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State v. P.M. (In re P.M.), 2025 UT App 154

Link to Official Court Opinion

Case Summary

M.M. (Mother) and O.D.M. (Father) are the parents of P.M. (Child), who was three months old when Mother, while traveling through Utah without Father, was involuntarily committed following an incident at a Salt Lake City hotel. Child was taken into protective custody, and the State filed a verified child welfare petition alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency as to both parents. Because the family resided out of state and then relocated twice during the case, the parties spent several months resolving jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and the adjudication hearing did not occur until roughly seven months after the petition was filed. On appeal, Mother challenged the delay in adjudication (both as a misapplication of the UCCJEA and as a due process violation) and the adequacy of Spanish-language interpretation of evidence admitted at the adjudication hearing.

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Oral Argument

Briefing Documents

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Coverage

Facts

Family Background and Travel to Utah

  • Child was born in March 2023 in Idaho, where Mother and Father lived together at the time.
  • On May 24, 2023, Father left Idaho for a short trip to Texas. Mother, feeling threatened by people in her community, decided to leave Idaho as well.
  • On June 9, 2023, Mother arrived at the Salt Lake City airport intending to buy a ticket to Texas to meet Father, but was told she lacked the necessary paperwork to purchase a ticket for Child. An airport employee called police; a Spanish-speaking case manager also responded. Mother speaks only Spanish, and none of the responding officers spoke Spanish.
  • Based on her conversation with Mother, the case manager believed Mother was fleeing an abusive relationship with Father. Because local shelters were full, Mother was placed in a nearby hotel.

The Hotel Incident and Removal

  • At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 10, two officers (Officer 1 and Officer 2) responded to the hotel on a report of a female having a “problem.” Neither officer spoke fluent Spanish, although Officer 2 spoke “a bit.” Both activated their body cameras.
  • The officers found Mother in the lobby holding Child, wearing only a bra, and “screaming or yelling at a high tone of voice.” Another woman, holding an ice pack to her face, alleged that Mother had hit her “in the face for no apparent reason.” Mother refused the officers’ request to return to her room, which the officers understood she believed was “dangerous.”
  • Based on Mother’s “erratic behavior,” the officers concluded she met the criteria for involuntary commitment. When they attempted to take her into custody, Mother “became combative,” refused to release Child, and “began to wrap her arm near [Child’s] neck area and squeeze rather tightly.” Officer 1 testified that this grip could restrict blood flow through the carotid arteries and lead to “unconsciousness” or “death.”
  • Officer 1 used his taser to stun Mother so that Child could be retrieved safely. Child was placed in temporary emergency protective custody, and Mother was involuntarily committed to a Salt Lake City hospital.

Father’s Arrival and the Petition

  • Father arrived in Utah on June 11 but was not contacted regarding Mother or Child. He returned to Idaho about twenty-four hours later, contacted police, and searched for Mother.
  • Mother was released from the hospital on June 12 and moved into a women’s shelter in Salt Lake City.
  • On June 13, the State filed a verified child welfare petition alleging Child was abused, neglected, or dependent because Mother had been involuntarily committed and the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) could not contact Father.

Shelter Hearing

  • At the June 16 shelter hearing, Mother’s counsel argued that Idaho was Child’s home state under the UCCJEA and that Utah had only emergency jurisdiction. Parents asked for Child’s return so the family could go back to Idaho, or alternatively for an expedited investigation under the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC).
  • The State opposed return, noting it had only just made contact with Father and that Mother’s domestic violence allegations against Father had not been investigated. Father contended the ICPC did not apply to a natural parent but agreed that, under Utah Code § 80-3-302, the court could order DCFS to check his home and background.
  • The juvenile court found the initial removal “reasonable and appropriate” due to an emergency amounting to aggravated circumstances, ordered DCFS to request an Idaho courtesy visit and a background check of Father, ordered an expedited ICPC investigation “just to keep things flowing,” and continued Child’s removal. The court candidly acknowledged it was “not sure that I’ve got much” information beyond the domestic violence allegation to support a substantial risk finding.

Jurisdictional Proceedings Under the UCCJEA

  • At the June 28 pretrial hearing, Mother’s counsel asked to set the case over to review discovery; the hearing was continued to August 2.
  • On August 2, the State advised that Idaho was the home state and requested a further pretrial in about three weeks to allow Idaho to file a petition. Mother’s counsel agreed the request made “the most sense.” Father then disclosed that Parents had moved from Idaho to South Dakota.
  • On August 21, all parties agreed it was “inappropriate” to take further action until jurisdiction was resolved. Mother’s counsel stated he was “hesitant to adjudicate on this case or anything like that until we figure out if this case is staying here or going somewhere else.”
  • On September 11, the parties agreed South Dakota was the preferable forum, and the court stressed that Parents should not move again while an ICPC investigation with South Dakota was pending. Although Parents voiced frustration with the pace, Mother’s counsel told the court “there’s nothing that we can do until it’s decided which Court is ultimately going to have jurisdiction.”
  • On September 26, the juvenile court conferred with judges from South Dakota and Idaho, and all agreed South Dakota was the most appropriate forum. At the October 2 hearing, Mother’s counsel stated he was “in favor of” continuing Child in DCFS custody until a South Dakota petition was filed.
  • On October 27, Parents moved from South Dakota to Utah. At a November 3 hearing and UCCJEA conference, Parents asked the Utah court to take jurisdiction; Idaho and South Dakota declined jurisdiction, and the juvenile court concluded jurisdiction was proper in Utah.

Mediation, Adjudication, and Reunification

  • On November 13, all parties agreed to mediation, which proved unsuccessful. On December 14, the parties asked the court to set a one-day adjudication hearing.
  • The adjudication hearing was held January 12, 2024. The State offered the officers’ body camera footage (with audio), and both officers testified about the encounter, including their understanding of what Mother said in Spanish. Before closing argument, the State withdrew the body camera exhibits. (The opinion refers at ¶ 23 to the “July 10 hotel encounter,” which appears to be a typographical reference to the June 10 incident.)
  • The juvenile court adjudicated Child dependent as to both Mother and Father. On October 23, 2024, Child was returned to Parents’ custody and the court’s jurisdiction was terminated. Father separately appealed. See In re P.M., 2025 UT App 155.
  • Although the appeal was technically moot, the parties agreed, and the court of appeals concluded, that it fell within the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine.

Issues of the Case

Mother (M.M.) raised two primary issues on appeal, which the court of appeals resolved as three distinct claims: a statutory challenge to the delayed adjudication, a due process challenge to that delay, and an evidentiary and due process challenge to the language interpretation at the adjudication hearing.

Issue 1: Delayed Adjudication / Application of the UCCJEA and the Sixty-Day Deadline

Issue 2: Delayed Adjudication / Due Process

Issue 3: Language Interpretation / Admission of Body Camera Footage and Officer Testimony

The court of appeals affirmed on all three issues; no issue was reversed or remanded.

  • Civil Procedure — Jurisdiction

    1. Delayed Adjudication / Application of the UCCJEA and the Sixty-Day Deadline

    Claim on Appeal: Mother argued that the juvenile court misapplied the UCCJEA by treating its temporary emergency jurisdiction as preventing adjudication of the petition, which caused the adjudication hearing to be held long after the sixty-day deadline in Utah Code § 80-3-401(2). Conceding that her trial counsel “seemingly did not” preserve the issue and had “acquiesced in the delay,” she argued that Parents’ repeated objections to delay were sufficient for preservation or, alternatively, sought review under the plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions. The guardians ad litem responded that Mother invited any error.

    Holding: — Affirmed. Because Mother’s counsel repeatedly and affirmatively asked the juvenile court to defer adjudication until jurisdiction was resolved, Mother invited any error in the delay, which precludes even plain error review; the exceptional circumstances exception was likewise unavailable because invited error is not a rare procedural anomaly.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 80-3-401(2) (requires the final adjudication hearing within sixty calendar days after the later of the shelter hearing or the petition filing); Utah Code §§ 81-11-201(1) and 81-11-204(1) (UCCJEA initial custody jurisdiction and temporary emergency jurisdiction).

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Preservation

    Specific Standard: “Under the doctrine of invited error, we have declined to engage in even plain error review when counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no objection to the action taken.” In re P.M., 2025 UT App 154, ¶ 29 (quoting State v. Ringstad, 2018 UT App 66, ¶ 58, 424 P.3d 1052).

    Applies To: Mother’s unpreserved challenge to the juvenile court’s UCCJEA-based postponement of the adjudication hearing beyond the sixty-day statutory deadline.

    Controlling Cases:

    • State v. Biel, 2021 UT 8, 484 P.3d 1172 (invited error doctrine prevents parties from misleading the trial court to preserve a hidden ground for reversal)
    • State v. Ringstad, 2018 UT App 66, 424 P.3d 1052 (invited error forecloses even plain error review where counsel affirmatively represents no objection)
    • State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443 (framework for the plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions to preservation)
    • In re adoption of K.A.S., 2016 UT 55, 390 P.3d 278 (exceptional circumstances applies only to rare procedural anomalies)
    • State v. Brown, 2019 UT App 122, 447 P.3d 1250 (a misstatement of law accepted by the trial court is not a procedural anomaly excusing preservation)

    Why It Matters: The opinion confirms that invited error applies with full force in child welfare proceedings, even where the claimed error implicates a mandatory statutory deadline designed to protect parents and children. A parent’s personal frustration with delay does not preserve an objection when counsel, on the record, repeatedly endorses continuances. Because the court did not reach the merits, the opinion leaves open whether a juvenile court exercising only temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA may, or must, proceed to adjudication within the sixty-day window.

  • Civil Procedure — Due Process

    2. Delayed Adjudication / Due Process

    Claim on Appeal: Mother argued that holding the adjudication hearing after the sixty-day deadline violated her procedural and substantive due process rights, chiefly because the delay consumed part of the limited statutory period for reunification services under Utah Code § 80-3-406(13)(a). She conceded the claim was unpreserved and sought plain error review.

    Holding: — Affirmed. Without deciding whether plain error review is available in child welfare cases, the court held Mother could not show harm, because she successfully reunified with Child before the statutory deadline and the dependency adjudication rested entirely on the hotel events, which would have produced the same result whenever the hearing was held.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 80-3-401(2) (sixty-day deadline for the final adjudication hearing); Utah Code § 80-3-406(13)(a) (reunification services may not exceed twelve months from the child’s initial removal).

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Preservation

    Specific Standard: “To demonstrate plain error, [Mother] must establish that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.” In re P.M., 2025 UT App 154, ¶ 33 (quoting State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 20, 416 P.3d 443).

    Applies To: Mother’s unpreserved procedural and substantive due process challenge to the juvenile court’s holding of the final adjudication hearing after the sixty-day statutory deadline.

    Controlling Cases:

    • State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443 (elements of plain error; harm requires a reasonable probability of a different outcome)
    • State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, 453 P.3d 657 (court need not address obviousness where the alleged error was not harmful)
    • In re A.W., 2018 UT App 217, 437 P.3d 640 (unpreserved constitutional claims are not reviewed absent an exception to preservation)
    • Kelly v. Timber Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, 507 P.3d 357 (plain error review generally unavailable in ordinary civil cases, with a possible exception for fundamental constitutional rights)

    Why It Matters: The opinion illustrates that the harm prong of plain error is case-specific: depletion of the reunification clock is not prejudicial in the abstract when the parent in fact reunified. It also signals that, where an adjudication rests solely on pre-removal events, post-removal delay will rarely be outcome-determinative. The court again reserved the question, flagged in Kelly, whether plain error review is available at all in child welfare proceedings involving fundamental parental rights.

  • Evidence — Admissibility

    3. Language Interpretation / Admission of Body Camera Footage and Officer Testimony

    Claim on Appeal: Mother argued that the juvenile court failed to ensure adequate language interpretation at the adjudication hearing, and abused its discretion by (1) admitting the officers’ body camera footage without an accurate interpretation of what was said and (2) allowing officers with limited Spanish proficiency to testify about what Mother said in Spanish. She also argued, conceding the point was unpreserved, that these errors deprived her of due process.

    Holding: — Affirmed. Any error in admitting the challenged evidence was harmless, because the officers’ observations of Mother’s conduct, independent of anything she said in Spanish, amply supported the dependency adjudication; the absence of harm also defeated her related plain error due process claim.

    Statutory Authority: None cited for this issue; the court resolved it under general evidentiary and harmless error principles.

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Abuse of Discretion

    Specific Standard: “We will not reverse the juvenile court’s rulings on evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that the juvenile court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that an injustice resulted.” In re P.M., 2025 UT App 154, ¶ 26 (quoting In re M.W., 2016 UT App 217, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 557).

    Applies To: The juvenile court’s admission of the officers’ body camera footage and its allowance of officer testimony recounting Mother’s Spanish-language statements at the adjudication hearing.

    Controlling Cases:

    • In re M.W., 2016 UT App 217, 387 P.3d 557 (standard for reviewing juvenile court evidentiary rulings; harmless evidentiary error is not grounds for reversal)
    • U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, 203 P.3d 943 (harmless error is error with no reasonable likelihood of affecting the outcome)
    • State v. Ray, 2022 UT App 95, 516 P.3d 329 (plain error harm standard mirrors the harmless error standard)

    Why It Matters: The opinion demonstrates that interpretation-based challenges will fail where the adjudication can stand on conduct observed by witnesses rather than on the content of translated statements. It also shows how a single harmlessness finding disposes of both a preserved evidentiary claim and a parallel unpreserved constitutional claim. Notably, the State withdrew the body camera exhibits before closing, which further weakened any argument that the footage drove the result.

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

  • In re P.M., 2025 UT App 155 (companion opinion resolving Father’s separate appeal from the same dependency adjudication)
  • State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443 (sets out the plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions to preservation and defines harm as a reasonable probability of a different outcome)
  • In re A.W., 2018 UT App 217, 437 P.3d 640 (unpreserved constitutional claims are not reviewed absent an exception to preservation)
  • In re M.W., 2016 UT App 217, 387 P.3d 557 (abuse of discretion standard for juvenile court evidentiary rulings; harmless error not grounds for reversal)
  • In re M.S., 2023 UT App 74, 533 P.3d 859 (collateral consequences exception to mootness, applied because custody had been restored)
  • In re adoption of K.A.S., 2016 UT 55, 390 P.3d 278 (exceptional circumstances doctrine applies only to rare procedural anomalies)
  • State v. Brown, 2019 UT App 122, 447 P.3d 1250 (a misstatement of law accepted by the trial court is not a procedural anomaly; cited to reject Mother’s exceptional circumstances argument)
  • Kelly v. Timber Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, 507 P.3d 357 (plain error review generally unavailable in ordinary civil cases; question left open here)
  • State v. Biel, 2021 UT 8, 484 P.3d 1172 (purpose of the invited error doctrine)
  • State v. Ringstad, 2018 UT App 66, 424 P.3d 1052 (invited error precludes even plain error review where counsel affirmatively represents no objection)
  • State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, 453 P.3d 657 (no need to address obviousness when the alleged error was not harmful)
  • U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, 203 P.3d 943 (definition of harmless error)
  • State v. Ray, 2022 UT App 95, 516 P.3d 329 (plain error harm standard mirrors harmless error doctrine)

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

  • A timely, specific objection on the record to continuances beyond the sixty-day adjudication deadline.
  • An adjudication that rests on post-removal circumstances rather than solely on the events precipitating removal.
  • A reunification period that actually expired or a termination petition that was filed because of the delay.
  • Adjudication findings that depend on the content of a non-English speaker’s statements as relayed by untrained or non-fluent witnesses.
  • Absence of independent, observed conduct supporting the dependency finding.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

  • The opinion does not impose a list of statutory factors that juvenile courts must address explicitly. It does, however, implicate the following statutory checkpoints that courts and counsel should track:
    • The sixty-day deadline for the final adjudication hearing under Utah Code § 80-3-401(2), measured from the later of the shelter hearing or petition filing.
    • The twelve-month limit on reunification services under Utah Code § 80-3-406(13)(a), measured from initial removal.
    • The basis for Utah jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, whether temporary emergency jurisdiction under § 81-11-204 or initial custody jurisdiction under § 81-11-201.
    • Interstate judicial communication under § 81-11-109 when another state may be the home state or a more appropriate forum.
    • The shelter hearing requirements of § 80-3-302 when a parent seeks return of the child.

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

  • An appeal of a delayed adjudication becomes viable when several factors converge: trial counsel objected on the record to delay; the juvenile court expressly ruled that the UCCJEA prevented adjudication; the delay demonstrably shortened or exhausted the reunification period; and the parent did not ultimately reunify. Where, as here, counsel endorsed each continuance and the parent regained custody, the claim is effectively unreviewable.

Strategy Insight

  • Mother framed her delay argument as a legal error in the juvenile court’s interpretation of the UCCJEA, but the court never reached the legal question because the record showed the delay was requested rather than imposed. The lesson is that a legal-error characterization is only as strong as the preservation record beneath it. Likewise, the interpretation challenge was framed as an evidentiary error, but it failed because it could not be tied to the conduct-based findings that actually supported the adjudication. Appellants should identify, before briefing, which findings the alleged error actually infected.

Open Questions Preserved for Future Cases

  • Whether a Utah juvenile court exercising only temporary emergency jurisdiction under § 81-11-204 may proceed to adjudication within the sixty-day statutory window, or must defer pending resolution of home-state jurisdiction.
  • Whether plain error review is available in child welfare proceedings, an issue the court again reserved in light of Kelly v. Timber Lakes Property Owners Ass’n.

Teaching Value

  • The case is a compact illustration of the hierarchy of appellate obstacles: invited error bars review entirely; absent invitation, plain error requires harm; and preserved evidentiary error is disregarded when harmless. It also shows how the collateral consequences exception permits review of a dependency adjudication even after custody is restored.

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence

  • The opinion relies exclusively on Utah authority. Although the UCCJEA is a uniform act adopted nationwide, the court cited no out-of-state decisions construing it, and the dispositive analysis rests entirely on Utah preservation, invited error, plain error, and harmless error precedent.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)

  • State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76 — Established the modern framework for the plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions to preservation. Role here: supplied the three-part plain error test and the “reasonable probability” definition of harm that defeated Mother’s due process claim.
  • State v. Biel, 2021 UT 8 — Articulated the purpose of the invited error doctrine as preventing parties from misleading the trial court to preserve a hidden ground for reversal. Role here: grounded the holding that counsel’s repeated requests for delay barred appellate review.
  • In re adoption of K.A.S., 2016 UT 55 — Confined the exceptional circumstances doctrine to rare procedural anomalies. Role here: foreclosed Mother’s attempt to recast counsel’s acquiescence as an anomaly.
  • U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10 — Defined harmless error as error with no reasonable likelihood of affecting the outcome. Role here: governed the language interpretation issue.

The Most Important Holding

  • The most significant holding is that a parent invites any error in a juvenile court’s failure to meet the sixty-day adjudication deadline of Utah Code § 80-3-401(2) when counsel repeatedly and affirmatively requests or endorses continuances, and that such invited error bars even plain error review. The holding matters because the sixty-day deadline is phrased in mandatory terms, yet the court treated it as fully subject to ordinary waiver principles. The parent’s expressed frustration with the delay did not override counsel’s on-the-record positions.

Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error

  • The judgment was affirmed in full, so no reversal occurred. Reversal on the delay issue would likely have required a preserved objection to continuing the case beyond sixty days, together with concrete prejudice, such as a reunification period that expired, or a termination proceeding that accelerated, because of the delay. Reversal on the interpretation issue would likely have required an adjudication that depended materially on the content of mistranslated or misunderstood statements rather than on independently observed conduct.
  • The opinion does not detail how the October 23, 2024 return of custody, which occurred more than twelve months after the June 2023 removal, related to the twelve-month reunification limit in § 80-3-406(13)(a); the court’s statement that Mother reunified “before the statutory deadline” may reflect extensions or computations not described in the opinion. Practitioners relying on this reasoning should confirm the reunification timeline in the record.

Practitioner Takeaways

  • Trial Lawyers:
    • If a client wants the case adjudicated promptly, object on the record to every continuance that pushes adjudication past the sixty-day deadline, and do not describe a delay as making “the most sense” or state that “there’s nothing that we can do.”
    • Where jurisdiction is genuinely uncertain under the UCCJEA, ask the court to rule expressly on whether temporary emergency jurisdiction permits adjudication in the interim, so the question is preserved.
    • Request a qualified court interpreter to translate recorded statements, and object specifically when witnesses with limited proficiency recount what a party said in another language.
    • Recognize that a client’s own complaints about delay at a hearing will not preserve an objection that counsel has affirmatively waived.
  • Appellate Lawyers:
    • Before raising an unpreserved timing claim, review every hearing transcript for statements by trial counsel that endorsed the delay; such statements will likely trigger invited error and end the inquiry.
    • Do not frame invited error as an exceptional circumstance; the court expressly rejected that characterization.
    • Build the harm showing around concrete, outcome-altering consequences. Abstract loss of reunification time is insufficient where the parent ultimately reunified.
    • For evidentiary challenges, identify how the challenged evidence was indispensable to the specific findings supporting adjudication; where independently observed conduct supports the result, harmlessness will be found.
  • Parents’ Counsel and Guardians ad Litem in Interstate Cases:
    • Advise parents that relocating during a pending UCCJEA or ICPC process can restart jurisdictional proceedings and extend the time a child remains in custody, as occurred twice in this case.

Majority Opinion

2025 UT App 154

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF P.M., A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE. M.M., Appellant, v. STATE OF UTAH AND O.D.M., Appellees.

Opinion No. 20240242-CA Filed October 23, 2025

Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Aaron Flater No. 1225905

Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellant Derek E. Brown, Deborah A. Wood, and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee State of Utah Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, and Heath Haacke, Guardians ad Litem

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 M.M. (Mother) and O.D.M. (Father) are the parents of P.M. (Child). While traveling in Utah with Child, Mother was involved in an incident that resulted in her involuntary commitment. Father was not with Mother at the time of the incident, and Child was taken into protective custody. The State filed a verified child welfare petition alleging that Child was abused, neglected, or In re P.M. 20240242-CA 2 2025 UT App 154 dependent as to both Mother and Father. Approximately seven months after the petition was filed, the juvenile court held an adjudication hearing on the petition, thereafter entering an order adjudicating Child dependent as to Mother. 1

¶2 Mother now appeals the juvenile court’s dependency adjudication, arguing that the court unlawfully delayed the adjudication hearing and that the court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence during the adjudication hearing. As part of both arguments, Mother asserts that her due process rights were violated. We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND ¶3 Child was born in March 2023, in Idaho. At the time of Child’s birth, Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) lived together in Idaho.

¶4 On May 24, 2023, Father left Idaho for a short trip to Texas. After he left, Mother felt threatened by people in her community, so she decided to leave Idaho to get away from the situation.

¶5 On June 9, 2023, Mother arrived at the airport in Salt Lake City, Utah, where she wanted to purchase a plane ticket to Texas to meet Father. After speaking with an airport employee, Mother was informed that she could not purchase a ticket for Child because she did not have the necessary paperwork. Thereafter, the employee called the police, and officers and a case manager arrived on scene. None of the officers spoke Spanish—which is the only language Mother speaks—although the case manager 1. Child was also adjudicated dependent as to Father based on the same events giving rise to this case, and Father has separately appealed the juvenile court’s adjudication order. See In re P.M., 2025 UT App 155. In this opinion, we resolve only Mother’s appeal. In re P.M. 20240242-CA 3 2025 UT App 154 spoke Spanish. Based on her conversation with Mother, the case manager believed Mother was in an abusive relationship with Father and was fleeing from him. The case manager worked to transfer Mother to a local shelter, but because all the shelters were full, Mother was taken to a nearby hotel.

¶6 At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 10, two officers (Officer 1 and Officer 2) were dispatched to the hotel on a report that an unknown female was having a “problem.” Neither officer spoke fluent Spanish, although Officer 2 spoke “a bit.”

¶7 When the officers arrived at the hotel, they activated their body cameras. They observed Mother standing in the hotel lobby holding Child. Mother was “screaming or yelling at a high tone of voice,” and she was not wearing a shirt, just a bra. A second female was seated in a chair near Mother. She was holding an ice pack to her face, and she alleged that Mother had hit her “in the face for no apparent reason.”

¶8 After trying to ascertain what had happened in the lobby, the officers decided it would be best for Mother to return to her room. The officers asked Mother to do so, but she did not comply with the request because, as the officers understood it, she believed the room was “dangerous.”

¶9 Based on the “erratic behavior” the officers had observed, they concluded that Mother was a danger to herself or others and that she met the criteria necessary to involuntarily commit her to the hospital. But when the officers attempted to take Mother into custody, she “became combative” and would not allow the officers to take Child. The officers quickly became concerned for Child’s safety due to the way that Mother was holding her. Officer 1 saw that Mother “began to wrap her arm near [Child’s] neck area and squeeze rather tightly.” He was concerned because this grip can “ultimately stop the blood flow in the carotid arteries if applied correctly” and, if held too long, it can lead to In re P.M. 20240242-CA 4 2025 UT App 154 “unconsciousness” or “death.” And Officer 2 also realized that Mother was holding Child “in an unsafe manner” by “pulling [Child] tighter towards herself, almost by the crook of her neck.” In light of the foregoing, Officer 1 used his taser to stun Mother so that Child could be retrieved safely. After being removed from Mother, Child was placed into temporary emergency protective custody, and Mother was involuntarily committed to a hospital in Salt Lake City.

¶10 The following day, June 11, Father arrived in Utah. Father was not contacted regarding Child or Mother or their whereabouts, so he left Utah approximately twenty-four hours after his arrival and returned to the family’s residence in Idaho. Once in Idaho, Father contacted the police and searched “everywhere” for Mother. On June 12, Mother was released from the hospital and moved into a local women’s shelter in Salt Lake City.

¶11 On June 13, the State filed a verified child welfare petition alleging that Child was abused, neglected, or dependent when Mother was involuntarily committed and the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) was unable to contact Father

. ¶12 On June 16, the matter came before the juvenile court for a shelter hearing. Mother and Father were present at the hearing. During the hearing, Father informed the court that the family resided in Idaho. Mother’s counsel (Counsel) stated that because the family lived in Idaho and Child had no “ties or connection” with Utah, Child’s home state for purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) was Idaho, and the Utah court “only ha[d] emergency jurisdiction.” See generally Utah Code § 81-11-204(1) (“A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the minor child is present in this state and the minor child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the minor child . . . .”). Parents requested that the court return Child to their custody so In re P.M. 20240242-CA 5 2025 UT App 154 that the family could return to Idaho. In the alternative, Mother asked that the court order an expedited investigation and determination under the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC) to determine whether placement with Parents in Idaho was appropriate.

¶13 The State opposed Parents’ request that Child be returned to them and asked the juvenile court to continue Child’s removal. Regarding Father, the State explained that it had no contact with him until the night before the hearing and that there had not been adequate time to evaluate whether his home in Idaho was an appropriate placement for Child. Moreover, the State noted that Mother had raised domestic violence allegations against Father that had not yet been investigated. The State indicated that it had “no objection” to the court ordering an expedited ICPC investigation for Father. In response, Father argued that he was not subject to the ICPC because he is Child’s natural parent, although he agreed that pursuant to Utah Code section 80-3-302 the court could order DCFS to visit his home and “check into his background to make sure there [were] no violent felonies or misdemeanors” before returning Child to his custody.

¶14 At the close of the shelter hearing, the juvenile court found that Child’s initial removal was “[d]ue to an emergency situation amounting to aggravated circumstances” and that the removal was therefore “reasonable and appropriate.” The court then determined that it was statutorily required to investigate Father’s fitness to assume custody and to conduct a criminal background check for Father. The court accordingly ordered DCFS to contact Idaho and request a courtesy visit to Parents’ home. The court continued Child’s removal pending that information, reasoning as follows: And I’m being careful here, but I also have to find that there’s a substantial risk that [Child] will suffer abuse or neglect if [she is] not removed from In re P.M. 20240242-CA 6 2025 UT App 154 the custody of [her] parent or guardian. And I’m not sure that I’ve got any, other than the indication of domestic violence by [Father] against [Mother]. I’m not sure that I’ve got much . . . other information to believe that [Child] would suffer abuse or neglect if [she is] not removed from the custody of [Father] or perhaps even [Mother]. The court declined to rule on the applicability of the ICPC at that time but nevertheless ordered an expedited ICPC investigation “just to keep things flowing.” A pretrial hearing was set for June 28.

¶15 At the June 28 pretrial hearing, the State informed the juvenile court that it had filed a report detailing DCFS’s efforts to investigate Parents’ residence in Idaho. At the parties’ request, the court then continued the hearing to August 2.

¶16 At the continued hearing on August 2, the State informed the juvenile court that it believed Idaho was Child’s home state under the UCCJEA and that Utah had only “emergency jurisdiction.” The State requested to set the matter for a further pretrial hearing in “about three weeks” to allow Idaho time to file a petition. Counsel did not object and affirmatively stated that he believed the request made “the most sense” given that Parents resided in Idaho; Father’s counsel took “the same position.” Following this, Father informed the court that Parents had moved from Idaho to South Dakota. The pretrial review hearing was continued to August 21.

¶17 During the August 21 pretrial hearing, the parties discussed jurisdictional concerns caused by Parents’ move to South Dakota. Because Parents were no longer living in Idaho, Idaho had stopped working with the State. Ultimately, all parties agreed that it was “inappropriate” to take further action until the jurisdictional questions were resolved. Counsel told the juvenile In re P.M. 20240242-CA 7 2025 UT App 154 court, “I think we need to figure out the jurisdictional issue first. I’m hesitant to adjudicate on this case or anything like that until we figure out if this case is staying here or going somewhere else . . . .” And Father’s counsel stated that she “share[d] . . . the perspective of” Counsel.

¶18 At a September 11 pretrial hearing, the parties discussed UCCJEA issues. The State informed the juvenile court that an ICPC investigation with South Dakota was pending, and all parties agreed that South Dakota was the preferable jurisdiction given Parents’ current location. In light of the pending ICPC investigation, the court “emphasize[d]” that it was “very important that [Parents] not move from their current location.” Parents expressed frustration at how long the case was taking, but Counsel told the court, “[T]here’s nothing that we can do until it’s decided which Court is ultimately going to have jurisdiction.” Father’s counsel stated that Father was “in a similar position” as Mother.

¶19 On September 26, the juvenile court held a conference with judges from South Dakota and Idaho to discuss the issue of jurisdiction. See generally Utah Code § 81-11-109(2) (“A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under [the UCCJEA].”). All states agreed that South Dakota would be the most appropriate forum. Father expressed that Parents wanted to remain in South Dakota and had no intention of returning to Idaho. Father therefore requested that the case be heard in South Dakota.

¶20 At a pretrial hearing on October 2, the State informed the juvenile court that it was anticipating a petition would be “filed shortly” in South Dakota. Counsel for Parents indicated that their clients wanted the case transferred to South Dakota. Counsel stated that he was “in favor of” continuing Child in DCFS custody until the petition was filed in South Dakota. Father’s counsel told the court, “We are in the exact same boat . . . .” In re P.M. 20240242-CA 8 2025 UT App 154

¶21 On October 27, Parents moved from South Dakota to Utah. On November 3, the juvenile court held a pretrial hearing and UCCJEA conference with the corresponding courts in Idaho and South Dakota. Mother indicated that Parents were intending to stay in Utah so that they could “be as close as possible to” Child. Because Parents no longer resided in Idaho or South Dakota, they asked the juvenile court to take jurisdiction of the case. Thereafter, both Idaho and South Dakota declined to exercise jurisdiction, which led the court to conclude that jurisdiction was proper in Utah. See generally id. § 81-11-201(1) (“[A] court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if [certain conditions are met, including when] . . . a court of another state does not have jurisdiction . . . or a court of the home state of the minor child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum . . . .”). A pretrial hearing was scheduled for November 13.

¶22 During the November 13 pretrial hearing, all parties agreed to attend mediation. Mediation was ultimately unsuccessful, however, and on December 14, the parties asked the juvenile court to set the matter for a one-day adjudication hearing.

¶23 That adjudication hearing took place on January 12, 2024. At the hearing, the State sought to admit Officer 1’s and Officer 2’s body camera footage—which included audio—of the July 10 hotel encounter with Mother. The officers also testified as to what they observed during that encounter. Although neither officer spoke fluent Spanish, each was allowed to testify about his understanding of what Mother had been saying in Spanish. Prior to closing argument, the State withdrew the exhibits containing the officers’ body camera footage.

¶24 The juvenile court adjudicated Child dependent as to both Mother and Father. At a later review hearing on October 23, 2024, Child was returned to Parents’ custody, and the court’s jurisdiction was terminated. In re P.M. 20240242-CA 9 2025 UT App 154

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶25 Mother now appeals, raising two primary issues for our review.2 First, she argues the juvenile court erred in applying the UCCJEA, which she asserts led to an unlawful delay in adjudication that violated her due process rights. Mother acknowledges Counsel did not contest the court’s application of the UCCJEA or raise concerns about due process below but asks us to consider both parts of her argument under an exception to our preservation rule. See generally State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶¶ 20, 29, 416 P.3d 443 (setting forth the exceptions of plain error and exceptional circumstances); In re A.W., 2018 UT App 217, ¶ 26, 437 P.3d 640 (“Utah appellate courts will not review unpreserved constitutional claims unless an exception to the preservation rule applies.”).

¶26 Second, Mother takes issue with the language interpretation at the adjudication hearing. She argues that the interpretation was inadequate and that the admission of certain evidence resulted in a deprivation of her due process rights. “We will not reverse the juvenile court’s rulings on evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that the juvenile court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that an injustice resulted.” In re M.W., 2016 UT App 217, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 557 (quotation simplified). 2. Although this appeal is technically moot because Child has been returned to Parents’ custody and the juvenile court’s jurisdiction has been terminated, we agree with the parties that this case satisfies the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine. See In re M.S., 2023 UT App 74, ¶¶ 31–40, 533 P.3d 859. We accordingly address the merits of the appeal. In re P.M. 20240242-CA 10 2025 UT App 154 ANALYSIS I. Delayed Adjudication

¶27 Mother presents two related arguments concerning the timing of the adjudication hearing. First, she argues the juvenile court erred in how it applied the UCCJEA, which resulted in the unlawful delay of the adjudication hearing. Second, Mother asserts the delayed adjudication violated her right to due process. We address each argument in turn. A. Application of the UCCJEA

¶28 Mother contends the juvenile court erred in how it applied the UCCJEA, which resulted in the adjudication hearing being held after the sixty-day statutory deadline specified in Utah Code section 80-3-401(2). See Utah Code § 80-3-401(2) (“The final adjudication hearing shall be held no later than 60 calendar days after the later of: (a) the day on which the shelter hearing is held; or (b) the day on which the abuse, neglect, or dependency petition is filed.”). Mother concedes that Counsel “seemingly did not” preserve this issue for appeal and argues that Counsel “acquiesced in the delay, and did not correct the Court’s misinterpretation that [the] UCCJEA did not allow the Court to adjudicate the Petition.” Nevertheless, she contends that Parents’ “repeated objections to delay” and requests to move the case forward were sufficient to preserve the issue. In the alternative, Mother asks us to review the issue under the plain error exception to our preservation rule.3 The guardians ad litem counter that we 3. Mother also argues the exceptional-circumstances exception to preservation is applicable. See In re adoption of K.A.S., 2016 UT 55, ¶ 19, 390 P.3d 278 (“Exceptional circumstances is a doctrine that applies to rare procedural anomalies.” (quotation simplified)); accord State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 29, 416 P.3d 443. According (continued…) In re P.M. 20240242-CA 11 2025 UT App 154 cannot reach this claim because Mother invited any error related to the delay in adjudication.4 We agree with the guardians ad litem. to Mother, the “convergence” of the juvenile court’s acceptance of the State’s “erroneous construction of the UCCJEA” and Counsel’s “acquiescence in that misinterpretation” despite Mother’s desire to regain custody constituted a rare procedural anomaly. But Mother’s argument is merely a concession that Counsel invited any error in the delay, and invited error does not constitute a rare procedural anomaly. Cf. State v. Brown, 2019 UT App 122, ¶ 25, 447 P.3d 1250 (“Misstatements of law, far from being a procedural anomaly, are an everyday occurrence in our adversarial system. . . . A misstatement of law by one party, even if erroneously accepted by the trial court, does not generally work a manifest injustice on the other party such that the party is excused from complying with preservation rules.”). Moreover, Mother has not shown how “the effects of the anomaly” warrant an exception given that custody has been restored. See Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 37. 4. Aside from their assertion that review of Mother’s claim is precluded under the doctrine of invited error, the guardians ad litem argue that plain error review is not available in this case. See Kelly v. Timber Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶¶ 42 n.10, 44, 507 P.3d 357 (holding that “plain error review is not available in ordinary civil cases unless expressly authorized by rule,” but leaving open the possibility that such review might be available in civil cases that “involve significant interests on par with those at issue in criminal cases, such as fundamental constitutional rights”). We need not resolve whether plain error review is available here, however, because even where the exception could potentially apply, Mother has failed to establish plain error, see infra ¶¶ 32–37, 39. In re P.M. 20240242-CA 12 2025 UT App 154

¶29 “Our doctrine of invited error is intended to prevent parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.” State v. Biel, 2021 UT 8, ¶ 46, 484 P.3d 1172 (quotation simplified). “Under the doctrine of invited error, we have declined to engage in even plain error review when counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no objection to the action taken.” State v. Ringstad, 2018 UT App 66, ¶ 58, 424 P.3d 1052 (quotation simplified).

¶30 Here, Counsel consistently urged the juvenile court to delay adjudicating the matter while questions regarding jurisdiction were resolved. Among other things, Counsel took the following actions: • At the June 28 pretrial hearing, Counsel asked the juvenile court “to set this case over” so that he could review discovery with Mother. • At the August 2 pretrial hearing, Counsel agreed to set the matter for a further pretrial in “about three weeks” to allow Idaho time to file a petition. At the end of this hearing, it was revealed that Parents had moved from Idaho to South Dakota. • At the August 21 pretrial hearing, Counsel told the juvenile court, “I think we need to figure out the jurisdictional issue first. I’m hesitant to adjudicate on this case or anything like that until we figure out if this case is staying here or going somewhere else . . . .” • At the September 11 pretrial hearing, Counsel agreed that South Dakota was the preferable jurisdiction given Parents’ current location, and Counsel told the juvenile court that “there’s nothing that we can do until it’s decided which Court is ultimately going to have jurisdiction.” In re P.M. 20240242-CA 13 2025 UT App 154 • At the October 2 pretrial hearing, Counsel stated that he was “in favor of” continuing Child in DCFS custody until a petition was filed in South Dakota. • At the November 3 pretrial hearing, Counsel confirmed that Parents had relocated from South Dakota to Utah on October 27 and asked the juvenile court to take jurisdiction over the matter. • At the November 13 pretrial hearing, Counsel agreed to defer the adjudication hearing until the parties could attend mediation. • At the December 14 pretrial hearing, Counsel requested that the matter be set for a one-day adjudication hearing. The hearing was scheduled for January 12, 2024.

¶31 In sum, Mother invited any error related to the delay in the adjudication hearing when Counsel affirmatively represented to the juvenile court that Mother wanted to delay the matter. Because Mother’s ongoing requests created her claim on appeal, Mother invited the error she now seeks to correct, and we are precluded from reviewing Mother’s claim for plain error. B. Due Process

¶32 Next, Mother argues that holding the final adjudication hearing after the sixty-day deadline set forth in Utah Code section 80-3-401(2) infringed on her procedural and substantive due process rights. Notwithstanding that Mother invited any error in the delay of the adjudication hearing, Mother cannot succeed on her unpreserved due process claim because she has not demonstrated plain error.

¶33 “To demonstrate plain error, [Mother] must establish that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT In re P.M. 20240242-CA 14 2025 UT App 154 76, ¶ 20, 416 P.3d 443 (quotation simplified). Because all three requirements must be met to establish plain error, “if we conclude that the alleged error was not harmful we need not analyze whether it was obvious.” State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, ¶ 36, 453 P.3d 657. An error is harmful when “there is a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged error, the outcome in the case would have been different.” Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 21 (quotation simplified).

¶34 Here, we can easily dispose of Mother’s due process claim for lack of harm. The only harm that Mother points to as stemming from the delayed adjudication hearing is the depletion of the limited amount of time she was afforded by statute to reunify with Child. See Utah Code § 80-3-406(13)(a) (“The time period for reunification services may not exceed 12 months from the day on which the minor was initially removed . . . .”). But on the facts of this case, this is not sufficient to demonstrate harm for two related reasons.

¶35 First, Mother has successfully reunified with Child and was able to do so before the statutory deadline. Thus, even if the adjudication hearing had occurred earlier, the outcome of the case would not have been different. See Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 21.

¶36 Second, any delay in the adjudication hearing had no bearing on the juvenile court’s decision to adjudicate Child dependent as to Mother. The court’s findings were based on the events at the hotel and had nothing to do with events that occurred after Child’s removal. Put differently, Child would have been adjudicated dependent as to Mother whether the hearing had been held the day after Child’s removal, the date on which the hearing actually occurred, or any other date in between. Thus, Mother cannot show that but for the delay, the outcome of the case would have been different. See id. In re P.M. 20240242-CA 15 2025 UT App 154

¶37 Because Mother cannot show that the delay of the adjudication hearing harmed her, she cannot establish plain error. II. Language Interpretation

¶38 Mother next faults the juvenile court for failing to ensure there was adequate language interpretation during the adjudication hearing. To that end, she contends as an evidentiary matter that the court abused its discretion (1) by admitting Officer 1’s and Officer 2’s body camera footage of the incident involving Mother without an accurate interpretation of what was being said, and (2) by allowing Officer 1 and Officer 2 to testify about what Mother was saying in Spanish despite their limited understanding of Spanish. Mother further contends that both errors deprived her of due process, although she concedes that her due process argument is unpreserved. Given all the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing, we conclude that the admission of the challenged evidence was harmless and is therefore not grounds for reversal. See In re M.W., 2016 UT App 217, ¶ 12, 387 P.3d 557.

¶39 “Harmless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, ¶ 44, 203 P.3d 943 (quotation simplified). Here, even without the challenged evidence, there was ample evidence supporting Mother’s dependency adjudication. Wholly apart from any specific Spanish statements by Mother, the officers testified that when they arrived at the hotel, they found Mother holding Child in the lobby. Mother was “screaming or yelling at a high tone of voice,” she was not dressed appropriately, and she had apparently assaulted another woman. This “erratic behavior” troubled the officers and led them to conclude that Mother was a danger to herself or others and should be involuntarily committed to the hospital. But when the officers attempted to take Mother into custody, she “began to wrap her arm near [Child’s] neck area In re P.M. 20240242-CA 16 2025 UT App 154 and squeeze rather tightly.” Officer 1 testified that this grip can “ultimately stop the blood flow in the carotid arteries if applied correctly” and, if held too long, it can lead to “unconsciousness” or “death.” And Officer 2 agreed that Mother was holding Child “in an unsafe manner.” Thus, even if Mother’s statements gave rise to some initial concern on the part of the officers, it was Mother’s subsequent conduct that caused the situation to escalate and ultimately resulted in the officers’ need to use force. Because of this, even if the body camera footage was excluded and the officers had not been allowed to recount what they believed Mother had said in Spanish during the encounter, there is no reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different. And because no harmful error exists, Mother’s related unpreserved due process claim, which she raises under a plain error argument, likewise fails. See State v. Ray, 2022 UT App 95, ¶ 50 n.17, 516 P.3d 329 (explaining that the plain error standard for harm “mirrors” that of the harmless error doctrine).

CONCLUSION

¶40 Mother invited any error related to the juvenile court’s delay in adjudicating the verified child welfare petition, and she did not suffer harm due to the delay. And any error on the part of the court in admitting the officers’ body camera footage or allowing the officers to testify at the adjudication hearing was harmless. Affirmed.

Affirmed

The reviewing court determined that the lower court committed no reversible error and upheld the judgment.