Prisbrey v. Prisbrey, 2026 UT App 39
Case Summary
Leona Maria Prisbrey and Kent Terry Prisbrey married in Australia in 2014 and later lived in Leeds, Utah, in a house Kent owned before the marriage. In the ensuing divorce, Leona never served initial disclosures under rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, despite repeated prompting from Kent and the district court, until three weeks before trial, long after both the original and the court-extended discovery periods had closed. The district court overruled Kent’s objection, admitted the late-disclosed evidence, and relied on Leona’s bank records to find that the Leeds home was marital property. The sole question on appeal was whether the district court exceeded its discretion in admitting evidence that rule 26(d)(4) presumptively excludes absent a showing of harmlessness or good cause.
Podcast Interviews and Other Sources
Podcast Interviews
Oral Argument
Briefing Documents
Plura pertinentia mox sequentur. Quaeso, redi mox.
Coverage
Facts
Marriage and Residence
- The parties married in Australia in 2014 and moved to Leeds, Utah, to live in a house owned by Kent (the Leeds Property).
- Kent maintained throughout the litigation that the Leeds Property was his premarital property and that the parties’ contributions while living there were no more than what any two occupants would ordinarily contribute.
Divorce Petitions and Pleadings
- The parties separated in 2022 and filed separate divorce petitions in January 2023; the cases were later consolidated.
- Kent answered Leona’s petition on February 8, 2023, which triggered Leona’s 14-day initial-disclosure deadline under rule 26(a)(2)(A). Kent served his own initial disclosures in December 2023.
Discovery History
- Leona never filed initial disclosures. She did, however, move on October 18, 2023, to reopen discovery, and the district court granted the motion and extended discovery through February 28, 2024. Leona still made no disclosures during the extended period.
- At an April 26, 2024 conference, Kent, then pro se, told the court he had requested initial disclosures and financial statements and had received nothing. Leona’s counsel acknowledged that discovery was over but said he was “not prepared to speak to” whether disclosures had been provided, prompting the court to observe that this was a “pretty basic question.” Counsel then stated he would comply with rule 26.
- At a May 7, 2024 pretrial conference, Kent’s newly retained counsel reported that no disclosures or discovery responses had been received and asked that undisclosed material be excluded. The court continued the matter.
- At a May 28, 2024 pretrial conference, Leona’s counsel conceded that initial disclosures had still not been provided. The court set trial for September 23, 2024, and indicated the disclosure issue would be addressed then.
Late Disclosure and Objection
- On September 3, 2024, twenty days before trial, Leona served initial disclosures identifying six witnesses and sixty-five exhibits, none of which had previously been disclosed.
- On September 9, 2024, Kent moved to exclude the evidence under rule 26(d)(4). Leona responded that most of the exhibits should have been disclosed by Kent, that Kent already possessed or knew of the materials, that good cause existed because the exhibits were “integral” to resolving issues Kent had not addressed, and that the lateness was harmless.
Trial Court Ruling
- On the first day of trial, Kent’s counsel argued that the contributions to the Leeds Property were the central issue and that Kent had had no opportunity to test Leona’s newly disclosed figures. The district court overruled the objection, stating that it saw no “kind of surprise” to Kent given his position that the property was his, and allowed each side to present the evidence it considered relevant.
- The court made no express finding of harmlessness and no finding addressing good cause.
Property Determination
- In its findings and conclusions, the district court ruled that the Leeds Property was marital property because Leona had “contributed more than $187,000 of her money to [its] renovation, construction, and maintenance,” a finding expressly “based on extensive and detailed bank records” that appear to have come from the late disclosures.
- At trial, Kent testified that Leona had “probably put $30,000 into the home and into rebuilding everything.”
Issues of the Case
Kent Terry Prisbrey, the appellant, identified three issues, which the Court of Appeals treated as a single issue because the other two both implicate it (¶ 13 n.3).
- Issue 1: Admission of Late-Disclosed Evidence / Rule 26(d)(4) Exclusion
The Court of Appeals reversed on Issue 1, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a new trial to be conducted without the late-disclosed evidence. No issues were affirmed.
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Civil Procedure — Discovery
1. Admission of Late-Disclosed Evidence / Rule 26(d)(4) Exclusion
Claim on Appeal: Kent argued that the district court erred in overruling his objection and admitting the six witnesses and sixty-five exhibits Leona first disclosed three weeks before trial, because Leona never showed that the failure was harmless or justified by good cause. Leona responded that the late disclosure was harmless because the bank records were cumulative, because Kent was not surprised, and because the records were admissible as impeachment evidence; below, she had also argued good cause based on her need for the material and Kent’s own allegedly deficient disclosures.
Holding: — Reversed and Remanded. Because Leona carried neither her burden to show harmlessness nor her burden to show good cause, the district court exceeded its discretion in admitting the late-disclosed evidence, and the property ruling built on that evidence was vacated.
Statutory Authority: No Utah Code provision was cited. The issue is governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A) (content and timing of initial disclosures), 26(d)(3) (a party is not excused from disclosing because another party’s disclosures are deficient), and 26(d)(4) (a party may not use undisclosed material unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause).
Standard of Review:
- Category: Abuse of Discretion
- Specific Standard: “But in reviewing a district court’s determination with respect to harmlessness and good cause, our review is necessarily deferential. This is because a court’s decision in discovery matters is a discretionary call, and we will affirm such decisions when the court’s discretion was not abused, even if we or another court might have made a different decision in the first instance.” Prisbrey v. Prisbrey, 2026 UT App 39, ¶ 13 (quoting Hansen v. Kurry Jensen Props. LLC, 2021 UT App 54, ¶ 19, 493 P.3d 1131) (cleaned up). (The court also stated that interpretation of the rules of civil procedure is reviewed for correctness, but the disposition turned on the discretionary ruling admitting the evidence, which the court held “exceeded its discretion.” ¶¶ 24–25.)
- Applies To: The district court’s ruling overruling Kent’s rule 26(d)(4) objection and admitting Leona’s late-disclosed witnesses and exhibits at trial.
Controlling Cases:
- Hansen v. Kurry Jensen Props. LLC, 2021 UT App 54, 493 P.3d 1131 (supplying the standard of review and, through the concurrence, the principles that harmlessness requires more than an attenuated basis to think the opponent could have anticipated the evidence and that disclosure after discovery closes forfeits the opponent’s opportunity for meaningful discovery)
- Keystone Ins. Agency v. Inside Ins., 2019 UT 20, 445 P.3d 434 (placing the burden to demonstrate harmlessness or good cause on the party seeking relief from disclosure requirements)
- Johansen v. Johansen, 2021 UT App 130, 504 P.3d 152 (holding that knowing the content of material is not the same as knowing it will be used in the opponent’s case-in-chief)
- RJW Media Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, 392 P.3d 956 (explaining that disclosures exist so parties can make informed choices about what discovery to pursue or forgo)
Why It Matters: The opinion closes three escape routes that late-disclosing parties commonly invoke. It holds that good cause must explain why the failure occurred, not why the evidence is needed; that a party cannot blame the opponent’s disclosures for its own noncompliance, as rule 26(d)(3) expressly forecloses; and that lack of surprise does not establish harmlessness where the late disclosure eliminated any opportunity for responsive discovery. It also demonstrates that a trial court’s finding that relies on late-disclosed evidence will itself establish prejudice on appeal.
Rules of Evidence
Utah Codes
Rules of Civil Procedure
Initial Disclosures; Timing of Disclosures and Discovery
Governs:
Requires each party, without awaiting a discovery request, to serve the names and contact information of individuals likely to have discoverable information, each fact witness it may call with a summary of expected testimony, and copies of all documents and tangible things it may offer in its case-in-chief. A plaintiff must serve these disclosures within 14 days after the defendant files the first answer. Rule 26(c) sets the timing framework for discovery.
Application in Prisbrey:
The court used rule 26(a) to fix Leona’s disclosure deadline in February 2023 and noted that by the time her counsel promised compliance in April 2024, compliance was impossible because both the disclosure period and discovery had closed.
Quote:
“This disclosure must be made by a plaintiff ‘within 14 days after the [defendant’s] filing of the first answer to that plaintiff’s complaint.’” Prisbrey v. Prisbrey, 2026 UT App 39, ¶ 14.
Utah Judiciary:
https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=26
No Excuse for Failing to Disclose
Governs:
Provides that a party is not excused from making disclosures or responses because it has not finished investigating, because it challenges the sufficiency of another party’s disclosures, or because another party has not made its disclosures.
Application in Prisbrey:
The court held that Leona’s attempt to justify her noncompliance by pointing to Kent’s allegedly deficient disclosures was foreclosed by the plain language of the rule, and noted that Kent had in fact made his disclosures.
Quote:
“Moreover, rule 26 clearly prohibits one party pointing to another party’s alleged failure to comply with disclosure requirements to justify its own failure.” Prisbrey v. Prisbrey, 2026 UT App 39, ¶ 20.
Utah Judiciary:
https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=26
Consequence of Failure to Disclose
Governs:
Bars a party that fails to timely disclose or supplement from using the undisclosed witness, document, or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.
Application in Prisbrey:
This was the controlling rule. The court held that the burden of showing harmlessness or good cause rests on the late-disclosing party, that good cause must relate to the reason for the failure, and that Leona established neither, so the evidence should have been excluded.
Quote:
“The sanction for failing to timely provide initial disclosures is severe. The associated evidence is barred from admission at trial unless the district court finds the failure to be harmless or justified by good cause.” Prisbrey v. Prisbrey, 2026 UT App 39, ¶ 15.
Utah Judiciary:
https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=26
Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
Case Cited
- Hansen v. Kurry Jensen Props. LLC, 2021 UT App 54, 493 P.3d 1131 (standard of review for harmlessness and good cause; concurrence by Judge Mortensen, joined by Judge Pohlman, relied on for the harmlessness threshold and the loss of discovery opportunity)
- Lunt v. Lunt, 2024 UT App 148, 559 P.3d 73, cert. denied, 564 P.3d 958 (Utah 2025) (a court abuses its discretion only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted)
- Keystone Ins. Agency v. Inside Ins., 2019 UT 20, 445 P.3d 434 (burden under rule 26(d)(4) is on the party seeking relief; a party must disclose what it has regardless of what it knows)
- Johansen v. Johansen, 2021 UT App 130, 504 P.3d 152 (knowing the content of material differs from knowing the opponent will use it in its case-in-chief)
- RJW Media Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, 392 P.3d 956 (disclosure requirements enable informed choices about what discovery to undertake or forgo)
- Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, 20 P.3d 332 (appellate court is not obligated to comb the record for support of poorly framed arguments)
- State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, 82 P.3d 1167 (“no reasonable person” formulation applied to find the district court exceeded its discretion)
Litigation and Appellate Strategy
Reversal Predictor
- Initial disclosures served after the close of discovery, leaving the opponent no opportunity for responsive discovery.
- Repeated, documented requests for disclosure by the opposing party that went unanswered.
- A trial court ruling admitting the evidence without express findings of harmlessness or good cause.
- A good-cause argument based on the need for the evidence rather than the reason for the delay.
- Justification premised on the opposing party’s allegedly deficient disclosures, which rule 26(d)(3) forecloses.
- Trial court findings that expressly rely on the late-disclosed evidence, which establishes prejudice on the face of the decision.
Mandatory Factor Checklist
The opinion involves no statutory factors. Under rule 26(d)(4), as construed here, a court ruling on late-disclosed evidence should explicitly address the following:
- Whether the disclosure was untimely under rule 26(a) or a court-ordered deadline.
- That the burden of proof rests on the late-disclosing party (Keystone).
- Whether the failure was harmless, considering the opponent’s lost opportunity to conduct informed discovery, not merely lack of surprise.
- Whether good cause justifies the failure itself, with the reason tied to why disclosure did not occur.
- Whether any proffered justification is foreclosed by rule 26(d)(3).
- If the evidence is offered for a limited purpose such as impeachment, the record basis for that purpose.
Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)
Appellate viability is strongest where the following converge: a disclosure failure spanning both the original and an extended discovery period; a well-documented record of the opponent’s objections and requests; a trial court ruling that rests on lack of surprise without addressing harmlessness or good cause; and findings that explicitly depend on the challenged evidence. When an appellee’s brief also lacks record citations or contains inaccurate authority, the appellee’s ability to offer an alternative ground for affirmance is substantially weakened.
Strategy Insight
Kent framed the appeal not as a quarrel with how the district court weighed the bank records, but as a failure to apply rule 26(d)(4)’s mandatory exclusion and its narrow exceptions. That framing converted what could have been a deferential, evidence-weighing review into a question of whether any reasonable court could have admitted the evidence on this record. Appellants challenging evidentiary rulings should anchor the argument in the governing rule’s required analysis and show, using the trial court’s own findings, that the improperly admitted evidence drove the result.
Elevation of Concurrence Reasoning to Panel Precedent
The harmlessness principles the court applied (¶¶ 16, 22) were drawn from Judge Mortensen’s concurrence in Hansen, joined by Judge Pohlman. Prisbrey, authored by Judge Mortensen for a unanimous panel, now states those principles in a majority opinion, giving practitioners clearer authority that an opponent “should have known” about evidence does not render a disclosure failure harmless.
Insights
Utah-Only Jurisprudence
The opinion relies exclusively on Utah authority: the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, two Utah Supreme Court decisions, and five Utah Court of Appeals decisions. It draws on no federal or out-of-state precedent, including federal Rule 37(c)(1) case law that addresses a similar exclusion remedy.
Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)
- Keystone Ins. Agency v. Inside Ins., 2019 UT 20, 445 P.3d 434 — Established that, under the plain language of rule 26(d)(4), the late-disclosing party bears the burden of demonstrating harmlessness or good cause, and that a party must disclose what it has regardless of uncertainty about its claims. Role here: the burden allocation framed the entire analysis, and Keystone supported the principle that good cause requires justification for failing to disclose information the party could have disclosed.
- Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, 20 P.3d 332 — Established that appellate advocates may not shift to the court the burden of combing the record to support poorly framed arguments. Role here: the court invoked Tanner in rejecting Leona’s unsupported impeachment argument, which rested on record assertions the court could not locate.
The Most Important Holding
Good cause under rule 26(d)(4) must relate to the reason the disclosure failure occurred, not to the late-disclosing party’s need for the evidence. As the court put it, “good cause for the failure to disclose has nothing to do with having a good reason to need the material in question” (¶ 19). Coupled with the holding that lack of surprise does not equal harmlessness when the opponent lost any chance at responsive discovery (¶ 22), this sharply narrows the arguments available to a party seeking to rescue late-disclosed evidence.
Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error
The reversal rested on an exceeded exercise of discretion infused with legal error. The district court applied the wrong lens, treating Kent’s lack of surprise as dispositive, and made no findings on harmlessness or good cause, the two exclusive exceptions under the rule. Because the record showed no basis on which either exception could be satisfied, and because the court’s own property finding rested on the late-disclosed bank records, the Court of Appeals concluded that no reasonable person would have admitted the evidence. This was not a dispute over the weight of the evidence; it was a failure to apply the rule’s required framework.
Practitioner Takeaways
- Trial Lawyers: Serve initial disclosures on time and treat rule 26 deadlines as substantive. Counsel opposing a late disclosure should object promptly, put the noncompliance on the record at each conference (as Kent did repeatedly), and specifically argue the lost opportunity for discovery. Counsel defending a late disclosure must offer a concrete reason for the failure itself, not the importance of the evidence or the opponent’s shortcomings.
- Appellate Lawyers: Every factual assertion needs a record citation, and every authority must be verified. The court checked each citation in the appellee’s brief, found that most were wrong and some appeared to be “made out of whole cloth” (¶ 23 n.6), and gave no weight to arguments it could not tie to the record. The court did not identify the cause, but any brief drafted with research or drafting tools must be checked citation by citation before filing.
- Trial Judges and Domestic Relations Practitioners: When ruling on a rule 26(d)(4) objection, make express findings on harmlessness and on good cause. A ruling grounded only in lack of surprise is vulnerable, especially when the court later relies on the challenged evidence in its findings.
- Divorcing Spouses Claiming an Interest in Premarital Property: A spouse asserting contributions to a separately owned home bears the practical burden of documenting those contributions and disclosing that documentation on time; failing to do so can forfeit the evidence entirely.
Majority Opinion
2026 UT App 39
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LEONA MARIA PRISBREY, Appellee, v. KENT TERRY PRISBREY, Appellant. Opinion No. 20250070‐CA Filed March 19, 2026 Fifth District Court, St. George
Department The Honorable Keith C. Barnes No. 234500039
Terry L. Hutchinson and Daniel J. Tobler, Attorneys for Appellant David W. Read, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and AMY J. OLIVER concurred. MORTENSEN, Judge:
¶1 This appeal arises out of a divorce trial between Leona Maria Prisbrey and Kent Terry Prisbrey. Leona never filed initial disclosures, even when reminded by Kent and the district court.1 Three weeks before trial, Leona finally submitted disclosures, but by this time, the original discovery period and an extension period of discovery had both expired, leaving no opportunity for any discovery. Kent objected to the disclosures and moved the court to exclude all of Leona’s evidence. The district court deferred the decision to the morning of trial, where the court 1. Because the parties share a common surname, we refer to them by their given names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality. Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 2 2026 UT App 39 overruled the objection, allowed the evidence, and then relied on the late‐disclosed evidence to rule against Kent. Kent now appeals, claiming that the district court exceeded its discretion in overruling the objection and allowing the evidence to be used at trial. We agree with Kent’s argument, vacate the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for a new trial to be conducted with the evidence excluded.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Leona and Kent married in Australia in 2014, and they subsequently moved to Leeds, Utah, to live in a house owned by Kent (the Leeds Property). The two separated in 2022 and separately petitioned for divorce in January 2023. The cases were later consolidated.
¶3 Kent filed his answer to Leona’s petition on February 8, 2023, and he submitted his initial disclosures in December 2023. Leona failed to file any initial disclosures. She did, however, move to reopen discovery on October 18, 2023—a request that the district court granted, allowing discovery to be conducted until February 28, 2024.
¶4 At a conference on April 26, 2024, Kent, who was acting pro se at the time, notified the court that he had asked Leona to provide initial disclosures and financial statements but had received none. He said he had been assured by Leona’s counsel that those items would be produced in discovery “soon,” but he still had not received anything as of the date of the conference. Leona’s counsel acknowledged that “discovery [was] over” and the “case [was] ripe to move forward for trial.” The court asked Leona’s counsel if initial disclosures and discovery had been provided, and counsel stated that he was “not prepared to speak to that” at the time. The court responded, “Isn’t that kind of a pretty basic question . . . ? Have you provided . . . the initial discovery . . . or not? It’s either yes or no. I think you would know Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 3 2026 UT App 39 that.” Counsel agreed it was a simple question and said that he would “comply with” the disclosure requirements set by rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.2 The court then set the matter for a pretrial conference on May 7.
¶5 At that pretrial conference, Leona’s counsel stated that he would like to set a date for trial. Kent, now represented by counsel, informed the court that he still had not received initial disclosures or a response to his discovery requests. Kent’s counsel expressed concern about setting the matter for trial in the absence of disclosures and responses to repeated discovery requests. He further asked that “anything [Kent has] requested [but not received] be excluded.” Kent’s counsel assured the court that he could not find “any certificates of service” indicating that disclosure had been made. More specifically, he stated, “My client says he has not received anything, and so my request was going to be that we might need some more time before setting it for trial to clean this up, get that information, and then proceed.” The court continued the matter until May 28.
¶6 At the pretrial conference on May 28, Leona’s counsel conceded that initial disclosures had still not yet been provided to Kent, but he represented that “a financial declaration” would be forthcoming. He did say that there was “one home at issue” and “any documents” related to it were “in the possession” of Kent. But Kent’s counsel told the court that it was “not just the financial declaration” that was missing but “the full initial disclosure” was also lacking. The court set the trial date for September 23 and indicated that the disclosure issue would be addressed at that time. 2. Of course, by that time compliance with rule 26 was impossible as the time period for disclosure had passed and discovery had closed. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a), (c) (setting out timing for initial disclosures and discovery). Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 4 2026 UT App 39
¶7 Less than three weeks prior to trial, on September 3, Leona finally provided initial disclosures to Kent. On September 9, Kent asked that the belatedly disclosed evidence be excluded from trial as untimely under rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He argued that Leona disclosed six witnesses and sixty‐five exhibits, noting that her disclosure “was the first time, ever, that [she] provided these exhibits or anything related to these exhibits, or named any of these witnesses.”
¶8 Leona responded to the objection, arguing that the “vast majority” of the exhibits she disclosed should have been disclosed by Kent; that Kent was familiar with or had in his control the documents, financial records, and materials she disclosed; and that Kent had not fully complied with his discovery obligations. She further asserted that she had “good cause” for the late disclosure because the exhibits were “integral to resolving issues that [Kent] failed to adequately address in his disclosures.” And she claimed that the late disclosure was “harmless” because Kent was aware of or had in his possession “many” of the “financial records, communication logs, and property documents” she had disclosed.
¶9 The district court addressed Kent’s objection and motion to exclude on the first day of the trial. Leona’s counsel explained that Leona had “received so little” in the way of disclosure from Kent that if her late‐disclosed documents were not “allowed as pretrial disclosures,” then the case could not move forward because there was “so little disclosed.” Kent’s counsel responded, [O]ne of the bigger issues is going to be [the Leeds Property] and how much money was put into the home by both parties during their marriage. That’s . . . the biggest issue that we have to address, and we didn’t receive any information regarding that up until a couple of weeks ago. Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 5 2026 UT App 39 So whatever [Leona] is claiming that she has put into the property, we have . . . no idea if that’s accurate. She’s provided a very simple sheet stating what she’s put into it. This is information that should have been disclosed much earlier in this proceeding. [Kent] was quite diligent in requesting it, filed the discovery request, served that on [Leona]. We brought it up more than once, and now here we are. We have that information now, very vague, but again, like I say, the issue is, [Kent] hasn’t had a chance to explore that further, or even try to find out whether it’s true or not. That’s the bigger issue.
¶10 Leona’s counsel replied, “If the [Leeds Property] is the core of the issue, we received nothing from [Kent]. We are providing information that he should have provided but failed to do.” To this, Kent’s counsel retorted, [Kent’s] position is, it’s his home, it’s been his home, there was nothing for him to disclose. That it’s true, both parties contributed some while they lived there, but there would be really not much more than what two people would contribute while they lived in a home. So it’s not an issue where somebody provided so much money or a substantial amount to where she should have an equitable interest in the property. So from [Kent’s] perspective, there was nothing to disclose further than just that it has been his premarital property. Leona’s counsel reiterated that since the “core issue” was the Leeds Property, she should be allowed to proceed with all the documents in her late disclosure. Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 6 2026 UT App 39
¶11 The court overruled Kent’s objection to the late disclosure and denied his motion to exclude the evidence. The court observed that it didn’t see “any kind of surprise” to Kent given his position that the Leeds Property belonged to him. Accordingly, the court said, “[F]or now, I’m going to allow counsel from each side to present what evidence they feel to be relevant to the finder of fact, myself.”
¶12 In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court determined that the Leeds Property was marital property because Leona had “contributed more than $187,000 of her money to [its] renovation, construction, and maintenance.” It made this determination “based on extensive and detailed bank records,” apparently those contained in the disclosures she provided to Kent for the first and only time three weeks before trial.
ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶13 Kent appeals, arguing that the district court erred in allowing Leona to introduce evidence that was not timely disclosed as required by rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. “We review a district court’s interpretation of our rules of civil procedure, precedent, and common law for correctness. But in reviewing a district court’s determination with respect to harmlessness and good cause, our review is necessarily deferential. This is because a court’s decision in discovery matters is a discretionary call, and we will affirm such decisions when the court’s discretion was not abused, even if we or another court might have made a different decision in the first instance.” Hansen v. Kurry Jensen Props. LLC, 2021 UT App 54, ¶ 19, 493 P.3d 1131 (cleaned up); see also Lunt v. Lunt, 2024 UT App 148, ¶ 27, 559 P.3d 73 (“A court abuses its discretion only if no reasonable person Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 7 2026 UT App 39 would take the view adopted by the trial court.” (cleaned up)), cert. denied, 564 P.3d 958 (Utah 2025).3
ANALYSIS
¶14 As relevant here, rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party, “without waiting for a discovery request,” to serve on the other party “the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of . . . each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, . . . and . . . each fact witness the party may call in its case‐in‐chief and, except for an adverse party, a summary of the expected testimony.” Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). The rule also requires the initial disclosures to include “a copy of all documents, data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible things in the possession or control of the party that the party may offer in its case‐in‐chief.” Id. R. 26(a)(1)(B). This disclosure must be made by a plaintiff “within 14 days after the [defendant’s] filing of the first answer to that plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. R. 26(a)(2)(A).
¶15 The sanction for failing to timely provide initial disclosures is severe. The associated evidence is barred from admission at trial unless the district court finds the failure to be harmless or justified by good cause. See id. R. 26(d)(4) (“If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness, document, or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.”). See generally Keystone Ins. Agency v. Inside Ins., 2019 UT 20, ¶ 18 n.7, 445 P.3d 434 (“Under a plain language reading of rule 26(d)(4), the burden to 3. Kent identifies two other issues on appeal, but they both implicate the single issue articulated above. Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 8 2026 UT App 39 demonstrate harmlessness or good cause is clearly on the party seeking relief from disclosure requirements . . . .”).
¶16 Establishing that the defective disclosures were “harmless” requires more from a party than simply showing “any logical basis, no matter how attenuated, to conclude that the opposing party should have been able to cobble together a prescient picture of the potential evidence or witnesses.” Hansen v. Kurry Jensen Props. LLC, 2021 UT App 54, ¶ 44, 493 P.3d 1131 (Mortensen, J., concurring, joined by Pohlman, J.). In other words, a defective disclosure cannot be considered harmless just because the other party ought to have known that the undisclosed evidence would be used. And showing “good cause,” under the plain language of rule 26, requires the party to show why the failure to adequately disclose was justified. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4). Thus, “good cause” has to mean something more than that the party needs the deficiently disclosed information to make its case. Showing good cause requires, at the very least, a party to demonstrate justification for not disclosing information that it should have been able to disclose. Cf. Keystone, 2019 UT 20, ¶ 17 (“Regardless of what Keystone knew or did not know about its damages, it was still incumbent on Keystone to disclose what it had and, more crucially, its method and computation for damages.”).
¶17 Here, there is no question that Leona was not timely in her initial disclosures. The initial disclosures were due in February 2023. And Kent reminded Leona on multiple occasions that they had not been made, even long after the deadline had passed. The district court—at Leona’s request—reopened discovery and set a deadline of February 28, 2024, for the parties to make disclosures. But even then, Leona did not make her disclosures. Indeed, she did not submit her initial disclosures until September 3, 2024— just twenty days before the trial and over six months after the disclosures were due pursuant to the extended deadline set by the court. Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 9 2026 UT App 39
¶18 Leona did not demonstrate harmlessness or good cause to excuse her late disclosures. Nor did the court rule that the late disclosures were harmless orthat herfailure was justified by good cause.4
¶19 Leona has not attempted to argue on appeal that there was good cause for her late disclosures. She did assert below that she had shown good cause because the late‐disclosed material was “integral to resolving issues that [Kent] failed to adequately address in his disclosures.” But just because a party needs late‐ disclosed material to resolve a case, it does not follow that the party can demonstrate good cause on that basis alone. If this were the standard for showing good cause, rule 26’s timing requirements would be meaningless because a party could simply assert any evidence should be admitted on the basis of need. Instead of good cause being based on the late‐disclosing party’s need for the material, good cause must be related to the reason that the late disclosure happened. As rule 26 explicitly states, a party is not allowed to use late‐disclosed materials unless “the party shows good cause for the failure,” not by showing a reason the material is needed. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4) (emphasis added). In other words, good cause for the failure to disclose has nothing to do with having a good reason to need the material in question.
¶20 Leona implies that her lack of compliance with disclosure requirements was due to Kent’s own lack of disclosure. But Kent had made his disclosures, and Leona has not pointed to anything in the record to show that they fell short. And he claimed he had nothing he needed to disclose relative to the Leeds Property— 4. While the district court stated that it did not see “any kind of surprise” to Kent in the late disclosures, it did not specifically address whether the late disclosures were harmless. And the district court made no finding that even remotely touched on good cause. Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 10 2026 UT App 39 meaning that he was ready to proceed based on what he had disclosed. Moreover, rule 26 clearly prohibits one party pointing to another party’s alleged failure to comply with disclosure requirements to justify its own failure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3) (“A party is not excused from making disclosures or responses because the party has not completed investigating the case, the party challenges the sufficiency of another party’s disclosures or responses, or another party has not made disclosures or responses.”). Accordingly, the rationale of Leona’s argument (namely, blaming Kent) is expressly foreclosed by the plain language of the rule.
¶21 Leona does argue that the late disclosures were harmless to Kent because the material in question did not affect the outcome of the trial, asserting that the “bank records were merely cumulative of other evidence confirming that both parties contributed labor and funds to the [Leeds Property’s] improvement.” This argument falls flat for at least two reasons. First, Leona’s appellate brief wholly fails to identify what this other evidence was. Second, and more importantly, the district court’s findings of fact belie this conclusion. The court specifically found, “based on extensive and detailed bank records, that [Leona] contributed more than $187,000 of her money to the renovation, construction, and maintenance” of the Leeds Property. This leads to but one conclusion in a prejudice analysis: Leona was successful in her claim that the Leeds Property was marital property largely because of the court’s reliance on the late‐ disclosed bank records. We simply do not see how Kent was not harmed by Leona’s noncompliance with rule 26 given this unequivocal statement of fact from the court.
¶22 Leona also suggests that Kent’s lack of surprise regarding the substance of the undisclosed material shows that no prejudice flowed from the late disclosures. We are not persuaded. This rationale would lead to the conclusion that it is always harmless to forgo initial disclosures if the opposing party would not be Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 11 2026 UT App 39 surprised by the material disclosed. This thinking misses the mark. First, noncompliance with disclosure requirements until three weeks before trial obviously means that the other party— whether surprised or not—cannot conduct any discovery in response. See Hansen, 2021 UT App 54, ¶ 46 (Mortensen, J., concurring, joined by Pohlman, J.) (“By [the plaintiff] not providing initial disclosures until after discovery had closed, the defendants had lost their opportunity to conduct meaningful fact discovery.” (cleaned up)). Moreover, it’s not an opposing party’s lack of surprise that makes late‐disclosed material harmless. Rather, it’s the material being used to build a late‐disclosing party’s case that makes it harmful. “A party may well know the content” of the late‐disclosed material so as not to be surprised by it, but the fact that the material will be used “by the other side in the other side’s case‐in‐chief undoubtedly” will come as a surprise because its content “will dictate how” a party prepares to defend at trial. See Johansen v. Johansen, 2021 UT App 130, ¶ 19, 504 P.3d 152. As we have repeatedly explained, The requirement to provide a summary of expected testimony is not merely a matter of form. Disclosure of specific facts . . . is required so that parties can make better informed choices about the discovery they want to undertake or, just as important, what discovery they want to forgo. More complete disclosures serve the beneficial purpose of sometimes giving the opposing party the confidence to not engage in further discovery. But this is only true if the potential for surprise is reduced by at least minimum compliance with the rule 26 disclosure requirements. RJW Media Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, ¶ 25, 392 P.3d 956. By blowing off disclosure requirements until it was too late in the game to be of any benefit to Kent, Leona harmed Kent by denying him the opportunity to conduct discovery in an informed manner. Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 12 2026 UT App 39
¶23 Leona further argues that “[e]ven if disclosure was technically late,” the district court properly admitted the financial records identified in her late disclosures as “impeachment evidence.”5 She bases this assertion on Kent’s alleged testimony that she “contributed ‘zero’ dollars toward improvements on the Leeds Property.” Leona argues that her “bank statements [identified in her late disclosures] did not introduce a new theory or previously undisclosed claim,” but they “simply demonstrated that [she] made purchases—such as ‘wood for pond’ and ‘cement for walkway’—contradicting [Kent’s] categorical claim that she made no contributions.” She asserts that the “trial court specifically found that these statements were used to test [Kent’s] credibility, not to expand [her] affirmative case.” Leona would have a good point if the claims supporting her impeachment argument were true. Unfortunately for her, she has not pointed out where in the record Kent allegedly stated that she contributed nothing toward the improvement of the Leeds Property or where the district court found that such an assertion by Kent supported the admission of impeachment evidence. Appellate advocacy requires “attentiveness to presenting a clear picture of facts and argument to [the reviewing] court, which, of course, does not have the benefit of having previously reviewed the evidence. In particular, appellate advocates must never assume that it is [the] court’s burden to comb the record for evidence supporting poorly framed arguments. We have stated this principle on multiple occasions.” Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, ¶ 19, 20 P.3d 332. Though it is not our responsibility to comb the record, we nevertheless diligently verify the accuracy of assertions made in briefing, 5. By no standard can it be said that initial disclosures being made eighteen months late and less than three weeks before trial is a mere “technicality.” Rather, such tardiness represents a fundamental disregard for the applicable rules and for conducting a trial fairly. Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 13 2026 UT App 39 especially when they are front and center in the controversy.6 We can find no place in the record where the court admitted the 6. It should come as no surprise that in rendering a decision, appellate judges, assisted by their law clerks, carefully read the briefs to verify the accuracy of the propositions asserted, the sources cited, and the representation of the record. Leona’s brief on appeal has fallen far short of our reasonable expectations. We note the following shortcomings as especially troubling: (1) Leona’s counsel has not provided a single citation to the record in Leona’s brief on appeal. And counsel makes some assertions about what happened at trial that, if true, would have had a substantive impact on our analysis and the outcome. Without record citations, we don’t even have the benefit of knowing which page in the record is being referred to. Still, we have taken the extra step of doing word searches to locate these phantom citations, but to no avail. As a result, the location of key information that Leona’s counsel represents as being in the record remains a mystery to us. (2) In the recitation of the standards ofreview, Leona’s counsel cites five Utah cases a total of six times to support his propositions. Of these six citations, four are incorrect for various reasons (e.g., the cited material has nothing to do with the proposition for which the case is cited, the case name is incorrect, or the cited paragraph does not exist). (3) In the argument section, which is just over four pages long, Leona’s counsel cites four Utah cases a total of seven times. Only one citation is correct. The others are deficient in various ways (e.g., wrong case name, unrelated in any way to the asserted proposition, cited paragraph of the case does not exist, or misquoted the case). Indeed, some of the citations appear to be made out of whole cloth. (continued…) Prisbrey v. Prisbrey 20250070‐CA 14 2026 UT App 39 disputed evidence for impeachment purposes. And we have found nothing in the record to suggest that Kent ever stated that Leona contributed “zero” dollars to the Leeds Property. Indeed, the opposite is true. Kent stated that he thought Leona “probably put $30,000 into the home and into rebuilding everything.” Accordingly, we are left to conclude that Leona’s impeachment argument is simply without any foundation.
¶24 In sum, the district court exceeded its discretion in allowing Leona to present her late‐disclosed evidence. To put it bluntly, “no reasonable person would take the view adopted” by the district court in overlooking the lateness of the disclosures. See State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, ¶ 14, 82 P.3d 1167 (cleaned up). And since the late disclosures prejudiced Kent and were not excused by good cause, we reverse the district court’s determination that the Leeds Property was marital property and remand this matter for a new trial based on the evidence that was properly disclosed.
CONCLUSION
¶25 Given that Leona has not shown good cause for her late disclosure orthat her violation ofrule 26 was harmless, the district court exceeded its discretion in allowing the admission of Leona’s late‐disclosed evidence. We therefore vacate the resulting judgment and remand this matter for a new trial to be conducted without that evidence. We realize attorneys find themselves pulled in many directions, but even in the midst of these pressures, we do expect a modicum of compliance with briefing and citation standards. In a case like this, where any similarity between the citation in the brief and the material cited appears to be purely accidental, we are left perplexed as to what happened in the composition process.