Skip to main content

Wilson v. Wilson, 2026 UT App 72

Case Summary

Lisa A. Wilson and Brad J. Wilson, married in 1985, began divorce proceedings in 2018; because their three children were adults, the only matters in dispute concerned the division of a marital estate valued at more than $30 million. After a court-ordered mediation in November 2022, the parties’ attorneys jointly drafted an eleven-point email memorializing the terms reached, and disputes over its enforceability, completeness, and timing arose almost immediately. The district court enforced the email as an integrated, unambiguous agreement without taking extrinsic evidence, implied a reasonable time for performance, and later awarded Brad delay damages tied both to the Fidelity investment accounts and to income from two LLCs. On appeal, Lisa challenged the integration ruling and both components of the damages award; the Court of Appeals affirmed the integration ruling and the Fidelity damages but reversed the LLC profits damages.

Podcast Interviews and Other Sources

Podcast Interviews

Oral Argument

Briefing Documents

Plura pertinentia mox sequentur. Quaeso, redi mox.

Coverage

Facts

Marriage and the Marital Estate

  • Brad and Lisa married in 1985, began divorce proceedings in 2018, and had three children who were adults by the time the case was filed.
  • The marital estate, estimated at more than $30 million, consisted of the marital home, three LLCs, several Fidelity Investments accounts, and various items of personal property.
  • Two Fidelity IRAs became central to the litigation: at the time of mediation, the account in Brad’s name held approximately $9 million and the account in Lisa’s name held approximately $3 million.

The Qualified Personal Residence Trusts (QPRTs)

  • For estate-planning purposes, the parties placed the marital home in two irrevocable Alaska QPRTs, one formed by each spouse, with their three adult children as beneficiaries; the trusts were drafted with the assistance of Alaska estate-planning counsel.
  • The QPRTs restricted amendments inconsistent with maintaining a valid QPRT during the fixed residence term, but each provided that the trust would cease to be a QPRT if the home ceased to be used or held as that settlor’s personal residence. The court observed that Brad’s QPRT may already have terminated when he moved out in 2018, although the parties and the court continued to refer to the trusts in the plural.

The LLCs and Pre-Mediation Litigation

  • The parties jointly owned Martha’s Vineyard LLC, Creekside Terrace LLC, and Eagle Crest Condos LLC, whose operating agreements required an independent special manager to distribute profits equally.
  • In November 2020, Lisa moved for temporary relief alleging that Brad was making self-directed profit distributions; the court appointed a Special Manager and reserved for later resolution whether Brad owed additional distribution amounts.
  • In July 2021, Lisa sought an order requiring Brad to repay at least $383,881.10 in disproportionate distributions and to cooperate in preparing proper LLC tax returns; in October 2021, the court certified Brad’s alleged violations of the temporary order, including the disproportionate distributions, for an evidentiary hearing to occur at trial.

The November 2022 Mediation and Email

  • On November 16, 2022, after a full day of court-ordered mediation, the parties’ attorneys jointly drafted an email on Lisa’s counsel’s computer, which Lisa’s counsel sent to Brad’s counsel with copies to both parties and the mediator.
  • The email stated that it “documents the agreement reached today in mediation” and set out eleven terms, including: Lisa would convey her interests in Creekside and Martha’s Vineyard to Brad; Brad would convey his interest in Eagle Crest to Lisa; Lisa would receive the marital home and its obligations and “the QPRTs will be eliminated”; Lisa would receive “$3 million of the value of the marital Fidelity accounts with Brad to receive the remaining value”; and Brad would obtain an MRI and neuropsychological evaluation, with written results provided to Lisa.
  • Minutes later, Brad’s counsel replied “Agreed” and proposed that the provisions take effect December 1, 2022; Lisa’s counsel told Brad’s counsel in person that evening that the December 1 date was not a term of the agreement.

Post-Mediation Disputes

  • The next morning, Brad’s counsel circulated a draft settlement agreement. Lisa’s counsel responded that the December 1 date was not agreed, that the Special Manager should remain in place until the properties were divided, that estate-planning counsel needed to be involved in eliminating the QPRTs, and that implementing documents should follow a court order.
  • In the ensuing emails, Lisa’s counsel acknowledged that “[t]he parties reached an agreement in princip[le] on material points” and that “[t]here is no disagreement that the parties have reached a settlement,” and stated that December 31 was “a reasonable time frame to get all that needs to be done completed.”

Motion to Vacate and Motion to Enforce

  • On November 18, 2022, Brad moved to vacate the temporary orders. Lisa opposed, asserting among other things that Brad’s draft omitted a material term allowing her to decide whether to proceed after reviewing the results of Brad’s evaluation. At a November 23 hearing, the court declined to vacate the temporary orders because it was unclear whether there had been a complete meeting of the minds, and it ordered a second mediation.
  • Brad then moved to enforce the November 2022 email and sought damages for Lisa’s noncompliance. The November 30 mediation failed. In January 2023, Lisa sent Brad a signed proposed settlement agreement, which Brad rejected.
  • Lisa’s opposition to the motion to enforce argued that the email was a privileged mediation communication, that no agreement had been reached because Brad’s draft contained terms she never accepted, and, alternatively, that any agreement should be implemented according to her own proposal. She emphasized the method for eliminating the QPRTs (by court order under Alaska Statute section 13.36.345, as recommended by Alaska counsel), the Fidelity allocation, and the need for a simultaneous closing.

The March 14, 2023 Ruling

  • The court ruled that the email was not a privileged mediation communication, a ruling Lisa did not challenge on appeal.
  • When asked whether the email was unambiguous and enforceable, Lisa’s counsel said it was missing several terms and sought leave to present extrinsic evidence. Regarding the evaluation, counsel acknowledged that Lisa’s January 2023 proposal omitted any right to review the results and stated that Lisa had “taken it out” because the parties could not agree on her consulting medical professionals.
  • The court ruled that the email was an enforceable settlement agreement, unambiguous on its face, and denied Lisa’s request to present extrinsic evidence. Because the email was silent on timing, the court implied a reasonable time; relying on Lisa’s counsel’s earlier suggestion that roughly 45 days was sufficient, it set an April 28, 2023 deadline for a simultaneous closing and exchange.
  • The court found a substantial change in circumstances not anticipated by the settlors, ruled that the QPRTs could be terminated under Alaska Statute section 13.36.345, ordered the parties to terminate them, and deferred Brad’s damages request for an evidentiary hearing.

Closing, Decree, and Rule 60 Proceedings

  • The court entered a written order on April 14, 2023. That day, the parties transferred their LLC interests and completed documentation transferring the home to Lisa, but the Fidelity transfer stalled over the transfer mechanism and the valuation date.
  • In May 2023, the court entered findings, conclusions, and a divorce decree consistent with the November 2022 email. Lisa then moved under rule 60 to set aside the decree, identifying unresolved issues concerning the Fidelity valuation, tax credits, and personal property; in that motion she stated that the court had adopted “the materially different terms sought by Lisa,” and in reply she stated that the implementation disputes had been resolved “largely in Lisa’s favor.”
  • The court granted the rule 60 motion and held a two-day evidentiary hearing in November 2023, during which Lisa’s counsel affirmed that the court had “adopted Lisa’s view” regarding elimination of the QPRTs.

The Damages Ruling

  • In its April 16, 2024 supplemental findings, the court found that, but for Lisa’s position that the email was not an enforceable agreement, the parties would have closed by December 31, 2022, and that her “litigation positions and tactics” caused about three and a half months of delay.
  • The court found that the parties had agreed to value the Fidelity accounts as of November 16, 2022, when Lisa’s account held $3,146,732, and ordered her to transfer $146,732 plus statutory interest (totaling $160,182.43).
  • The court also awarded Brad $129,828.20, representing income from Creekside and Martha’s Vineyard from January through April 2023, plus interest, as damages for Lisa’s delay. Lisa appealed.

Issues of the Case

Appellant Lisa A. Wilson raised two principal challenges on appeal; because the court resolved her damages challenge in two separately analyzed components with different outcomes, this brief presents three issues.

Issue 1: Contract Integration / Refusal to Consider Extrinsic Evidence

Issue 2: Delay Damages / Fidelity Accounts

Issue 3: Delay Damages / LLC Profits

The Court of Appeals affirmed on Issues 1 and 2 and reversed on Issue 3, vacating the LLC Profits Damages and remanding with instructions to enter a damages award based solely on the Fidelity Damages.

  • Contracts — Contract Interpretation

    1. Contract Integration / Refusal to Consider Extrinsic Evidence

    Claim on Appeal: Lisa argued that the district court erred by ruling that the November 2022 email was a fully integrated agreement without taking extrinsic evidence, which she contended would have shown four additional terms or categories of terms: (1) the timing of a single, simultaneous closing within a reasonable period; (2) the mechanism for eliminating the QPRTs; (3) her right to withdraw assent based on the results of Brad’s evaluation; and (4) terms addressing issues reserved for trial, namely Brad’s alleged misappropriation of LLC profits and his handling of the LLCs’ tax returns. The court rejected Brad’s preservation objection, holding that Lisa raised the issue at the hearing on the motion to enforce.

    Holding: — Affirmed. Any error in declining to take extrinsic evidence was not reversible because Lisa received the timing terms she sought (harmless error), was estopped from challenging the QPRT ruling she requested and later endorsed (judicial estoppel and invited error), abandoned the evaluation term, and offered no proof that the parties had agreed to the remaining terms.

    Statutory Authority: No Utah Code provision. The court relied on Utah R. Civ. P. 61 (courts must disregard errors that do not affect substantial rights) and addressed Alaska Stat. § 13.36.345 (termination of an irrevocable trust due to circumstances not anticipated by the settlor), noting that this provision does not require beneficiary consent.

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Clear Error

    Specific Standard: “And when the question of integration is a question of fact, we review the district court’s factual determination for clear error.” Wilson v. Wilson, 2026 UT App 72, ¶ 42 (citing Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ¶ 10, 182 P.3d 326).

    Applies To: The district court’s determination, made without extrinsic evidence, that the November 2022 email was a fully integrated and enforceable settlement agreement.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Reid v. All Surface LC, 2025 UT App 134, 578 P.3d 259, cert. denied, 585 P.3d 48 (Utah 2026) (absent a clear integration clause, a court may consider parol evidence and decide integration as a matter of fact)
    • Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326 (factual determination of integration reviewed for clear error)
    • Lundahl Farms LLC v. Nielsen, 2021 UT App 146, 504 P.3d 735 (harmless error is error with no reasonable likelihood of affecting the outcome)
    • RJW Media Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, 392 P.3d 956 (appellate court need not reverse for harmless error)
    • NetDictation LLC v. Rice, 2019 UT App 198, 455 P.3d 625 (law implies a reasonable time for performance when a contract is silent)
    • Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, 207 P.3d 1235 (judicial estoppel bars denying a position successfully maintained in a prior proceeding)
    • State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, 453 P.3d 657 (invited error bars relief where a party affirmatively represented that the court was proceeding appropriately)
    • Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (abandonment of contract rights requires a clear and unequivocal showing)
    • Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) (extrinsic evidence may supplement, but not contradict, a partially integrated writing)
    • Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982) (courts will not rewrite a contract to supply omitted terms)
    • Monaco Apartment Homes v. Figueroa, 2021 UT App 50, 489 P.3d 1132 (court cannot rewrite a contract because a party failed to protect its rights)

    Why It Matters: The decision shows that a challenge to the exclusion of extrinsic evidence on integration requires a showing of prejudice and a proffer that the parties actually agreed to the omitted term; a party cannot use the partial-integration doctrine to add terms never agreed upon. It also illustrates that a litigant’s own post-ruling characterizations of the court’s rulings, particularly in rule 60 filings, can trigger judicial estoppel and invited error on appeal. For settlement practice, the opinion confirms that an attorney-drafted mediation email answered with “Agreed” can be enforced as a binding agreement even when implementation details remain contested.

  • Damages — Delay Damages

    2. Delay Damages / Fidelity Accounts

    Claim on Appeal: Lisa challenged the order requiring her to pay Brad $160,182.43, representing the amount by which her Fidelity account exceeded $3 million on November 16, 2022, plus interest.

    Holding: — Affirmed. Because Lisa did not meaningfully challenge the finding that the parties agreed to a November 16, 2022 valuation date, or the court’s authority to award interest, the Fidelity award merely enforced the terms of the parties’ agreement.

    Statutory Authority: None cited.

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Correctness

    Specific Standard: “As explained below, we view part of the ruling in question as turning on the district court’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement. We review that aspect of the ruling for correctness.” Wilson v. Wilson, 2026 UT App 72, ¶ 43 (citing Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6, ¶ 15, 367 P.3d 994).

    Applies To: The district court’s enforcement of the November 2022 email’s Fidelity provision, using a November 16, 2022 valuation date, to order Lisa to transfer $146,732 plus interest to Brad.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6, 367 P.3d 994 (contract interpretation is a legal question reviewed for correctness)

    Why It Matters: The court distinguished damages that enforce a bargained-for term from damages imposed under the court’s own authority. Where an award rests on an unchallenged finding of the parties’ agreement, such as an agreed valuation date, it is treated as contract enforcement rather than a sanction and requires no separate finding of misconduct. Appellants seeking to disturb such an award must squarely attack the underlying factual finding

  • Damages — Delay Damages

    3. Delay Damages / LLC Profits

    Claim on Appeal: Lisa challenged the award of $129,828.20, representing income from Creekside and Martha’s Vineyard LLCs from January through April 2023, plus interest, which the district court imposed on the ground that her litigation positions delayed a closing that otherwise would have occurred by December 31, 2022.

    Holding: — Reversed and Remanded. The court affirmed that 45 days was a reasonable period to close but held that the record supplied no legal or factual basis to start that period at the mediation and penalize Lisa for litigating, absent a rule 11 finding, a contempt finding, or a finding of bad faith or abuse of process; the award was vacated and the case remanded for entry of a damages award based solely on the Fidelity Damages.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 78B-6-301(4) (contempt, including abuse of the court’s process or proceedings by a party); Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)–(c) (sanctions for filings made for an improper purpose, such as unnecessary delay).

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Abuse of Discretion

    Specific Standard: “With respect to the decision to award sanctions itself, we review that decision for an abuse of discretion. See Raass Bros. Inc. v. Raass, 2019 UT App 183, ¶ 11, 454 P.3d 83. An abuse of discretion “may be demonstrated by showing that the district court relied on an erroneous conclusion of law or that there was no evidentiary basis” for its ruling.” Wilson v. Wilson, 2026 UT App 72, ¶ 43.

    Applies To: The district court’s decision to hold Lisa liable for the LLC income Brad lost between January 2023 and the April 14, 2023 closing.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Raass Bros. Inc. v. Raass, 2019 UT App 183, 454 P.3d 83 (sanctions decisions reviewed for abuse of discretion; abuse shown by erroneous conclusion of law or lack of evidentiary basis)
    • NetDictation LLC v. Rice, 2019 UT App 198, 455 P.3d 625 (reasonable time implied for performance where agreement is silent)
    • Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, 123 P.3d 416 (court’s authority to sanction contemptuous conduct is both statutory and inherent)

    Why It Matters: This is the operative reversal. A court that implies a reasonable time for performance must also identify when that period starts, and good-faith litigation over whether an agreement exists and what it contains does not, by itself, start the clock or justify monetary consequences. Before penalizing a party for delay, the court must ground the award in an identified source of authority (an agreement, rule 11, contempt, or statutory bad faith or abuse of process) and make the corresponding findings.

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

  • Reid v. All Surface LC, 2025 UT App 134, 578 P.3d 259, cert. denied, 585 P.3d 48 (Utah 2026) (integration inquiry begins with whether there is a clear integration clause; absent one, integration is a question of fact on which parol evidence may be considered)
  • Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, 182 P.3d 326 (factual integration determinations reviewed for clear error)
  • Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6, 367 P.3d 994 (contract interpretation reviewed for correctness; applied to the Fidelity Damages)
  • Raass Bros. Inc. v. Raass, 2019 UT App 183, 454 P.3d 83 (sanctions reviewed for abuse of discretion; applied to the LLC Profits Damages)
  • Lundahl Farms LLC v. Nielsen, 2021 UT App 146, 504 P.3d 735 (definition of harmless error; applied to the timing argument)
  • RJW Media Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, 392 P.3d 956 (no reversal required for harmless error)
  • NetDictation LLC v. Rice, 2019 UT App 198, 455 P.3d 625 (law implies a reasonable time for performance when a contract is silent; basis for the 45-day period)
  • Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, 207 P.3d 1235 (judicial estoppel; barred Lisa’s QPRT and additional-terms arguments)
  • State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, 453 P.3d 657 (invited error; barred Lisa’s QPRT and additional-terms arguments)
  • Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (abandonment of contract rights; Lisa abandoned the evaluation-withdrawal term)
  • Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) (extrinsic evidence admissible to supplement, not contradict, a writing; Lisa offered no proof of agreed-upon missing terms)
  • Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982) (courts will not rewrite contracts to supply omitted terms)
  • Monaco Apartment Homes v. Figueroa, 2021 UT App 50, 489 P.3d 1132 (court cannot rewrite a contract because a party failed to include protective language)
  • Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, 123 P.3d 416 (statutory and inherent authority to sanction contemptuous conduct; no contempt finding supported the LLC Profits Damages)

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

  • A monetary award for delay that is not tied to an agreed contractual deadline or valuation date.
  • An implied “reasonable time” for performance with no clearly identified or justified starting date.
  • Penalties imposed for litigation conduct without a rule 11 improper-purpose finding, a contempt finding, or a finding of bad faith or abuse of process under Utah Code § 78B-6-301(4).
  • A record showing that the penalized party was litigating genuine disputes regarding the existence or terms of an agreement, which the district court did not find improper.
  • Conversely, reversal is unlikely where the appellant obtained the substance of the relief sought, endorsed the challenged ruling below, or abandoned the term at issue.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

The opinion does not impose a statutory multi-factor test, but it identifies findings a district court must make before assessing delay-based damages or sanctions:

  • Whether the award enforces a term the parties agreed to (such as a valuation date or performance deadline), supported by a finding of that agreement.
  • If not, which source of authority supports the award: rule 11(b)–(c) (improper purpose, including unnecessary delay); statutory or inherent contempt authority; or bad faith litigation or abuse of process under Utah Code § 78B-6-301(4).
  • Express findings satisfying the selected standard.
  • Where a reasonable time is implied, both the length of the period and a supported determination of when it began to run.
  • For termination of an Alaska irrevocable trust under Alaska Stat. § 13.36.345, a finding of a substantial change in circumstances not anticipated by the settlors.

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

The following factors, in combination, increase the viability of an appeal from a delay-based damages award:

  • A settlement agreement silent as to timing, with the deadline supplied by the court.
  • Damages measured from a date preceding the court’s resolution of disputes over the agreement’s existence or terms.
  • District court findings attributing delay to a party’s “litigation positions and tactics” without labeling them improper, contemptuous, or in bad faith.
  • No rule 11 motion, order to show cause, or contempt proceeding preceding the award.
  • An appellant who preserved and briefed the challenge to the damages award without having endorsed it below.

Strategy Insight

Wilson rewards framing the appeal as legal error rather than an evidentiary dispute. Lisa’s integration challenge, presented largely as a dispute about what extrinsic evidence would have shown, failed on harmlessness, estoppel, abandonment, and lack of proof. Her challenge to the LLC Profits Damages succeeded because it identified a missing legal predicate: the district court penalized litigation conduct without invoking or satisfying any recognized source of sanctioning authority. Practitioners should identify whether a challenged award lacks a legal foundation, as opposed to merely resting on contested facts, and lead with that argument.

Consistency of Litigation Positions

The opinion is a cautionary example of how a party’s advocacy in post-judgment motions can constrain later appellate arguments. Lisa’s statements that the court had resolved implementation disputes “largely in Lisa’s favor” and had eliminated the QPRTs “as requested by Lisa” were persuasive in obtaining rule 60 relief but later precluded her from contending on appeal that those same rulings were inadequate. Counsel should evaluate whether favorable characterizations in trial-level filings may foreclose arguments that the client may later need to raise on appeal.

Enforceability of Post-Mediation Email Settlements

The court affirmed enforcement of an attorney-drafted email, accepted with a one-word reply, as a complete and enforceable agreement dividing a marital estate exceeding $30 million, notwithstanding subsequent disputes regarding implementation. The decision reinforces that settlement communications prepared at the close of mediation should be drafted with the expectation that they may be enforced as written, with gaps such as timing filled by implied terms of reasonableness rather than by later negotiation.

Teaching Value

The opinion is a useful teaching vehicle for distinguishing (1) contract enforcement from sanctions, (2) supplementing a partially integrated writing from adding new terms, and (3) harmless error, judicial estoppel, invited error, and abandonment as distinct grounds for denying appellate relief despite a potential trial-level error.

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence

  • The opinion relies exclusively on Utah case law: Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals decisions supply every standard of review, every contract doctrine, and every preclusion doctrine applied.
  • The only non-Utah authority is Alaska trust statutes, which governed as substantive law because the QPRTs were Alaska trusts. The court did not interpret those statutes in depth; it resolved the QPRT challenge on judicial estoppel and invited error grounds, noting only that Alaska Stat. § 13.36.345 does not require beneficiary consent.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)

  • Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20 — Established that, absent a clear integration clause, integration is a question of fact reviewed for clear error; it framed the standard for Lisa’s primary challenge.
  • Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) — Established that extrinsic evidence may supplement, but not contradict, a partially integrated writing; the court used it to require proof that the parties actually agreed to the claimed missing terms.
  • Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982) — Established that courts will not rewrite a contract to supply omitted terms; it foreclosed Lisa’s attempt to add the misappropriation and tax-liability issues.
  • Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27 — Articulated the elements of judicial estoppel; it barred Lisa from disputing QPRT and implementation rulings she had told the district court were adopted in her favor.
  • Mind & Motion Utah Investments, LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6 — Established that contract interpretation is reviewed for correctness; it governed the Fidelity Damages as contract enforcement.
  • Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68 — Recognized that the authority to sanction contemptuous conduct is both statutory and inherent; the absence of any contempt finding helped defeat the LLC Profits Damages.

The Most Important Holding

The most significant holding is that a district court may not impose delay-based damages on a party merely because her litigation positions postponed performance of a settlement agreement that was silent on timing. Implying a reasonable time for performance requires identifying when that period begins, and where the parties were contesting in good faith whether a binding agreement existed and what its terms were, the clock began when the court resolved those disputes, not at the mediation. To penalize a party for the intervening delay, the court must rest the award on an agreed term or on an identified source of sanctioning authority, such as rule 11, contempt, or statutory bad faith or abuse of process, supported by express findings. Wilson v. Wilson, 2026 UT App 72, ¶¶ 72–74.

Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error

  • The reversal of the LLC Profits Damages rested on legal error: the district court imposed what the appellate court characterized as a sanction without any legal basis or the findings necessary to support one. Within the abuse-of-discretion framework, this was a reliance on an erroneous conclusion of law and the absence of an evidentiary basis for the timing determination.
  • The underlying factual finding that 45 days was a reasonable period for performance was affirmed; the error lay in when that period began and in holding Lisa financially responsible for the intervening time.
  • The Fidelity Damages survived because they rested on an unchallenged factual finding that the parties had agreed to a November 16, 2022 valuation date, making the award contract enforcement rather than a sanction.

Practitioner Takeaways

Trial Lawyers:

  • When an email or term sheet is drafted at the end of mediation, assume it may be enforced as a binding, integrated agreement once opposing counsel replies “Agreed.” Include timing, closing mechanics, conditions precedent, and an express statement of which pending claims are released or preserved before transmitting it.
  • If a term is genuinely missing, proffer specific extrinsic evidence that the parties agreed to it at the time; arguments that a term should have been included, without evidence of prior agreement, will fail under Stanger and Hal Taylor.
  • Exercise care when characterizing rulings in later filings. Statements in rule 60 papers and at hearings that the court adopted your client’s position can foreclose appellate challenges to those same rulings.
  • When seeking delay damages, tie the request to an agreed term or to a specific source of sanctioning authority and request express findings on improper purpose, contempt, or bad faith; when opposing such a request, emphasize the absence of those findings.

Appellate Lawyers:

  • Demonstrate prejudice. Even a procedural error in refusing extrinsic evidence will not produce reversal where the client ultimately obtained the substance of the omitted terms.
  • Review the entire post-ruling record for client concessions before framing issues; judicial estoppel and invited error disposed of two of the four integration sub-arguments.
  • Distinguish awards that enforce the parties’ bargain from awards that operate as sanctions. The former are reviewed as contract interpretation, while the latter require an identified legal basis and supporting findings, which presents a more favorable avenue for reversal.
  • Challenge the predicate finding directly; the Fidelity award stood because the valuation-date finding was not meaningfully contested.

Mediators and Settlement Counsel:

  • Where settlement implementation depends on third-party instruments, such as irrevocable trusts, identify the termination mechanism, required consents, and notice to beneficiaries in the settlement document itself.
  • Specify whether pending claims, such as alleged misappropriation or tax-liability disputes, are released by a settlement framed as dividing “marital assets.”

High-Net-Worth Divorce Clients with Estate-Planning Structures:

  • Irrevocable trusts holding marital property, such as QPRTs, can complicate settlement implementation; parties should consult estate-planning counsel before mediation regarding how such structures may be modified or terminated.

Majority Opinion

2026 UT App 72

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LISA A. WILSON, Appellant, v. BRAD J. WILSON, Appellee.

Opinion No. 20240444-CA Filed May 7, 2026 Third District Court, Silver Summit Department

The Honorable Richard E. Mrazik No. 184500216

Sara Pfrommer, Emily Adams, and Melissa Jo Townsend, Attorneys for Appellant Julie J. Nelson, Michael J. Teter, and Aaron R. Harris, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred. TENNEY, Judge:

¶1 Brad and Lisa Wilson began divorce proceedings in 2018.1 In November 2022, they engaged in mediation to resolve the division of their marital estate. At the end of the mediation, their attorneys jointly drafted an email that outlined the terms of an agreement that Brad and Lisa had reached. Very soon after, however, Brad and Lisa began disputing various issues relating to the enforceability and timing of the terms set forth in the email. Brad eventually filed a motion to enforce the agreement that had 1. Because the parties share the same surname, we’ll refer to them by their first names moving forward, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 2 2026 UT App 72 been memorialized in the email. In her opposition to that motion, Lisa asked the court to take additional evidence on various terms that, in her view, still needed to be added. After a hearing, the district court ruled that the email constituted an enforceable, integrated agreement and that the court therefore did not need to take additional evidence. The court then made several rulings relating to the distribution, and the timing of the distribution, of various marital assets. Following additional litigation, the court issued a ruling that awarded damages to Brad based on various actions taken by Lisa that, in the court’s view, had improperly delayed the distribution to Brad of (1) monies that had been in an investment account and (2) monies that were linked to various LLCs.

¶2 On appeal, Lisa first argues that the court erred by determining that the post-mediation email was a fully integrated agreement. As explained below, Lisa has not persuaded us that the court committed any reversible error with respect to this ruling. Lisa next challenges the court’s decision to award damages based on her delays. For the reasons set forth below, we see no error with respect to the damages relating to the investment account, but we do see error with respect to the damages associated with the LLCs. We accordingly affirm in part and reverse in part.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Brad and Lisa were married in 1985, and in 2018, they began divorce proceedings. The couple had three children together, but since the children were adults at the time the divorce proceedings began, the only issues to be resolved concerned the division of the marital estate. The Marital Estate

¶4 Brad and Lisa’s marital estate had an estimated value of over $30 million and was generally comprised of the following Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 3 2026 UT App 72 assets: (1) the marital home; (2) three LLCs; (3) several Fidelity Investment accounts; and (4) various items of personal property.

¶5 For estate planning purposes, Brad and Lisa had placed ownership of the marital home in two irrevocable Alaska Qualified Personal Residence Trusts (QPRTs)—one had been formed by Brad, and the other had been formed by Lisa. Brad and Lisa’s three adult children were the beneficiaries of the QPRTs. The QPRTs were formed with the assistance of Alaska estate planning counsel (Alaska Counsel) and had complicated terms. As relevant here, the QPRTs gave Brad and Lisa the right to reside in the marital home for a fixed term, after which, if they chose to stay in the home, they would have been required to pay fair market rent to the beneficiaries. The QPRTs also had detailed provisions regarding Brad and Lisa’s ability to modify or amend them. Specifically, the QPRTs provided that during this fixed term, Brad and Lisa could “not make any amendments” that were “inconsistent with the settlor’s intention to form and maintain a valid qualified personal residence trust.” However, each QPRT provided that the trust would “cease to be a qualified personal residence trust . . . if the [marital home] cease[d] to be used or held for use as a personal residence by” Brad or Lisa.

 

¶6 As indicated, Brad and Lisa also jointly owned three LLCs. These were (1) Martha’s Vineyard LLC; (2) Creekside Terrace LLC; and (3) Eagle Crest Condos LLC. The operating agreements for these LLCs required an independent special manager to distribute their profits equally between Brad and Lisa.

¶7 As also indicated, Brad and Lisa owned several financial accounts at Fidelity Investments (the Fidelity accounts). Two of them in particular ended up mattering in the litigation: one was an IRA in Brad’s name, while the other was an IRA in Lisa’s name. The Pre-Mediation Divorce Litigation

¶8 Brad and Lisa engaged in several years of litigation, during which the district court entered various temporary orders Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 4 2026 UT App 72 governing the management and disposition of the marital home, the three LLCs, and the Fidelity accounts. In November 2020, Lisa filed a motion for temporary relief, claiming that Brad was making “self-directed profit distributions to himself” from the LLCs. Lisa asked the court to appoint an independent special manager “to maintain the status quo” and distribute profits according to the LLCs’ operating agreements. In response, the district court issued an order that appointed a special manager (Special Manager) and gave Special Manager authority to manage the assets of the LLCs. But the court “reserve[d] for later resolution . . . whether [Brad] should pay additional monthly distribution amounts” for the applicable period in which he allegedly made improper distributions.

¶9 In July 2021, Lisa filed a motion arguing, among other things, that Brad had violated the temporary orders by failing to cooperate with the parties’ accountant in the preparation of the LLCs’ tax returns and by pursuing “improper and undocumented tax deductions.” As a result, Lisa requested “an order directing that Brad immediately pay” the LLCs, “through . . . Special Manager, all disproportionate profit distributions made to Brad of at least $383,881.10” and an “order that Brad cooperate with the filing of proper tax returns.” In response, the court issued an order in October 2021 “certif[ying] for evidentiary hearing [Brad’s] violation of the [temporary order],” and this order noted that this certification included “alleged disproportionate profit distributions from Creekside LLC, Martha’s Vineyard LLC, and Eagle Crest LLC.” The order also stated that the evidentiary hearing would “occur at trial.” The November 2022 Mediation and Email

¶10 In August 2022, the court issued an order requiring the parties to mediate. On November 16, 2022, the parties engaged in that mediation. After a full day of mediation, the mediator left, after which the parties’ attorneys jointly drafted an email (the November 2022 email). This email was drafted on the computer of Lisa’s counsel, and when the attorneys were done drafting it, Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 5 2026 UT App 72 Lisa’s counsel sent it to Brad’s counsel, and he also copied Brad, Lisa, and the mediator. The email stated, in full, as follows: This documents the agreement reached today in mediation. The parties will split marital assets as follows: 1. Lisa will convey to Brad her 50% membership interest in the Creekside LLC. 2. Lisa will convey to Brad her 50% membership interest in the Martha’s Vineyard LLC. 3. Brad will convey to Lisa his 50% membership interest in the Eagle Crest LLC. 4. Lisa will receive 100% ownership of the [marital] home, and all existing financial obligations (including mortgages) related to the home, and the QPRTs will be eliminated. 5. Lisa will receive $3 million of the value of the marital Fidelity accounts with Brad to receive the remaining value in such accounts.[2] 6. Brad will receive Lisa’s interest in the houseboat, motorhome, and Land Cruiser. 7. Married filing separate returns will be filed in 2020 and 2021. Lisa will receive credit with IRS of one half of the estimated tax payments made (currently believed to total $182k, $91k 2. At the time of mediation, the Fidelity account in Brad’s name was worth around $9 million, and the Fidelity account in Lisa’s name was worth around $3 million. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 6 2026 UT App 72 Brad and $91k Lisa). Lisa to pay her share of tax for $100k IRA payment to Lisa in 2020 from the $91k estimated tax payments. 8. Brad to indicate to the [c]ourt and Summit County authorities that all previous civil stalking injunction compliance and violation issues have been resolved and that the divorce is settled. 9. Personal property to be reasonably split, with Lisa to receive her jewelry, the 32” Globe, and children’s books. Brad to receive his personal clothing, fishing gear, Christmas train, onehalf of Christmas decorations (preseparation), china (Brad’s mother’s and aunt’s if in the marital home), luggage, and 20” globe. Counsel to agree on the process for reviewing and dividing the remaining personal property consistent with existing [c]ourt orders. 10. Brad agrees to obtain an MRI and neuropsychological evaluation by qualified physician recommended by [his doctor] with expertise regarding TIAs and TBI. Medical records requested by evaluator are to be provided by Brad. Written results to be provided to Lisa, and Lisa will not distribute any of the written results to anyone without Brad’s written consent. 11. Winco LLC funds to be split 50/50 with [Special Manager] to account for and control.

¶11 A few minutes after Lisa’s counsel sent the email, Brad’s counsel replied, stating, “Agreed. We will plan for these Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 7 2026 UT App 72 provisions to take effect as of December 1, 2022. . . . [D]o you want me to write up the stipulation, findings, etc. that mimic the term provisions below?” As the attorneys were leaving for the evening, however, Lisa’s counsel told Brad’s counsel in person that the December 1 date was “not a term of the agreement.”

¶12 At 10:20 a.m. the next morning, Brad’s counsel sent an email to Lisa’s counsel with a draft settlement agreement, stating: [P]lease see the attached draft that memorializes the agreement terms that we confirmed yesterday. If you have changes to suggest, please get those to me ASAP so that we can get this signed and filed next week. Once counsel agrees on the scope, we can circulate to clients for final approval of the written content of the stipulation. Once that happens, my office can circulate a DocuSign to make execution simple.

¶13 In response to Brad’s draft, Lisa’s counsel responded by noting that the email from Brad’s counsel that had suggested a December 1 date “was made after the agreement was made,” and Lisa’s counsel reiterated that the December 1 date was “not a term of the agreement.” Lisa’s counsel then stated that he had told Brad’s counsel as they were leaving the mediation that Special Manager “would need to stay in place . . . until the parties [could] divide the properties and implement a settlement.” He also noted that “numerous documents need[ed] to be prepared to implement the separation[,] including documents to eliminate the QPRTs,” and he asserted that “the parties’ estate planning lawyers need[ed] to be consulted if not charged with the task of drafting such documents.” He maintained that any “‘deal’ documents to implement the separation of property should come after the [c]ourt’s order splitting the marital property.” And he further indicated that he was “happy to provide input on a stipulation but [they] need[ed] to first agree upon the timing for the separation and whether dates [were] necessary to the stipulation.” In a responsive email, Brad’s counsel stated that the “parties did Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 8 2026 UT App 72 not make any deal, whatsoever, in any of the 11 provisions . . . to unwind slowly or at Lisa’s preferred pace, or that the division of the business or real estate assets required additional court approval before becoming effective,” and he further asserted, “Based on the agreement provisions that you sent, the agreement is binding as of last night.”

¶14 The parties’ attorneys exchanged several more emails that day setting forth their views about what the parties had agreed to and what needed to take place before transferring the marital assets. During one of these emails, Lisa’s counsel affirmed that, as set forth in the November 2022 email, “[t]he parties reached an agreement in princip[le] on material points.” But he then noted that “we need to implement the parties’ agreement and transfer marital assets to the parties after a court order is entered and pursuant to appropriate documents,” after which he stated, “We expect that 12/31 is a reasonable time frame to get all that needs to be done completed.” In another email that was sent on the morning of November 18, Lisa’s counsel stated, “There is no disagreement that the parties have reached a settlement. . . . But we do not agree with changing the status quo or existing court orders until the parties are in a position to close an agreement that gives each side sole ownership of the marital assets as contemplated in the parties’ agreement.” The Motion to Vacate

¶15 Later on the morning of November 18, Brad filed an expedited motion to vacate the temporary orders that were in place. Lisa subsequently filed an opposition to Brad’s motion to vacate, in which she asserted, among other things, that Brad’s proposed settlement agreement had neglected to include a “material term”—namely, that “Lisa could make a decision whether to proceed at all with the negotiated distribution of marital assets . . . after reviewing” Brad’s MRI and neuropsychological evaluation. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 9 2026 UT App 72

¶16 At a hearing on that motion that was held on November 23, the court began by noting that Lisa’s counsel had “suggest[ed]” that all of the “obligations that the parties [had] agreed to” could occur “by December 31.” After listening to both parties’ arguments, the court stated that it was “not prepared to terminate the temporary orders, because it’s unclear . . . whether there’s actually been a complete meeting of the minds about the order of operations, deadlines, and what have you.” Brad’s counsel then argued that “[Lisa’s counsel] said December 31st, fine. Let’s do December 31st.” The court then explained that it was “not going to resolve today whether or not the parties [had] reached an enforceable agreement,” and it ordered the parties “to reengage with [the mediator] for an additional session of mediation.” The Motion to Enforce

¶17 Shortly before the parties engaged in the second mediation, Brad filed a motion to enforce the November 2022 email, attaching several post-mediation emails and his draft settlement agreement as exhibits to his motion. In this motion, Brad also sought damages due to Lisa’s refusal to comply with the terms of the November 2022 email. The parties participated in a second mediation on November 30, 2022, but this mediation was unsuccessful.

¶18 On January 13, 2023, Lisa’s counsel sent Brad’s counsel a proposed settlement agreement that was signed by Lisa. After Brad’s counsel rejected this proposed agreement, Lisa filed an opposition to Brad’s motion to enforce. There, Lisa first argued that the November 2022 email was a privileged mediation communication and was thus inadmissible. In the alternative, Lisa argued that even if the November 2022 email was admissible, the court should conclude that the parties had “reached no agreement” due to the fact that Brad’s proposed settlement agreement “include[s] material terms never agreed to by Lisa.” Finally, Lisa argued that if the court concluded that the November 2022 email was admissible and that it constituted an enforceable Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 10 2026 UT App 72 agreement, the court should rule that the parties had “reached a property settlement which [could] and must be implemented in accordance with” Lisa’s proposed settlement agreement (which she attached to her opposition).

¶19 One of the central concerns outlined in Lisa’s opposition was how to eliminate the QPRTs.3 Lisa maintained that Brad’s proposed settlement agreement came “nowhere close” to effectuating the parties’ agreement from the November 2022 email that “the QPRTs [would] be eliminated.” She contended that in order to “accurately memorialize and accomplish the intent of the [November 2022 email],” the parties needed to follow advice that had been given by Alaska Counsel—specifically, that the elimination of the QPRTs “would be accomplished . . . after notice to the parties’ children (the QPRT beneficiaries) and entry of a necessary [c]ourt order under Alaska Statute [section] 13.36.345 due to ‘changed circumstances.’”

¶20 Lisa also contested Brad’s proposal for how to distribute the funds in the Fidelity accounts. She argued that Brad’s proposed settlement agreement called for her to “pay[] Brad about $142,000 from the Fidelity account with her name on it,” which was “a result that [was] not consistent with the [November 2022] email’s plain language”—namely, that Lisa was to “receive 3. As noted above, the marital home was owned by two QPRTs— one formed by Brad and the other formed by Lisa. Because each of the QPRTs included a provision stating that the person’s trust would terminate “if the [marital home] cease[d] to be used or held for use as a personal residence” by that person, Brad’s QPRT seems to have been eliminated in 2018 when he moved out of the marital home. Indeed, at one point in her opposition memorandum, Lisa expressed this view. But even so, Lisa’s arguments about the QPRTs below were typically written in the plural (i.e., she discussed the elimination of the QPRTs), and she continues to do so on appeal. Because this ultimately makes no difference to the result we reach in this appeal, we’ll follow suit. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 11 2026 UT App 72 $3 million of the value of the . . . Fidelity accounts with Brad to receive the remaining value in such accounts.”

¶21 Finally, Lisa pushed back on Brad’s assertion that the parties could have completed a closing on the necessary transactions by December 1, 2022. She noted that Brad had first raised that date after the November 2022 email was sent and that it was not a term of the agreement. Instead, Lisa argued that in order for her “to obtain the benefit of what she bargained for,” there must be “a simultaneous receipt of one-half the value of marital property by the parties at a closing.”

¶22 The court held a hearing on Brad’s motion to enforce on March 14, 2023. Early in the hearing, the court ruled that the November 2022 email was “not a privileged mediation communication.”4 The court then indicated that, as it understood the current state of things, the parties’ remaining disagreements were about “how to [e]ffect or enforce the terms of the parties’ November 16 agreement,” particularly regarding “elimination of the QPRTs, securing the $3 million held in the Fidelity accounts . . . , [and] handling of the MRI and neuropsych evaluation of [Brad] in the sequence or timing of events.”

¶23 The court then asked Lisa’s counsel whether he agreed that the November 2022 email was “an unambiguous enforceable agreement” “[s]uch that consideration of extrinsic evidence would be impermissible.” Lisa’s counsel responded that he did not. Lisa’s counsel instead asserted that the November 2022 email was “missing several terms,” and he asked for permission to present extrinsic evidence as to those additional terms.

¶24 Lisa’s counsel stated that one of these “additional material terms” related to the MRI and neuropsychological evaluation that Brad was required to undergo (the Evaluation). Lisa’s counsel referred the court to the language in the November 2022 email stating that the results of the Evaluation “would be provided to 4. Lisa does not challenge this portion of the ruling on appeal. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 12 2026 UT App 72 [Lisa].” Lisa’s counsel then said that “a dispute” had arisen almost “[i]mmediately” after the mediation “with respect to the meaning of that.” Lisa’s counsel said that Lisa had “requested and contemplated” the ability to “make a go or no-go decision” on the agreement itself depending on the results of the Evaluation. Lisa’s counsel said that Brad had refused to allow anyone else to see those results, however, and “[t]hat’s when it fell apart.”

¶25 During an ensuing dialogue with the court about this, Lisa’s counsel told the court that because Lisa couldn’t fully understand the meaning of those test results without assistance, Lisa had agreed to “proceed on [the] terms as mapped out” in the November 2022 email (i.e., with terms requiring Brad to submit to an exam, but without an extra provision stating that she could withdraw her assent to the agreement based on those results). Lisa’s counsel further acknowledged that Lisa’s proposed settlement agreement had not included a provision for her to “review” the Evaluation results. At that point, the court asked, “Well, then how integral could [that term] be?” Lisa’s counsel responded, “[O]ur legal judgment and decision—it’s very material. But we’ve taken it out because we could not get an agreement that [Lisa] could consult with medical professionals to be able to evaluate that, and we felt like we’re better off in that situation with letting [Brad] do what he will with his own examination.”5

¶26 During this hearing, the parties also discussed the elimination of the QPRTs. The court asked Lisa’s counsel why Lisa hadn’t yet taken steps to eliminate the QPRTs. Lisa’s counsel explained that he was told by Alaska Counsel that “the way to do 5. It’s unclear to us whether, through the statements we’ve quoted above, Lisa’s counsel meant that Lisa had agreed to not insist on this term during the November 2022 mediation itself, or instead whether counsel meant that Lisa had agreed to omit this term when she submitted her proposed settlement in January 2023. Either way, what is clear is that Lisa’s counsel was telling the court that Lisa had agreed at some point to withdraw this term. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 13 2026 UT App 72 this was to either get written consent of the beneficiaries of the QPRTs, or have a hearing and notice those beneficiaries and recognize that under a specific Alaska statute that . . . there’s been a change in circumstances based upon the divorce, and the provisions could be modified.” The court then asked Brad’s counsel what his position was on the elimination of the QPRTs, to which Brad’s counsel said that under the terms of the QPRTs, an “independent trustee” could be appointed who would have “discretion” to distribute the trust assets to Lisa. When pressed by the court as to possible objections from the beneficiaries regarding elimination of the QPRTs, Brad’s counsel stated that Brad “[had] already talked to the kids and they’re not going to object.”

¶27 In response, Lisa’s counsel asserted that Brad’s approach “just seems more complicated than what [Alaska Counsel] recommended, [which was to] just get a court order under this provision for the change in circumstance [and] either get [the beneficiaries] to sign off, which is just simply signing the document, or give them notice if they don’t sign it.” Lisa’s counsel affirmed that Alaska Counsel had told him that it didn’t have to be an Alaska court that implemented the order and that “the divorce court can do it.” Seemingly accepting this proposal, Brad’s counsel then stated, “I think Your Honor can just enter the order at this point.” Lisa’s counsel then reminded the court that Alaska Counsel “said we need to give notice to the beneficiaries,” but when the court asked if Alaska Counsel “[had] any legal authority for that,” Lisa’s counsel responded, “I didn’t ask.” Brad’s counsel then stated that “the beneficiaries have been on notice since November [2022] that this [was] pending.”

¶28 At the close of the March 14 hearing, the court made an oral ruling. The court first ruled that the November 2022 email was “an enforceable settlement agreement” that was “unambiguous on its face as a matter of law” because “Brad’s counsel unambiguously responded to that email, . . . ‘agreed’” and because “[t]he face of the agreement shows a meeting of the minds as to its integral terms, and [it] shows terms that are sufficiently definite and capable of being enforced.” The court accordingly Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 14 2026 UT App 72 denied Lisa’s request to present additional extrinsic evidence about the allegedly missing terms.

¶29 The court acknowledged that the November 2022 email was “silent as to a deadline for the parties’ respective performances,” but it then ruled that in such a circumstance, “the law implies a reasonable time under the circumstances.” The court noted that “Lisa’s counsel” had previously “suggested that December 31, 2022, which was approximately 45 days in the future, would be a reasonable deadline for performance,” and it further noted that Brad’s counsel had “agreed that that was workable.” The court thus ruled that “45 days approximately from today or on or before April 28, [2023,] is a reasonable deadline by which the parties will need to conduct a closing and tender and exchange their respective performances.” In response to further dialogue with the attorneys, the court also stated that it was ordering “a simultaneous exchange, whether at closing, or earlier of the relinquishment of the LLC interests.”

¶30 Turning to the elimination of the QPRTs, the court found that “there ha[d] been a substantial change in circumstances not anticipated by the settlors”—i.e., that they “did not anticipate getting divorced at that time”—and that under Alaska Statute section 13.36.345, the QPRTs “may be terminated.” The court accordingly “order[ed] the parties to do so.”

¶31 Finally, the court deferred ruling on Brad’s still pending request for damages, concluding that it would need to hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on that request.

¶32 On April 14, 2023, the court issued a written order that memorialized the oral ruling from the March 14 hearing. That same day, the parties transferred their respective interests in the LLCs, and they further completed the necessary documentation transferring ownership of the marital home to Lisa. With respect to the Fidelity accounts, the parties also exchanged on that same day most of the documents that would be necessary to transfer funds from Lisa’s account to Brad, but this transfer was halted Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 15 2026 UT App 72 when the parties began disputing the precise mechanism for the transfer (which the parties apparently believed might have tax implications) and the proper date on which to value the amounts in the accounts.

¶33 In May 2023, the court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, along with a Decree of Divorce, which, together, settled the division of the parties’ assets in terms consistent with those set forth in the November 2022 email. The Rule 60 Motion and Further Proceedings on Damages

¶34 Following the entry of the divorce decree, Lisa filed a motion pursuant to rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There, Lisa asked the court to set aside the decree because, in her view, the decree had not resolved several outstanding issues, including (1) how and when to value the Fidelity accounts; (2) whether Lisa was entitled to various tax credits; and (3) who should receive various items of personal property. In the course of describing the prior proceedings, Lisa stated: At the March 14, 2023 hearing, the [c]ourt granted Brad’s motion to enforce the November [2022 email] as a binding and complete settlement, but the [c]ourt ordered that such a settlement would be implemented not as specifically proposed by either party. The [c]ourt’s oral ruling, however, adopts, in Lisa’s view, only immaterial aspects of the implementation terms proposed by Brad’s counsel, and instead adopts the materially different terms sought by Lisa despite Lisa’s reservation that no settlement was ever reached as to all marital assets and liabilities. Lisa also included a footnote asserting that the court had “ordered a simultaneous exchange rather than Brad’s receipt of all consideration prior to Lisa’s receipt of the majority of her Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 16 2026 UT App 72 consideration, and the [c]ourt eliminated” the QPRTs “by [c]ourt order as requested by Lisa and as recommended by [Alaska Counsel].” In a subsequent reply memorandum on her rule 60 motion, Lisa affirmatively stated that the “parties’ disputes regarding how to implement the November . . . 2022 email were also resolved by the [c]ourt largely in Lisa’s favor.”

¶35 The court later granted Lisa’s rule 60 motion, stating that when it had entered the divorce decree, “it mistakenly understood that the parties had resolved remaining property allocation issues.” The court agreed to “hold an evidentiary hearing to make the determinations necessary to fully resolve those property division matters.”

¶36 A two-day evidentiary hearing was held on November 27 and 28, 2023. On the first day of the hearing, the parties presented evidence and arguments about the issues the court had agreed to resolve pursuant to Lisa’s rule 60 motion. With respect to the Fidelity accounts, the parties agreed that the value of Lisa’s account had been in excess of $3 million since the time of the November 2022 email (albeit at fluctuating amounts). In light of the provision in the November 2022 email stating that Lisa would receive “$3 million of the value of the marital Fidelity accounts with Brad to receive the remaining value in such accounts,” the disagreement thus focused on which date should control the valuation—and, thus, how much Brad should now receive. Lisa argued that the accounts should be valued as of December 31, 2022—the date that the court had previously ruled would have been a reasonable date on which the parties could close. Brad, however, argued that the Fidelity accounts should be valued as of April 14, 2023, the date on which the parties had transferred their interests in the LLCs and the home, and on which they had exchanged some documents that, but for their last-minute dispute, would have allowed Lisa to transfer funds to Brad from her Fidelity account.

¶37 On the second day of the hearing, the court addressed the outstanding issues regarding Brad’s request for damages. The Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 17 2026 UT App 72 court expressed its understanding “that Lisa took the position in court beginning after the November 16, 2022 mediation through December 31st, and through the hearing on [Brad’s] motion to enforce . . . , that there was no enforceable settlement agreement.” Lisa’s counsel corrected the court, stating that Lisa’s position was that the parties had “not reached agreement with respect to all material terms” and that “there [were] conditions,” but that if the court was “enforcing a settlement agreement, it [could] and should enforce it pursuant to the terms that [would] eliminate the QPRTs.” The court responded, “Okay. Got it. And then there was a disagreement about how to eliminate the QPRTs. Ultimately, the [c]ourt adopted Brad’s view of that, correct?” Lisa’s counsel replied, “No. The [c]ourt adopted Lisa’s view of that . . . . And the [c]ourt entered an order under the Alaska statute that [Alaska Counsel] had recommended.”

¶38 Following the hearing, the court entered Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 16, 2024. Early in this ruling, the court found that “[b]ut for Lisa taking the position” that the November 2022 email “was not an enforceable written agreement . . . , the parties would have closed . . . on or before December 31, 2022.” The court then concluded that “the litigation positions and tactics taken by Lisa, after Brad informed the [c]ourt of the November [2022 email] settlement agreement by the parties, [were] the cause of the three and a half months of delay of the performance required” in the November 2022 email.

¶39 Turning to the Fidelity accounts, the court found that the evidence showed that the “parties made their November 16, 2022 agreement based on the values of the IRA accounts on November 16, 2022, and that the values of the accounts on that date are the values that each party understood would be the values governing the parties’ bargained-for exchange.” The court then concluded that because Lisa’s balance on that date was $3,146,732, she “was obligated to transfer $146,732 to Brad,” plus an award of statutory interest. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 18 2026 UT App 72

¶40 Finally, the court determined that because the transfers of the parties’ interests in the LLCs didn’t occur until April 14, 2023, “Brad failed to receive cash that he would have received had those transfers occurred on or before December 31, 2022.” The court found that the income streams for Creekside LLC and Martha’s Vineyard LLC (the two LLCs that Brad was awarded in the November 2022 email) from January 2023 through April 2023, plus interest, amounted to $129,828.20. The court accordingly ordered Lisa to pay that amount to Brad as damages for her delay.

¶41 Lisa now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶42 Lisa first argues that the district court erred by determining that the November 2022 email was a fully integrated agreement without considering any extrinsic evidence to make that determination.6 “A determination of whether a contract is integrated begins with answering the legal question of whether the written expression of the parties’ agreement contains a clear integration clause. If there is a clear integration clause, the integration inquiry generally ends.” Reid v. All Surface LC, 2025 UT App 134, ¶ 31, 578 P.3d 259 (emphasis in original, quotation otherwise simplified), cert. denied, 585 P.3d 48 (Utah 2026). Neither of the parties here asserts that the November 2022 email contained an integration clause. Where, as here, “there is no clear integration clause, . . . a court may consider relevant parol evidence and determine as a matter of fact whether the writing is integrated.” Id. (emphasis in original, quotation otherwise simplified). And when the question of integration is a question of fact, we review 6. Brad claims that this issue is not preserved, but we disagree. At the hearing on Brad’s motion to enforce, Lisa advanced her argument that the November 2022 email was not completely integrated, and the district court later explicitly noted that Lisa had preserved this issue at the evidentiary hearing that was held in November 2023. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 19 2026 UT App 72 the district court’s factual determination for clear error. See Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ¶ 10, 182 P.3d 326.

¶43 Lisa next argues that the district court erred by ordering her to pay damages relating to her delays. As explained below, we view part of the ruling in question as turning on the district court’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement. We review that aspect of the ruling for correctness. See Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6, ¶ 15, 367 P.3d 994 (“The interpretation of a contract is a legal question, which we . . . review for correctness.”). With respect to the decision to award sanctions itself, we review that decision for an abuse of discretion. See Raass Bros. Inc. v. Raass, 2019 UT App 183, ¶ 11, 454 P.3d 83. An abuse of discretion “may be demonstrated by showing that the district court relied on an erroneous conclusion of law or that there was no evidentiary basis” for its ruling. Id. (quotation simplified). ANALYSIS I. Enforcement of the November 2022 Email

¶44 Lisa first argues that the district court erred by not taking extrinsic evidence before deciding that the November 2022 email was a fully integrated and enforceable contract. In her briefing, Lisa insists that she was not asking the district court to vary from the stated terms of the November 2022 email. Rather, she argues that if the court had taken extrinsic evidence, it would not have held that the November 2022 email was fully integrated and that it would have instead concluded that additional terms should be added. Specifically, she contends that extrinsic evidence would have shown that there were four additional terms (or, as indicated below, categories of terms) that still needed to be added to the parties’ agreement, namely: 1. a term setting forth the timing by which the parties would exchange their respective documents and convey their interests in the various marital assets; Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 20 2026 UT App 72 2. a term establishing the mechanism by which the QPRTs would be eliminated; 3. a term allowing Lisa to withdraw her assent to the November 2022 email depending on the results of the Evaluation; and 4. additional terms governing various issues that the court had reserved for trial, including Brad’s alleged misappropriation of the LLCs’ profits, as well as Brad’s alleged mishandling of the LLCs’ tax returns.

¶45 For the reasons set forth below, we see no reversible error with respect to any of the above.

A. Timing

¶46 In Lisa’s briefing, she essentially raises two components regarding her timing claim: first, she argues that extrinsic evidence would have shown that the parties had anticipated a single, simultaneous closing, and second, she argues that evidence would have shown that the parties needed a reasonable period of time in which to complete this closing.

¶47 It’s true that the November 2022 email did not explicitly establish either of these things. But in order to prevail on her claim, Lisa needs to show not only that the court erred by not taking additional evidence, but also that she was harmed by the court’s failure. A “harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Lundahl Farms LLC v. Nielsen, 2021 UT App 146,

¶ 48, 504 P.3d 735 (quotation simplified). “If we conclude that an error is harmless, we are not required to reverse.” RJW Media Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, ¶ 33, 392 P.3d 956 (quotation simplified); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 61 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). Here, Lisa has not persuaded Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 21 2026 UT App 72 us that she was harmed by the court’s failure to consider extrinsic evidence with respect to timing. This is so because Lisa ended up receiving both of the things that she’s now claiming should have been added as terms to the agreement. ¶48 First, in the district court’s March 2023 ruling on Brad’s motion to enforce, the court ordered the parties to conduct a single, simultaneous closing. And in subsequent filings, Lisa repeatedly acknowledged that the court had indeed ordered this. For example, in her rule 60 motion, Lisa stated that the “[c]ourt’s oral ruling . . . adopts, in Lisa’s view, only immaterial aspects of the implementation terms proposed by Brad’s counsel, and instead adopts the materially different terms sought by Lisa.” In a footnote, Lisa more specifically stated that the district court had “ordered a simultaneous exchange rather than Brad’s receipt of all consideration prior to Lisa’s receipt of the majority of her consideration.” Then, in her rule 60 reply memorandum, Lisa reiterated her broader view that the “parties’ disputes regarding how to implement the November . . . 2022 email were also resolved by the [c]ourt largely in Lisa’s favor.”7

¶49 Second, as for Lisa’s claim that there needed to be a term giving the parties a “reasonable time” in which to accomplish the closing, the district court concluded in the March 2023 oral ruling that while the November 2022 email was “silent as to a deadline for the parties’ respective performances,” “the law” would allow it to “impl[y] a reasonable time under the circumstances.” See NetDictation LLC v. Rice, 2019 UT App 198, ¶ 27, 455 P.3d 625. The 7. Lisa’s claim seems to be that a simultaneous closing should have been included in the parties’ agreement. This seems slightly different from a potential claim that a party later violated its obligations by not participating in such a simultaneous closing. We don’t regard Lisa as having fully briefed the latter type of claim. Regardless, the record shows that with just a few exceptions, the parties did in fact effectuate a single, simultaneous closing on April 14, 2023, and those exceptions were later resolved by the court in the November 2023 hearing. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 22 2026 UT App 72 court then noted that Lisa’s counsel had originally suggested that the parties could close by December 31, 2022, which was about 45 days from the date of the November 2022 email, and that this was “a reasonable time frame to get all that needs to be done completed.” In the court’s view, this showed that Lisa had believed that a period of 45 days was sufficient to allow the parties to complete the closing. From this, the district court gave the parties 45 days from the hearing in March 2023—i.e., until April 28, 2023—“to conduct a closing and tender and exchange their respective performances.” On appeal, Lisa does not meaningfully argue, much less persuade us, that this was an unreasonable amount of time. Thus, as with the simultaneous closing issue, it seems clear to us that Lisa ended up receiving the very thing that she is now asserting should have been memorialized in the agreement.

¶50 Given the above, we see no basis for concluding that Lisa was prejudiced by the district court’s failure to consider extrinsic evidence with respect to any issue relating to timing. B. Elimination of the QPRTs

¶51 The November 2022 email provided that “the QPRTs [would] be eliminated.” During the litigation that followed, the parties expressed various views on how this was to be done. At the March 2023 hearing, Lisa’s counsel stated that Alaska Counsel had recommended that the parties “just get a court order under” Alaska Statute section 13.36.345 “for the change in circumstance [and] either get [the beneficiaries] to sign off, which is just simply signing the document, or give them notice if they don’t sign it.” In accordance with that request, the court made a finding in its March 2023 oral ruling that “there [had] been a substantial change in circumstances not anticipated by the settlors,” i.e., that they “did not anticipate getting divorced at that time,” and that under Alaska Statute section 13.36.345, the QPRTs “may be terminated.” The court then “order[ed] the parties” to terminate the QPRTs accordingly. In its written ruling, it further “order[ed] the parties to complete transfers as described herein to eliminate the QPRTs.” Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 23 2026 UT App 72

¶52 On appeal, Lisa argues that this order was “improper because (1) the QPRTs were not parties to the proceedings and (2) the district court’s order misapplied the Alaska statute that it purported to rely on and accordingly did not properly eliminate the QPRTs.” In particular, she contends that the court erred by disregarding her assertion “that the consent of the beneficiaries was required,” noting that, in addition to Alaska Statute section 13.36.345, which allows an irrevocable trust to be terminated because of unanticipated circumstances, Alaska Statute section 13.36.360 “allows” an irrevocable trust to be terminated “by consent of the beneficiaries.” She further argues that section 13.36.345 (as well as section 13.36.060) “requires that the request to terminate an irrevocable trust . . . be commenced by ‘a petition’” and under Alaska Statute section 13.06.110, all “interested parties must be given notice of [that] petition.”

¶53 But in the proceedings below, Lisa repeatedly assured the court that the approach she was asking the court to take was “recommended by [Alaska Counsel].” In fact, she specifically stated that Alaska Counsel had “confirmed that [the district court could] enter such an order pursuant to the parties’ agreement under [Alaska Statute section 13.36.345] and that such orders are not uncommon in divorces.” Lisa further represented to the court at the March 2023 hearing that Alaska Counsel had told her that it didn’t have to be an Alaska court that implemented the order but that “the divorce court [could] do it.”8 8. We further note that the only Alaska statute that was presented to the court in the proceedings below was Alaska Statute section 13.36.345. On appeal, Lisa does not argue that it was error for the court to terminate the QPRTs based on section 13.36.345, as opposed to section 13.36.360. Rather, Lisa’s opening brief notes that “under Alaska law, a court may terminate an irrevocable trust” under Alaska Statute section 13.36.345 but an irrevocable trust “may also be terminated” under Alaska Statute section 13.36.360. (Emphases added.) And we note that under section (continued…) Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 24 2026 UT App 72

¶54 Perhaps more importantly, in various proceedings after the court’s March 2023 ruling, Lisa repeatedly and affirmatively stated that the district court had now done what she had requested regarding the elimination of the QPRTs. In her rule 60 motion, for example, Lisa stated that the court had “eliminated” the QPRTs “by [c]ourt order as requested by Lisa and as recommended by [Alaska Counsel].” And at the November 2023 evidentiary hearing, she stated that the “[c]ourt [had] adopted Lisa’s view” regarding elimination of the QPRTs and had “entered an order under the Alaska statute that [Alaska Counsel] had recommended.”

¶55 In light of these representations to the court, we see no basis for accepting Lisa’s assertions on appeal that the court’s resolution of this issue was somehow improper or inadequate. Under the judicial estoppel doctrine, “a person may not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same persons or their privies involving the same subject matter, if such prior position was successfully maintained.” Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, ¶ 42, 207 P.3d 1235 (quotation simplified). And under the invited error doctrine, a party cannot obtain relief on appeal when the party had “manifest[ed] some sort of affirmative representation to the trial court that the court [was] proceeding appropriately.” State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, ¶ 23, 453 P.3d 657. Both doctrines apply here, where Lisa repeatedly told the district court below what was required to eliminate the QPRTs, and where she then later repeatedly and explicitly told the court that it had properly eliminated the QPRTs pursuant to her requests. In light of those representations, she cannot now claim on appeal 13.36.345, consent of the beneficiaries is not required to terminate an irrevocable trust. Thus, we see no error in the court’s decision to terminate the QPRTs under section 13.36.345 rather than section 13.36.360, especially when that was the statute that Lisa asked the court to apply. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 25 2026 UT App 72 that the court erred by not eliminating them in some other manner.9 C. The Evaluation

¶56 Lisa next argues that the district court should have taken extrinsic evidence on whether there was an additional term that would allow her to withdraw her assent to the terms set forth in the November 2022 email once she received the results of the Evaluation.

¶57 But we note that this additional term was not included in Lisa’s own proposed settlement agreement, which she sent to Brad in January 2023. Indeed, in that proposal, Lisa took out the provision from the November 2022 email that had given her the right to receive the written results of the Evaluation.10 This at least arguably suggests that, two months after the November 2022 9. We acknowledge that, in the March 2023 hearing, Lisa expressed her understanding that the beneficiaries of the QPRTs (which, as noted, were the parties’ children) needed to be given notice or instead affirmatively agree to the dissolution of the QPRTs. Brad told the court that this had occurred, but the court never entered a finding that it had, nor did it rule that they had been notified in a way that was meaningful under Alaska law. That said, however, after the court issued its March 2023 ruling, Lisa repeatedly told the court that it had already properly dissolved the QPRTs. Thus, even if the beneficiaries themselves could in theory challenge the dissolution in some proceeding, what we hold here is that under principles of judicial estoppel and invited error, Lisa cannot challenge the adequacy of the court’s actions in this appeal because she repeatedly assured the court below that it had already done enough. 10. Under Lisa’s January 2023 proposal, Brad was still required to obtain the Evaluation, but that proposal said nothing about Lisa being able to receive the results, much less withdraw her assent to the November 2022 email based on them. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 26 2026 UT App 72 mediation, Lisa did not think that there had been some prior agreement under which she was allowed to withdraw her assent based on her review of the Evaluation.

¶58 But more importantly, in subsequent proceedings, Lisa stated that she had consciously withdrawn this additional term. At the March 2023 hearing, Lisa’s counsel had an exchange with the court in which he specifically affirmed that in Lisa’s proposed settlement agreement, Lisa had not included a provision allowing her to “review” the results of the Evaluation because she was “willing to proceed on these terms as mapped out” in the November 2022 email “without seeing” the results of the Evaluation. Lisa’s counsel explained that Lisa had decided to “take[] . . . out [this term] because [they] could not get an agreement that [Lisa] could consult with medical professionals to be able to evaluate [the results],” and “if [she couldn’t] talk to a medical professional about what [the results meant], then [she couldn’t] . . . exercise that provision” to withdraw her consent based on the results of the Evaluation.

¶59 Given this, even if it were true that the parties had previously agreed on this as an additional term, the above affirmations made by Lisa’s counsel during the March 2023 hearing are a clear showing that Lisa had subsequently abandoned it. See generally Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (“Abandonment means the intentional relinquishment of one’s rights in the contract; and in order to nullify such rights, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such abandonment.”). We therefore see no basis for reversing based on the district court’s failure to consider extrinsic evidence about whether the parties had previously agreed to this term.

D. Other Additional Terms

¶60 Finally, Lisa argues that there were additional issues that she “had long been concerned about that [she] had litigated over, which were not addressed by the November 2022 [email] nor Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 27 2026 UT App 72 explicitly excluded,” such as Brad’s alleged misappropriation of the LLCs’ profits (the Misappropriation Issue) and Lisa’s concerns regarding Brad’s handling of the LLCs’ tax returns (the Tax Liability Issue). Lisa further argues that she “[was] harmed by the non-inclusion of [such] terms in the divorce decree” because “she never formally agreed to relinquish” them. In her view, “[i]t was unreasonable for the court to assume, without hearing any evidence . . . , that Lisa intended to give up on [these issues], absent a clear articulation that [they were] resolved.” But Lisa has not persuaded us that there was any reversible error. This is so for two principal reasons.

¶61 First, Lisa simply has not proved her claim. When a party contends that an otherwise integrated agreement is missing terms (i.e., that the agreement is only partially integrated), extrinsic evidence “is admissible to show what the entire contract really was, by supplementing, as distinguished from contradicting, the writing.” Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added, quotation otherwise simplified). In the absence of any extrinsic evidence showing that the parties had actually agreed upon the missing term (or at least intended to include a specific term), the party cannot ask the court to rewrite the contract to supply the term that the parties omitted. See Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982) (highlighting the “long-standing rule in Utah that persons dealing at arm’s length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the intervention of the courts to relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain” and holding that courts “will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties omitted”); Monaco Apartment Homes v. Figueroa, 2021 UT App 50, ¶ 10, 489 P.3d 1132 (“The court cannot rewrite the contract because a party failed to include language to protect its rights.” (quotation simplified)).

¶62 Here, at the outset of the November 2022 email, the parties wrote that the agreement would govern how the parties would split “marital assets.” It’s not entirely clear to us that these additional terms (i.e., those relating to the Misappropriation Issue and the Tax Liability Issue) would necessarily be part of such an Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 28 2026 UT App 72 agreement. But more to the point, Lisa has not pointed to any place in the record in which either she or Brad proffered that the parties had agreed to these terms prior to or during the November 2022 mediation. For this reason alone, it appears that she was trying to add new terms, rather than present extrinsic evidence of terms on which the parties previously agreed. Thus, to the extent that her claim is about the failure to accept extrinsic evidence regarding the November 2022 agreement, it fails for lack of proof. 11

¶63 Second, even if Lisa thought that she could present such proof in a future hearing, we conclude that principles of judicial estoppel and invited error prevent her from obtaining relief on this issue on appeal. As noted, Lisa claimed in her rule 60 motion that although the court had not “implemented” the agreement “as specifically proposed by either party,” it had “adopt[ed], in Lisa’s view, only immaterial aspects of the implementation terms proposed by Brad’s counsel and instead adopt[ed] the materially different terms sought by Lisa.” Then, in her rule 60 reply memorandum, Lisa expressed her view that the “parties’ disputes regarding how to implement the November . . . 2022 email were also resolved by the [c]ourt largely in Lisa’s favor.” Thus, to the extent that Lisa had previously asserted that the court should take evidence on whether these additional issues were part of the November 2022 email, she was now telling the court that its ruling had given relief on all “material” terms in her favor. In light of 11. Indeed, the available evidence actually suggests that the parties did not agree to these additional terms during that mediation. As noted, the parties’ attorneys engaged in extensive discussions via email in the days after the November 2022 mediation. But although the attorneys extensively argued in those emails about how the final decree should reflect each of the other issues we’ve addressed above (timing, the QPRTs, and the Evaluation), the attorneys never mentioned the Misappropriation Issue or the Tax Liability issue at all. This silence is notable, and it suggests that no one thought at the time these issues had been settled in the mediation. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 29 2026 UT App 72 this, she cannot claim on appeal that the court had actually left something out.12

¶64 For these reasons, Lisa has not persuaded us that the court committed any reversible error with respect to its failure to take extrinsic evidence. II. Delay Damages

¶65 In the March 14, 2023 oral ruling, the district court gave the parties 45 days to close on the necessary transactions, thus setting the deadline as April 28, 2023. In subsequent proceedings, the court held Lisa responsible for (1) $160,182.43, which represented the balance in Lisa’s Fidelity account over $3 million as of November 16, 2022, plus interest (the Fidelity Damages), as well as (2) $129,828.20, which represented the income streams for Creekside LLC and Martha’s Vineyard LLC (both of which had been awarded to Brad) from January 2023 through April 2023, plus interest (the LLC Profits Damages). Lisa now challenges these awards. We see no error with respect to the Fidelity 12. Even if it were true that the November 2022 email itself didn’t resolve these issues, this wouldn’t mean that Lisa couldn’t have obtained an order from the court resolving them in some other way. Indeed, Lisa made exactly that kind of request in her rule 60 motion, asking the court there to vacate the decree so that it could rule on several other outstanding issues. But of note, she did not include, in her rule 60 motion, a request that the court now rule on either the Misappropriation Issue or the Tax Liability Issue. Moreover, while she did make a passing reference to the Tax Liability Issue in her reply memorandum, she didn’t mention it in the subsequent hearing, and after the court didn’t decide it in the rule 60 ruling, Lisa didn’t file anything with the court suggesting that it had erred by failing to do so. Moreover, Lisa has not meaningfully briefed a claim on appeal demonstrating that the court erred by failing to recognize this as an issue that she had properly raised in the rule 60 litigation. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 30 2026 UT App 72 Damages, but we do see error with respect to the LLC Profits Damages.

¶66 Fidelity Damages. Starting with the Fidelity Damages, the November 2022 email stated that Lisa was entitled to “$3 million of the value of the marital Fidelity accounts with Brad to receive the remaining value in such accounts.” However, the parties subsequently disputed when the valuation of Lisa’s Fidelity account should occur. In the ruling that the court issued after the two-day evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that the parties had agreed that the Fidelity accounts would be valued as of November 16, 2022. Because Lisa’s Fidelity account had a balance of $3,146,732 as of November 16, 2022, the court ordered her to transfer $146,732 plus interest to Brad.

¶67 On appeal, Lisa has not meaningfully challenged the court’s determination that the proper valuation date was November 16, 2022—indeed, it’s not clear that she’s even trying to challenge that decision at all—nor has she challenged the court’s ability to award interest on it. And with that date as the backdrop, the court’s damages order relating to the Fidelity accounts did nothing more than enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement. We accordingly see no error regarding the imposition of these damages.

¶68 LLC Profits Damages. We do, however, see error with respect to the LLC Profits Damages.

¶69 As noted, the parties did not include a clause in the November 2022 email setting a date by which the parties were required to transfer their ownership interests in these LLCs, nor was there ever a finding of any other agreement that would control this issue. This means that, unlike the Fidelity Damages, these damages appeared to be based on the court’s own authority.

¶70 The record is clear enough that the court invoked this authority because of its concerns about Lisa’s delay. As discussed, Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 31 2026 UT App 72 the court noted that when an agreement is silent as to the time for performance, the law presumes a reasonable time under the circumstances. See NetDictation LLC, 2019 UT App 198, ¶ 27. With that rule as the jump-off, the court initially found that, shortly after the November 16, 2022 mediation, Lisa had proposed December 31, 2022, as a reasonable deadline on which the parties could close. From this, the court then found that it would be reasonable to give the parties 45 days to close. Lisa challenges these findings on appeal, but for the same reasons expressed above, we see no merit to that challenge. Again, on the day after the mediation, Lisa proposed December 31 as a “reasonable time frame to get all that needs to be done completed,” and that was a period of about 45 days. We see no basis for overturning the district court’s conclusion that 45 days was a reasonable amount of time.

¶71 This leaves the question of when the 45-day period should have started running. In its order, the district court assessed damages against Lisa for the lost income that Brad would have received from the two LLCs that he was awarded had the closing occurred on December 31, 2022. In the court’s view, these damages were appropriate because, “[b]ut for Lisa taking the position” that the November 2022 email “was not an enforceable written agreement . . . , the parties would have closed . . . on or before December 31, 2022,” and the court further observed that it was Lisa’s “litigation positions and tactics” that prevented the parties from closing until April 2023.

¶72 But having reviewed the record, it’s unclear to us what the legal or factual basis was for the court’s decision to sanction Lisa for taking these positions in the litigation. Under rules 11(b) and (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court can award sanctions if litigation was done for an “improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” But the court never found that Lisa’s litigation had met this standard. Separate from rule 11, Utah caselaw allows courts to impose sanctions based on the courts’ statutory and “inherent authority to punish contemptuous Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 32 2026 UT App 72 conduct.” Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 36, 123 P.3d 416; see id. (“A court’s authority to sanction contemptuous conduct is both statutory and inherent.”). But there was no finding of contempt by the district court. Nor, for that matter, was there any finding that Lisa had engaged in bad faith litigation or “abuse of the [legal] process,” see Utah Code § 78B-6-301(4), which could in theory have provided a separate statutory basis for assessing these damages.

¶73 To be clear, we stress here the difference between the Fidelity Damages and the LLC Profits Damages when it comes to timing. The Fidelity Damages were based on a valuation date that, according to the court’s unchallenged finding, was the product of an agreement by the parties. But the LLC Profits Damages were not. Instead, they were based on the court’s own determination of when it would have been reasonable for the parties to have closed. While we’ve affirmed the conclusion that it would have been reasonable to close within 45 days, those 45 days needed to start running at some point. In its damages ruling, the court seems to have fixed that date as the November 2022 mediation. But in the months between that mediation and the March 2023 ruling, the parties were litigating various issues—which the district court did not state were improper or abusive to pursue—that would have impacted that closing, such as what the terms of the November 2022 agreement even were and whether the agreement was binding. It wasn’t until the March 2023 ruling that those issues were resolved. Indeed, in that ruling, the court officially started the 45-day clock and gave the parties until April 28, 2023, to close.

¶74 On this record, we see no legal or factual basis for holding Lisa responsible for the LLC income that Brad lost between January 2023 and the date on which the parties closed. We accordingly reverse and vacate the portion of the court’s decision that awarded those damages and remand with instructions for the court to enter a damages award based solely on the Fidelity Damages. Wilson v. Wilson 20240444-CA 33 2026 UT App 72

CONCLUSION

¶75 For the reasons set forth above, we see no reversible error stemming from the district court’s failure to consider extrinsic evidence regarding the November 2022 email. We also see no error in the district court’s award of the Fidelity Damages. But we do see error regarding the court’s imposition of the LLC Profits Damages, and we accordingly reverse and vacate those damages and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed

The reviewing court determined that the lower court committed reversible error and overturned the judgment.

Affirmed

The reviewing court determined that the lower court committed no reversible error and upheld the judgment.

Remanded

The reviewing court returned the case to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.