations of income imputation.” Godfrey v. Godfrey, 2024 UT App 156, ¶ 51, 560 P.3d 151 (quotation simplified). Because “we will find that the trial court abused its discretion only if no reasonable person would take the view” the court did, Brandon “bears a heavy burden” here. Id. (quotation simplified). And he has not met it. Despite the court’s findings that “Emily could potentially earn gross income between $1,950 and $3,089 per month,” it nonetheless concluded that because she “was and still is a full-time homemaker and caretaker for the parties’ minor child, who requires special medical attention due to lingering medical issues,” and because she was also “pursuing educational opportunities,” she was “not voluntarily unemployed” and should “not be imputed any income.” We perceive no abuse of discretion on this point.

b. Extracurricular Costs

¶67 In the divorce decree, the court ordered the parties to “equally share costs associated with the minor children’s extracurricular activities.” The court found this cost to be $490 per month. Brandon argues that this expense should be reduced based on the representation by his attorney at trial that the cost of the parties’ remaining minor child’s soccer was $2,400 per year, which he works out to total just $100 per month for each parent. But as far as we can tell, this representation by counsel was not substantiated by evidence on the record. Nor was there any Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 28 2026 UT App 141 indication that this was the only extracurricular expense for this child. And Emily testified that the extracurricular expenses were “[d]efinitely a bit higher when . . . more children [were] involved,” although she conceded that with one minor child, “it won’t be as much.” All things considered, we see no abuse of discretion in including this extracurricular cost among Emily’s needs.

2. Brandon’s Ability to Pay a. Reasonable Monthly Expenses

¶68 Brandon argues that in calculating his ability to pay alimony, the court failed to make an express finding of what his reasonable monthly expenses were. We agree.

¶69 Brandon claimed that his monthly expenses totaled $14,137.69. The court found that this was “inflated” and should be “reduced.” Other than determining that the $1,275 he spent on childcare for the children he shared with his girlfriend “should be eliminated entirely,” the court did not specify any other reductions. For instance, while the court found that Brandon “inflated” the cost of “his mortgage, HOA fee, electricity, natural gas, water, sewer, garbage, paid television and internet” and his “claimed expenses associated with taking” his girlfriend and other children “out to dinner,” it did not say by how much. The court also stated that Brandon’s expenses for pet care and repairing the Haven Oaks house should be “reduced significantly.” But again, the court did not explain by how much. And the court did not provide a net number for what Brandon’s reasonable monthly expenses should be after these reductions.

¶70 In Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, 379 P.3d 890, the district court found that a wife’s “claimed monthly expenses . . . were unreasonably inflated,” but it “did not determine the expenses that it considered reasonable.” Id. ¶ 28 (quotation simplified). We concluded that “[t]he lack of detailed findings in this respect Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 29 2026 UT App 141 makes it impossible for us to determine on review whether the . . . alimony award was proper.” Id. So too here. “Although the trial court entered lengthy findings after patiently enduring” the trial, its failure to make both a numeric global finding about Brandon’s reasonable monthly expenses and more detailed findings about exactly what the reductions to those expenses should be leaves us “hampered in our review.” See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 18, 176 P.3d 476. On remand, the district court will need to make such findings.11 b. Expenses Paid by RMT

¶71 In Brandon’s view, the district court should have included the $4,733.77 he testified that RMT paid on his behalf each month toward his personal expenses. We disagree. In the decree, the court stated that “[t]he most difficult part[] in calculating Brandon’s income is personal expenses RMT pays on his behalf.” In trying to determine this, the court found that $2,816.77 of what RMT paid monthly was used “so that Brandon could go on vacations” and that “[t]o the extent that the funds were spent to take [his girlfriend] and their children on vacation, such should be considered income available to Brandon to pay alimony.” Thus, it was appropriate for the court to credit this as income and not as an expense.12 11. In opposing Brandon’s motion to amend the findings, Emily conceded that the court’s findings and decree did “not include a number for Brandon’s ability to pay” and she stated that she did “not oppose the court adding one, after considering, first, the court’s findings, and second, Brandon’s arguments.” 12. In her briefing, Emily notes that Brandon claimed that his expenses paid by RMT included the $2,816.77 for vacations, the $2,000 he paid to Emily as a “general employee” during the (continued…) Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 30 2026 UT App 141 c. Tax Rate

¶72 The court assumed “a 20% tax rate” in calculating Brandon’s income and ability to pay alimony, reasoning that Emily’s “suggested rate of 10%” was “low,” while “Brandon’s estimate of 25%” did “not account for the fact that some of the income included in the calculation . . . (i.e., the personal expenses paid by the company)” was taxed under the business. Brandon points out that the 20% rate does not indicate whether it also encompasses state and federal taxes as well as FICA and Medicare deductions. We agree, and on remand the district court should clarify why it chose the tax rate it applied to Brandon’s income.

B. Support Arrearage

¶73 Under the court’s temporary orders, in effect during the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Brandon was required to pay Emily $4,000 per month “as family support” and $2,000 per month as salary from RMT. He was also required to pay for “fuel and maintenance” on Emily’s car and for her and their children’s health insurance. And the parties were ordered to “share equally the costs of the extracurricular activities the children are already participating in.”

¶74 Based on Emily’s financial disclosure and trial testimony, the court found that Emily received only $1,500 per month from RMT after taxes and, thus, that she received a total of $209,000 from RMT and in “family support” during the pendency of the divorce. But the court determined that based on its child support and alimony findings, she should have received a total of $336,959 during that time. Subtracting the $209,000 from that sum, the court determined that Brandon owed Emily $127,959 in unpaid pendency of the divorce, and car expenses for his girlfriend that exceeded the marital standard by $245 per month. She asserts that removing these amounts left $1,672 of reasonable expenses. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 31 2026 UT App 141 support. But in its supplemental decree, the court recognized that the parties had more than one minor child during the pendency of the divorce and the child support therefore should have been higher. The court thus increased the amount owed to $157,815.

¶75 Brandon argues on appeal that the total arrearage should be reduced to account for payments he made for Emily’s health insurance, for her auto fuel and maintenance, and for his half of their children’s extracurriculars during the pendency of the divorce. And he argues that the court should not have increased child support retroactively.

¶76 As noted, Emily conceded error in the court’s calculation of her income from RMT and Brandon’s payment of her auto fuel costs during the pendency of the divorce. See supra ¶ 30. And she agrees with Brandon that the arrearage should exclude the amount he paid for her health insurance. So on remand, the court must alter the total arrearage owed after making the necessary corrections on these points.

¶77 But we are not persuaded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in not reducing the amount of the arrearage based on auto maintenance, extracurricular costs, or the additional child support. Brandon argues he should be credited for having paid $250 per month for Emily’s auto maintenance during the pendency of the divorce. But there was no evidence that he did pay that amount. To the contrary, Emily testified at trial that despite the temporary order requiring Brandon to pay “for regular maintenance” of her car, when she had to replace the shocks on the car, she borrowed $6,000 from her parents. There was likewise no evidence that Brandon was paying his share of the extracurricular costs during the course of the divorce proceeding. Indeed, Emily testified that in an email, Brandon told her that he would provide a cell phone, car insurance, and health insurance for the children but had stated, “Other financial support from me needs to be part of a relationship they each have Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 32 2026 UT App 141 individually with me.” She also testified that Brandon had entirely refused to pay extracurricular costs for one of the children while she was still a minor. And we disagree with Brandon’s bare assertion that “an increase in the child support amount would have decreased the alimony amount for the relevant period” and thus reduced the overall arrearage owed. The court did not treat child support and alimony interdependently or proportionally such that increasing one would decrease the other.

V. Attorney Fees

¶78 Brandon challenges the district court’s initial and post-trial awards of attorney fees to Emily. While we affirm the court’s decision to order the initial fee award, we remand for the district court to reassess the amount. And we reverse the post-trial fee award and remand for the court to make further findings regarding Emily’s request for those fees.

A. Initial Fee Award

¶79 The district court initially awarded Emily attorney fees based on its conclusion that “where Brandon has paid his expert witness costs and attorney fees with marital funds using marital resources, Emily has in fact paid for one-half of Brandon’s costs and fees” and she “should be permitted to pay her expert witness costs and attorney fees with marital funds using marital resources.” The court further determined, “The attorney fees Emily incurred were reasonable in light of the relatively complex nature of the issues and the amount of time necessary to litigate them.” Brandon argues that the court erred in making this award without first “making the requisite determinations under [Utah Code] section 81-1-203 or rule 102.” See Utah Code Ann. § 81-1-203 (LexisNexis 2025); Utah R. Civ. P. 102. And he argues that Emily provided only “wholly redacted” billing statements, leaving the court unable to adequately determine the reasonableness of her requested fees. Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 33 2026 UT App 141

¶80 “In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract.” Silva v. Silva, 2018 UT App 210, ¶ 26, 437 P.3d 593 (quotation simplified). But “in the absence of a statutory or contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity.” Id. (quotation simplified). See Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 34, 299 P.3d 1079 (“A court making an equitable award of attorney fees must ascertain whether the equities of a given case justify the use of its inherent and discretionary power to award fees.”) (quotation simplified).

¶81 In Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276, a divorcing wife argued that her husband “was allowed to pay his attorney fees from marital assets, while she was denied the same privilege.” Id. ¶ 207. Though it concluded that the wife had not preserved the argument, our Supreme Court “agree[d] that such a result would be inequitable.” Id. Based on this statement in Dahl, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that here it would be inequitable to allow Brandon to pay his attorney fees out of the marital estate while not allowing Emily to do the same. Cf. Knowlton v. Knowlton, 2023 UT App 16, ¶ 87, 525 P.3d 898 (affirming the district court’s dissipation finding based on the “obvious imbalance” resulting from a husband’s “virtually unfettered access to the marital funds during the pendency of the divorce proceedings and his use of those funds to pay his legal expenses without providing” his former wife “a similar benefit”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023).

¶82 But the amount of those fees must be reasonable. See Silva, 2018 UT App 210, ¶ 26 (recognizing that “a court has inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees”) (emphasis added; quotation otherwise simplified). And the district court’s statement that “[t]he attorney fees Emily incurred were reasonable in light of the relatively complex nature of the issues and the amount of time necessary to litigate them” glosses over Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 34 2026 UT App 141 this. So while we affirm the court’s decision to award attorney fees on an equitable basis, we vacate the amount of the award and remand for the court to reassess it in light of the detailed findings it must make to support its award. See CWS, LLC v. Montgomery, 2025 UT App 183, ¶ 49, 583 P.3d 373 (“Utah appellate courts have consistently encouraged trial courts to make findings to explain the factors which they considered relevant in arriving at an attorney fee award.”) (quotation simplified).

B. Post-Trial Fee Award

¶83 The district court also awarded Emily attorney fees for litigating Brandon’s post-trial motion to amend the divorce decree. Brandon argues that this fee award was based on “the same flawed reasoning” that the court relied on in making its initial award and that reasoning no longer applied in the post-trial context. We have just concluded that the reasoning there was not flawed. And while that reasoning—premised on equitably dividing the marital estate—does not apply here, in the post-trial and post-decree context in which the marital estate has already been divided, the district court did not rely solely on equitable considerations in making the post-trial fee award.

¶84 In its order, the court stated that “[a]fter analyzing the factors outlined in rule 102, the award of attorney fees” was “proper.” Rule 102 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “either party may move the court for an order requiring the other party to provide costs, attorney fees, and witness fees . . . to enable the moving party to prosecute or defend the action.” Utah R. Civ. P. 102(a). “Such an award must be based on evidence of the receiving spouse’s financial need, the payor spouse’s ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees.” Krajeski v. Krajeski, 2025 UT App 19, ¶ 53, 565 P.3d 544 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 574 P.3d 519 (Utah 2025). See Utah R. Civ. P. 102(b). “When a court decides to award fees, it must make detailed findings of fact supporting its determination.” Miner v. Miner, Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 35 2026 UT App 141 2025 UT App 64, ¶ 30, 571 P.3d 788 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 574 P.3d 526 (Utah 2025).

¶85 The court noted that “as was true during the pendency of the divorce,” Emily could not “afford to pay the attorney fees” as she was still a stay-at-home mother, caring for the parties’ minor child, “who requires special attention due to medical issues,” and pursing her education. The court also stated that the alimony award was calculated only to meet Emily’s monthly needs and that she would receive her share of the marital estate over the next 10 years rather than in a lump sum. In contrast, the court found that Brandon “continue[d] to have the financial resources that he had at the time of trial to pay” Emily’s fees because he had “the entirety of his share of the marital estate at his disposal” and “continue[d] to have the business.” The court also stated that Brandon had “not indicated that his financial condition has significantly changed since” the court previously “found he has the ability to pay.”

¶86 The court further found that the fees Emily incurred were necessary to defend against Brandon’s motion to amend and that they were reasonable. The court stated that it was “not persuaded that the only reason that [Brandon] filed his motion was to address some errors that were introduced by” Emily because “in looking closely at his motion to alter or amend the judgment,” Brandon “raised about two dozen separate issues and was unsuccessful in all but one, the length of alimony.”

¶87 While the court clearly articulated the reasonableness of making a post-trial fee award, it did not make adequate findings regarding Emily’s need for the fees, Brandon’s ability to pay them, or the reasonableness of the fees Emily incurred. And given the adjustments that will need to be made to the parties’ income and expenses on remand, the court will also need to make more detailed findings of fact on these points. See Leppert v. Leppert, 2009 Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 36 2026 UT App 141 UT App 10, ¶ 26, 200 P.3d 223.13 We accordingly reverse the post-trial fee award and remand for the district court to revisit the issue after making the necessary findings of fact.

CONCLUSION

¶88 Based on the foregoing, we remand to the district court to address several parts of its findings and decree. First, based on the parties’ agreement, the court should address errors in its calculation of Emily’s living expenses, salary from RMT, and her auto fuel costs during the pendency of the divorce, as well as the value of the water shares she was awarded.

¶89 Next, we reverse the award of equity in the Rolling Brook house to Emily, as Brandon technically complied with his duty to disclose his ownership of the Haven Oaks house. On remand, the district court should categorize the Rolling Brook house as either marital property or Brandon’s separate property and adjust its property distribution accordingly. We also reverse the court’s award of 75% of Brandon’s total dissipation and remand for the court to make adequate findings regarding what dissipation occurred in the first place, awarding Emily half of that total. 13. Emily also requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. “Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have been awarded below to the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal.” Duffin v. Duffin, 2025 UT App 136, ¶ 40 n.7, 578 P.3d 751 (quotation simplified). But here, with both parties having had a measure of success on appeal, the prevailing party determination is best left to the district court on remand. See Vanderwood v. Woodward, 2019 UT App 140, ¶ 49, 449 P.3d 983 (“At the conclusion of the proceedings on remand, the district court should reassess the ‘prevailing party’ issue and award attorney fees as appropriate at that time.”). Bonham v. Bonham 20240597-CA 37 2026 UT App 141

¶90 While we conclude that the court did not exceed its discretion in its valuation of RMT and most of Brandon’s personal property, on remand the court is instructed to make specific findings regarding the value it assigned to his YPO membership.

¶91 While we affirm the court’s determinations regarding Emily’s need for alimony and her ability to produce income, we reverse and remand for the court to address Brandon’s ability to pay—in particular, his reasonable monthly expenses and tax rate—in greater detail. And on remand, the court will need to recalculate the support arrearage, incorporating its new findings regarding Emily’s income from RMT and the auto fuel and health insurance costs Brandon has already paid.

¶92 Finally, while we affirm the court’s decision to make an initial award of attorney fees to Emily, we remand for the district court to determine the reasonable amount for such an award once adequate findings have been made. And we reverse the post-trial attorney fees award and remand to allow the court to make adequate findings on Emily’s need, Brandon’s ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees Emily incurred, especially in light of the adjustments necessitated by this opinion.