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John v. John, 2023 UT App 103

Link to Official Court Opinion

Case Summary

Lucas Allen John (Father) and Cassandra Kathleen John (Mother) divorced after a marriage marked by Mother’s documented drug use, a vehicular incident that produced a temporary protective order, and years of supervised parent-time under temporary orders. Following a 2021 bench trial, the district court awarded Father sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ daughter (Child), granted Mother unsupervised weekly virtual parent-time, and ordered that Mother’s in-person parent-time be subject to line-of-sight supervision pending a therapist-directed reunification plan. On appeal, Mother argued that the court ordered supervision without the present-risk-of-harm finding required by Utah Code § 30-3-34.5(1) (now § 81-9-207) and without the “specific goals and expectations” required by § 30-3-34.5(5). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court’s oral and written findings together established a present risk of harm, that the court did identify specific goals, and that Mother’s remaining arguments were unpreserved.

Podcast Interviews and Other Sources

Podcast Interviews

Oral Argument

Briefing Documents

Plura pertinentia mox sequentur. Quaeso, redi mox.

Coverage

Facts

Marriage and Early History

  • The parties married in March 2014, and Child was born in September 2014.
  • Mother had engaged in drug use over the years, and although she was a stay-at-home mother, Father hired a babysitter to care for Child because he feared for Child’s safety due to Mother’s drug use.
  • The parties’ second child was born with substances in her system and died shortly after birth; the district court noted that the death was reportedly attributed to medical malpractice rather than to Mother’s conduct.

Separation, Divorce Petition, and Protective Order

  • The parties separated around May 2016, and Father petitioned for divorce in August 2016, then moved for temporary orders seeking sole custody, supervised visitation for Mother, and drug testing.
  • At a restaurant, Mother placed Child in the front seat of a truck without a car seat or restraint and drove off, striking Father with the truck; a temporary protective order issued on the basis that she attempted to run Father over and abscond with Child.
  • In October 2016, the commissioner recommended dismissal of the protective order, entry of mutual restraining orders, and unsupervised daytime parent-time for Mother; the protective order was dismissed that month.

Temporary Orders and Drug Testing (December 2016 – March 2017)

  • On December 8, 2016, the court awarded Father temporary sole custody, entered mutual restraining and no-contact orders, provided Mother facilitated daytime parent-time, and ordered a same-day hair follicle test.
  • The hair follicle test was positive for cocaine and marijuana, and on December 20, 2016, the court ordered line-of-sight supervision of Mother’s parent-time and further testing.
  • Mother submitted an “unofficial” negative test on January 9, 2017, but the commissioner found the results drastically inconsistent with the December test, ordered a same-day retest (positive for marijuana), and continued supervised parent-time.
  • In March 2017, Mother failed to file the results of a required urinalysis, and her counsel proffered that it was positive for THC; supervision with no overnights continued.

Relocation and Limited Contact (2017 – 2021)

  • Around April 2017, Mother moved to Idaho, then Louisiana, and then Iowa, where she lived with a boyfriend.
  • After leaving Utah, Mother requested no review hearings and made no attempt to exercise in-person parent-time; she was physically around Child on only three occasions between January 2017 and June 2021.

Trial, Findings, and Decree (2021)

  • A bench trial was held in March 2021, when Child was six years old.
  • The court credited Mother with trying to make changes, including therapy for anger, trauma, and substance abuse, but found that she lacked maturity in decision-making, placed her own needs above Child’s, might not be completely emotionally stable, had engaged in past instances of violence, and had failed to prioritize Child’s welfare because of her history of drug abuse.
  • The court awarded Father sole legal and physical custody, granted Mother unmonitored weekly virtual parent-time, and ordered line-of-sight supervised in-person parent-time at a frequency to be set by a reunification therapist.
  • When asked whether Child would be in danger if left with Mother unsupervised, the court stated that, given Mother’s noncompliance with prior orders and failure to complete drug testing, she “potentially could still be a danger,” and that her minimal physical contact with Child was problematic; the written findings stated that it was “not clear” whether Mother was still a danger.
  • In an extended colloquy, Mother’s counsel repeatedly asked about the process and timeline for establishing criteria to lift supervision; the court required clean drug tests, retention of an AFCC therapist within three weeks, and completion of reunification therapy, and indicated it would review the therapist’s reports before deciding whether to lift supervision.

Issues of the Case

Appellant Cassandra Kathleen John (Mother) raised two statutory challenges to the supervised parent-time order, the second of which rested on three independent arguments, yielding four issues for review.

  1. Issue 1: Supervised Parent-Time / Present Risk of Harm Finding
  2. Issue 2: Supervised Parent-Time / Specific Goals and Expectations
  3. Issue 3: Supervised Parent-Time / Comprehensive Criteria as Condition Precedent (Preservation)
  4. Issue 4: Supervised Parent-Time / Delegation of Criteria to Reunification Therapist (Preservation)

No issue was reversed or remanded. Issues 1 and 2 were affirmed on the merits; Issues 3 and 4 were not reached because they were unpreserved, and the decree was affirmed in full.

  • Custody & Parent-Time — Parent-Time

    1. Supervised Parent-Time / Present Risk of Harm Finding

    Claim on Appeal: Mother argued that the district court ordered supervised parent-time without finding, as § 30-3-34.5(1) requires, that she presently posed a risk of harm to Child if left unsupervised, and that the written finding that it was “not clear” whether she remained a danger was insufficient. She further argued that supervision was not the least restrictive means of protecting Child.

    Holding: — Affirmed. The statute requires evidence of a present or future risk of harm rather than a merely historical one, but the court’s oral statement that Mother “potentially could still be a danger,” read together with its written findings on immaturity, instability, self-focus, and unabated drug concerns, was an adequate finding of a presently existing risk; the least-restrictive-means argument was a repackaging of the same claim and offered no plausible alternative.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-9-207 (Formerly: § 30-3-34.5(1)) (a court may order supervised parent-time, when necessary and no less restrictive means is reasonably available, only on a finding of evidence that the child would be subject to physical or emotional harm or child abuse from the noncustodial parent if left unsupervised).

    Standard of Review:

    Abuse of discretion — the district court’s parent-time determination.

    Correctness — interpretation of § 30-3-34.5 and the legal adequacy of the findings of fact.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, 427 P.3d 1221 (supplying the abuse-of-discretion and correctness standards for parent-time rulings and findings).
    • Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 176 P.3d 476 (written and oral findings are reviewed together for adequacy).
    • Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984) (incomplete or ambiguous written findings may be elaborated by the court’s oral explanation).
    • Cox v. Cox, 2023 UT App 62, 532 P.3d 128 (distinguishing sufficiency-of-the-evidence from adequacy-of-findings challenges).
    • Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (findings that omit statutorily required findings are inadequate).

    Why It Matters: The opinion establishes that § 30-3-34.5(1) (now § 81-9-207) is forward-looking: historical harm alone cannot justify supervision, but unabated past circumstances are probative of present risk, and a finding of an existing risk—not certainty of harm—suffices. It also demonstrates that an equivocal written finding can be rescued by the trial court’s oral remarks, particularly where counsel’s own question framed the statutory standard. Practitioners challenging supervision must distinguish an adequacy-of-findings claim from a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim and brief each separately.

  • Custody & Parent-Time — Parent-Time

    2. Supervised Parent-Time / Specific Goals and Expectations

    Claim on Appeal: Mother argued that the district court’s orders were silent as to what conditions she had to meet before supervision would be lifted, in violation of § 30-3-34.5(5).

    Holding: — Affirmed. The court plainly identified three specific goals: (1) clean drug tests in connection with supervised visitation, (2) working with Father to retain a therapist within three weeks, and (3) completion of reunification therapy as determined by the therapist.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-9-207 (Formerly: § 30-3-34.5(5)) (a court ordering supervised parent-time must provide specific goals and expectations the noncustodial parent must accomplish before unsupervised parent-time may be granted).

    Standard of Review:

    Correctness — interpretation of § 30-3-34.5(5) and the legal adequacy of the court’s findings and orders.

    Abuse of discretion — the underlying parent-time determination.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, 427 P.3d 1221 (governing standards of review).

    Why It Matters: The decision confirms that the “specific goals and expectations” requirement can be satisfied by concrete directives announced orally and repeated during the ruling colloquy, even where they are not collected in one written paragraph. A court need not guarantee that meeting the stated goals will automatically end supervision to comply with the statute’s baseline requirement. Parents under supervision should treat every oral directive in the ruling hearing as an enforceable benchmark.

  • Custody & Parent-Time — Parent-Time

    3. Supervised Parent-Time / Comprehensive Criteria as Condition Precedent (Preservation)

    Claim on Appeal: Mother argued that the court failed to state that completion of reunification therapy was a condition precedent to lifting supervision—construed by the Court of Appeals, in the alternative, as an argument that § 30-3-34.5(5) requires a comprehensive list of criteria at the time supervision is ordered that guarantees supervision will be lifted.

    Holding: — Not reached (unpreserved); decree affirmed. To the extent the argument restated Issue 2 it was mistaken, and to the extent it asserted a right to a comprehensive, guaranteed list of criteria, counsel’s repeated questions below were requests for clarification rather than an objection raised to a level of consciousness the trial court could consider.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-9-207 (Formerly: § 30-3-34.5(5)) (specific goals and expectations before unsupervised parent-time may be granted).

    Standard of Review:

    Preservation — threshold requirement; the issue must have been timely and specifically raised, with supporting evidence or authority, so the trial court had an opportunity to rule.

    Controlling Cases:

    • 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 99 P.3d 801 (three-part preservation test: timely, specific, and supported).
    • State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d 543 (an objection must be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial court can consider it).
    • State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332 (Utah 1993) (failure to make a clear and timely objection waives the issue on appeal).

    Why It Matters: The ruling is a cautionary lesson in preservation: framing concerns as questions (“is that accurate?”, “to clarify”) and accepting the court’s answers does not preserve an objection. The Court of Appeals relied on contextual cues—the court turning to opposing counsel for a response, counsel’s own “to clarify” preface, and counsel’s closing logistical question—to conclude no objection was made. Whether § 30-3-34.5(5) (now § 81-9-207) requires a comprehensive list of criteria at the outset therefore remains an open question.

  • Custody & Parent-Time — Parent-Time

    4. Supervised Parent-Time / Delegation of Criteria to Reunification Therapist (Preservation)

    Claim on Appeal: Mother argued that conditioning unsupervised parent-time on completing reunification therapy as determined by a therapist impermissibly delegated to the therapist the court’s statutory duty to set goals and expectations.

    Holding: — Not reached (unpreserved); decree affirmed. The delegation theory was never raised below, and an argument based on an entirely distinct legal theory must be separately preserved.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-9-207 (Formerly: § 30-3-34.5(5)) (duty of the court to provide specific goals and expectations).

    Standard of Review:

    Preservation — threshold requirement; a distinct legal theory not presented below will not be addressed on appeal.

    Controlling Cases:

    • True v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2018 UT App 86, 427 P.3d 338 (an argument based on an entirely distinct legal theory is a new claim that must be separately preserved).

    Why It Matters: Therapist-directed reunification plans are common in Utah supervised parent-time orders, and whether they unlawfully delegate judicial authority is a significant, unresolved question. Because the Court of Appeals declined to reach it, the delegation challenge remains available in a future case in which it is squarely raised and supported with authority at the trial level.

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

  • Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 4, 427 P.3d 1221 (standards of review: abuse of discretion for parent-time determinations; correctness for statutory interpretation and legal adequacy of findings).
  • Cox v. Cox, 2023 UT App 62, ¶ 32 n.5, 532 P.3d 128 (distinguishing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge from an adequacy-of-findings challenge).
  • Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (findings inadequate where they omit critical findings required by statute; a third type of inadequate-findings argument).
  • Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 17, 176 P.3d 476 (appellate court reviews written and oral findings together to assess adequacy).
  • Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1984) (incomplete, inadequate, or ambiguous written findings may be elaborated or interpreted by the trial court’s oral explanation).
  • United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) (cited “cf.” for the principle that a challenger proposing a least-restrictive-means argument must offer a plausible, less restrictive alternative).
  • 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (preservation requires that an issue be timely raised, specifically raised, and supported by evidence or legal authority).
  • State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ¶ 33, 122 P.3d 543 (an objection must be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial court can consider it).
  • State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1993) (a party who fails to make a clear and timely objection waives the issue on appeal).
  • True v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2018 UT App 86, ¶ 32, 427 P.3d 338 (an argument based on an entirely distinct legal theory must be separately preserved; applied to the therapist-delegation argument).

Other authorities cited: Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (definition of “condition precedent”); Grammaring, “The Modal WOULD to Express Unreal Situations” (usage of “would be” to describe hypothetical future situations); Laws of Utah 2022, ch. 430, § 7 (2022 amendment to § 30-3-34.5).

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

  • Written and oral findings that speak only of past harm or past risk, with no present-tense or forward-looking finding.
  • A record showing the parent has substantially remedied the original concern (e.g., sustained clean tests) yet supervision continues without new findings.
  • A supervision order with no identifiable goals or expectations, or goals so vague they cannot be accomplished.
  • A preserved objection to delegating the conditions for lifting supervision to a third party.
  • A preserved sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge where the evidence of present risk is thin.
  • A plausible, less restrictive alternative presented below that the court failed to address.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

Under § 81-9-207 (formerly § 30-3-34.5), as construed in John, a court ordering supervised parent-time should expressly address:

  • Necessity: that supervision is necessary to protect the child.
  • Least restrictive means: that no less restrictive means is reasonably available.
  • Present risk: evidence that the child would be subject to physical or emotional harm or child abuse from the noncustodial parent if left unsupervised—a current or future risk, not merely a historical one.
  • Supervisor selection: preference for supervisors suggested by the parties, including relatives, and whether professional supervision is required (statutory; not addressed in John).
  • Specific goals and expectations the noncustodial parent must accomplish before unsupervised parent-time may be granted.
  • The parent’s ability to petition for modification once those goals are accomplished.

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

An appeal of a supervised parent-time order is most viable when the following factors appear together:

  • The written findings are equivocal (e.g., “it is not clear whether” the parent is a danger) and the oral ruling does not supply a forward-looking finding.
  • The historical concern is remote in time and the record shows it has abated.
  • Trial counsel lodged an express, authority-backed objection to the absence of goals or to delegation, rather than seeking clarification.
  • Both adequacy of findings and sufficiency of the evidence were briefed as distinct issues.
  • A concrete less-restrictive alternative was proposed below and ignored.

Strategy Insight

Mother framed her appeal as legal error—the absence of statutorily required findings and goals—which triggered correctness review. That framing was sound, but it failed because the Court of Appeals found the required finding in the oral record and the required goals in the court’s colloquy, and because her strongest structural arguments (comprehensive criteria and delegation) were never presented below as objections. The lesson is that a legal-error framing on appeal is only as strong as the trial-level record: the objection must be made explicitly, with authority, before the court leaves the bench.

Teaching Value

  • John is a clear illustration of how oral rulings can supplement—and effectively cure—ambiguous written findings under Rule 52(a)(1) and Bill Nay & Sons.
  • It offers a vivid example of the line between seeking clarification and making an objection for preservation purposes, with the court identifying specific contextual cues in the transcript.
  • It leaves open two significant questions for future litigation: whether § 81-9-207 requires a comprehensive list of criteria at the time supervision is ordered, and whether conditioning unsupervised parent-time on a therapist’s determination is an impermissible delegation of judicial authority.

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence

  • The opinion rests almost entirely on Utah authority: the Utah Code, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Utah Supreme Court and Court of Appeals precedent.
  • The sole non-Utah case, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, is cited only with a “cf.” signal as an analogy on least-restrictive-means burdens; the court also drew on a grammar reference and Black’s Law Dictionary for textual meaning.
  • The interpretive analysis of “would be” in § 30-3-34.5(1) is a plain-language, textualist reading rather than one derived from other jurisdictions’ supervised-visitation statutes.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)

  • 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72 — Established the three-part preservation test (timely, specific, supported). Role: the framework for rejecting Issues 3 and 4 as unpreserved.
  • State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45 — Established that an objection must reach a “level of consciousness” permitting the trial court to consider it. Role: the decisive standard for concluding counsel’s clarifying questions were not objections.
  • State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332 (Utah 1993) — Held that failure to make a clear and timely objection waives the issue. Role: reinforces the waiver consequence of counsel’s framing.
  • Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984) — Held that ambiguous written findings may be interpreted by reference to the trial court’s oral explanation. Role: the basis for reading the oral “potentially could still be a danger” statement into the written findings.

The Most Important Holding

The central holding is the court’s construction of § 30-3-34.5(1) (now § 81-9-207): supervised parent-time requires evidence of a present or future risk of harm, not merely historical harm, but the court need not find that harm will definitely occur—a finding of a presently existing risk suffices. Critically, evidence that past harmful circumstances have recurred or have not substantially abated is probative of present risk. Here, Mother’s history of drug abuse, her failure to produce a single clean test since supervision began, her minimal physical contact with Child, and her ongoing immaturity and instability together supported the finding that she “potentially could still be a danger.”

Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error

The decree was affirmed in full. Reversal would likely have followed a legal error such as:

  • A supervision order supported solely by historical harm (e.g., a years-old incident) with no finding—written or oral—that the risk persists or has not abated.
  • A supervision order that identifies no goals or expectations whatsoever for the noncustodial parent, which would violate the mandatory language of § 30-3-34.5(5).
  • A properly preserved delegation objection, if the court were to conclude that leaving the conditions for lifting supervision entirely to a therapist abdicates the court’s statutory duty.

Mother did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, so no factual-error argument was before the court.

Practitioner Takeaways

Trial Lawyers

  • When a court orders supervision, state a clear objection on the record—e.g., “We object that the court has not set specific goals and expectations as § 81-9-207 requires, and we object to delegating those conditions to the therapist”—rather than asking a series of clarifying questions.
  • Be careful how you frame questions to the bench: the Court of Appeals adopted counsel’s own phrasing (“would be in danger”) as the lens for construing the court’s equivocal answer as a statutory finding.
  • Request express written findings on present risk, on the absence of less restrictive alternatives, and on each goal the parent must meet, and file a Rule 52(b) motion if the written findings are ambiguous.
  • Propose a concrete less-restrictive alternative (e.g., drug-testing protocols with unsupervised daytime visits, exchange-only supervision, or relative supervisors) if contesting supervision.

Appellate Lawyers

  • Brief adequacy-of-findings and sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges as separate, independently supported arguments; raising only one forfeits the other.
  • Review the full oral ruling transcript before arguing that written findings are deficient—the appellate court will read oral and written findings together.
  • Audit preservation carefully: a new legal theory (such as improper delegation) is a distinct claim that must have been raised below, and clarification requests are unlikely to satisfy Cruz.

Parents Subject to Supervised Parent-Time

  • Treat each goal announced orally at the ruling hearing (clean drug tests, prompt retention of a therapist, completion of reunification therapy) as a binding benchmark, and document compliance.
  • Consistent, in-person engagement matters: minimal physical contact and noncompliance with prior orders were themselves treated as evidence of continuing risk.
  • Once the goals are met, the statute permits a petition to modify supervised parent-time on a showing that the court’s goals and expectations have been accomplished.

Majority Opinion

2023 UT App 103

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LUCAS ALLEN JOHN, Appellee, v. CASSANDRA KATHLEEN JOHN, Appellant. Opinion No. 20210506-CA

Filed September 14, 2023 Third District Court, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Su Chon No. 164904953

Benjamin K. Lusty, Attorney for Appellant Mary Deiss Brown, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred. LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 In Lucas Allen and Cassandra Kathleen John’s divorce decree, the district court gave Lucas1 sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ daughter, Child. The decree gave Cassandra once-a-week virtual parent-time and in-person parenttime as often “as the parties agree, or as recommended by the reunification therapist.” The court ordered that Cassandra’s virtual parent-time “not be . . . monitored” but that her in-person parent-time be “subject to line-of-sight supervision.” The court 1. As is our practice, because the parties share the same last name, we use their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality. John v. John 20210506-CA 2 2023 UT App 103 then outlined a “reunification” plan, with the goal of Cassandra’s eventual transition to unsupervised parent-time with Child.

¶2 Cassandra contends that the district court erred by ordering supervised in-person parent-time without making the statutorily required finding of “evidence that [Child] would be subject to physical or emotional harm or child abuse . . . from [Cassandra] if left unsupervised with [her].” Utah Code § 30-3-34.5(1).2 Cassandra also forwards multiple arguments in support of the assertion that the court erred by failing to provide, as required by statute, “specific goals and expectations” for her to meet “before unsupervised parent-time may be granted.” Id. § 30-3-34.5(5). We conclude that the district court made an adequate finding of evidence that Child would be subject to physical or emotional harm from Cassandra if left unsupervised with her, and we conclude that each of Cassandra’s arguments regarding specific goals and expectations is either mistaken or unpreserved. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Lucas and Cassandra married in March 2014. Child was born in September of that year. Cassandra had “engaged in drug use over the years,” and “even though [Cassandra] was a stay-athome mom,” Lucas “hired a baby-sitter to take care of [Child] . . . because of [Cassandra’s] drug use” and because “he feared for [Child’s] safety.” 2. After Cassandra filed her notice of appeal, Utah Code section 30-3-34.5 was amended to expand the number of crimes that qualify as child abuse under this section. See Act of Feb. 16, 2022, ch. 430, § 7, 2022 Utah Laws 3391, 3398. Because the amendment is not relevant to our analysis, we cite the current version of the code for convenience. John v. John 20210506-CA 3 2023 UT App 103

¶4 Soon after Child was born, Cassandra became pregnant with the parties’ second child. When the second child was born, the baby “had substances in her system,” “indicat[ing] that [Cassandra had been] engaging in activities that were potentially harmful to the . . . child.” This child died shortly after her birth.3

¶5 The parties separated around May 2016, and Cassandra moved in with her boyfriend later that year. In August 2016, Lucas petitioned for divorce. The next month, he moved for temporary orders to grant him sole legal and physical custody of Child. He also requested that Cassandra’s visitation time with Child be supervised and that Cassandra be ordered to submit to drug testing.

¶6 Around this time, Lucas and Cassandra were together “at a local restaurant” when Cassandra “took [Child], put her in the front seat of [a] truck without any car seat or any appropriate child restraints and then drove off,” hitting Lucas with the truck in the process. A temporary protective order was entered against Cassandra because she had attempted to run Lucas over with her truck and abscond with Child. A hearing on the protective order was held in October 2016, at which the commissioner recommended dismissal of the protective order,4 entry of a mutual restraining order, and the granting to Cassandra of “unsupervised parent time . . . with no overnights.”

¶7 On December 8, 2016, a hearing was held on Lucas’s Motion for Temporary Orders. Following the hearing, the court entered mutual restraining and no-contact orders against the parties, awarded Lucas temporary sole legal and physical custody of Child, and directed Cassandra to “submit to a hair follicle 3. The district court found that the second child’s death “reportedly” “was not attributed to [Cassandra’s potentially harmful activities] but was attributed to medical malpractice.” 4. The protective order was dismissed in October 2016. John v. John 20210506-CA 4 2023 UT App 103 [drug] test before 5:00 p.m.” that day. The court gave Cassandra parent-time “with . . . no overnights” and provisionally ordered that it be “facilitated” by a particular family friend. The court further instructed that if Cassandra’s drug test came back positive, Lucas’s attorney was to “call the court to schedule a telephone conference to determine the status moving forward.”

¶8 Cassandra’s hair follicle drug test came back positive for both cocaine and marijuana, and another hearing was held on December 20, 2016. Following that hearing, the court ordered that Cassandra’s parent-time be subject to line-of-sight supervision and that Cassandra complete another drug test by January 9, 2017.

¶9 On January 9, 2017, Cassandra submitted an “unofficial” drug test showing negative results for a collection taken that day. At a review hearing on January 30, 2017, however, the commissioner was “concern[ed]” because the results of the January 9 unofficial test were “drastically different” than the results of the test on December 8, 2016. The commissioner therefore directed Cassandra to complete another drug test that day. The commissioner also ordered “continue[d] . . . supervised parent time, status quo,” and set a review hearing for February 13, 2017.

¶10 Cassandra’s drug test on January 30, 2017, came back positive for marijuana, and following the February 13 review hearing, the court ordered “expanded supervised parent-time” with “no overnight visits.” It also ordered Cassandra to submit to a urinalysis by March 8, 2017, and it set another review hearing for March 13, 2017.

¶11 Cassandra took the required test before the March 13 review hearing, but she failed to submit the results. Her counsel (Counsel) nevertheless proffered at the hearing that the test had come back “positive for THC.” The court ordered that Cassandra’s parent-time remain subject to “direct line-of-sight” supervision “with no overnight visits.” John v. John 20210506-CA 5 2023 UT App 103

¶12 “At some point”—likely during April 2017—Cassandra “moved to Idaho for several months.” After a “stint in Louisiana,” she then moved to Iowa and lived there with a boyfriend. Once she had left Utah, Cassandra did not request any review hearings or make any attempt to exercise in-person parent-time with Child. As a result, she was “around [Child] physically on [only] three occasions” between January 2017 and June 2021.

¶13 Eventually, in March 2021, after compromise negotiations proved only minimally successful, the court held a bench trial on the parties’ outstanding issues. At the time of trial, Child was six years old.

¶14 Following trial, the court held a hearing to orally announce its rulings. To Cassandra’s credit, the court found that she was “trying to make some changes in her life,” including engaging in “therapy to resolve anger, trauma, and substance abuse” issues, and that she “appear[ed] to be improving.” But the court found that Cassandra still “lack[ed] . . . maturity in her decision-making processes,” “consider[ed] her own needs first and primary over [Child]’s,” and might not be “completely emotionally stable.” The court also found that Cassandra had engaged in “instances of violence” in the past (including the one that led to the temporary protective order noted above). And it found that Cassandra’s failures to “give[] first priority to [Child]’s welfare” were due to her “history with drug abuse.” Based on the foregoing findings, the court awarded Lucas sole legal and physical custody of Child.

¶15 The court then granted Cassandra supervised in-person parent-time at a frequency to be determined by a therapist and unsupervised virtual parent-time at least once per week. The court said that it thought there ought to be “some sort of ramping up” of supervised in-person visits and that a therapist should “come up with a schedule” for those visits after talking with Child, Cassandra, and Lucas to “see what’s appropriate.” The court further explained, “I expect that the therapist will come up with so many overnights so that [Cassandra] can practice with all John v. John 20210506-CA 6 2023 UT App 103 of those things, and then once she’s completed the therapist’s plan, then I would say that the standard relocation statute would then become effective.” Counsel then asked whether “at that point”—i.e., when Cassandra had completed the therapist’s plan—“supervision would no longer be required.” The court responded, “I don’t know, Counsel,” “because there’s . . . some ongoing drug issues . . . and we don’t have any evidence . . . that she would have clean tests.”

¶16 Counsel then asked if the court was going to make findings as to whether Child “would be in danger if she were with [Cassandra unsupervised].” In response, the court said: [G]iven that [Cassandra]’s not complied with the Court orders, it’s not clear to me whether or not she’s a danger to [Child] still. She hasn’t completed the drug tests, et cetera, so given her noncompliance with the Court’s prior temporary orders, she potentially could still be a danger; but given also that she hasn’t been around [Child] physically except for three times, I just think that’s problematic.[5]

¶17 Counsel then said, “So . . . [a]fter two things occur, if I understand correctly, then [Cassandra]’s parent time will be according to [section] 30-3-37 and unsupervised.” He listed “one, the completion of the ramp up period as recommended by the 5. These oral findings were later memorialized in the court’s written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: The Court finds that, given [Cassandra]’s noncompliance with the Court orders, including her failure to provide clean drug tests, it is not clear whether [she] is still a danger to [Child]. The Court finds it problematic that [Cassandra] has only been around [Child] physically on three occasions since 2016. John v. John 20210506-CA 7 2023 UT App 103 therapist; and two, . . . submitting to the Court a clean drug test.” He asked, “Is that accurate?” The court responded that it could not “say that [Cassandra]’s going to go immediately to unsupervised [visitation] after the ramp up” because the court might “need some more information at that point.”

¶18 Counsel then informed the court, “My understanding, your Honor, is that the Court needs to provide specific criteria that [Cassandra] needs to meet . . . in order to have supervision dismissed.” The court replied, “I . . . don’t know what the therapist is going to say, Counsel. So I think it’s a little bit speculative. . . . What I’m going to have to see is what the therapist recommends, and then I can give you some further instructions at that point.” It added, “But yes, we do need her to have clean drug tests . . . .” Then the court, Counsel, and Lucas’s attorney discussed what the drug test requirements would be.

¶19 Counsel later asked, “Your Honor, what would be the time line and/or process for setting up what sounds like is a . . . review hearing on how we are going to . . . establish the criteria for having supervision lifted?” The court asked Lucas’s attorney if she “want[ed] to respond,” saying, “[Counsel] wants criteria on how to remove supervision.” Lucas’s attorney explained that she did not think there was “enough information . . . to anticipate . . . the factors that [the court was] going to have to consider” and that it seemed reasonable to “notice up a hearing after [the parties got] a lot of these things going[] and have enough information to go ahead.” But the court indicated that it was “not going to notice up a hearing at [that] point.” It directed the parties to “get the therapist on board first, and . . . to do that within three weeks,” then to get “the drug test filed.” The court said, “[A]fter I’ve reviewed these things[,] . . . I’d like to make sure that Cassandra is complying with everything, and that she’s able to do what she needs to do.” It further stated, “So I would like to do that as quickly as possible, [Counsel], but I don’t know how long of a period it’s going to take because it will also depend on whether or John v. John 20210506-CA 8 2023 UT App 103 not your client is able to do everything that’s required. I hope that she does.”

¶20 Counsel then, again, stated his interpretation of the process the court was explaining: [I]t sounds like . . . you’re saying that there’s a twostep process. That we won’t be able to arrive at the criteria for . . . when supervision will be lifted until [Cassandra] has complied with everything the therapist has said and filed clean drug tests. Then we can come back to have a hearing to determine what the criteria are for supervision to be lifted; is that accurate?

¶21 At that point, the court turned to Lucas’s attorney and asked whether she “[had] any objection” to the process Counsel had just summarized or whether she thought that supervision “should be lifted” as soon as Cassandra “completes the criteria” the court had already identified. She said that she thought “there might be concerns” even after Cassandra completes reunification therapy, although she did not “know what they would be.” The court then said, “Let’s just get through the therapy portion, and then I want to see what the reports are. . . . It could be likely that if she’s successful with all of th[e] things [the therapist recommends] that the Court will lift supervision at that time.”

¶22 Counsel once again spoke, seeking “to clarify” certain matters by asking, “[I]f after [Cassandra] has met with the therapist and complied with the therapist, the therapist recommends that supervision be lifted, . . . then would the Court accept that recommendation . . . or do we still need to meet to determine criteria for if and how supervision would be lifted?” The court replied that it “[did not] know the answer to that yet,” saying, “[B]ut let’s go through that, and if the therapist recommends it, if we need to have a discussion with the therapist John v. John 20210506-CA 9 2023 UT App 103 present, then we might need to do that, okay? Because I might . . . have some questions.”

¶23 Counsel then asked the court to order that the therapist be an Association for Family and Conciliation Courts therapist, and the court agreed. Then the court said, “If there’s no other questions, I do need to get to my next hearing.” Counsel initially replied that he had “[n]o other questions” but then said, “Last question, your Honor. . . . [I]s the review hearing going to be . . . before you or the Commissioner?” The court answered that the review hearing would be before the court.

¶24 The court concluded the hearing and memorialized its oral rulings into written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce. Cassandra appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶25 On appeal, Cassandra contends that the district court erred in two ways when it ordered supervised parent-time. First, she argues that the order of supervised parent-time was legally inappropriate under Utah Code section 30-3-34.5(1) because the court “did not find that Cassandra poses a present threat of harm” to Child. Second, she argues that the order of supervised parent-time was legally inappropriate under Utah Code section 30-3-34.5(5) because the court did not “provide specific goals and expectations for Cassandra to meet” in order to be granted unsupervised parent-time. “We generally will not disturb the district court’s parent-time determination absent a showing that the court has abused its discretion. However, we review the district court’s interpretation of a statute for correctness. Likewise, we review the legal adequacy of findings of fact for correctness as a question of law.” Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 4, 427 P.3d 1221 (cleaned up). John v. John 20210506-CA 10 2023 UT App 103

ANALYSIS I. Adequacy of the District Court’s Findings in Support of Supervised Parent-Time

¶26 Cassandra argues that the district court erred in ordering supervised parent-time because it did not make the finding that the Utah Code mandates as a prerequisite to supervised parent-time. The pertinent portion of the relevant provision reads as follows: When necessary to protect a child and no less restrictive means is reasonably available . . . , a court may order supervised parent-time if the court finds evidence that the child would be subject to physical or emotional harm or child abuse, as described in Sections 76-5-109, 76-5-109.2, 76-5-109.3, and 76-5- 114, from the noncustodial parent if left unsupervised with the noncustodial parent. Utah Code § 30-3-34.5(1).

¶27 As an initial matter, we agree with Cassandra’s assertion that this statute means that the court must find a current risk of harm to the child from unsupervised parent-time, “rather than merely [a] past or historic risk of harm.” (Emphasis added.) To require “evidence that the child would be subject to . . . harm or . . . abuse . . . if left unsupervised with the noncustodial parent,” id. (emphasis added), is to require evidence of harm or abuse during a potential situation that would occur, if at all, in the future.6 Thus, before ordering supervised parent-time, a court must find that 6. The phrase “would be” “can refer to” situations that “may or may not happen in the future.” The Modal WOULD to Express Unreal Situations, Grammaring, https://www.grammaring.com/ the-modal-would-to-express-unreal-situations [https://perma.cc/ C2ZD-RBY5]. John v. John 20210506-CA 11 2023 UT App 103 there is evidence that harm or abuse could occur in the future, not merely that harm or abuse, or a risk of harm or abuse, occurred or was present in the past.

¶28 That is not to say that the existence of harm, or a risk of harm, from a noncustodial parent in the past has no bearing on whether there is a risk of harm from that parent in the future. Evidence that harmful or potentially harmful circumstances from the past have recurred or have not substantially abated could certainly be probative of whether there is a risk of harm in the future.

¶29 Moreover, a court need not find that the child definitely would be subjected to harm or abuse if left unsupervised with the noncustodial parent. Rather, a court is required to find only “evidence that the child would be subject to . . . harm or . . . abuse” if left alone with the noncustodial parent. Id. (emphasis added). For this reason, we, like Cassandra, conclude that a finding of a presently existing threat or risk of harm or abuse is sufficient to support supervised parent-time under section 30-3-34.5(1).

¶30 However, we disagree with Cassandra that “the district court did not find that [she] presently poses a threat of harm to [Child] if she were [to be left] unsupervised with [Child].”

¶31 Cassandra’s argument here is a challenge to the adequacy of the district court’s findings, not to the sufficiency of the evidence.7 When we assess the adequacy of findings, “we review 7. In Cox v. Cox, 2023 UT App 62, 532 P.3d 128, we recently explained that “a sufficiency of the evidence argument asserts that there was insufficient evidentiary support for a particular factual finding,” while “a challenge to the adequacy of the findings . . . asserts that the court’s findings did not adequately explain the basis for the court’s rulings.” Id. ¶ 32 n.5. The instant case presents another type of inadequate-findings argument—the argument (continued…) John v. John 20210506-CA 12 2023 UT App 103 the [trial court’s] written and oral findings of fact together to determine if they are [adequate] to support the trial court’s rulings.” Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 17, 176 P.3d 476. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) (“The findings . . . may be stated in writing or orally following the close of the evidence.”). This is particularly true when “the written findings are incomplete, inadequate, or ambiguous.” Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Constr. Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1984). In those instances, the written findings “may be elaborated [on] or interpreted (in respects not inconsistent therewith) by reference to the trial court’s . . . oral explanation of the decision.” Id. This is one of those instances.

¶32 Cassandra supports her argument that the court failed to make the requisite finding by pointing to only one statement from the district court’s written findings: “[I]t is not clear whether [Cassandra] is still a danger to [Child].” But the court orally supplied additional findings and reasoning. When asked if it was going to make findings as to whether “[Child] would be in danger if she were with [Cassandra],” the court replied, “[G]iven that [Cassandra has] not complied with the Court orders, it’s not clear to me whether or not she’s a danger to [Child] still. She hasn’t completed the drug tests, et cetera, so given her noncompliance that the trial court did not make a finding that is legally required as a prerequisite to a particular order. See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the trial court’s “findings on the whole” were inadequate because “they omit[ted] critical findings required by the statute”). While Cassandra argues that the district court did not make the legally required finding of a present risk of harm to Child if Child were to be left unsupervised with Cassandra, she does not make the separate argument that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of such a present risk of harm. Thus, we review only the adequacy of the district court’s findings, not the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those findings. John v. John 20210506-CA 13 2023 UT App 103 with the Court’s prior temporary orders, she potentially could still be a danger . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The court then added that it also found it “problematic” that Cassandra “[had]n’t been around [Child] physically except for three times” during the preceding four-plus years. Because Counsel, in posing the question, employed the phrase “[Child] would be in danger if she were with [Cassandra]” to summarize the requirement of a current threat of harm or abuse, we take the court’s responsive statement that Cassandra “potentially could still be a danger” to Child to be a finding of a current threat of physical or emotional harm to Child if Child were to be left unsupervised with Cassandra.8

¶33 Our reading of the court’s answer to Counsel’s question is bolstered by the fact that it came on the heels of additional findings that Cassandra still “lack[ed] . . . maturity in her decisionmaking processes,” that Cassandra still “consider[ed] her own needs first and primary over [Child]’s,” that Cassandra still might not be “completely emotionally stable,” and that Cassandra’s failures to “give[] first priority to [Child]’s welfare” were linked to her “history with drug abuse.” When the court’s response to Counsel’s question is viewed in the context of these and other findings, its import is unmistakable: Cassandra has a history of drug abuse, which, without objection, merited supervised parenttime in the past; since supervised parent-time was instituted, Cassandra has failed to provide a negative drug test; six-year-old Child has been in Cassandra’s physical presence only three times over the course of four-plus years; and Cassandra remains immature, potentially emotionally unstable, and self-centered in 8. We also read the court’s back-to-back statements that “it’s not clear . . . whether or not [Cassandra is] a danger” and “[Cassandra] potentially could still be a danger” as the court’s recognition that it need not find that Child definitely would be harmed if left unsupervised with Cassandra but that, instead, it need only find an existing risk of harm to Child through unsupervised visitation. See supra ¶¶ 16, 29. John v. John 20210506-CA 14 2023 UT App 103 relation to Child; accordingly, Cassandra “potentially could still be a danger” to Child in the present. This finding is adequate to support the court’s order of supervised parent-time.9

II. The District Court’s Provision of Specific Goals and Expectations to Discontinue Supervised Parent-Time

¶34 When a court orders supervised parent-time, it must “provide specific goals and expectations for the noncustodial parent to accomplish before unsupervised parent-time may be granted.” Utah Code § 30-3-34.5(5). Cassandra’s initial brief on appeal states at least two, and perhaps three, independent arguments to support her assertion that the district court did not comply with section 30-3-34.5(5). We disagree with her first argument, and we conclude that her second possible argument and her third argument are unpreserved.

¶35 Cassandra’s first argument regarding the district court’s compliance with section 30-3-34.5(5) is that the court’s orders “are 9. Cassandra also argues that supervised parent-time is “not the least restrictive means of protecting [Child].” However, her least-restrictive-means argument is a repackaging of her assertion that the district court failed to find a current risk of harm to Child from unsupervised parent-time with Cassandra. This is evident from her argument’s circular premise—that “supervised parent time cannot constitute the least restrictive means of [protecting a child from harm from a noncustodial parent] if the [noncustodial] parent cannot be found to be a risk of harm.” Additionally, Cassandra does not offer a plausible, less restrictive alternative for protecting Child during parent-time other than through supervision. Cf. United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) (“When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the Government’s obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals.” (emphasis added)). For these reasons, Cassandra’s least-restrictive-means argument is unavailing. John v. John 20210506-CA 15 2023 UT App 103 silent on the question of what conditions Cassandra must meet prior to [the] lifting of supervised parent time” and that, because of this purported silence, “the district court erred.” Cassandra is mistaken, however.

¶36 After Counsel informed the court of his understanding that the court “need[ed] to provide specific criteria that [Cassandra] needs to meet . . . in order to have supervision dismissed,” the court said that it “need[ed] her to have clean drug tests” and also directed the parties to “get [a] therapist on board . . . within three weeks.” Moreover, Cassandra acknowledges that the court ordered her to complete reunification therapy. The court repeated these requirements multiple times. Plainly, the court provided three specific goals or expectations for Cassandra to meet before unsupervised parent-time would be granted: (1) Cassandra needed to provide clean drug tests in connection with her supervised visitation; (2) Cassandra needed to work with Lucas to identify a therapist within three weeks; and (3) Cassandra needed to complete reunification therapy as determined by the therapist. Thus, Cassandra’s first argument fails.

¶37 Next, Cassandra asserts that the district court did not comply with Utah Code section 30-3-34.5(5) because the court did not say that “completion of reunification therapy . . . [was] a condition precedent to lifting supervised parent time.”10 What Cassandra means by this assertion is not clear. If what she means is that completion of reunification therapy is not a condition the court expected her to meet before supervision would be lifted, this is merely a restatement of Cassandra’s first argument and Cassandra is simply mistaken, as we have explained. On the other hand, if what she means is that to comply with section 30-3-34.5(5), a court must identify at the time it orders supervised 10. A “condition precedent” is “[a]n act or event, other than a lapse of time, that must exist or occur before a duty to perform something promised arises.” Condition precedent, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). John v. John 20210506-CA 16 2023 UT App 103 parent-time a comprehensive list of the things the parent must do to receive a guarantee that supervision will be lifted, she did not preserve this potential issue for our review.

¶38 “In order to preserve an issue for appeal,” the appellant must have “presented [it] to the trial court in such a way that the trial court ha[d] an opportunity to rule on that issue.” 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (cleaned up). “For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct [an asserted] error (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be specifically raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.” Id. (cleaned up). As to the second of these requirements, “an objection must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial court can consider it.” State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ¶ 33, 122 P.3d 543 (cleaned up).

¶39 Here, Counsel indicated to the district court that his “understanding” was “that the Court needs to provide specific criteria that [Cassandra] needs to meet . . . in order to have supervision dismissed.” The court then identified or reiterated three specific criteria for Cassandra to meet, as we have explained. Counsel then repeated, over the course of a lengthy discussion, essentially the same question three times. First, he asked, “[W]hat would be the time line and/or process for setting up what sounds like is a . . . review hearing on how we are going to . . . establish the criteria for having supervision lifted?” The second time he described “a two-step process” in which the parties “won’t be able to arrive at the criteria for” lifting supervision “until [Cassandra] has complied with everything the therapist has said and filed clean drug tests” and they then “come back to have a hearing to determine what the criteria are for supervision to be lifted.” He asked the court, “[I]s that accurate?” Finally, “to clarify,” he asked a third time whether—“after [Cassandra] has met with the therapist and complied with the therapist”—if “the therapist recommends that supervision be lifted, . . . would the Court accept that recommendation . . . or do we still need to meet to determine John v. John 20210506-CA 17 2023 UT App 103 criteria for if and how supervision would be lifted?” Each of these questions came after the court had iterated or reiterated specific initial expectations for Cassandra to meet to have supervision lifted. In that context, each of Counsel’s foregoing questions can be fairly understood as an attempt to clarify when or whether additional expectations would be set, not as an objection to the fact that the court had not identified a comprehensive set of expectations at the outset.

¶40 Indeed, after the second of the foregoing questions from Counsel, the court turned to Lucas’s attorney and asked if she objected to the process Counsel had just summarized. This clearly indicates that the court did not understand Counsel’s question to be an objection but rather an attempt at clarification. Thereafter, Counsel emphasized the notion that he was attempting to gain clarity rather than objecting when he explicitly prefaced the third of his questions by stating that he was seeking “to clarify.” Then, after the court reiterated for the third time its initial expectation— for Cassandra to “go through” therapy—it said, “If there’s no other questions, I do need to get to my next hearing.” Cassandra’s counsel responded not by objecting but by saying: “Last question, your Honor. . . . [I]s the review hearing going to be . . . before you or the Commissioner?”

¶41 Given the foregoing, we conclude that even if Counsel was trying to raise an objection to the fact that the district court had not provided a comprehensive set of expectations for Cassandra to meet in order to have supervision of her parent-time lifted, he did not raise that objection to a level of consciousness in the mind of the court such that the court could consider it. Accordingly, this potential issue was not preserved for our review. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ¶ 33; State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1993) (“A party who fails to make a clear and timely objection waives the right to raise the issue at the appellate level.” (cleaned up)).

¶42 Finally, Cassandra argues that the expectation that she complete reunification therapy as determined by a therapist John v. John 20210506-CA 18 2023 UT App 103 before she is allowed unsupervised parent-time violates section 30-3-34.5(5) because that section “does not allow the district court to delegate the [setting of conditions for the lifting of supervision] to a therapist.” Again, she did not raise this issue below. Because it is unpreserved, we do not address it. See True v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2018 UT App 86, ¶ 32, 427 P.3d 338 (stating that “an argument based upon an entirely distinct legal theory is a new claim or issue and must be separately preserved” (cleaned up)).

CONCLUSION

¶43 The district court made an adequate finding that Cassandra posed a present risk of harm to Child if Child were to be left unsupervised with her. Additionally, Cassandra’s first argument in support of a conclusion that the district court failed to comply with Utah Code section 30-3-34.5(5) by not providing specific goals and expectations for Cassandra to meet before being granted unsupervised parent-time is mistaken, and her other arguments in support of that conclusion were unpreserved. We therefore affirm.

Affirmed

The reviewing court determined that the lower court committed no reversible error and upheld the judgment.