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Stephenson v. Stephenson, 2025 UT App 149

Case Summary

Shauna H. Stephenson and Kerry Kay Stephenson were married for thirty-one years before Shauna petitioned for divorce in 2016. The ensuing litigation spanned six years and two bench trials, centering on the division of a commercial rental company (KMK Properties LLC), a residence under construction (Bell Canyon), and a joint investment account. During the case, Kerry managed KMK, completed Bell Canyon, and liquidated the investment account, moving funds among personal and business accounts. Kerry appealed the district court’s final property distribution, challenging (1) the denial of credit for Bell Canyon completion costs paid from marital funds, (2) the denial of credit for KMK “hard expenses” paid after a 2019 order that split rental revenue evenly with no expense reserve, and (3) a $60,000 credit to Shauna for missed rental distributions.

Podcast Interviews and Other Sources

Podcast Interviews

Oral Argument

Briefing Documents

Plura pertinentia mox sequentur. Quaeso, redi mox.

Coverage

Facts

Marriage and Marital Assets

  • The parties married in 1985, and Shauna filed for divorce in 2016 after thirty-one years of marriage.
  • The parties owned KMK Properties LLC, which held a single commercial rental property whose rental revenue was the parties’ main source of income.
  • The parties also owned their primary residence and a second residential property, Bell Canyon, which was under construction when the petition was filed.
  • The parties held a joint investment account (the Investment Account) valued at $197,584 at the time of separation.

Temporary Orders During the Litigation

  • A temporary order awarded Shauna possession of the primary residence and awarded Kerry possession of Bell Canyon, authorizing (but not requiring) him to complete its construction, with a goal of completion by the end of 2016.
  • The temporary order directed Kerry to manage KMK, distribute $3,000 per month to each party, and deposit the remaining revenue into a joint account from which KMK expenses were to be paid.

Lease Renegotiation and Movement of Funds

  • In early 2019, Kerry negotiated a new lease that increased KMK’s monthly rent to $15,000 and shifted all property expenses, including building insurance, taxes, maintenance, and repairs, to the tenant.
  • Kerry liquidated at least part of the Investment Account, deposited the proceeds into his personal account, and transferred some of those funds to KMK’s business account, booking the transfers as “personal loans” from himself to KMK.
  • Kerry used KMK business-account funds for Bell Canyon construction, personal expenses, and divorce-related attorney fees.

The 2019 Stipulation and the 2019 Order

  • Following a two-day bench trial in 2019, the parties stipulated that each would receive $6,000 per month from KMK revenue, with $3,000 reserved for KMK expenses; that Kerry would receive a 5% property-management fee; and that both the KMK property and Bell Canyon would be listed for sale.
  • Disputes continued, and five months later the court ordered that KMK revenue be split $7,500 to each party “regardless of what the expenses are” (the 2019 Order), over Kerry’s objection that he would be left to cover KMK expenses from his half.
  • The court responded that if KMK “is going to go under, then it goes under,” expressing frustration with the pace of the case and urging the parties to sell the properties.

Sale of the Properties and the Second Trial

  • Both Bell Canyon and the KMK property were eventually sold, and the parties agreed the proceeds should in principle be divided equally, but disputed credits and offsets for expenses each claimed to have paid on behalf of the marital estate.
  • At a five-day trial, Kerry sought credit for Bell Canyon labor and expenses, a 5% KMK management fee from separation to sale, a $108,900 salary, a 3% lease-renegotiation fee, and KMK expenses including commercial insurance ($7,127), building insurance ($8,153), and a city bond ($3,808).
  • Shauna’s accountant testified that Kerry had used KMK funds for personal and Bell Canyon expenses and that the resulting accounting was difficult to follow.
  • Shauna sought credit for missed KMK distributions, testifying to $45,000 missing in 2020 and $15,000 missing in 2021, although her own summary exhibit reflected five missed 2020 distributions totaling $37,500 and two missed 2021 distributions totaling $15,000. Kerry’s documentation matched for 2020 but reflected only one missed 2021 distribution.

The Final Order

  • The court classified the KMK property, Bell Canyon, and the Investment Account as marital property and awarded each party half of the Bell Canyon proceeds ($440,534), half of the KMK proceeds (approximately $1.35 million), and half of the Investment Account valued at separation ($98,792), the latter listed as an amount due from Kerry to Shauna.
  • The court treated KMK and its account as marital, found Kerry’s accounting commingled with personal and Bell Canyon expenses, and declined to rely on much of the testimony of Kerry’s expert, who was also KMK’s accountant.
  • The court rejected Kerry’s Bell Canyon claims for $10,000 in unrecorded expenses, $203,175 in labor costs, and “personal loans,” and, although it found that Kerry’s exhibit showing approximately $172,485 in completion costs was the more reliable figure, denied any offset because those costs were “paid with marital monies.”
  • The court rejected the pre-2019 management fee, the 3% renegotiation fee, and the salary claim; credited Kerry $11,500 in stipulated management fees from June 2019 through March 2021; and declined to adjust for post-2019 KMK expenses on the ground that the parties had “stipulated” to a division of rental income as it came in.
  • The court credited Shauna $60,000 for missed KMK distributions ($45,000 for 2020 and $15,000 for 2021), stating that it relied on Shauna’s exhibit.

Issues of the Case

Kerry Kay Stephenson, the appellant, raised three issues challenging the district court’s division of the marital estate.

  1. Issue 1: Property Division / Credit for Bell Canyon Completion Costs
  2. Issue 2: Property Division / Credit for KMK Hard Expenses After the 2019 Order
  3. Issue 3: Sufficiency of the Evidence / Credit to Shauna for Missed KMK Distributions

The court reversed and remanded on Issue 1 (completion-cost credit) and Issue 2 (post-2019 KMK hard expenses), while affirming the rejection of Kerry’s other Bell Canyon and KMK claims; on Issue 3, the court reversed the $45,000 credit for 2020 (reducing it to $37,500) and affirmed the $15,000 credit for 2021.

  • Property Division – Equitable Distribution

    1. Property Division / Credit for Bell Canyon Completion Costs

    Claim on Appeal: Kerry argued that the district court abused its discretion by requiring him to pay Shauna a full half of the Investment Account (valued at separation) without crediting him for the Bell Canyon completion costs he paid from that same account, giving Shauna an oversized share of the marital estate. Shauna responded that Kerry had commingled marital and personal funds, defeating any claim to an offset.

    Holding: — Reversed and Remanded in part; Affirmed in part. Because the completion costs were legitimate marital expenses paid from a marital account, awarding Shauna half of the account’s full separation-date value without deducting those costs effectively burdened Kerry with the entire expense; the court’s rejection of Kerry’s labor-cost, unrecorded-expense, and “personal loan” claims was affirmed.

    Statutory Authority: None cited in the opinion. The court resolved the issue under Utah’s equitable property-division caselaw, including the presumption of an equal division of marital property.

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Abuse of Discretion

    Specific Standard: “Generally, district courts have considerable discretion concerning property distribution in a divorce proceeding and their determinations enjoy a presumption of validity.” . . . “[W]e will uphold the decision ‘unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.’” Stephenson v. Stephenson, 2025 UT App 149, ¶ 17 (quoting Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 119, 459 P.3d 276) (cleaned up).

    Applies To: The district court’s denial of an offset to Kerry for the Bell Canyon completion costs in Section 3.C. of the Final Order, and its corresponding award to Shauna of half the full separation-date value of the Investment Account.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276 (district courts have considerable discretion in property distribution; review for clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion).
    • Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 299 P.3d 1079 (appellant must show legal error, findings against the clear preponderance of evidence, or serious inequity manifesting a clear abuse of discretion).
    • Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 176 P.3d 476 (marital property is ordinarily divided equally).
    • Fischer v. Fischer, 2021 UT App 145, 505 P.3d 56 (each party is presumed entitled to fifty percent of the marital property).
    • Boyer v. Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, 259 P.3d 1063 (primary purpose of property division is a fair, just, and equitable result).
    • Thorup v. Thorup, 2024 UT App 93, 554 P.3d 329 (commingling doctrine addresses separate property mixed with marital property; distinguished as inapplicable where all relevant funds are marital).

    Why It Matters: The opinion clarifies that when one spouse pays a legitimate marital expense from a marital account during the litigation, the other spouse’s share of that account must be computed net of the expense; otherwise the paying spouse bears 100% of a shared obligation. It also confines commingling arguments to disputes over separate-versus-marital character, holding that commingling is not implicated when every dollar at issue is marital and the expense is ascertainable. Under the court’s illustration, the difference is substantial: Kerry would owe $12,549.50 rather than $98,792 if completion costs were $172,485.

  • Property Division — Debt Allocation

    2. Property Division / Credit for KMK Hard Expenses After the 2019 Order

    Claim on Appeal: Kerry argued that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to credit him for KMK expenses (such as commercial insurance, building insurance, and a city bond) that he paid from his half of the revenue after the 2019 Order split KMK income evenly with no reserve for expenses. At oral argument, Kerry limited this challenge to “actual hard expenses.”

    Holding: — Reversed and Remanded in part; Affirmed in part. The district court erroneously treated the $7,500/$7,500 split as a stipulation when Kerry had objected to it, and therefore never determined whether he paid legitimate post-2019 hard expenses; the court’s rejection of the pre-2019 management fee, the 3% lease-renegotiation fee, and the salary claim was affirmed.

    Statutory Authority: None cited in the opinion.

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Abuse of Discretion

    Specific Standard: An appellant challenging a marital property division “has the burden to prove that either (1) there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2) the evidence clearly preponderated against the finding; or (3) such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.” Stephenson v. Stephenson, 2025 UT App 149, ¶ 20 (quoting Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 44, 299 P.3d 1079) (cleaned up).

    Applies To: The district court’s determination, in Section 3.E.v. of the Final Order, that no adjustment for post-2019 KMK expenses was necessary because the parties had stipulated to an even split of rental revenue.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 299 P.3d 1079 (reversal warranted where a misunderstanding or misapplication of law results in substantial and prejudicial error).
    • Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276 (deferential review of property distribution).
    • Boyer v. Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, 259 P.3d 1063 (property division must achieve an equitable result).

    Why It Matters: A district court cannot rest a property-division ruling on a stipulation that does not exist; the parties’ actual 2019 stipulation reserved $3,000 per month for expenses, and the later even split was imposed by the court over Kerry’s objection. Where a court-imposed interim order shifts operating expenses onto one spouse, that spouse’s documented payment of legitimate marital expenses must be accounted for at final distribution. The opinion also illustrates that a district court’s own figures (here, an adjusted expense figure of $171,003.71 apparently reflecting legitimate KMK expenses) can expose an internal inconsistency that supports reversal.

  • Property Division – Equitable Distribution

    3. Sufficiency of the Evidence / Credit to Shauna for Missed KMK Distributions

    Claim on Appeal: Kerry argued that the $60,000 credit to Shauna was unsupported by sufficient evidence because the evidence showed only $37,500 (not $45,000) missing in 2020 and only $7,500 (not $15,000) missing in 2021.

    Holding: — Reversed and Remanded as to 2020; Affirmed as to 2021. Both parties’ exhibits, including the Shauna exhibit on which the district court expressly relied, showed only five missed 2020 distributions totaling $37,500, while conflicting evidence on 2021 was sufficient to support the $15,000 finding.

    Statutory Authority: None cited in the opinion.

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Clear Error

    Specific Standard: “[A] district ‘court’s factual determinations are clearly erroneous only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence, or if this court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’” Stephenson v. Stephenson, 2025 UT App 149, ¶ 18 (quoting Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)) (cleaned up).

    Applies To: The district court’s factual findings that Shauna did not receive $45,000 in KMK distributions in 2020 and $15,000 in KMK distributions in 2021.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (sufficiency challenges concern findings of fact reviewed for clear error; definite and firm conviction standard).
    • Clarke v. Clarke, 2023 UT App 160, 542 P.3d 935 (financial rulings supported by sufficient evidence are upheld even if other evidence cut the other way).
    • Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276 (findings in property distribution not set aside unless clearly erroneous; due regard for credibility determinations).

    Why It Matters: Clear-error review is deferential but not toothless: a finding that contradicts the very exhibit the court claims to rely on, and that is controverted by both parties’ documentation, will be reversed notwithstanding contrary testimony from the benefited party. Conversely, where the evidence genuinely conflicts, as it did for 2021, the court of appeals will not reweigh it. The concession by appellee’s counsel at oral argument that the exhibit reflected the seventh 2020 payment underscores the value of record-based precision.

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

  • Boyer v. Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, 259 P.3d 1063 (cited for the principle that the primary purpose of property division is a fair, just, and equitable result).
  • Clarke v. Clarke, 2023 UT App 160, 542 P.3d 935 (cited to affirm the 2021 distribution finding because sufficient evidence supported it despite contrary evidence).
  • Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (cited for the clear-error standard governing sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges; applied to reverse the 2020 distribution finding).
  • Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276 (cited for the abuse-of-discretion and clear-error standards governing review of property distributions).
  • Fischer v. Fischer, 2021 UT App 145, 505 P.3d 56 (cited for the presumption that each spouse is entitled to fifty percent of marital property).
  • Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 299 P.3d 1079 (cited for the three grounds on which an appellant may overturn a property division; applied to reverse the KMK hard-expense ruling as a misapplication of law).
  • Petrzelka v. Goodwin, 2020 UT App 34, 461 P.3d 1134 (cited in a footnote for the court’s discretion to select a valuation date; the valuation-date question was expressly not reached because Kerry did not challenge it).
  • Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 176 P.3d 476 (cited for the rule that marital property is ordinarily divided equally and separate property awarded to the acquiring spouse).
  • Thorup v. Thorup, 2024 UT App 93, 554 P.3d 329 (cited for the definition of commingling; distinguished because all funds at issue were marital).

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

  • The district court finds an expense legitimate or reliable but declines to credit it on a rationale (such as “paid with marital monies”) that results in one spouse bearing the full cost.
  • A spouse is awarded half of a marital account’s separation-date value even though the account was drawn down to pay marital obligations before trial.
  • The ruling rests on a stipulation that the record shows the appellant did not make, or to which the appellant objected.
  • The district court leaves a category of claimed expenses unaddressed, without findings on what the expenses were.
  • A factual finding conflicts with the exhibit the court expressly relied upon and with the opposing party’s matching documentation.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

  • The opinion does not impose any statutory factor checklist. It does, however, require the following findings and computations on remand:
    • An express finding of the actual amount of the Bell Canyon completion costs.
    • Subtraction of that amount from the $197,584 separation-date value of the Investment Account, with the remainder split equally between the parties.
    • A determination of whether Kerry paid any KMK hard expenses after the 2019 Order that were not expressly rejected in the Final Order, with credit to Kerry for any such expenses.
    • Amendment of the missed-distribution credit for 2020 from $45,000 to $37,500, leaving the $15,000 credit for 2021 intact.
    • Whether to hold a new evidentiary hearing on remand is left to the district court’s discretion.

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

  • Lengthy, contentious litigation with interim court orders that shifted costs between spouses, combined with a frustrated trial court expressly prioritizing speed over precise accounting.
  • A final order that accepts a figure as legitimate or reliable but does not carry it through to the distribution.
  • Reliance on a characterization of the record (a “stipulation”) contradicted by transcripts of the appellant’s objection.
  • Arithmetic or tabulation discrepancies between the findings and the exhibits cited in support.
  • An appellant who narrows the appeal to documented, quantifiable credits and concedes weaker claims.

Strategy Insight

  • Kerry succeeded by framing his Bell Canyon and KMK claims as accounting and legal-application errors (an unequal division resulting from an uncredited marital expense, and reliance on a nonexistent stipulation) rather than as disputes over credibility or the weight of evidence. Where he challenged credibility-laden determinations, such as labor costs and the pre-2019 management fee, the court of appeals deferred. The lesson is to locate the error in the structure of the court’s computation or in a misreading of the record, not in the court’s assessment of witnesses.

Court-Imposed Orders Are Not Stipulations

  • The distinction between the parties’ 2019 stipulation ($6,000 each with a $3,000 expense reserve) and the court’s later 2019 Order ($7,500 each with no reserve) was dispositive. Practitioners should carefully track which interim terms were agreed to and which were imposed, because only the former can bind a party to forgo later credits.

Limits of the Commingling Doctrine

  • The opinion confirms that commingling under Thorup addresses whether separate property has lost its separate character. It is not a basis for denying credit when all funds are marital and the relevant expense can be traced and computed.

Teaching Value

  • The opinion is a useful illustration of how the equal-division presumption operates at the level of individual line items. Footnote 3 provides a worked example: if completion costs were $172,485, the remaining $25,099 in the Investment Account would be split, with Kerry owing Shauna $12,549.50 rather than $98,792.

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence

  • The opinion relies exclusively on Utah authority. Every case cited is a decision of the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Court of Appeals, and the court drew on no out-of-state authority or secondary sources.
  • The analysis is built almost entirely on settled Utah standards of review and equal-division principles, applied to the specific accounting record rather than to any novel doctrinal question.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)

  • Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276.
    • Established: District courts have considerable discretion in property distribution, reviewed for clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, with factual findings reviewed for clear error and due regard for credibility determinations.
    • Role: Supplies the governing standards of review for all three issues.
  • Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 299 P.3d 1079.
    • Established: An appellant challenging a property division must show (1) a misunderstanding or misapplication of law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, (2) evidence clearly preponderating against a finding, or (3) a serious inequity manifesting a clear abuse of discretion.
    • Role: Provides the framework for reversal, and its first prong is the express basis for reversing the KMK hard-expense ruling.

The Most Important Holding

  • When a spouse pays a legitimate marital expense out of a marital account during the divorce, the court must compute the other spouse’s share of that account net of the expense. Awarding the other spouse half of the account’s separation-date value without that deduction forces the paying spouse to bear the entire shared obligation and produces an inequitable division.
  • Corollary: Commingling doctrine does not defeat such a credit where all relevant funds are marital and the expense is ascertainable; commingling concerns the loss of separate property’s identity, not the tracing of marital funds to marital expenses.

Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error

  • Issue 1 (Bell Canyon completion costs): Reversed as an abuse of discretion because the court’s accounting, after accepting the completion costs as legitimate, failed to reflect them in the Investment Account allocation, producing an unequal division. The error was one of applying equal-division principles, not of weighing evidence.
  • Issue 2 (KMK hard expenses): Reversed as a misunderstanding or misapplication of law under Goggin, because the court relied on a nonexistent stipulation and never adjudicated Kerry’s claimed post-2019 expenses.
  • Issue 3 (2020 distributions): Reversed as clear factual error because the finding conflicted with both parties’ exhibits, including the exhibit the court said it relied on. The 2021 finding was affirmed because the evidence genuinely conflicted.

Practitioner Takeaways

  • Trial Lawyers:
    • Separate credible, documented expense claims from inflated or uncorroborated ones. Kerry’s unsupported labor and fee claims were rejected and affirmed, while his documented completion costs and hard expenses survived appeal.
    • When a court imposes an interim revenue or expense allocation, object on the record and explain the financial consequence. Kerry’s objection to the 2019 Order was decisive in defeating the “stipulation” rationale.
    • Prepare a clean tracing schedule showing marital funds flowing to marital expenses, and request express findings on the amount of each credit.
    • Ensure that summary exhibits are internally consistent with testimony; a client’s overstated testimony can be undone by the client’s own exhibit.
  • Appellate Lawyers:
    • Identify internal inconsistencies within the final order, such as a finding that an expense is legitimate followed by a refusal to credit it, or an expense figure the court computes but never applies. These inconsistencies frame the error as legal rather than evidentiary.
    • Narrow the appeal to the strongest claims. Kerry’s concession at oral argument that he sought only “actual hard expenses” allowed the court to affirm the weaker claims and reverse on the stronger ones.
    • Be precise about what is and is not challenged; Kerry’s express disclaimer of any valuation-date challenge kept the court focused on the credit question.
  • Business Owners and Managing Spouses:
    • A spouse managing a marital business during divorce should keep business, personal, and project expenses in separate, documented accounts. Booking transfers of marital funds as “personal loans” undermined Kerry’s credibility and his expert’s reliability.
    • Management or brokerage-type fees claimed against the marital estate must rest on an agreement, a court order, or evidence of time expended and a reasonable rate.

Majority Opinion

2025 UT App 149

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SHAUNA H. STEPHENSON, Appellee, v. KERRY KAY STEPHENSON, Appellant.

Opinion No. 20220469-CA Filed October 17, 2025 Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy No. 164903861 J

ulie J. Nelson, Attorney for Appellant Mary C. Corporon and Kristen C. Kiburtz, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred. HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 After six years of divorce litigation, including two separate bench trials, the district court entered a final order distributing marital property between Shauna H. Stephenson and Kerry Kay Stephenson. Kerry1 appeals that order, arguing (among other things) that the district court did not properly credit him for expenses he incurred in managing marital assets during the pendency of the case. We affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. 1. Because the parties share the same last name, we follow our usual practice of referring to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality. Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 2 2025 UT App 149

BACKGROUND

¶2 Kerry and Shauna married in 1985. In 2016, after thirty-one years of marriage, Shauna filed for divorce. During their marriage, Kerry and Shauna owned various properties, as well as savings, investment, and retirement accounts. Relevant to this appeal, they owned a company—KMK Properties LLC (KMK)— that held a single commercial rental property (the KMK property), and the rental revenue from KMK was the parties’ main source of income. In addition to KMK, the parties owned their primary residence and another residential property—known as Bell Canyon—which was under construction at the time the petition for divorce was filed. Among their various accounts, the parties owned a joint investment account (the Investment Account) valued at $197,584 at the time of separation.

¶3 After Shauna filed for divorce, the court entered a temporary order for the management of the parties’ assets during the pendency of the case. In that order, the court granted Shauna possession of the parties’ primary residence and granted Kerry possession of Bell Canyon, authorizing Kerry to complete the construction of that residence. The order stated, “The [Bell Canyon home] should be completed as soon as possible with the goal of having the home completed and receiving a certificate of occupancy by the end of 2016. However, this temporary order shall not be construed to require [Kerry] to complete the construction if he elects not to.” The court further ordered that Kerry manage KMK, requiring Kerry to distribute $3,000 monthly from KMK revenue to himself and $3,000 to Shauna, while allocating all remaining KMK revenue to a joint account from which KMK’s expenses were to be paid.

¶4 In early 2019, Kerry negotiated a new lease with KMK’s tenant that increased KMK’s monthly rental revenues to $15,000 and “required the tenant to pay all expenses of the property, including building insurance, property taxes, maintenance and Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 3 2025 UT App 149 repairs to the property.” Kerry also liquidated at least part of the Investment Account and deposited the proceeds into his personal bank account. Kerry then transferred, in a series of transactions, part of these funds from his personal account to KMK’s business account and booked these transactions as “personal loans” from Kerry to KMK. Kerry used some of the funds from KMK’s business account for construction work on Bell Canyon, as well as for personal expenses and attorney fees for the divorce case.

¶5 Later that year, the case proceeded to a two-day bench trial. After that trial, the parties reached a stipulation—later memorialized into an order—providing, among other things, that: • the parties would each receive $6,000 per month from the $15,000 monthly rental revenue KMK received, with the remaining $3,000 to be held to cover KMK’s expenses; • Kerry would receive a property management fee of 5% of KMK’s gross rental revenue; • the KMK property would be listed for sale; and • Bell Canyon would be listed for sale.

¶6 However, this stipulated order “resulted in disagreement and argument between the parties,” protracting the litigation further. Shauna asserted, among other things, that she had not received all of her KMK distributions and that both Bell Canyon and the KMK property had not been listed for sale. So, the district court held another hearing, five months later, to address the parties’ continued disputes. Frustrated, the court offered its view that the “parties need[ed] to move forward” and that it could not “assess whose delay it [was],” so it would “make decisions . . . that [would] move this case forward and then move people off their intractable positions.” The court ordered that the KMK rental distributions be divided equally between the parties, with each Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 4 2025 UT App 149 party receiving $7,500 monthly “regardless of what the expenses are” (the 2019 Order). Kerry objected, arguing that dividing the revenue this way would harm him because he would then be responsible for covering any KMK expenses with his half of the proceeds. The court responded that “if getting . . . to the bottom line means that KMK is going to go under, then it goes under. And that’s the way it is.” The court explained that the case had “been pending for four years with the same arguments being made” and “maybe” the court’s ruling would “light a fire under somebody to get this thing done.” The court urged the parties to get Bell Canyon and the KMK property listed and sold.

¶7 Eventually, both Bell Canyon and the KMK property were sold, and the parties agreed that the proceeds should, in theory, be divided equally. But the parties disagreed about whether and to what extent each should receive credits and offsets for expenses they claimed to have paid on behalf of the marital estate.

¶8 To resolve these issues, the court held another trial, and this one lasted for five days. During the trial, the parties presented “dueling accounting explanations” from accounting experts regarding their claimed credits and offsets. Kerry sought credit for his labor and expenses related to the Bell Canyon construction, as well as credit for his management of KMK; on that score, he sought a 5% management fee from the date of separation until sale, a salary of $108,900, and a 3% fee for renegotiating the new lease in 2019. Kerry also sought reimbursement for other KMK business expenses, including commercial insurance of $7,127, “building insurance” of $8,153, and a city bond for $3,808. Some of these expenses were incurred before the 2019 Order, while others were incurred after. In support of his requests, Kerry presented his own testimony, the testimony of KMK’s accountant, and receipts documenting the expenses. In response, Shauna’s retained accountant testified that Kerry used KMK funds to pay for his personal expenses as well as Bell Canyon expenses and that, given the way Kerry had combined his personal expenses Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 5 2025 UT App 149 with the Bell Canyon expenses, there was “very little” about the accounting that made it clear and understandable.

¶9 Shauna sought, among other things, credit for distributions from KMK she claimed she did not receive in 2020 and 2021. She testified that she had not received $45,000 in rental distributions in 2020 (for six months) and another $15,000 in distributions in 2021 (for two months). In support, she submitted an exhibit summarizing the missing distributions and noting in relevant part that she was missing five distributions in 2020 (August through December) totaling $37,500 and two in 2021 (February and March) totaling $15,000. Kerry’s documentation for 2020 was consistent with Shauna’s exhibit, but his documentation for 2021 conflicted with Shauna’s, noting only one missing distribution of $7,500.

¶10 A few weeks after trial, the court issued a lengthy written ruling finalizing the property division (the Final Order). In that order, the court identified all the relevant property—the KMK property, Bell Canyon, and the Investment Account—as marital property that was “subject to distribution after offsets or adjustments.” In turn, the court concluded that the parties were each entitled to half ($440,534) of the proceeds of the Bell Canyon sale, with an adjustment stipulated to by the parties, and half (some $1.35 million) of the proceeds of the KMK property sale, subject to the parties’ claims of offsets and credits. The court also determined that the parties were each entitled to half ($98,792) of the value of the Investment Account, which the court valued at $197,584 at the time of the parties’ separation. In the final breakdown of the property distribution, the court credited Shauna $98,792 in a line item under the “[a]mounts [d]ue” from Kerry to Shauna for her half of the Investment Account.

¶11 The court also concluded that KMK’s income and expenses during the pendency of the litigation were attributable to the marital estate. The court explained that KMK and its business account “were joint marital assets at the time of separation, and Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 6 2025 UT App 149 . . .remained marital property.” The court further determined that “the accounting of this business was commingled with personal expenses of [Kerry] and marital expenses for expenses incurred in the work on Bell Canyon.” Because of this, the court ruled that it would “attribute all funds in this KMK account to be marital property, and all funds subsequently commingled into it [would] be marital property subject to offsets as later set forth.” On this point, the court addressed the testimony of Kerry’s expert, explaining that although the expert tried to reconcile “these commingled accounts in an attempt to appropriately allocate KMK business, [Kerry’s] personal expenses, and Bell Canyon expenses,” the expert “chose to ignore the fact that monies [Kerry] claimed as personal monies were actually marital assets,” apparently referring to the funds transferred from the Investment Account or other joint accounts into his personal account. As an example, the court noted that one of Kerry’s exhibits included a transaction entitled “working capital” for Bell Canyon as a “personal loan” from Kerry “when actually, it was entirely a marital asset.” The court added that Kerry’s expert, who had been working as KMK’s accountant, had been uncooperative in providing financial information to Shauna and had provided testimony in Kerry’s favor. With all of this in mind, the court stated it was hesitant “to rely on much” of the information generated by Kerry’s expert. The court then stated that it would “allocate against the marital estate some of the expenses for Bell Canyon, with a presumption that some allocations by [Kerry and his expert were] simply not supported by credible evidence.”

¶12 After addressing each item of marital property, the court addressed the parties’ claims for offsets and credits. First, regarding the Bell Canyon expenses, the court rejected Kerry’s claim for $10,000 in “unrecorded” expenses for construction costs because “[n]o evidence ha[d] been provided other than [Kerry’s] representation to corroborate these expenses.” The court also rejected Kerry’s claim for $203,175 in “labor costs” he allegedly expended on Bell Canyon, explaining that “without evidence to Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 7 2025 UT App 149 corroborate the actual work expended by [Kerry], and the apparent attempt to charge the marital estate at an absurdly high hourly rate for labor, for among other things, the changing of smoke alarm batteries,” Kerry had failed to present “credible evidence to meet his burden of proof.” Finally, the court rejected Kerry’s request for an offset for the “personal loans” he purportedly contributed to the construction of Bell Canyon because, as the court had stated before, these transfers “actually came from joint monies of the marital estate and as a result [did] not accrue to [Kerry] as a ‘personal loan’ for which he [was] entitled to a personal claim of offset.”

¶13 In that same vein, the court rejected Kerry’s claim of $172,485 for the “completion costs” of Bell Canyon. The court seemed to acknowledge the legitimacy of these expenses, explaining that Kerry’s trial exhibit showing approximately $172,485 in “completion costs” was “a more reliable representation of the charges appropriately attributable to completion costs” of Bell Canyon. And the court apparently referred to these expenses in another part of the Final Order when it explained that it would attempt “to allocate against the marital estate some of the expenses for Bell Canyon.” Yet the court ultimately disregarded this claim for credit because it found that the “completion costs, whatever they may have accurately been, were paid with marital monies and therefore [were] not an offset against either party.” In turn, the court stated that it “finds $172,485.23 as the cost of completion of Bell Canyon, which [would] be deducted against the sale price,” and that there would be “no offset against the sale for monies spent on completion.”

¶14 The court likewise rejected many of Kerry’s claims of offsets for KMK expenses. Specifically, the court rejected his claim for a 5% management fee for services provided before the 2019 Order, explaining that “[t]here was no agreement between the parties, nor any order of the [c]ourt, . . . for management of KMK until the parties entered into a stipulation in June 2019.” However, Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 8 2025 UT App 149 the court credited Kerry $11,500 for a management fee “from June 2019 through March 2021 as was stipulated by the parties.” The court next rejected Kerry’s claim for a 3% fee for the renegotiation of the KMK lease, explaining that “there was no agreement by the parties for such an additional fee to be incurred on top of the fee [Kerry] was already receiving for management of KMK,” that Kerry was not a “broker, realtor, [or] third party entitled to such a fee,” and that his claim was “unsupported by any evidence as to [the] time expended or a reasonable rate for such a service.” Finally, the court rejected his claim to $108,900 as a salary “on the same basis” as it had rejected his two previous claims.

¶15 The court also addressed Shauna’s claim for missing rental distributions and credited her $60,000. The court relied on Shauna’s exhibit summarizing her missing distributions and explained that the exhibit “reflects $60,000 in unpaid KMK rental distributions, $45,000 of which was not paid in 2020.”

¶16 The court next addressed the significant disparity between the parties’ calculations of net revenue for KMK’s rental proceeds from the time of separation to KMK’s sale. Kerry’s calculation included deductions for the expenses discussed above. The court explained that the “total KMK expenses reflected on [Kerry’s statement of income and expenses] include[d] items such as management fees, property maintenance work (already excluded by the [c]ourt), property management; and legal fees,” and as a result, the court concluded that Kerry’s evidence was “largely unusable” because “it contain[ed] claims and expenses disallowed by the [c]ourt.” (Emphasis added.) After “[a]dding these fees back into the [net] income,” the court found that the expenses had been reduced “from $678,272.97 to $171,003.71.” But the court did not elaborate on what constituted the $171,003 remaining expense figure. Shauna’s calculation, in the court’s view, “allegedly reflect[ed] total net rental revenue from separation until sale of KMK but [did] not account for expenses poured into Bell Canyon or KMK.” With these competing calculations, the court explained Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 9 2025 UT App 149 that it was “left with a decision of net rental income for KMK of [Shauna’s] $783,482.91 claim and [Kerry’s] adjusted claim figure of $507,269.26.” In resolving this disparity, the court decided that the “parties had negotiated and stipulated to a division of the rental income as it came in, and the [c]ourt [would] not make any adjustment except to include the cash in the KMK account post sale.” Accordingly, the court did not specifically address at least some of the KMK expenses that had accrued after the 2019 Order, and it made no findings about what those expenses actually were.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶17 Kerry now appeals, and he asks us to review the district court’s division of property. “Generally, district courts have considerable discretion concerning property distribution in a divorce proceeding and their determinations enjoy a presumption of validity.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 119, 459 P.3d 276 (cleaned up). In this context, we will uphold the decision “unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.” Id. (cleaned up). “In reviewing a property distribution, we will not set aside findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, unless they are clearly erroneous, and we give due regard to the district court’s superior position from which to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. ¶ 121.

¶18 Kerry also challenges part of the court’s property division as unsupported by sufficient evidence. “A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence concerns the [district] court’s findings of fact.” Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). As already noted, we will not set aside findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 121. And a district “court’s factual determinations are clearly erroneous only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence, or if this court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Cummings, 821 P.2d at 476 (cleaned up). Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 10 2025 UT App 149

ANALYSIS

¶19 Under Utah law, the primary purpose of property division in a divorce proceeding “is to achieve a fair, just, and equitable result between the parties.” Boyer v. Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, ¶ 10, 259 P.3d 1063 (cleaned up). In a divorce, “marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing spouses and separate property . . . will be awarded to the acquiring spouse.” Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 13, 176 P.3d 476 (cleaned up); see also Fischer v. Fischer, 2021 UT App 145, ¶ 23, 505 P.3d 56 (“In dividing the marital estate in a divorce proceeding, each party is presumed to be entitled to fifty percent of the marital property.” (cleaned up)).

¶20 In dividing the marital estate, a district court is provided “considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.” Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 44, 299 P.3d 1079 (cleaned up). Because of this broad discretion, an appellant who is challenging a marital property division “has the burden to prove that either (1) there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2) the evidence clearly preponderated against the finding; or (3) such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶21 In this case, Kerry challenges the district court’s property division in three respects. First, he argues that the court abused its discretion when it rejected his claim for credit for the “completion costs” of Bell Canyon.2 Second, Kerry raises a similar challenge 2. Early in his opening brief, Kerry presents this issue on appeal as follows: “Whether the [district] court abused its discretion when it valued the marital estate as of the date of separation and then refused to make Kerry whole by crediting him for the marital (continued…) Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 11 2025 UT App 149 regarding the district court’s rejection of his claim for expenses related to KMK after the 2019 Order. Finally, Kerry challenges the district court’s credit to Shauna of $60,000 for missed KMK distributions as unsupported by sufficient evidence. We address each challenge in turn, and we conclude that many of Kerry’s arguments have merit. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand the case for further proceedings. I. The Bell Canyon Expenses

¶22 Kerry first argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to credit him for using his half of the marital estate to pay some of the Bell Canyon expenses, an oversight that he claims has resulted in “Shauna receiv[ing] an oversized share of the marital estate.” For the reasons discussed, we agree, at least in part.

¶23 The district court rejected several of Kerry’s claims for credit related to Bell Canyon and provided well-grounded reasons for doing so. With regard to these items, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to reject Kerry’s claims. For example, the court rejected Kerry’s claim for $203,175 in expenses he paid for from the date of separation until entry of the court’s final order, over six years later.” But later in his brief, Kerry makes clear that he does not contest the valuation date, and he instead focuses on the court’s purported failure to credit Kerry for expenses he paid. Indeed, Kerry states plainly that he “does not challenge the valuation date” of the marital property. Thus, we are not asked to, and we do not, address whether the court abused its discretion by valuing the Investment Account as of the date of separation in 2016. See Petrzelka v. Goodwin, 2020 UT App 34, ¶ 47, 461 P.3d 1134 (“While a court should generally value the marital estate at the time of the divorce decree or trial, a court has broad discretion to value the parties’ marital assets at a different time, such as that of separation, if it determines that the circumstances so warrant.” (cleaned up)). Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 12 2025 UT App 149 “labor costs” he allegedly expended on Bell Canyon, explaining that “without evidence to corroborate the actual work expended by [Kerry], and the apparent attempt to charge the marital estate at an absurdly high hourly rate for labor, for among other things, the changing of smoke alarm batteries,” Kerry failed to present “credible evidence to meet his burden of proof.” And the court similarly rejected a claim for $10,000 in “unrecorded” expenses because “[n]o evidence ha[d] been provided other than [Kerry’s] representation to corroborate these expenses.”

¶24 But the court found that some of the Bell Canyon expenses—the “completion costs”—were legitimate, yet it did not credit Kerry for using his half of the marital estate for these expenses. That was an error, and it produced an inequitable division of property in this case.

¶25 In the Final Order, the court addressed the completion costs for Bell Canyon and explained that Kerry’s trial exhibit showing some $172,000 in completion costs was “a more reliable representation of the charges appropriately attributable to completion costs.” And the court seems to have validated these expenses in another part of the Final Order, explaining that it would attempt “to allocate against the marital estate some of the expenses for Bell Canyon.” Yet the court ultimately rejected Kerry’s claim because it found that the “completion costs, whatever they may have accurately been, were paid with marital monies and therefore [were] not an offset against either party.”

¶26 The district court was correct in stating that the ultimate source of the funds—the Investment Account—from which the completion costs were paid was marital property, but the court was incorrect in requiring Kerry to effectively pay Shauna half of the value of the Investment Account without first giving Kerry a credit for the Bell Canyon completion costs he paid out of that account. The key to understanding the court’s error requires a general tracing of the Investment Account funds. The Investment Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 13 2025 UT App 149 Account was deemed marital property, and it was valued at $197,584 at the time of separation. During the litigation, Kerry liquidated the Investment Account and deposited these funds into his personal account. Eventually, Kerry used part of these funds—possibly $172,485—for the costs of completion for Bell Canyon. So, the court was correct that Kerry paid marital expenses (for Bell Canyon) with marital funds (from the Investment Account). But in its Final Order, the court did not accurately account for all of this.

¶27 In the final breakdown of the property division, the court allocated to Shauna her complete half of the Investment Account ($98,792)—the account from which the Bell Canyon completion costs were ultimately paid—without making any deduction for her half of those Bell Canyon completion costs. In doing so, the court effectively burdened Kerry with paying the entirety of those completion costs, which all parties agree were marital expenses. In other words, to achieve an equal division here, Shauna’s credit should have been half of whatever amount remained of the Investment Account funds after the Bell Canyon completion costs had been deducted.3 The district court thus erred by ordering 3. The court’s finding as to the Bell Canyon completion costs was somewhat ambiguous. The court stated that it found “$172,485.23 as the cost of completion of Bell Canyon, which [would] be deducted against the sale price.” But in the same section, the court stated that the “completion costs, whatever they may have accurately been, were paid with marital monies and therefore [were] not an offset against either party.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, on remand, the district court should make an express finding as to the amount of the Bell Canyon completion costs. This amount—whatever it is ultimately found to be on remand—should be subtracted from $197,584, and the parties should then split what remains. Assuming for purposes of illustration that $172,485 is the correct number for the Bell Canyon completion costs, the parties should (continued…) Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 14 2025 UT App 149 Kerry to give Shauna a full half of the Investment Account (valued at separation) when he apparently used most of the Investment Account funds to complete the construction of Bell Canyon, a marital asset.

¶28 Shauna resists this conclusion by arguing that the district court correctly found that Kerry had commingled marital assets— including the Investment Account—with his personal funds and therefore any claim he had for an offset could not be proved. Commingling occurs where “separate property . . . has been mixed in with marital assets to such a degree that it is no longer reasonably possible to distinguish between the separate and marital property.” Thorup v. Thorup, 2024 UT App 93, ¶ 24, 554 P.3d 329. We have explained that an important part of “any commingling analysis . . . is whether the property in question has retained its separate character,” and “this inquiry often turns on whether the property’s separate identity can still be traced or accounted for.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶29 But we agree with Kerry that the concept of commingling is not implicated here. The court expressly found that all the relevant property was marital. And Kerry has not argued—nor did the district court find—that he contributed separate property to the marital estate for which he is entitled to an offset. All the relevant tracing in this case involves marital property only, and therefore the identity of the funds is simply not at issue. And in any event, the amount of the Bell Canyon completion costs is an ascertainable figure that can be traced and computed. We therefore do not find Shauna’s invocation of the commingling caselaw to be persuasive. split $25,099, and that split should be effected by requiring Kerry to pay to Shauna half ($12,549.50) of that amount instead of half of the full value of the Investment Account. Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 15 2025 UT App 149

¶30 We therefore affirm the district court’s findings and conclusions regarding many of the Bell Canyon expenses, see supra ¶ 23, but we vacate Section 3.C. of the Final Order rejecting Kerry’s claim for an offset for the completion costs of Bell Canyon, and we remand this case for further proceedings on this point, including a determination of what those costs actually were and an equitable allocation of the remaining funds from the Investment Account. II. The KMK Expenses

¶31 Next, Kerry argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to credit him for KMK expenses he paid after the 2019 Order, an oversight that he claims also resulted in “Shauna receiv[ing] an oversized share of the marital estate.” Specifically, he argues that after the 2019 Order, which split all of the KMK revenue equally without reserving any funds from which to pay KMK’s expenses, he was forced to pay any such expenses out of his half of the revenue and that he did not receive credit for paying these expenses. As with the previous section, we agree with some of Kerry’s assertions in this regard.

¶32 The district court addressed most of Kerry’s claims for credit related to KMK’s expenses and provided well-grounded reasons for rejecting those claims. The court reasonably rejected Kerry’s claim for a 5% management fee for services provided before the 2019 Order because “[t]here was no agreement between the parties, nor any order of the [c]ourt, . . . for management of KMK until the parties entered into a stipulation in June 2019.” The court also appropriately rejected Kerry’s claim for a 3% fee on the renegotiation of the KMK lease because “there was no agreement by the parties for such an additional fee to be incurred on top of the fee [Kerry] was already receiving for management of KMK,” Kerry was not a “broker, realtor, [or] third party entitled to such a fee,” and his claim was “unsupported by any evidence as to time expended or a reasonable rate for such a service.” And the court Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 16 2025 UT App 149 rejected Kerry’s claim to $108,900 as a salary “on the same basis” as the claims discussed above. In short, these claims for credit were squarely addressed in the Final Order, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s handling of them.

¶33 However, Kerry asserts that the district court, in the Final Order, failed to address a number of “hard expenses” associated with KMK, and on this point we agree with Kerry. 4 He provides a few examples: commercial insurance of $7,127, “building insurance” of $8,153, and a city bond for $3,808. Instead of addressing whether Kerry had proved that he was entitled to a credit for any hard expenses he may have paid on behalf of KMK after the 2019 Order, the court simply ruled that the parties had “stipulated” to the fifty-fifty revenue split in 2019 and that, therefore, the court would not adjust the accounting accordingly. That was an error.

¶34 Indeed, the court appeared to acknowledge the existence and legitimacy of some of these hard expenses when it addressed the significant disparity between the parties’ calculations of KMK’s total revenue. The court first explained that Kerry’s calculation included deductions for “items such as management fees, property maintenance work (already excluded by the [c]ourt), property management, and legal fees,” and as a result, the court concluded that Kerry’s evidence was “largely unusable” because “it contain[ed] claims and expenses disallowed by the [c]ourt.” In other words, Kerry’s calculation mostly included expenses that the court had reasonably rejected, as discussed above. The court then explained that after “[a]dding these fees back into the [net] income,” the expenses in Kerry’s calculation had been reduced “from $678,272.97 to $171,003.71,” a figure that appears to represent legitimate KMK expenses. And as to 4. Indeed, Kerry made clear at oral argument before this court that, regarding the KMK expenses, “all [Kerry is] appealing is the actual hard expenses.” Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 17 2025 UT App 149 Shauna’s proposed calculation, the court explained that it “allegedly reflect[ed] total net rental revenue from separation until [the] sale of KMK but [did] not account for expenses poured into Bell Canyon or KMK.” (Emphasis added.)

¶35 Faced with these competing calculations, the court explained that it was “left with a decision of net rental income for KMK of [Shauna’s] $783,482.91 claim and [Kerry’s] adjusted claim figure of $507,269.26.” And in resolving that disparity, the court decided that it would “not make any adjustment” because “the parties had negotiated and stipulated to a division of the rental income as it came in.” While its meaning is not entirely clear, it appears that the court rejected Kerry’s claims for a credit for KMK hard expenses because of a purported stipulation.

¶36 But that was not entirely accurate. After the two-day trial in 2019, the parties did indeed stipulate to a $6,000/$6,000 split of the revenue, but that stipulation included a reservation of $3,000 per month to pay KMK expenses; Kerry did not ever stipulate to the 2019 Order provision that split the revenue $7,500/$7,500 with no reserve for expenses. Indeed, Kerry objected, arguing that dividing the revenue this way would harm him because he would then be responsible for covering any KMK expenses with his half of the proceeds. The court responded that “if getting . . . to the bottom line means that KMK is going to go under, then it goes under. And that’s the way it is.” Because the court did not grapple with the hard expenses Kerry claimed to have paid after the 2019 Order and instead relied on a purported stipulation, we conclude that “there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error.” Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 44, 299 P.3d 1079 (cleaned up).

¶37 Accordingly, while we do not disturb the court’s rejection of a number of Kerry’s claimed credits for asserted KMK expenses, see supra ¶ 32, we vacate the part of the Final Order that assumed Kerry had stipulated to not being given a credit for KMK Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 18 2025 UT App 149 hard expenses incurred after the 2019 Order, 5 and we remand this matter to the district court to assess whether Kerry incurred any such expenses that were not expressly rejected in the Final Order and, if he did, for the court to give Kerry credit for such expenses. III. The KMK Distributions

¶38 Finally, Kerry challenges—as unsupported by sufficient evidence—part of the district court’s credit to Shauna of $60,000 for missing KMK distributions. This challenge is bifurcated into two distinct claims of error, one for crediting Shauna $45,000 (instead of $37,500) in missing distributions from 2020, and the other for crediting Shauna $15,000 (instead of $7,500) for 2021. In summary, Kerry claims that the court made two separate $7,500 errors, one regarding 2020 and one regarding 2021. As discussed below, we reverse regarding 2020 and affirm regarding 2021.

¶39 In this case, the district court credited Shauna a total of $60,000 for missing KMK distributions. This total represented six monthly distributions of $7,500 for 2020 (totaling $45,000) and two for 2021 (totaling $15,000). Yet for 2020, Shauna’s and Kerry’s trial exhibits are consistent regarding the missing distributions, showing only five missing distributions, totaling $37,500. Kerry’s exhibits not only match Shauna’s total for 2020 but also contain supporting documentation for the seventh distribution in 2020 (July). And the district court stated that, for this finding, it was relying on Shauna’s exhibit—which, again, totaled $37,500 in 2020. For these reasons, we have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made,” Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (cleaned up), and conclude that this 5. Specifically, we reverse the court’s determination that an adjustment for expenses was unnecessary because the parties had stipulated to an even split of the revenue, per Section 3.E.v. of the Final Order. Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 19 2025 UT App 149 was clear error. Shauna is entitled to only $37,500 in unpaid distributions for 2020.

¶40 It is true that Shauna testified at trial that she had not received $45,000 in rental distributions in 2020, but that testimony is overwhelmingly controverted by the evidence, even by her own trial exhibit. And counsel for Shauna conceded at oral argument before this court that Shauna’s trial exhibit reflects that the seventh distribution was in fact made.

¶41 As for 2021, we conclude that the court’s findings and conclusions were supported by sufficient evidence. The parties disputed whether Shauna received her distribution for March of that year. Kerry’s trial exhibit noted only one missing distribution (for $7,500 total). Yet Shauna testified that she was missing two distributions for 2021 (totaling $15,000), and her trial exhibit supported her claim. The trial record therefore contains evidence sufficient to support the court’s finding that Shauna was entitled to $15,000 in distributions for 2021. See Clarke v. Clarke, 2023 UT App 160, ¶ 27, 542 P.3d 935 (“[W]here there exists evidence sufficient to support a court’s rulings regarding a divorcing couple’s finances, that ruling will be upheld on appeal, even if evidence was presented that might have cut the other way.”).

¶42 We therefore affirm the court’s findings and conclusions regarding 2021—that Shauna did not receive two distributions that year, totaling $15,000. But we reverse the court’s credit to Shauna of $45,000 for 2020 distributions, because the evidence is insufficient to support it; with regard to 2020, the evidence supports only a conclusion that Shauna did not receive five distributions that year, totaling $37,500. We therefore remand this matter to the district court with instructions to amend the Final Order on this point. Stephenson v. Stephenson 20220469-CA 20 2025 UT App 149

CONCLUSION

¶43 The district court abused its discretion in this case when it failed to credit Kerry for two specific categories of marital expenses he incurred from his half of the marital estate during the pendency of the divorce litigation. The court also clearly erred when it credited Shauna for a revenue distribution that she had in fact been paid in 2020. These errors resulted in an inequitable division of the marital property, and we vacate and reverse the parts of the Final Order identified above. We affirm the Final Order in all other respects, and we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings, which may or may not—in the court’s discretion—require a new evidentiary hearing.

Reversed

The reviewing court determined that the lower court committed reversible error and overturned the judgment.

Affirmed

The reviewing court determined that the lower court committed no reversible error and upheld the judgment.

Remanded

The reviewing court returned the case to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.