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Spall-Goldsmith v. Goldsmith IV, 2012 UT App 302

Case Summary

Willard Leroy Goldsmith IV (Father) appealed a Judgment After Trial on Bifurcated Decree of Divorce entered against him and in favor of his former wife, Renee Spall-Goldsmith (Mother). The Decree awarded Mother physical custody of the parties’ minor child (Child), gave the parties joint legal custody, and granted Father approximately 160 overnights of parent-time per year (roughly 44% of the year). Although Father’s overnight parent-time exceeded the 30% statutory threshold associated with joint physical custody, the trial court calculated Father’s child support obligation using the sole custody worksheet rather than the joint custody worksheet. Father argued this was an abuse of discretion under the Utah Child Support Act. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Father failed to establish the second statutory element of joint physical custody.

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Facts

Trial and Initial Custody Determination:

  • A one-day trial was held on July 8, 2010, before Judge Stephen L. Henriod.
  • Judge Henriod announced his decision from the bench, concluding it was in Child’s best interest that Mother be awarded physical custody and that the parties share joint legal custody.
  • Judge Henriod awarded Father parent-time of approximately 160 overnight stays per year, or roughly 44% of the year.
  • Judge Henriod ruled that Father’s past payments for Child’s extracurricular activities could be offset against child support in calculating any arrearage.
  • Judge Henriod announced findings regarding each party’s income but did not calculate the child support amount at that time, instead instructing Father’s attorney to prepare the Decree.

Dispute Over the Decree and Judicial Transition:

  • Father’s counsel submitted a proposed decree that calculated child support using the joint custody worksheet in the Guidelines.
  • Mother’s counsel objected, asserting that the sole custody worksheet should apply because the court had awarded her sole physical custody of Child.
  • Judge Henriod retired before the dispute was resolved and before a final divorce decree was entered.

Entry of the Decree by Judge Adkins:

  • Judge Robert W. Adkins was assigned to the case and, based on the record and counsel’s arguments at a telephone conference, entered the Decree on June 20, 2011.
  • The Decree awarded “Physical Custody” of Child to Mother and “Joint Legal Custody” to both parents, and retained Father’s parent-time of approximately 160 overnights per year (roughly 44% of the year).
  • The Decree set Father’s base child support obligation at $509 per month, based on the sole custody worksheet.
  • The Decree provided that neither parent was ordered to pay for extracurricular activities in which Child was enrolled by the other parent, and that any past payments Father made for activities such as football or golf could be counted as child support in determining any arrearage.

Appeal:

  • Father filed a timely appeal of the Decree, challenging the trial court’s use of the sole custody worksheet.

Issues of the Case

Father, as appellant, raised a single issue on appeal.

  • Issue 1: Child Support Worksheet Selection (Joint vs. Sole Custody)

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s use of the sole custody worksheet and affirmed the Decree in full.

  • Child Support — Support Calculation

    1. Child Support Worksheet Selection (Joint vs. Sole Custody)

    Claim on Appeal: Father argued that the trial court abused its discretion by calculating child support using the sole custody worksheet instead of the joint custody worksheet, because his overnight parent-time (approximately 44% of the year) exceeded the 30% statutory threshold for joint physical custody. Mother countered that the sole custody worksheet was proper because Father was not ordered to contribute to Child’s expenses beyond child support, and that his extracurricular-activity payments were credited against his child support obligation rather than constituting a separate contribution to expenses.

    Holding: — Affirmed. Because Father advanced no argument that he satisfied the second statutory element of joint physical custody — contributing to Child’s expenses in addition to paying child support — he did not establish that the parties shared joint physical custody, and the trial court correctly applied the sole custody worksheet without needing to make findings justifying deviation from the Guidelines.

    Statutory Authority:

    • Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-102(14) (now § 81-6-101(14)) — defines “joint physical custody” to require both (1) overnight stays with each parent exceeding 30% of the year, and (2) both parents contributing to the child’s expenses in addition to paying child support.
    • Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-202(3) (now § 81-6-202(6)) — requires a trial court deviating from the joint custody guidelines to consider and enter findings on statutory deviation factors.
    • Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-208 (now § 81-6-206) — governs joint physical custody obligation calculations, including use of the joint custody worksheet.

    Standard of Review:

    • Correctness — applied to the trial court’s interpretation of the Utah Child Support Act.
    • Abuse of discretion — applied to the trial court’s child support order generally.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, 974 P.2d 306 (requiring use of the joint custody worksheet, or findings supporting deviation, once both statutory elements are met).
    • Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (analyzing joint physical custody by reference to both overnight percentage and expense contribution).
    • Boyce v. Goble, 2000 UT App 237, 8 P.3d 1042 (articulating the bright-line, two-element rule for distinguishing joint from sole physical custody).
    • Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, 263 P.3d 520 (statutory interpretation reviewed for correctness).
    • Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, 233 P.3d 836 (child support orders reviewed for abuse of discretion).
    • Salt Lake Cnty. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, 234 P.3d 1105 (primary goal of statutory interpretation is legislative intent).
    • State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, 193 P.3d 92 (best evidence of legislative intent is the statute’s plain language).
    • Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, 267 P.3d 863 (no further interpretive tools needed once plain meaning is discerned).

    Why It Matters: The decision confirms that “joint physical custody” under the Utah Child Support Act is a conjunctive, two-part test — a parenting-time percentage above 30% is necessary but not sufficient. An appellant who exercises substantial overnight parent-time still bears the burden of affirmatively showing a contribution to the child’s expenses beyond the child support obligation itself, and crediting extracurricular payments against arrearages does not, standing alone, satisfy that showing. Practitioners litigating worksheet selection must build a record — and brief on appeal — addressing both elements, not just the overnight-percentage element.

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

  • Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, 263 P.3d 520 (cited for the correctness standard applied to a trial court’s statutory interpretation.)
  • Blackner v. Department of Transp., 2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 949 (cited in support of the correctness standard of review for statutory interpretation.)
  • Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, 233 P.3d 836 (cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard applied to child support orders.)
  • Salt Lake Cnty. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, 234 P.3d 1105 (cited for the principle that statutory interpretation aims to discern legislative intent.)
  • State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, 193 P.3d 92 (cited for the principle that a statute’s plain language is the best evidence of legislative intent.)
  • In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, 165 P.3d 1206 (cited (via State v. Miller) for the plain-language rule of statutory interpretation.)
  • Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, 267 P.3d 863 (cited for the rule that no further interpretive tools are needed once a statute’s plain meaning is discerned.)
  • Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, 974 P.2d 306 (cited for the requirement that a court use the joint custody worksheet, or enter findings supporting deviation, once the statutory joint-custody elements are met.)
  • Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (cited for the two-part analysis of joint physical custody under a predecessor statute.)
  • Boyce v. Goble, 2000 UT App 237, 8 P.3d 1042 (cited for the bright-line rule distinguishing joint from sole physical custody based on overnight percentage and expense contribution.)
  • Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (cited for the rule that a trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter detailed findings on the statutory deviation factors.)

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

  • Trial court awards a party overnight parent-time above 30% of the year and also finds or the record shows that party contributed to the child’s expenses beyond child support, yet the court nonetheless applies the sole custody worksheet without deviation findings.
  • Trial court applies the joint custody worksheet without any finding that both statutory elements — overnight percentage and expense contribution — were met.
  • Trial court deviates from the applicable worksheet without entering findings addressing the statutory deviation factors.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

  • Overnight parent-time percentage — whether the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year.
  • Expense contribution — whether both parents contribute to the child’s expenses in addition to paying child support.
  • If deviating from the applicable guidelines, the statutory deviation factors under Utah Code § 81-6-202(6) (formerly § 78B-12-202(3)).

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

An appeal is most viable where the record affirmatively establishes both statutory elements of joint physical custody — overnight percentage above 30% and documented expense contributions beyond child support — yet the trial court nonetheless applied the sole custody worksheet without entering deviation findings.

Strategy Insight

Frame worksheet-selection appeals as legal error in applying a conjunctive statutory test, not merely as a factual dispute over parent-time percentages. Where the expense-contribution element is unaddressed in the trial record or in the appellate briefing, the argument fails as a matter of law regardless of how favorable the overnight numbers are — as this case illustrates.

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence

The opinion relies exclusively on Utah authority — the Utah Child Support Act and a line of Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court decisions construing it. No out-of-state or federal authority is cited, reflecting the highly statute-driven nature of Utah child support determinations.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)

  • Salt Lake Cnty. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, 234 P.3d 1105 — establishes that the primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent; anchors the court’s interpretive approach to the joint-custody definition.
  • State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, 193 P.3d 92 — establishes that plain statutory language is the best evidence of legislative intent; used to justify reading § 78B-12-102(14) according to its plain, conjunctive terms.
  • Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, 267 P.3d 863 — establishes that no further interpretive tools are needed once plain meaning is discerned; forecloses resort to legislative history once the two-element test is read from the statute’s text.

The Most Important Holding

The single most significant holding is that “joint physical custody” under the Utah Child Support Act requires proof of both statutory elements — overnight parent-time exceeding 30% of the year and a contribution to the child’s expenses beyond child support — and that the burden of establishing both rests on the parent seeking application of the joint custody worksheet. A favorable overnight percentage alone is not enough.

Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error

The Decree was affirmed in full, so no reversal occurred. Had reversal been warranted, it would most likely have arisen from a legal error — a trial court’s mistaken belief that overnight percentage alone establishes joint physical custody, or a failure to enter findings on the statutory deviation factors once both elements of joint physical custody were shown — rather than a purely factual dispute over overnight counts.

Practitioner Takeaways

  • Trial Lawyers: When seeking the joint custody worksheet, build a factual record — receipts, canceled checks, testimony — showing the client’s contribution to the child’s expenses beyond the child support obligation itself; overnight counts alone will not carry the argument.
  • Appellate Lawyers: An assignment of error challenging worksheet selection must brief both statutory elements; omitting argument on the expense-contribution element, as Father did here, is fatal regardless of the overnight-percentage showing.
  • Self-Represented or Settling Parties: Provisions crediting extracurricular or similar payments against a child support arrearage do not, by themselves, establish the kind of “contribution to expenses” needed for joint physical custody status.

Majority Opinion

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

‐‐‐‐ooOoo‐‐‐‐

Renee Spall‐Goldsmith, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Willard Leroy Goldsmith IV, Respondent and Appellant.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISION Case No. 20110628‐CA F I L E D (October 25, 2012)   2012 UT App 302

‐‐‐‐‐ Third District, Tooele Department, 084300172 The Honorable Robert W. Adkins Attorneys: Vernon C. Jolley and John J. Diamond, Sandy, for Appellant Olivia D. Uitto, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

‐‐‐‐‐ Before Judges Davis, McHugh, and Voros. McHUGH, Judge:

¶1 Willard Leroy Goldsmith IV (Father) appeals from the trial court’s Judgment After Trial on Bifurcated Decree of Divorce (the Decree), which awarded child support payments to his former wife, Renee Spall‐Goldsmith (Mother). Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to comply with the Utah Child Support Act guidelines (the Guidelines) when it based its child support determination upon a sole custody worksheet rather than a joint custody worksheet. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B‐12‐102(12) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); id. 78B‐12‐202 (LexisNexis 2008). We affirm.

¶2 After a one‐day trial on July 8, 2010, Judge Stephen L. Henriod announced his decision from the bench, concluding that it was in the best interest of the parties’ minor 20110628‐CA 2 child (Child) that Wife be awarded physical custody of Child and that the parties share joint legal custody. Judge Henriod also awarded Father parent‐time of approximately 160 overnight stays per year, or roughly 44% of the year, and ruled that Father’s past payments for Child’s participation in extracurricular activities could be offset against child support in calculating any arrearage. Although Judge Henriod announced findings regarding the income of each party, he did not calculate the amount of child support at that time. Instead, Judge Henriod instructed Father’s attorney to prepare the Decree.

¶3 Father’s counsel submitted a proposed decree, which included a child support award based on the joint custody worksheet provided in the Guidelines. Mother’s counsel objected, asserting that child support should be calculated using the sole custody worksheet because the court had awarded her sole physical custody of Child. Before that dispute could be resolved and a final divorce decree entered, Judge Henriod retired.

¶4 Judge Robert W. Adkins was then assigned to the case. Based on the record and the arguments of counsel at a telephone conference, Judge Adkins entered the Decree on June 20, 2011, awarding “Physical Custody” of Child to Mother and “Joint Legal Custody” to both Mother and Father. As originally indicated by Judge Henriod, the Decree also allowed Father to exercise parent‐time with Child equal to approximately 160 overnight stays per year, or roughly 44% of the year. The Decree sets Father’s base child support obligation at $509 per month, a figure based on the sole custody worksheet. In addition, the Decree states that “[n]either parent is Ordered to pay for those extra‐curricular activities in which . . . [Child] is enrolled by the other parent” and that “[a]ny past payments for things like football or golf that [Father] may have paid may be counted as child support for determining what the arrearage will be.” Father filed a timely appeal of the Decree.

¶5 Father contends that the trial court erred when it failed to base its child support award on the joint custody worksheet. Specifically, Father argues that, although the trial court awarded physical custody to Mother, he was granted overnight visitation that exceeds the thirty percent threshold for joint physical custody established by the Utah Legislature. See id. § 78B‐12‐102(14) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). Thus, Father contends that the trial court was required to apply the joint custody worksheet, see id. § 78B‐12‐208 (LexisNexis 2008), or to make findings of fact that would justify deviation from it, see id. 20110628‐CA 3 § 78B‐12‐202(3). Mother disagrees, claiming that the trial court correctly used the sole custody worksheet to calculate child support because Father was not ordered to contribute to Child’s expenses in addition to child support. See id. § 78B‐12‐102(14). Furthermore, Mother claims that because Father’s payments for Child’s extracurricular activities were credited against his child support obligation, they should be considered part of the child support award, not a contribution to Child’s expenses.

¶6 “[A] trial court’s interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for correctness.” Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, ¶ 9, 263 P.3d 520 (alteration in original) (citing Blackner v. Department of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 8, 48 P.3d 949). Otherwise, “[w]e review a trial court’s child support order for an abuse of discretion.” Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 7, 233 P.3d 836.

¶7 We first review the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. When facing a question of statutory interpretation, “our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the [Utah] Legislature.” Salt Lake Cnty. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, ¶ 27, 234 P.3d 1105 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The best evidence of the legislature’s intent is ‘the plain language of the statute itself.’” State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, ¶ 18, 193 P.3d 92 (quoting In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 6, 165 P.3d 1206). “When the meaning of [a] statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 15, 267 P.3d 863 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶8 The Utah Child Support Act defines “[j]oint physical custody” to mean that “the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B‐12‐102(14). “Utah law requires a court to use a joint custody child support worksheet” when the requirements for section 78B‐12‐102(14) are met or to “make findings supporting its deviation.” See Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ¶ 16, 974 P.2d 306. When deviating from the joint physical custody guidelines, “the trial court must at least consider the seven factors listed in [Utah Code section 78B‐12‐202(3)] and enter findings” with reference to them. See id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78‐45‐7(3) (Michie 1996) (current version at id. § 78B‐12‐203(3) (LexisNexis 2008)); Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). “A court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter detailed findings on each of these factors.” Id. (citing Allred, 797 P.2d at 1111). 1 In Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41,  974 P.2d 306, the court applied a previous version of the statute—the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78‐45‐2(13), ‐2(10) (Michie Supp. 1998 & Supp. 1994)—defining joint physical custody to mean that “the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 25% of the year, and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support.” See Udy, 893 P.2d at 1099–1100; Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ¶ 16. 20110628‐CA 4

¶9 The relevant language of the Utah Child Support Act is plain on its face and defines joint physical custody to include both (1) that “the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year” and (2) that “both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B‐ 12‐102(14). Moreover, this court has consistently interpreted the definition of joint physical custody as requiring both elements. See, e.g., Boyce v. Goble, 2000 UT App 237, ¶ 21, 8 P.3d 1042 (discussing “a bright line rule to determine if custody is joint or sole” that requires both a percentage requirement of overnight stays and that both parents contribute to expenses beyond child support for joint physical custody); Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ¶ 17 (requiring use of a joint custody worksheet when the “[father] had custody of the children over 25% of the time and, in addition to his support obligation, contributed to the overnight expenses of the children” (emphasis added)); Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (analyzing whether the joint custody worksheet was properly applied by reviewing the percent of time father had custody of his child in addition to father’s payment of expenses beyond his child support obligations).1

¶10 Father correctly argues, and Mother concedes, that he has met the requirement for joint physical custody that Child stay with him overnight for more than 30% of the year. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B‐12‐102(14). However, Father advances no argument on the second requirement that “both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support.” See id. Indeed, he fails to identify any of Child’s expenses that he paid or to explain why such a showing is unnecessary. As a result, Father has not established that he and Mother share joint physical custody of Child. Therefore, the trial court correctly applied the child support worksheet for sole custody and was not required to make findings warranting deviation from the Guidelines. Cf. id. § 78B‐12‐202(3). 20110628‐CA 5

¶11 In summary, although Father has Child overnight more than 30% of the year, he fails to advance any argument that he has satisfied the second element of joint physical custody by contributing to Child’s expenses in addition to paying child support. See id. Because Father has not argued that both requirements for a joint physical custody arrangement are present, we conclude that the trial court properly awarded child support based on the sole physical custody worksheet.

¶12 Affirmed. ____________________________________ Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge ‐‐‐‐‐

¶13 WE CONCUR: ____________________________________ James Z. Davis, Judge ____________________________________ J. Frederic Voros Jr., Judge

Affirmed

The reviewing court determined that the lower court committed no reversible error and upheld the judgment.