Reese v. Reese, 2026 UT App 31

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Coverage

Facts

Marriage and Postnuptial Agreement

• MaKaibree and Kylan married in 2015 and share two children.
• In early 2017, the parties executed a postnuptial agreement under which Kylan agreed, in the event of divorce, to pay monthly child support of either $2,500 or one-half of his monthly salary, whichever was greater.

Divorce Proceedings

• MaKaibree filed a petition for divorce through counsel in January 2021; Kylan did not retain counsel.
• The parties filed a stipulated settlement agreement, and the district court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a divorce decree in June 2021.
• The findings, conclusions, and decree each incorporated the postnuptial agreement’s child support provision.
• According to the opinion, Kylan later realized that the agreed amount was more than double what he otherwise would have paid under applicable law.

Post-Decree Motion

• In January 2024, Kylan moved to set aside the decree’s child support provision for voidness under rule 60(b)(4), also citing rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6); the court of appeals concluded that the actual basis of the motion was rule 60(b)(4).
• Kylan argued that the provision was void ab initio because Utah Code section 81-3-203(2) bars a premarital agreement from affecting a child’s right to support, health and medical provider expenses, medical insurance, and child care coverage.
• The district court concluded that the statute applies only to premarital agreements and does not bar parties from dictating future child support obligations through a postnuptial agreement; it therefore held the provision was not void and denied the motion as untimely.

Issues of the Case

• Civil Procedure — Post-Judgment Relief

  1. Rule 60(b)(4) Voidness of Child Support Provision

  Claim on Appeal: Kylan argued that the district court erred in determining that the decree’s child support provision was not void, asserting that the provision was illegal, and therefore void under rule 60(b)(4), because it was incorporated into the decree pursuant to the parties’ postnuptial agreement in contravention of Utah Code section 81-3-203(2).

  Holding: — Affirmed. The provision was not void because section 81-3-203(2) by its plain terms governs only premarital agreements, and in any event the case presents none of the three recognized grounds for voidness (lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, or lack of due process notice), so the motion was untimely.

  Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-3-203(2) (a premarital agreement may not affect a child’s right to support, health and medical provider expenses, medical insurance, and child care coverage); Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) and 60(c) (relief from a void judgment; motions to be filed within a reasonable time).

  Standard of Review:

  • Category: Correctness
  • Specific Standard: “Normally, we review a district court’s denial of a 60(b) motion under an abuse of discretion standard of review. But when dealing with a rule 60(b)(4) motion seeking to set aside a judgment as void, we review the district court’s decision for correctness.” Reese v. Reese, 2026 UT App 31, ¶ 4 (quoting Sanders v. Sanders, 2021 UT App 122, ¶ 4, 502 P.3d 1230) (cleaned up).
  • Applies To: The district court’s determination that the decree’s child support provision was not void under rule 60(b)(4) and its resulting denial of the motion to set aside as untimely.

  Controlling Cases:

  • Migliore v. Livingston Fin., LLC, 2015 UT 9, ¶ 26, 347 P.3d 394 (void judgments are narrowly construed in the interest of finality; a judgment is void only for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, or lack of due process notice).
  • In re Estate of Willey, 2016 UT 53, ¶ 17, 391 P.3d 171 (rule 60(c)’s reasonable-time limitation does not apply where a judgment is void for fatally defective service of process).
  • Sanders v. Sanders, 2021 UT App 122, ¶ 4, 502 P.3d 1230 (denial of a rule 60(b)(4) motion is reviewed for correctness).
  • Federated Cap. Corp. v. Libby, 2016 UT 41, ¶ 26, 384 P.3d 221 (courts may not rewrite clear statutory language on policy grounds).
  • Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, ¶ 17 n.11, 263 P.3d 520 (a party may agree to pay child support in excess of the guidelines).

  Why It Matters: The opinion confirms that rule 60(b)(4) is not a vehicle for relitigating the legality or wisdom of a stipulated decree term. A provision that is allegedly contrary to statute or public policy does not render a judgment “void”; only jurisdictional or due process defects do. Because a voidness motion escapes rule 60(c)’s timing limits, the narrow construction protects the finality of stipulated divorce decrees and forces parties to raise substantive challenges through timely motions, petitions to modify, or direct appeal.

• Contracts — Postnuptial Agreement

  2. Application of Utah Code § 81-3-203 to Postnuptial Agreements

  Claim on Appeal: Kylan argued that the district court should have applied section 81-3-203 of the Utah Code to the parties’ postnuptial agreement.

  Holding: — Not reached. The court declined to address this issue because the rule 60(b)(4) issue was dispositive, although in resolving Issue 1 it observed that the statute by its plain terms applies only to premarital agreements.

  Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-3-203(2) (limits on the content of premarital agreements regarding child support and related rights).

  Standard of Review:

  • Category: Not applicable — issue not reached; no standard stated by the court.
  • Specific Standard: Not specified in opinion.
  • Applies To: The district court’s refusal to apply section 81-3-203 to the postnuptial agreement.

  Controlling Cases:

  • None; the court did not reach this issue.

  Why It Matters: Although formally unreached, the court’s plain-language observation in resolving Issue 1 signals that section 81-3-203(2)’s protection of a child’s right to support will not be judicially extended to postnuptial agreements. Any extension of that protection must come from the Legislature.

• Child Support — Support Calculation

  3. Characterization of the Child Support Order

  Claim on Appeal: Kylan argued that the district court erroneously determined that the child support order was the product of a settlement agreement executed in the context of a divorce proceeding rather than the product of a postnuptial agreement.

  Holding: — Not reached. The court declined to address this issue because the decree was not void and Kylan did not timely file his motion under any other provision of rule 60(b).

  Statutory Authority: Not specified in opinion.

  Standard of Review:

  • Category: Not applicable — issue not reached; no standard stated by the court.
  • Specific Standard: Not specified in opinion.
  • Applies To: The district court’s characterization of the source of the decree’s child support provision.

  Controlling Cases:

  • None; the court did not reach this issue.

  Why It Matters: The issue illustrates that once a voidness theory fails, collateral characterization arguments become irrelevant if the remaining rule 60(b) grounds are time-barred. Whether a stipulated decree term originated in a postnuptial agreement or a divorce settlement does not affect finality once the decree is entered.

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

• The issuing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce or support claims.
• The issuing court lacked personal jurisdiction over the moving party.
• The moving party did not receive notice required by due process before the judgment was entered.
• A non-voidness rule 60(b) motion was filed within the time limits of rule 60(c) and the district court misapplied the governing standard.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

The opinion does not impose statutory factors. It does, however, require courts evaluating a rule 60(b)(4) motion to determine whether any of the three exclusive voidness grounds is present:

• Did the court have subject matter jurisdiction?
• Did the court have personal jurisdiction over the moving party?
• Did the moving party receive the notice required by due process?

If all three are answered affirmatively, the judgment is not void and rule 60(c)’s timeliness requirements apply.

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

An appeal from the denial of a rule 60(b)(4) motion is most viable when it combines (1) a genuine jurisdictional or notice defect apparent from the record, (2) preservation of that specific defect in the district court, and (3) a filing timeline that makes voidness the only available route to relief. Reese presented only the third element, which is why the appeal failed.

Strategy Insight

The appeal was framed as a legal error, which secured correctness review, but the asserted error—an allegedly illegal decree term—did not fit the narrow legal category of voidness. Practitioners should recognize that correctness review on a 60(b)(4) motion offers no advantage unless the underlying defect is jurisdictional or constitutional; otherwise, the substantive challenge is effectively an untimely attack on the merits.

Above-Guideline Support by Agreement

In a footnote, the court reiterated that Utah law permits a party to agree to pay child support exceeding the guidelines (Davis v. Davis). Stipulations to elevated support are therefore not inherently unlawful, further undermining any policy-based voidness argument.

Teaching Value

Reese is a concise illustration of the distinction between void and voidable judgments, the interplay between rules 60(b)(4) and 60(c), and the limits of policy-based statutory interpretation. It is well suited to instruction on post-decree remedies in family law practice.

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence

The opinion rests almost entirely on Utah authority: Utah Supreme Court precedent defining void judgments and governing statutory construction, Court of Appeals precedent on standard of review and above-guideline support agreements, and the plain text of Utah Code section 81-3-203. The sole non-Utah source is a supporting citation to Wright & Miller’s treatise on the federal analogue to rule 60(b)(4), offered as confirmation rather than as a basis for the holding.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)

• Migliore v. Livingston Fin., LLC, 2015 UT 9, 347 P.3d 394. Established that void judgments are narrowly construed in the interest of finality and limited to three circumstances: lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and lack of due process notice. Role: the controlling framework that disposed of the appeal.
• In re Estate of Willey, 2016 UT 53, 391 P.3d 171. Established that rule 60(c)’s time limits do not apply to a judgment void for fatally defective service. Role: explains why the voidness characterization mattered—it was Kylan’s only route around the timeliness bar.
• Federated Cap. Corp. v. Libby, 2016 UT 41, 384 P.3d 221. Established that courts may not rewrite clear statutory language or second-guess its policy. Role: foreclosed extending section 81-3-203(2) to postnuptial agreements.

The Most Important Holding

A judgment is not void under rule 60(b)(4) merely because a party contends that one of its terms is illegal or contrary to statute. Absent a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a lack of personal jurisdiction, or a due process notice defect, an allegedly unlawful provision in a stipulated divorce decree is at most voidable and must be challenged within rule 60(c)’s time limits or through other proper channels. This holding operates independently of the court’s plain-language reading of section 81-3-203(2), so it would have defeated the motion even if the statute applied to postnuptial agreements.

Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error

The court affirmed in full. Reversal under this framework would have required a showing that the decree was void in the Migliore sense—for example, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or over Kylan, or that Kylan did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the proceeding. Alternatively, a timely motion under rule 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6) could have presented the substantive challenge on its merits, subject to the abuse of discretion standard.

Practitioner Takeaways

• Trial Lawyers: Scrutinize child support terms in stipulated decrees against the guidelines before entry, particularly where a postnuptial agreement predetermines support. Once the decree is entered, an above-guideline stipulation is difficult to undo; the realistic avenues are a timely rule 60(b) motion on non-voidness grounds or a petition to modify based on a qualifying change in circumstances.
• Appellate Lawyers: A rule 60(b)(4) argument must be framed in jurisdictional or due process terms. Characterizing a substantive legal defect as rendering a judgment “void ab initio” will not succeed, and the court will decline to reach collateral merits arguments once the voidness theory fails.
• Self-Represented Parties: Parties who stipulate to a decree without counsel are bound by its terms. Kylan’s lack of representation did not alter the voidness analysis.
• Parties to Marital Agreements: Section 81-3-203(2)’s protection of children’s support rights, by its plain terms, governs premarital agreements; parties negotiating postnuptial agreements should not assume the same statutory limitation applies.