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Hinkle v. Jacobsen 2019 UT 72

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Case Summary

Theresa Hinkle (Mother) and Korey Jacobsen (Husband) married in 2002 and separated in 2005, but remained legally married when Mother conceived and bore a child during a relationship with Jody Rhorer, making Husband the child’s presumed father under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA). When Mother and Husband later divorced, Rhorer intervened to assert his biological paternity, but a commissioner and the district court concluded he lacked statutory standing because the child had a presumed father, and gave him an opportunity to pursue a “constitutional standing” theory instead. Rhorer never adequately developed that constitutional argument and, over the course of several hearings, shifted his position toward seeking limited parent-time and a “dual fatherhood” arrangement rather than displacing Husband’s paternity, prompting the district court to find that he had abandoned his paternity claim altogether. Rhorer appealed four district court orders, and the Utah Supreme Court took the case on certification from the court of appeals. The appeal was resolved alongside a companion case, Castro v. Lemus, which favorably reinterpreted the UUPA’s standing provisions, but the Court held that Rhorer could not benefit from that change because he had waived any challenge to the district court’s abandonment finding.

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Facts

Marriage, Separation, and Conception.

  • Mother and Husband married in 2002 and separated in 2005.
  • During 2005, Mother and Rhorer engaged in a relationship during which a child was conceived and born.
  • Because Mother and Husband were still married when the child was born, Husband is the child’s presumed father under the UUPA, Utah Code § 81-5-204(1)(a) (formerly § 78B-15-204(1)(a)).

Divorce Proceedings and Intervention.

  • Mother and Husband began divorce proceedings in 2012.
  • Rhorer intervened in the divorce, alleging he is the child’s biological father, and filed motions to establish himself as the biological father and for a determination of parentage, asserting he could prove paternity with genetic test results.

Standing Determination Before the Commissioner.

  • The commissioner concluded that under the court of appeals’ decision in R.P. v. K.S.W., 2014 UT App 38, 320 P.3d 1084, Rhorer lacked statutory standing because the child had a presumed father, and only the mother and presumed father could challenge paternity under the UUPA.
  • The commissioner nonetheless noted R.P.’s reservation of whether the UUPA’s standing limits are unconstitutional as applied to an alleged father with an established relationship with the child, and afforded Rhorer a custody evaluation to develop facts for a constitutional challenge.
  • The district court adopted this recommendation, ruling Rhorer had no statutory standing unless he could establish “constitutional standing.”

Custody Evaluation and Attempt to Establish Constitutional Standing.

  • Rhorer completed the custody evaluation but never used the results to argue the UUPA was unconstitutional as applied to him; instead he asked the court to grant him “standing to pursue a claim for time-sharing with the minor child at time of trial.”
  • Although the commissioner expressly requested briefing on any constitutional issues, Rhorer’s reply brief merely asserted he had already addressed them elsewhere, without providing analysis of why due process required him to have standing.
  • The commissioner concluded there was no compelling reason to grant Rhorer standing to assert paternity contrary to Utah Code § 81-5-607 (formerly § 78B-15-607), and the district court adopted that recommendation in a December 21, 2016 order.

District Court’s Abandonment Rulings.

  • At a hearing on Rhorer’s belated objection, his counsel disclaimed any intent to take the child from Husband and instead asked the court to recognize a “dual fatherhood” relationship with limited parent-time.
  • In a June 1, 2017 memorandum decision, the district court found Rhorer had abandoned any claim to rebut Husband’s paternity by seeking only a hybrid parent-time remedy the court concluded the law does not recognize.
  • Rhorer’s subsequent motion for amended findings and a new trial saw his counsel walk back the dual-fatherhood request, but the district court’s November 14, 2017 memorandum decision again concluded Rhorer had accepted Husband’s parental rights and was merely asking the court to recognize his bond with the child.
  • Rhorer moved to set aside the November 14, 2017 decision under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, briefing for the first time a claim that Utah Code § 81-5-607 violates the federal Equal Protection Clause; the district court denied the motion in a January 25, 2018 minute entry as an improper attempt to raise a new argument that could have been preserved earlier.

Appeal and Companion Case.

  • Rhorer appealed all four district court orders, and the Utah Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction on certification from the court of appeals under Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(j).
  • In the companion case Castro v. Lemus, 2019 UT 71, issued the same day, the Court interpreted the UUPA to grant standing to a man whose paternity is to be adjudicated, which mooted the need to reach Rhorer’s constitutional arguments but raised the question whether he could benefit from that favorable interpretation.

Issues of the Case

Rhorer, as intervenor and appellant, raised one central argument on appeal, but the Court’s disposition turned on a related, independently dispositive waiver question.

  • Issue 1: Constitutionality of the UUPA’s Standing Limitations
  • Issue 2: Waiver of Challenge to the Abandonment of the Paternity Claim

Because Rhorer failed to challenge the district court’s abandonment finding in his opening brief, the Court did not decide Issue 1 on the merits; it held Issue 2 against Rhorer and dismissed the appeal in its entirety.

  • Paternity — Constitutionality

    Claim on Appeal: Rhorer argued that the UUPA is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution because it denies standing to an alleged biological father, like him, to establish paternity when the child already has a presumed father.

    Holding: — Not Reached (Mooted). The Court explained that its interpretation of the UUPA in the companion case Castro v. Lemus grants standing to a man whose paternity is to be adjudicated, which does not implicate Rhorer’s equal protection or due process concerns, rendering the preservation dispute over his constitutional arguments moot.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-5-607 (limitation on standing to rebut a presumed father’s paternity); Utah Code § 81-5-204(1)(a) (presumption of paternity for a child born during marriage).

    Standard of Review:

    • Standing — a mixed question of fact and law; reviewed with deference to the district court’s factual determinations but minimal discretion on whether a given set of facts satisfies the legal standard for standing.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Castro v. Lemus, 2019 UT 71 (companion case reinterpreting the UUPA to grant standing, mooting the constitutional question)
    • P. v. K.S.W., 2014 UT App 38, 320 P.3d 1084 (prior court of appeals interpretation limiting standing to the mother and presumed father)
    • Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, 424 P.3d 95 (standing as a mixed question of fact and law)
    • Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372 (Utah 1997) (standard of review for standing determinations)

    Why It Matters: The Court avoided a significant constitutional ruling on the UUPA by resolving the standing question through statutory interpretation in Castro, illustrating the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. For practitioners, it signals that alleged biological fathers with an established relationship to a child may now have a statutory path to standing without needing to litigate a constitutional challenge, though this case shows that path can still be lost through appellate waiver.

  • Civil Procedure — Waiver

    Claim on Appeal: Rhorer’s opening brief did not substantively address the district court’s repeated, specific findings that he had abandoned his paternity claim by pursuing a “dual fatherhood” and parent-time remedy instead of rebutting Husband’s paternity; he raised the abandonment issue only in his reply brief.

    Holding: — Affirmed; Appeal Dismissed on Waiver Grounds. Because Rhorer failed to challenge the abandonment finding in his opening brief, the issue was waived, foreclosing any benefit he might otherwise have obtained from Castro’s favorable interpretation of the UUPA, and the Court dismissed his appeal.

    Statutory Authority: None directly governs waiver, which is a judicially developed appellate briefing doctrine; Rhorer’s underlying motion to set aside invoked rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

    Standard of Review:

    • Whether an issue was adequately preserved and briefed for appeal is a question of law.

    Controlling Cases:

    • State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443 (an issue raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived)
    • Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, 194 P.3d 903 (an appellate court will not seek out errors the appellant failed to allege)
    • Webster v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2012 UT App 321, 290 P.3d 930 (a reply brief is reserved for responding to new matter, not for raising an argument in the first instance)
    • Utah Physicians for a Healthy Env’t v. Exec. Dir. of the Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2016 UT 49, 391 P.3d 148 (technical compliance with appellate procedure is not enough)

    Why It Matters: This holding underscores that an appellant must affirmatively challenge every independently dispositive trial-court finding in the opening brief, not merely the finding the appellant considers most significant. A conclusory denial, or an argument first raised in reply, will not preserve the issue — even where, as here, an intervening and favorable change in the law would otherwise have revived the appellant’s claim.

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Utah Codes

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Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

  • P. v. K.S.W., 2014 UT App 38, 320 P.3d 1084 (court of appeals decision limiting UUPA standing to the mother and presumed father when a child has a presumed father; basis for the commissioner’s initial ruling against Rhorer)
  • Castro v. Lemus, 2019 UT 71 (companion case reinterpreting the UUPA to grant standing to a man whose paternity is to be adjudicated, mooting Rhorer’s constitutional argument)
  • Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, 424 P.3d 95 (standing as a mixed question of fact and law)
  • Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372 (Utah 1997) (standing is primarily a question of law; deference given to factual determinations)
  • State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443 (an issue raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived)
  • Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, 194 P.3d 903 (an appellate court will not seek out errors the appellant failed to allege)
  • Webster v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2012 UT App 321, 290 P.3d 930 (a reply brief may not be used to raise an argument in the first instance)
  • Utah Physicians for a Healthy Env’t v. Exec. Dir. of the Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2016 UT 49, 391 P.3d 148 (technical compliance with appellate procedure is not enough)

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

  • Every independently dispositive trial-court finding is not challenged in the opening brief.
  • A challenge to a dispositive ruling first appears in the reply brief rather than the opening brief.
  • The opening brief offers only a conclusory denial rather than substantive argument addressing the trial court’s reasoning.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

  • The opening brief must identify and argue every specific error, including each independently dispositive finding supporting the judgment below.
  • Any constitutional challenge to a statute must be briefed with adequate specificity in the trial court, including facts and legal analysis, when the court invites such briefing.

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

  • Multiple trial-court orders are being appealed together, but only some are substantively briefed.
  • A dispositive alternative ground (such as abandonment of the claim) exists alongside the “headline” issue (such as constitutionality) and goes unaddressed in the opening brief.
  • A late-filed rule 60(b) motion raises an argument for the first time rather than preserving it earlier in the litigation.

Strategy Insight

Frame an appeal around every independently dispositive ground identified by the trial court, not just the most legally interesting one. An appellant who ultimately wins the “big” doctrinal argument — as Rhorer effectively did when Castro reinterpreted the UUPA in his favor — can still lose the appeal if a separate, unchallenged finding fully supports the judgment below.

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence.

The opinion relies exclusively on Utah authority — the UUPA, the companion case Castro v. Lemus, the court of appeals’ decision in R.P. v. K.S.W., and Utah’s own appellate waiver doctrine. No out-of-state or federal case law anchors the decision; the federal Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses are referenced only as the basis for the constitutional argument the Court ultimately did not need to reach.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court).

  • Castro v. Lemus, 2019 UT 71 — decided the same day, this companion case reinterpreted UUPA § 602 (Utah Code § 81-5-602) to grant standing to a putative biological father; its holding is what made Rhorer’s waiver of the abandonment issue so consequential.
  • Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372 (Utah 1997) — supplies the standard of review for standing determinations, distinguishing questions of law from deferential factual review.
  • Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45 — reaffirms standing as a mixed question of fact and law.

The Most Important Holding.

A party who fails to challenge an independently dispositive trial-court finding in the opening brief waives that challenge — even when a later, favorable change in the law would otherwise entitle the party to relief. A favorable change in governing law cannot rescue an appeal when the finding that independently supports the judgment goes unchallenged.

Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error.

The appeal was not resolved on the merits of any legal or factual error at all; it was dismissed on a purely procedural default — waiver from inadequate appellate briefing. Had Rhorer’s opening brief squarely challenged the district court’s abandonment finding, the outcome could have turned entirely differently given Castro’s intervening, favorable interpretation of the UUPA.

Practitioner Takeaways

Trial Lawyers

  • When a client raises alternative or hybrid remedies (such as “dual fatherhood” or limited parent-time) instead of squarely pursuing the claim as pleaded, build a clear record of whether the client is abandoning the original claim or merely arguing in the alternative.
  • Encourage clients to timely and specifically brief constitutional challenges when a commissioner or court invites them, rather than deferring the argument to a later, procedurally disfavored vehicle like a rule 60(b) motion.

Appellate Lawyers

  • Identify every independently dispositive trial-court finding before drafting the opening brief, and challenge each one — an unchallenged alternative ground can defeat an otherwise meritorious appeal.
  • Never reserve a dispositive argument for the reply brief; under State v. Johnson and Webster, it will be treated as waived.

Intervening or Alleged Biological Fathers

  • Track companion or pending cases that may reinterpret UUPA standing provisions, but do not assume a favorable change in the law will automatically apply — preserve every finding that could independently bar relief.

Majority Opinion

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter

2019 UT 72 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH THERESA

I. HINKLE, Appellee, v. KOREY D. JACOBSEN, Appellee, and JODY RHORER, Intervenor and Appellant.

No. 20180124 Heard February 22, 2019 Filed December 19, 2019

On Certification from the Court of Appeals

Third District, Salt Lake The Honorable Andrew H. Stone No. 124906297

Attorneys: Theresa I. Hinkle, Salt Lake City, pro se Colleen K. Coebergh, Salt Lake City, for appellee Korey D. Jacobsen David Pedrazas, Wade Taylor, Salt Lake City, for intervenor and appellant

JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE HIMONAS, and JUSTICE PEARCE joined.

HINKLE v. JACOBSEN Opinion of the Court 2

JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court: INTRODUCTION

¶1 Jody Rhorer appeals the district court’s determination that he does not have standing to establish paternity of his biological daughter under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA). But the district court also concluded that Rhorer had abandoned his paternity claim entirely, and Rhorer did not challenge this ruling in his opening brief. He has consequently waived the issue, and we dismiss his appeal. BACKGROUND

¶2 Theresa Hinkle (Mother) and Korey Jacobsen (Husband) married in 2002 and then separated in 2005. In 2005, Mother and Rhorer engaged in a relationship during which a child was conceived and born. Because Mother and Husband were still married at the time the child was born, Husband is the child’s presumed father under the UUPA. See UTAH CODE § 78B-15-204(1)(a).

¶3 Mother and Husband began divorce proceedings in 2012. Rhorer intervened in the divorce proceedings, alleging that he is the biological father of the child. He filed multiple motions including one to establish himself as the child’s biological father and another for a determination of parentage. He asserted that he could establish his paternity with genetic test results.

¶4 After briefing and proceedings before the commissioner, the commissioner concluded that under the court of appeals’ interpretation of the UUPA in R.P. v. K.S.W., 2014 UT App 38, 320 P.3d 1084, Rhorer did not have statutory standing to assert his paternity because the child had a presumed father—Husband—and, under such a circumstance, only the mother and presumed father had standing to challenge paternity under the UUPA.

¶5 However, the commissioner noted the court of appeals’ statement in R.P. that [a]lthough constitutional considerations might require further analysis in cases such as this—where the alleged father has an established relationship with the child—R.P. has not raised a constitutional challenge in the district court or on appeal. Accordingly, we leave for another day the issue of the constitutional implications of the UUPA’s standing limitations where Cite as: 2019 UT 72 Opinion of the Court 3 the alleged father has an established relationship with the child. Id. ¶ 7. In light of this language, the commissioner gave Rhorer the opportunity through a custody evaluation to develop facts relevant to whether the UUPA was unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court adopted the recommendation as a court order. The court order provided that Rhorer had no statutory standing to assert his paternity. Therefore, unless he could show “constitutional standing,” he could not move forward with his petition.

¶6 Rhorer proceeded with the custody evaluation in an attempt to establish “constitutional standing.” However, he never analyzed the results of the evaluation to make a legal argument that the UUPA was unconstitutional as applied to him. Rather, he filed a motion in which he asked the court to grant him “standing to pursue a claim for time-sharing with the minor child at time of trial.”

¶7 At a hearing before the commissioner on the custody evaluation and Rhorer’s motion, the commissioner directly requested briefing from Rhorer on any constitutional issues he sought to assert. The commissioner stated, “[I]t’s already the law of this case . . . that [Rhorer] wouldn’t have standing under the statute were it not for concerns about . . . protecting his constitutional rights, and so I’d like to have something that actually states the parties’ positions in writing . . . referring to any facts that are in the file.”

¶8 But Rhorer did not do this. Instead, he filed a reply brief in which he asserted he had already addressed the constitutional issues in other pleadings. But while Rhorer did make reference to the due process clause in some of his pleadings, he did not provide any analysis or argument as to why it required he have standing here.

¶9 The commissioner ultimately concluded that [i]nasmuch as the issue before the Court . . . is whether the strict application of the [UUPA] is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case . . . the Commissioner cannot conclude that there exists a compelling reason to grant standing to [Rhorer] to assert his claim of parentage contrary to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-607.

¶10 In light of the commissioner’s recommendation, in a December 21, 2016 order, the district court concluded that Rhorer “lacks standing to assert his parentage claim.” HINKLE v. JACOBSEN Opinion of the Court 4

¶11 Rhorer filed a belated objection to the commissioner’s recommendation and also moved to set aside the December 21, 2016 order. At a hearing on the objection before the district court, Rhorer’s counsel stated that Rhorer was not trying to take “this little girl away from [Husband],” but that he was “asking this Court to give him a relationship with the child.” Counsel added, “I’m asking this Court to admittedly break new ground . . . to say ‘[N]o, why can’t you have two fathers?’”

¶12 In a June 1, 2017 memorandum decision denying the motion to set aside, the district court found that Rhorer “asked th[e] Court to craft a remedy whereby he is ultimately granted limited parent-time with [the child], while not actually seeking custody of the child or challenging [Husband’s] status as [the child]’s presumed father.” The district court explained, Ultimately, while Mr. Rhorer may have had a right at the time the biological mother and [Husband] sought a divorce to assert standing to challenge the child’s paternity and to rebut [Husband’s] paternity (assuming that Mr. Rhorer could mount a constitutional challenge to [Utah Code section 78B-15-607] as applied to him), he has plainly abandoned such a claim at this point. The court noted that Rhorer had failed to “brief his theories of why Section 607 is unconstitutional as applied to him with adequate specificity to permit intelligent analysis.” Finally, the court concluded that Rhorer had not met his burden to demonstrate the statute’s unconstitutionality and that Rhorer “[did] not seek to rebut [Husband’s] paternity and [did] not seek to establish himself as the legal father” of the child, so he had no standing to challenge Husband’s status as presumed father.

¶13 Rhorer responded to the June 1, 2017 memorandum decision by filing a motion for amended findings and a new trial. At a hearing on the motion, Rhorer’s counsel walked back the request for dual fatherhood and explained that Rhorer still sought to establish paternity and rebut Husband’s status as the child’s presumed father.

¶14 The district court denied the motion in a November 14, 2017 memorandum decision. The court outlined the procedural history of the case and explained that “the only issue” was the “conclusion regarding the constitutional implications of the UUPA’s standing limitations.” The court noted again that “neither Cite as: 2019 UT 72 Opinion of the Court 5 Mr. Rhorer’s written briefing nor his counsel’s oral argument focused on th[e] constitutional challenge” and that Rhorer’s counsel at the time “did not mount a constitutional challenge.” The district court then concluded that Rhorer had “accepted [Husband’s] parental rights” and “was merely asking this Court to take judicial notice of the bond he had formed with [the child] and find it sufficient to enter into a ‘multiple relationship’ of fathering.”

¶15 Rhorer then moved to set aside the November 14, 2017 memorandum decision under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In this motion, for the first time, he briefed a constitutional argument asserting that section 78B-15-607 of the UUPA violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.

¶16 In a January 25, 2018 minute entry, the district court denied Rhorer’s motion. The district court reasoned that it seemed as if “Rhorer [wa]s seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief simply to advance an entirely new legal argument, one that could have been raised and preserved during the multiple instances when this Court and the Commissioners considered the issue of who has standing to challenge a presumed father’s paternity under the [UUPA].”

¶17 Rhorer appeals these four district court orders.1 We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j). STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶18 Standing is generally a mixed question of fact and law “because it involves the application of a legal standard to a particularized set of facts.” Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶ 10, 424 P.3d 95 (citation omitted). However, “the question of whether a given individual or association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question of law.” Kearns— Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997). We review the district court’s “factual determinations” with deference. Id. at 373–74. But we give “minimal discretion” to the district court on “determinations of whether a given set of facts fits the legal requirements for standing.” Id. at 374. _____________________________________________________________ 1 Specifically, Rhorer challenges (1) the December 21, 2016 order; (2) the June 1, 2017 memorandum decision; (3) the November 14, 2017 memorandum decision; and (4) the January 25, 2018 minute entry. HINKLE v. JACOBSEN Opinion of the Court 6 ANALYSIS

¶19 Rhorer’s primary argument on appeal is that the UUPA is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. Husband argues that Rhorer did not preserve these arguments in the district court. As the procedural history above makes clear, Husband is correct.

¶20 But in a companion case issued today, Castro v. Lemus, we interpret the UUPA to grant standing to “a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated.” 2019 UT 71, ¶ 51, — P.3d —. This statutory interpretation does not implicate Rhorer’s equal protection or due process concerns. Accordingly, Rhorer’s failure to preserve his constitutional arguments is moot because the constitutionality of the UUPA is no longer at issue.

¶21 However, we do need to determine whether Rhorer can benefit from any favorable change in the law as articulated in Castro. This hinges upon whether he waived any challenge to the district court’s determination that he abandoned his paternity claim.

¶22 In its June 1, 2017 memorandum decision, the district court noted that Rhorer had asked it “to craft a remedy whereby he is ultimately granted limited parent-time with [the child], while not actually seeking custody of the child or challenging [Husband’s] status as [the child’s] presumed father.” The court concluded that the “law clearly does not recognize the hybrid role proposed by Mr. Rhorer,” and determined that Rhorer no longer sought to rebut Husband’s paternity or to establish himself as the child’s legal father.

¶23 Further, in its November 14, 2017 memorandum decision, the district court concluded that Rhorer had “accepted [Husband’s] parental rights” and “was merely asking [the] Court to take judicial notice of the bond he had formed with [the child] and find it sufficient to enter into a ‘multiple relationship’ of fathering.”

¶24 In these rulings, the district court concluded that Rhorer had abandoned his pursuit of his constitutional standing argument by never briefing it. Further, the court found that Rhorer had abandoned his paternity claim altogether by instead pursuing dual fatherhood and shared parent-time and stating that he did not want to disrupt the relationship between the child and Husband.

¶25 Rhorer does not address these rulings in his briefing to us, other than making a conclusory statement that he did not abandon Cite as: 2019 UT 72 Opinion of the Court 7 his paternity claim.2 He did respond to [Husband’s] argument regarding waiver in his reply brief. But that is insufficient. “When a party . . . raises [an issue] for the first time in a reply brief, that issue is waived and will typically not be addressed by the appellate court.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 16, 416 P.3d 443; see also Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 7, 194 P.3d 903 (“If an appellant fails to allege specific errors of the lower court, the appellate court will not seek out errors in the lower court’s decision.”); Webster v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2012 UT App 321, ¶ 21, 290 P.3d 930 (“The reply brief, however, is reserved for ‘answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief,’ not for making an argument in the first instance.”).

¶26 Accordingly, we can only hold that Rhorer waived any challenge to the district court’s conclusion that he had abandoned his paternity petition. CONCLUSION

¶27 The district court found that Rhorer abandoned his paternity claim, and Rhorer did not challenge that finding on appeal. We therefore conclude that Rhorer waived any claim to challenge Husband’s presumed paternity. Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal. _____________________________________________________________ 2 Specifically, Rhorer stated in his opening brief that he “never abandoned his claim to rebut [Husband’s] paternity in this matter and to seek custody of the minor child.” But this conclusory statement does not constitute a challenge to the district court’s repeated, specific conclusion that he had abandoned his paternity claim. Rhorer did “technically appeal[]” the orders containing the district court’s conclusions about abandonment, but “technical compliance is not enough.” Utah Physicians for a Healthy Env’t v. Exec. Dir. of the Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2016 UT 49, ¶ 18, 391 P.3d 148.

Affirmed

The reviewing court determined that the lower court committed no reversible error and upheld the judgment.