Nix v. Nix, 2022 UT App 83
Case Summary
This appeal arises from a divorce between Jill Nix and Roland Compton Nix Jr. in which the only contested matter was the ground on which the divorce would be granted. Jill petitioned for divorce on the ground of adultery (with cruelty pleaded in the alternative), and Roland counter-petitioned on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The district court awarded Jill a divorce on the ground of adultery, treating Roland’s refusal to answer a deposition question about extramarital sexual relations “since the marriage” as an adoptive admission of adultery committed before Jill filed her petition. The central appellate question was whether any evidence supported a finding of pre-filing adultery, as required by Vrontikis v. Vrontikis, 358 P.2d 632 (Utah 1961). The Court of Appeals held that no such evidence existed and reversed.
Podcast Interviews and Other Sources
Podcast Interviews
Oral Argument
Briefing Documents
Plura pertinentia mox sequentur. Quaeso, redi mox.
Coverage
Facts
Divorce Petition and Pleadings
- Jill filed for divorce in August 2017, asserting “adultery committed by Roland during the marriage” as a ground for dissolution and asserting cruelty as an alternative ground. (¶ 4)
- The cruelty ground was never further litigated, the district court never ruled on it, and neither party raised it on appeal. (¶ 4)
- Roland denied Jill’s asserted grounds in his answer, but because he did not wish to remain married, he counter-petitioned for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. (¶ 5)
The Deposition Exchange
- At Roland’s deposition, Jill’s counsel asked whether he had “had any sexual relations with someone other than Jill since the marriage.” Roland responded that it was “none of your business,” and his counsel objected on relevance grounds, stating that adultery had not been alleged in the pleadings. (¶ 6)
- Roland added that the parties were separated and that the matter was “none of their business.” After a break and further objections, Roland referred somewhat vaguely to a woman with whom he apparently had a relationship. (¶ 6)
- When asked shortly afterward whether he had “engaged in sexual relations with this person,” Roland answered “Yes.” (¶ 6)
- At no point in the deposition was Roland asked when any extramarital sexual relations occurred. (¶¶ 17–18)
Settlement and Memoranda Procedure
- The parties settled most aspects of the divorce but could not agree on the ground for divorce. Although Jill’s counsel requested a trial on that issue, the parties and the court agreed at a scheduling conference to resolve it through written memoranda followed by oral argument. (¶ 7)
- Jill asked the court to draw “an adverse inference” from Roland’s non-response that he had committed adultery subsequent to the marriage, and she also relied on his express admission. (¶ 8)
- Roland responded that, under Vrontikis, post-filing adultery cannot constitute a ground for divorce, and that Jill had offered no evidence of adultery before she filed. (¶ 9)
- Jill also submitted an alimony check from Roland embossed with a picture of Roland and another woman, which identified the woman’s last name as “Nix.” The check was dated September 2019, after Jill filed for divorce. (¶ 19)
District Court Ruling
- The district court accepted the Vrontikis framework: post-filing adultery does not constitute fault, but evidence of it may lend weight to evidence of pre-filing adultery. (¶ 10)
- The court found that Roland’s express admission related only to adultery after the petition was filed but before the divorce was finalized. Neither party challenged that temporal finding on appeal. (¶ 10 & n.2)
- The court concluded that Roland’s non-response to the “since the marriage” question was an adoptive admission under rule 801(d)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and treated it as proof both that Roland committed adultery and that his adultery “caused the divorce,” i.e., occurred before filing. The court awarded Jill a decree of divorce on the ground of adultery. (¶ 11)
Post-Judgment Motion and Appeal
- Roland moved for a new trial or to alter the judgment under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, challenging the ruling on procedural fairness, misapplication of the adoptive-admission standard, and insufficiency of the evidence. The court denied the motion, and Roland timely appealed. (¶ 12)
Issues of the Case
Appellant Roland Compton Nix Jr. challenged the denial of his rule 59 motion on three principal grounds and additionally requested that the Court of Appeals itself modify the decree; Appellee Jill Nix requested attorney fees on appeal. The court resolved the case on a single dispositive issue.
- Issue 1: Sufficiency of the Evidence of Pre-Filing Adultery
- Issue 2: Adoptive Admission Under Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B)
- Issue 3: Procedural Fairness of the Ruling Below
- Issue 4: Request for Appellate Modification to Irreconcilable Differences
- Issue 5: Appellee’s Request for Attorney Fees on Appeal
Outcome: The adultery-based divorce decree was reversed and the case remanded for insufficient evidence of pre-filing adultery (Issue 1). The court did not reach the adoptive-admission and procedural-fairness challenges (Issues 2 and 3), declined as inadequately briefed Roland’s request that it enter a decree on the ground of irreconcilable differences (Issue 4), and denied Jill’s request for appellate attorney fees (Issue 5).
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Divorce — Grounds for Divorce
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Pre-Filing Adultery
Claim on Appeal: Roland argued that, even if his deposition non-response were treated as an adoptive admission, nothing in the record showed that he committed adultery before Jill filed her divorce petition. Jill relied on the express admission, the check, and the deferential standard of review.
Holding: — Reversed and Remanded. Because neither the deposition question nor any other evidence addressed when Roland’s extramarital sexual relations occurred, there was not even a scintilla of evidence of pre-filing adultery as Vrontikis requires. (¶¶ 16–21)
Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-4-405(1)(b) (Formerly: § 30-3-1(3)(b)) (adultery committed by the respondent subsequent to marriage as a ground for divorce).
Standard of Review:
- Discretion — a district court ordinarily has some discretion in deciding whether to grant a new trial under rule 59. (¶ 14)
- Sufficiency of the evidence — where a rule 59 challenge rests on insufficiency, the court reverses only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. (¶ 14)
- “No evidence” challenge — the appellee need only point to a scintilla of credible evidence supporting the finding to defeat the challenge. (¶ 20)
Controlling Cases:
- Vrontikis v. Vrontikis, 358 P.2d 632 (Utah 1961) (post-filing adultery is inadmissible to establish grounds for divorce but may corroborate evidence of prior acts)
- Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) (rule 59 discretion and sufficiency review)
- In re Estate of Anderson, 2016 UT App 179, 381 P.3d 1179 (sufficiency standard on review of new-trial denial)
- Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, 54 P.3d 1177 (scintilla standard for “no evidence” challenges)
- State v. Pullman, 2013 UT App 168, 306 P.3d 827 (reviewing courts stretch the evidence but may not make a speculative leap across a gap)
Why It Matters: The opinion confirms that Vrontikis imposes a temporal element on the adultery ground: the proponent must produce evidence that the adultery occurred before the petition was filed. Evidence of undated or post-filing infidelity cannot carry the burden alone, however favorably it is viewed. The decision also illustrates that the highly deferential sufficiency standard is not insurmountable when a critical element is supported by no evidence at all.
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Evidence — Adoptive Admission
2. Adoptive Admission Under Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B)
Claim on Appeal: Roland argued that the district court erred in treating his refusal to answer the deposition question as an adoptive admission.
Holding: — Not Reached. The court assumed without deciding that the non-response qualified as an adoptive admission, because even so it said nothing about timing. (¶ 16)
Statutory Authority: None; governed by Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B).
Controlling Cases:
- Vrontikis v. Vrontikis, 358 P.2d 632 (Utah 1961) (framework rendering the adoptive-admission question non-dispositive)
Why It Matters: Whether a party’s refusal to answer a deposition question, accompanied by a relevance objection from counsel, can constitute an adoptive admission remains unresolved by this opinion. Practitioners should not read Nix as endorsing or rejecting the district court’s evidentiary theory; the court simply held that, even if accepted, the admission could prove no more than the question asked.
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Civil Procedure — Procedural Fairness
3. Procedural Fairness of the Ruling Below
Claim on Appeal: Roland asserted, as he had in his rule 59 motion, that the manner in which the district court resolved the grounds issue was procedurally unfair. The opinion does not describe this argument in further detail.
Holding: — Not Reached. The court resolved the appeal on sufficiency grounds and found it unnecessary to address Roland’s remaining challenges. (¶ 13)
Statutory Authority: None cited.
Why It Matters: The court’s decision to resolve the appeal on the narrowest available ground reflects its customary practice of avoiding unnecessary rulings. Litigants who agree to resolve a contested issue on memoranda in lieu of a trial should recognize that any procedural objection to that format remains open for another case.
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Divorce — Grounds for Divorce
4. Request for Appellate Modification to Irreconcilable Differences
Claim on Appeal: Roland asked the Court of Appeals not only to reverse but to “alter the Ruling” itself and grant him a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
Holding: — Declined. Roland cited no authority establishing the court’s ability to modify the order in that manner, and neither party competently briefed whether Jill may continue litigating her alternative cruelty ground on remand. (¶ 21 n.3)
Statutory Authority: None cited.
Why It Matters: A request for affirmative appellate relief beyond reversal must be supported by authority establishing the court’s power to grant it. Because the alternative cruelty ground was never adjudicated, the ground on which the divorce will ultimately be entered remains an open question for the district court on remand.
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Attorney Fees — Appellate Fees
5. Appellee’s Request for Attorney Fees on Appeal
Claim on Appeal: Jill requested her attorney fees incurred on appeal under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
Holding: — Denied. Jill was not the prevailing party on appeal. (¶ 22 n.4)
Statutory Authority: None cited; request made under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
Why It Matters: The ruling is a routine application of the principle that appellate fees in this posture follow success on appeal. A party whose trial-level victory is reversed cannot recover fees for defending that victory.
Rules of Evidence
Statements that are not hearsay — adoptive admissions by a party-opponent
Governs:
Provides that a statement offered against an opposing party is not hearsay if it is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true.
Application in Nix:
The district court treated Roland’s non-response to the deposition question as an adoptive admission of pre-filing adultery. The Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the rule applied and held that the admission was nonetheless silent on timing.
Quote:
“In the court’s view, Roland’s non-response to the deposition question about whether he’d had sexual relations “since the marriage” qualified as an adoptive admission under rule 801(d)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.” Nix v. Nix, 2022 UT App 83, ¶ 11.
Utah Judiciary: https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=ure&rule=801
Utah Codes
Grounds for divorce — adultery
Governs:
Enumerates the grounds on which a court may dissolve a marriage, including adultery committed by the respondent after the marriage. By judicial gloss under Vrontikis, the adultery must precede the filing of the divorce petition to serve as the ground; post-filing conduct is admissible only to corroborate evidence of earlier acts.
Application in Nix:
The court applied the adultery ground, as construed in Vrontikis, to require evidence of pre-filing adultery. Finding none, it reversed the adultery-based decree.
Quote:
“Under the Utah Code, there are ten “[g]rounds for divorce,” one of which is “adultery committed by the respondent subsequent to marriage.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2019).” Nix v. Nix, 2022 UT App 83, ¶ 1.
Utah Legislature: https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title81/Chapter4/81-4-S405.html
Rules of Civil Procedure
New trials; amendments of judgment
Governs:
Permits a party to move for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment on enumerated grounds, including insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or decision.
Application in Nix:
Roland sought a new trial or alteration of the judgment on the grounds issue under rule 59; the appeal was taken from the denial of that motion, and review proceeded under the sufficiency standard because his challenge rested on insufficiency of the evidence.
Quote:
“Roland subsequently filed a motion under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure “for [a] new trial or for an alteration of judgment on the issue of grounds for divorce.”” Nix v. Nix, 2022 UT App 83, ¶ 12.
Utah Judiciary: https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=59
Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Principal briefs — request for attorney fees
Governs:
Requires a party seeking attorney fees on appeal to state the request and the legal basis for it in the principal brief.
Application in Nix:
Jill requested appellate fees under this rule; the court denied the request because she did not prevail on appeal.
Quote:
“Jill has asked for her attorney fees on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Because she is not the prevailing party in this appeal, we deny her request.” Nix v. Nix, 2022 UT App 83, ¶ 22 n.4.
Utah Judiciary: https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urap&rule=24
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
Case Cited
- Vrontikis v. Vrontikis, 358 P.2d 632 (Utah 1961) (controlling rule that post-filing adultery cannot establish grounds for divorce but may corroborate prior acts; supplies the temporal element the evidence failed to satisfy)
- Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) (district court discretion on new-trial motions; sufficiency standard where the motion rests on insufficient evidence)
- In re Estate of Anderson, 2016 UT App 179, 381 P.3d 1179 (reversal only if evidence, viewed favorably to the prevailing party, is insufficient)
- Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, 54 P.3d 1177 (a scintilla of credible evidence defeats a “no evidence” challenge)
- State v. Pullman, 2013 UT App 168, 306 P.3d 827 (reviewing court may stretch the evidentiary fabric but may not take a speculative leap across a gap)
Litigation and Appellate Strategy
Reversal Predictor
- The fault-ground finding rests on evidence that is undated or temporally ambiguous.
- The only admission (express or adoptive) is to a question that encompasses both pre- and post-filing periods.
- Supporting documentary evidence post-dates the filing of the petition.
- The district court’s own findings limit the express admission to post-filing conduct.
- The appellee relies principally on the deferential standard of review rather than on specific record evidence addressing the missing element.
Mandatory Factor Checklist
To grant a divorce on the ground of adultery under Utah Code § 81-4-405(1)(b), as construed in Vrontikis and Nix, the court must find evidence establishing:
- The respondent engaged in sexual relations with a person other than the petitioner.
- The conduct occurred subsequent to the marriage.
- The conduct occurred before the petitioner filed for divorce.
- Any evidence of post-filing conduct is used only to corroborate independent evidence of pre-filing acts, not as the sole basis for the finding.
Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)
- A contested fault ground was resolved on memoranda and argument rather than a full evidentiary trial.
- The finding depends on an inference from silence or refusal to answer.
- The record contains no testimony, document, or witness fixing the conduct before the filing date.
- The court’s findings on the express admission are temporally limited and unchallenged.
- When these factors converge, the adultery finding is vulnerable to a “no evidence” reversal regardless of the deferential standard of review.
Strategy Insight
- Nix demonstrates that a sufficiency challenge succeeds when it is framed as a gap in the record on a discrete legal element rather than as a disagreement about weight or credibility. Roland did not ask the court to reweigh evidence of infidelity; he showed that no evidence addressed the element Vrontikis Appellants should identify the precise element the law demands, demonstrate that the record is silent on it, and invoke the principle that courts may not bridge an evidentiary gap through speculation.
Teaching Value
Nix is a concise illustration of how a single phrase in a deposition question — “since the marriage” — can determine the outcome of a fault-based divorce. It is well suited for teaching deposition technique, the relationship between substantive elements and evidentiary proof, and the practical limits of the scintilla standard.
Insights
Utah-Only Jurisprudence
- The opinion relies exclusively on Utah authority: one Utah Code provision, rules of Utah civil, evidentiary, and appellate procedure, and five Utah appellate decisions. No out-of-state or federal authority is cited.
- The controlling substantive rule derives from a single 1961 Utah Supreme Court decision, Vrontikis, which the court applied without extension, qualification, or reexamination.
Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)
- Vrontikis v. Vrontikis, 358 P.2d 632 (Utah 1961).
- Established: Adultery occurring after the divorce complaint is filed is inadmissible to establish the ground for divorce, though it may be admitted to lend weight to and corroborate testimony regarding prior acts.
- Role in Nix: Supplied the temporal requirement that doomed the adultery-based decree; the case turned entirely on the absence of evidence of pre-filing conduct.
- Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988).
- Established: District courts have some discretion on new-trial motions, but challenges resting on insufficiency are reviewed to determine whether the evidence supports the verdict.
- Role in Nix: Framed the standard of review for Roland’s appeal from the denial of his rule 59 motion.
- Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, 54 P.3d 1177.
- Established: An appellee defeats a “no evidence” challenge by pointing to a scintilla of credible record evidence supporting the finding.
- Role in Nix: Defined the low threshold Jill needed to meet, and her failure to meet even that threshold confirmed the reversal.
The Most Important Holding
- An admission of adultery, whether express or adoptive, establishes only what the question asked. Where the question and answer are silent on timing, they cannot support a finding that adultery occurred before the petition was filed, and a court may not infer the missing timing element by speculation. (¶¶ 17, 21)
- Put differently, Vrontikis converts the adultery ground into a time-bound element, and the proponent must affirmatively prove the “when,” not merely the “whether.”
Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error
- The reversal rests on evidentiary insufficiency — a factual failure — rather than on a misstatement of law. The district court correctly articulated the Vrontikis rule but found a fact (pre-filing adultery) that no evidence supported.
- This is a comparatively rare form of reversal: sufficiency challenges ordinarily fail under the deferential standard. Roland succeeded because he framed the issue as a “no evidence” challenge targeting a discrete element rather than as a dispute over how evidence should be weighed.
- Notably, the court avoided the more legally complex adoptive-admission question, demonstrating that a narrow sufficiency argument can be more effective than a broader evidentiary-error argument.
The Deposition Question Controls the Admission
- The adoptive-admission theory failed not because of the evidentiary rule but because of how the question was phrased. “Since the marriage” encompassed both pre- and post-filing conduct, so an adoption of that proposition proved nothing about the pre-filing period.
- Had counsel asked whether Roland engaged in sexual relations with someone other than Jill after the marriage but before August 2017, a refusal or affirmative answer might have supplied the missing element.
Unchallenged Findings Bind the Appellee Too
- The district court limited Roland’s express admission to post-filing conduct, even though Roland himself never drew that chronological line in the deposition. (¶ 10 n.2)
- Because Jill did not challenge that temporal limitation on appeal, she could not rely on the express admission to prove pre-filing adultery. (¶ 18) Appellees who wish to defend a judgment on alternative grounds must contest adverse subsidiary findings rather than accept them.
Remand Uncertainty and the Unlitigated Alternative Ground
- The court declined to decide whether Jill may pursue her alternative cruelty ground on remand or whether a decree should enter on irreconcilable differences, citing inadequate briefing on both sides. (¶ 21 n.3)
- Parties who plead alternative grounds should either litigate them to decision or expressly address their status, so that a reversal does not leave the ground for divorce unresolved.
Recodification Note
- The adultery ground formerly codified at Utah Code § 30-3-1(3)(b) now appears at § 81-4-405(1)(b), effective September 1, 2024, with the operative “subsequent to marriage” language carried forward. The Vrontikis pre-filing requirement is a judicial construction rather than statutory text, so practitioners should continue to cite Vrontikis and Nix alongside the recodified section.
Practitioner Takeaways
Trial Lawyers
- Plead and prove the date range of alleged adultery. Frame deposition questions, requests for admission, and interrogatories expressly around the petition filing date.
- When a witness refuses to answer, follow up with a time-limited question and, where appropriate, seek an order compelling an answer rather than relying on an adoptive-admission inference.
- Scrutinize the dates on documentary evidence. Post-filing items such as the September 2019 check can only corroborate, never independently establish, the ground for divorce.
- If an adultery-based decree matters to the client, consider whether a full evidentiary hearing rather than a memoranda-only procedure will better develop the record on timing.
- Litigate alternative grounds to decision or preserve them expressly, so a reversal does not strand the case.
Appellate Lawyers
- When a finding rests on a missing element, frame the challenge as a “no evidence” claim. The scintilla standard is deferential, but it still requires some evidence on every element.
- Lead with the narrowest dispositive argument; the court may resolve the appeal on that ground and avoid more contestable evidentiary questions.
- As appellee, challenge adverse subsidiary findings you may need to defend the judgment, or be prepared to be bound by them.
- Support any request for affirmative appellate relief, such as entry of a decree on a different ground, with authority establishing the court’s power to grant it.
Family Law Clients
- Pursuing a fault-based divorce requires proof of when misconduct occurred, not merely that it occurred. Conduct after separation or after the petition is filed will not by itself support an adultery ground.
Majority Opinion
2022 UT App 83
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JILL NIX, Appellee, v. ROLAND COMPTON NIX JR., Appellant. Opinion No. 20200691-CA Filed June 30, 2022 Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Darold J. McDade No. 174402122
Seth D. Needs, Attorney for Appellant D. Grant Dickinson, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JILL M. POHLMAN concurred. TENNEY, Judge:
¶1 Under the Utah Code, there are ten “[g]rounds for divorce,” one of which is “adultery committed by the respondent subsequent to marriage.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2019). Interpreting this provision, our supreme court has held that evidence of adultery “subsequent to the filing of a divorce complaint is inadmissible for the purpose of establishing grounds for divorce,” though it can be “admissible as lending weight to and corroborating testimony as to prior acts” of infidelity. Vrontikis v. Vrontikis, 358 P.2d 632, 632 (Utah 1961).
¶2 When Jill Nix filed for divorce from Roland Nix Jr., she alleged “adultery committed by Roland during the marriage” as one of “the grounds for dissolution of this marriage.” During his subsequent deposition, Roland declined to answer a question Nix v. Nix 20200691-CA 2 2022 UT App 83 from Jill’s attorney about whether he’d had extramarital sexual relations “since the marriage.” The district court later concluded that this non-response constituted an adoptive admission that Roland had committed adultery before Jill filed for divorce. Based on this conclusion, the court awarded Jill a divorce on the ground of adultery.
¶3 Roland now appeals that decision. As explained below, we agree that Roland’s non-response did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that Roland committed adultery before Jill filed her divorce petition. We accordingly reverse.
BACKGROUND1
¶4 Jill filed for divorce from Roland in August 2017. In her petition, Jill asserted two “grounds for dissolution of [the] marriage,” one of which was “adultery committed by Roland during the marriage.” Jill also asserted cruelty as an alternative ground for divorce. But that alternative ground was not further litigated below, the district court never ruled on it, and neither party has raised any issue about it on appeal.
¶5 In his answer, Roland “denie[d]” Jill’s “[g]rounds.” But Roland did not want the marriage to continue, so he counterpetitioned for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
¶6 Roland was later deposed. During his deposition, the following exchange occurred between Jill’s counsel, Roland, and Roland’s counsel: 1. Because the parties share the same last name, we’ll follow our normal practice and refer to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality. Also, for purposes of consistency and readability, we’ll use the parties’ first names (and corresponding pronouns) when quoting references to them from the record or the briefing, and we’ll do so without using brackets to note any such alterations. Nix v. Nix 20200691-CA 3 2022 UT App 83 [Jill’s counsel:] Have you had any sexual relations with someone other than Jill since the marriage? [Roland:] It is none of your business. [Jill’s counsel:] Counsel I am entitled to know. [Roland’s counsel:] I question the relevance. I don’t think that adultery or anything has been alleged in the pleadings. . . . . [Roland:] We are separated and that is none of their business. . . . . [brief break taken by the parties] [Jill’s counsel:] We left on the question of adultery. Mr. Nix what is your response? After another objection and then more discussion between counsel, Roland made a somewhat vague reference to a woman with whom he’d apparently had some type of relationship. A short time later, Roland was asked, “And have you engaged in sexual relations with this person?” Roland answered, “Yes.”
¶7 Roland and Jill eventually settled most aspects of their divorce. But when they weren’t able to agree on the ground for divorce, Jill’s counsel requested a trial on that issue. At a scheduling conference, however, the parties and the court agreed on an alternative procedure under which the parties would submit memoranda about the ground for divorce, after which the court would hear oral argument on the matter.
¶8 In her memorandum, Jill pointed to Roland’s non-response to the deposition question of whether he’d “had any sexual relations with someone other than Jill since the marriage.” From this, Jill asked the court to draw “an adverse inference” that Roland had “committed adultery subsequent to the marriage.” In addition, Jill pointed to Roland’s express admission that he’d “engaged in sexual relations with this person.” Nix v. Nix 20200691-CA 4 2022 UT App 83
¶9 In his responsive memorandum, Roland asked the court to deny Jill’s request for an adultery-based divorce. Roland asserted that under Vrontikis v. Vrontikis, 358 P.2d 632 (Utah 1961), any adultery that he had committed after Jill filed for divorce could not constitute a ground for divorce. And Roland then argued that Jill had offered no evidence that he had “committed adultery prior to her filing for divorce.”
¶10 After briefing and then a hearing, the district court issued a written decision. There, the court agreed that under Vrontikis, “adulterous conduct subsequent to a divorce petition does not constitute fault,” but that “evidence of such conduct can be used to lend weight” to other evidence that the party had “committed adultery prior to the divorce petition.” (Emphases omitted.) The court then concluded that although Roland had expressly admitted to adultery in his deposition, this express admission had only been to “adultery subsequent to the divorce petition, but prior to divorce finalization.” 2
¶11 Given its understanding of Vrontikis, the court next considered whether there was any evidence of pre-filing adultery. The court concluded that there was. In the court’s view, Roland’s non-response to the deposition question about whether he’d had sexual relations “since the marriage” qualified as an adoptive admission under rule 801(d)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Notably, the court not only regarded this as proof “that Roland did commit adultery,” but also as proof “that Roland’s adultery caused the divorce,” i.e., proof that the adultery happened prefiling. Thus, the court concluded that even if “Roland’s express admission [was] not, stand[ing] alone, a grounds for fault, the adoptive admission satisfie[d] Jill’s burden to show that Roland’s 2. We note that Roland did not actually draw this chronological line in the portion of the deposition in which he made his express admission. But neither party has challenged the court’s determination that the express admission was only to post-filing adulterous conduct. Nix v. Nix 20200691-CA 5 2022 UT App 83 adultery caused the divorce.” Based on this, the court later “awarded Jill a decree of divorce on the grounds of adultery.”
¶12 Roland subsequently filed a motion under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure “for [a] new trial or for an alteration of judgment on the issue of grounds for divorce.” Roland challenged the district court’s ruling on several fronts, including procedural fairness, incorrect application of the adoptive admission standard, and insufficiency of the evidence. After Jill opposed the motion, the court denied it. Roland timely appealed.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13 Roland challenges the district court’s denial of his rule 59 motion. As he did below, Roland assails this ruling for several reasons. We need address only one of them: Roland’s contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s determination that he committed adultery before Jill filed for divorce.
¶14 A district court ordinarily has “some discretion in deciding whether or not to grant a new trial.” Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). But because Roland’s “challenge rests on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we will reverse only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.” In re Estate of Anderson, 2016 UT App 179, ¶ 7, 381 P.3d 1179 (quotation simplified); accord Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17.
ANALYSIS
¶15 The district court determined that Roland had committed adultery before Jill filed for divorce. It based this determination on Roland’s non-response to a question about this subject in his deposition, which the court regarded as an adoptive admission of pre-filing adultery. Nix v. Nix 20200691-CA 6 2022 UT App 83
¶16 On appeal, Roland first argues that the district court erred in concluding that his non-response qualified as an adoptive admission. But we need not decide whether this was so. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the non-response did qualify as an adoptive admission, the court was still required to point to some evidence that Roland had committed adultery before Jill filed for divorce. See Vrontikis v. Vrontikis, 358 P.2d 632, 632 (Utah 1961) (holding that evidence of adultery “subsequent to the filing of a divorce complaint is inadmissible for the purpose of establishing grounds for divorce,” though it can be “admissible as lending weight to and corroborating testimony as to prior acts” of infidelity).
¶17 Roland argues that there was no such evidence. Of note, Roland points out that, in the deposition exchange at issue, he “was never specifically asked whether he had had sexual relations with someone other than Jill since the marriage, but prior to the filing of the petition for divorce.” Having reviewed the portion of the deposition that is in the record, we agree. While Jill’s counsel asked Roland whether he had engaged in extramarital sexual relations, Jill’s counsel never asked Roland when he had done so. As a result, with respect to the critical issue of timing, the question and non-answer that supported the court’s adoptive-admission determination were silent.
¶18 Jill nevertheless points to Roland’s express admission of adultery. But on this, the district court only found that Roland had expressly admitted to post-filing adultery, and Jill has not challenged the court’s temporal limitation of its own finding on appeal. In any event, we’ve reviewed the exchange ourselves. We see nothing in it in which Roland said that his extramarital conduct was limited to post-filing behavior, but we also see nothing in it in which he admitted to any pre-filing conduct. Instead, as with the (alleged) adoptive admission, the timing of Roland’s behavior simply never came up.
¶19 This same defect exists with respect to the small amount of other evidence that Jill provided below to inferentially support Nix v. Nix 20200691-CA 7 2022 UT App 83 her claims about Roland’s adultery. For example, Jill provided the court with a check that Roland had given her for alimony. This check was embossed with a picture of Roland and another woman, and in the identification block in the upper corner, it identified the other woman’s last name as “Nix.” Even accepting Jill’s contention that this could inferentially show that there was a sexual relationship between Roland and the other woman, what matters here is that the check was dated September 2019—which was after Jill had filed for divorce.
¶20 This leaves us with Jill’s final argument, which is to rely heavily on the favorable standard of review. Because Roland challenges the district court’s ruling on sufficiency grounds, we’re required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s determination. But Roland’s argument presents us with a “no evidence” challenge—i.e., he argues that “even with the evidence in the record, nothing would demonstrate that . . . Roland committed adultery prior to the filing of the Petition for Divorce.” And to defeat such a claim, Jill “need only point to a scintilla of credible evidence from the record that supports the finding of fact in order to overcome [Roland’s] ‘no evidence’ assertion.” Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ¶ 22, 54 P.3d 1177.
¶21 She hasn’t. Even on such a review, there must be some evidence to support the determination in question. As we have explained in another context, a “reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go,” but “this does not mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict.” State v. Pullman, 2013 UT App 168, ¶ 14, 306 P.3d 827 (quotation simplified). Here, the evidence demonstrates that Roland engaged in sexual activity with another woman before his divorce was finalized. After all, he expressly admitted as much. But Vrontikis requires evidence of adultery at a particular time—namely, before the petitioner filed for divorce. Jill points to no evidence, and we see none, that even inferentially says anything about when Roland engaged in extramarital sexual activity. Without such evidence, the district court’s finding that Nix v. Nix 20200691-CA 8 2022 UT App 83 Roland had engaged in pre-filing extramarital sexual relations cannot stand. We accordingly reverse for insufficient evidence.3
CONCLUSION
¶22 There was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s determination that Roland committed adultery before Jill filed for divorce. We accordingly reverse that decision and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 4 3. Our determination leaves a potential wrinkle about what should happen next. At the close of his brief, Roland asks us to not only reverse on insufficiency grounds, but also to “alter the Ruling” ourselves to grant him a divorce on “the grounds of irreconcilable differences.” Roland provides us with no authority that establishes our ability to modify an order in this manner, however, so this request is inadequately briefed. Moreover, Jill petitioned for divorce on an alternative ground, but neither party on appeal has competently briefed the question of whether Jill would be entitled to continue litigating that ground if we reverse the district court’s adultery-based decree. Without such briefing, we decline to decide the question in the first instance. 4. Jill has asked for her attorney fees on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Because she is not the prevailing party in this appeal, we deny her request.