Lunt v. Lunt, 2024 UT App 148

2024 UT App 148

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MEGAN LUNT,
Appellee,
v.
DREW E. LUNT,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20220596-CA
Filed October 18, 2024

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Patrick Corum
No. 194902053

Julie J. Nelson, Attorney for Appellant
Sara Pfrommer, Attorney for Appellee
Matt Wadsworth, Attorney for Amicus Curiae in

support of Appellee1

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN D. TENNEY

concurred.

ORME, Judge:
¶1 In this appeal, Drew E. Lunt challenges alimony and child
support awards entered in Megan Lunt’s favor as part of their
1. Appellee assigned her interest in the business at issue in this
appeal to Matt Wadsworth, who acted as her attorney in the
proceedings before the trial court. As Appellee no longer has a
stake in the outcome of the distribution of the business,
Wadsworth was granted permission to file an amicus brief urging
affirmance of the trial court’s division of the business, while
Appellee’s brief is limited to the issues related to alimony and
child support.

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 2 2024 UT App 148
divorce action. He argues that the trial court erred as a matter of
law when it determined the parties’ financial needs and gross
incomes. He also challenges the court’s valuation of his business,
arguing that the court erroneously determined that only 5% of the
business’s value is attributable to his personal goodwill. Because
the trial court’s determination regarding the parties’ financial
needs was based on a misapplication of law, we reverse and
remand the matter for the court to enter the requisite findings and
to reevaluate the alimony award. But we otherwise affirm the trial
court’s decisions.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties married in 2000 and have three children
together, two of whom were still minors at the time of trial.
Drew,2 an attorney, worked for various law firms but
eventually went out on his own to develop an employment law
website business (the Business), of which he is the
sole shareholder. For most of the marriage, Megan worked in
the home, but in 2014, she began working full-time as a
schoolteacher.

¶3 In 2019, Megan filed a petition for divorce. The trial court
entered temporary orders that, among other things, awarded
Megan monthly child support and alimony. Prior to trial, the
parties stipulated to joint physical and legal custody of the two
minor children, and the trial court entered an order to that effect.

¶4 In October 2020, the trial court held the first bench trial in
this matter, following which it entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding, in relevant part, alimony, child
support, and the valuation of the Business. Both parties
subsequently filed post-trial motions. As a result, the court held a

2. Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them
hereafter by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the
apparent informality.

second bench trial in February 2022 to consider additional
testimony from the parties’ expert witnesses, and it later entered
supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding
alimony and the valuation of the Business. We recount the
combined findings and conclusions below.
Alimony and Child Support

¶5 For child support and alimony purposes, Drew asked the
trial court to count as part of Megan’s gross income, in addition
to her salary as a teacher, (1) her employer-paid healthcare and
retirement benefits, (2) income she received for previously
operating an annual two-week summer camp, and (3) charitable
donations she received from her church. The trial court declined
to count any of these three sources as part of Megan’s gross
income.

¶6 Employer-Paid Benefits. In addressing Megan’s healthcare
and retirements benefits, the court stated that for child support
purposes, Drew’s “approach appears inconsistent with both the
plain language and legislative intent behind the exhaustive list of
gross income sources found in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203.”3
The court also noted that many of the decisions from other states
that permit employer-paid benefits to be counted as gross income
“rest their analysis on the notion that certain benefits are received
in lieu of additional salary” and no evidence was presented that
Megan had that option. For alimony purposes, the court stated
that it was “similarly not persuaded that [Megan’s]
employer-paid benefits should be included in the income
calculation” or that Utah law even permitted such benefits to be
considered in that context. And in any event, the court stated that
it was not “clear that it would ultimately make any difference in
the alimony determinations as any additional ‘income’ regarding
these benefits would be offset directly by the corresponding

3. Utah Code section 78B-12-203 has recently been renumbered as
section 81-6-203.

additional need created by considering the employer-paid benefit
to be income.”

¶7 Summer Camp. Between 2016 and 2019, Megan organized
and operated an annual two-week science summer camp. Megan
did not operate the camp in 2020, and the court found she credibly
testified as to compelling reasons why it was not held then and
why she had no plans to operate the camp again in the future.
Specifically, “the camp name and logo had elicited a cease and
desist letter, neither of her children had any interest in helping
with the camp any longer, she currently lacked a physical
location, [Drew] would no longer be able to help with the website
and billing, and the [COVID-19] pandemic made the camp
problematic if not impossible to operate.” The court stated that
“[a]ny one of these reasons would suffice to credibly explain
[Megan’s] assertion that she would not be engaged in the camp,”
and it thus declined to count Megan’s previous earnings from the
summer camp as part of her gross income. The court further noted
that the camp “is not a current endeavor and was not at the time
of trial,” and even if Megan’s discontinued participation in the
camp “could be viewed as a form of underemployment,” given
the reasons to which Megan credibly testified, the court found
that such underemployment was “not wholly voluntary.”4 The
court also stated that Megan was otherwise employed full time as
a school teacher and that it “is not in the habit of ordering parties
to work more than one full-time job except under those very
limited circumstances identified in the law.” It also characterized
the camp as “a relatively short-term side business” that “was
always above and beyond [Megan’s] normal, full-time job and,

4. The trial court noted that while a finding regarding
voluntariness is no longer statutorily mandated, it considered that
factor to be “highly relevant” and to weigh “strongly” in the
income imputation analysis. See Merrill v. Merrill, 2024 UT App
125, ¶ 33.

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 5 2024 UT App 148
thus, by statute excluded for child support purposes.” See Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(2) (LexisNexis 2022).5
¶8 Charitable Donations. In her most recent financial
declaration, Megan listed $1,000 as monthly income under
“Church Help.” Drew argued that this should be counted as part
of her gross income for alimony purposes because she did not
provide evidence that such payments would not occur in the
future. But the court noted that Megan had testified that the
charitable donations were expected to cease and that there had
already been discussions to that effect. The court stated that
because there was “no other evidence” regarding those charitable
donations, it was unable to find that the donations should be
counted as income. Additionally, the court stated that “inclusion
of charitable donations received by either of the parties from
anyone let alone a church as income would seemingly work to
defeat one of the primary policy purposes behind alimony and
may ultimately and improperly make the donating party
responsible for the receiving party in perpetuity.”

¶9 Accordingly, for child support and alimony purposes, the
trial court set Megan’s gross monthly income at $5,043.75, which
represented her schoolteacher salary.

¶10 The court next addressed Drew’s gross monthly income.
Because Drew was the sole proprietor of the Business, the court
applied the statutory formula set forth in Utah Code section
78B-12-203(4)(a) of subtracting “[o]nly those expenses necessary
to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level” from the
gross receipts. The court agreed with Megan’s expert witness,
who used this approach to calculate Drew’s 2019 total gross
income. Megan’s expert did not take the COVID-19 pandemic into
account, stating that there were indications that “things are
coming back and there’s still a lot of employment related issues.”

5. Because our Legislature has since amended and renumbered
some of the statutes at issue in this appeal, we cite the version of
the Utah Code in effect at the relevant time.

Accordingly, the court determined Drew’s income for alimony
and child support purposes to be $12,384 per month. In its
supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court
stated that this amount “includes Drew’s wage compensation for
services rendered as well as the profits, distributions, and access
to retained earnings that he has as an owner” of the Business.

¶11 Based on each party’s gross monthly income and the
parenting schedule, the court awarded Megan $492 per month in
child support.

¶12 Next, as part of its alimony ruling, the trial court addressed
the parties’ standard of living. The court determined that the
evaluation of the parties’ standard of living at the time of
separation—and not at the time of trial—was appropriate in this
case. The court did not consider evidence Megan proffered
regarding the marital standard of living in 2013—when Drew
“was at his high water mark of salary as an attorney”—because
there was “no true support in law or fact” for the contention that
the 2013 marital standard of living should be used rather than the
standard at the time of the parties’ separation. Conversely, Drew’s
expert testified regarding the parties’ standard of living from
March 2017 until their separation in March 2019, which he
calculated to be $9,016 per month. The court found this valuation
“to be an accurate and reasonable estimate of the marital standard
of living for that two-year period” but made a few minor
adjustments and ultimately concluded that the parties’ marital
standard of living at the time of separation was $8,779.50 per
month.

¶13 Next, the court addressed the parties’ financial needs.
Based on Megan’s monthly net earned income and child support
award, the court determined that meeting the $8,779.50 marital
standard of living left her with a monthly shortfall of $4,208. And
based on Drew’s monthly net earned income minus the monthly
child support obligation, the court determined that he was left
with a monthly shortfall of $624. Based on “the length of the
marriage, the significant disparity in incomes between the parties
to meet the marital standard, the continuing improvement of and
overall upward trajectory of [the Business], and other
circumstances,” the court found “it fair and equitable that the
parties’ shortfall should be equally divided,” leaving each party
with a monthly shortfall of $2,416. Accordingly, the court
awarded Megan $1,792 per month in alimony.

¶14 Following the second bench trial, Drew did not present any
additional evidence related to alimony or Megan’s needs. And
after considering prior testimony, the court was not persuaded
that its initial findings regarding alimony should be altered. The
court specifically stated that “the value attributed to the marital
standard of living was provided by [Drew’s] expert . . . and
backed by credible information to support the amount.” But
because the court found that the alimony awarded in the
temporary orders “was grossly inadequate based on the net
income actually generated by the [B]usiness,” it made the $1,792
monthly alimony award retroactive to the date Megan filed the
divorce petition, and it ordered Drew to pay the difference within
90 days.

The Business’s Valuation and Personal Goodwill

¶15 After graduating from law school in 2003, Drew worked
for the National Labor Relations Board for approximately three
and a half years. Next, he worked for law firms in Tennessee and
Georgia that specialized in employment law. Drew holds himself
out as “an expert in researching information about employment
laws in all 50 states.”

¶16 In 2008, Drew developed a website, employmentlawhand
book.com (elh.com),6 “to provide information related to labor law
as a marketing tool for his legal practice while he worked as an

6. We follow the parties’ and the trial court’s lead in using this
shorthand to refer to employmentlawhandbook.com, but it
should be noted that elh.com is not actually a website associated
with the Business.

attorney” for an employment law firm in Tennessee. Notably,
elh.com does not offer legal advice. By the time of the parties’
separation in 2019, the Business had expanded to include an
additional website: theluntgroup.com. Of the two websites,
elh.com produces “the vast majority” of the Business’s revenue.

¶17 As summarized by the trial court, elh.com advertises Drew
as “an experienced employment law attorney with previous
employment at various law firms and the National Labor
Relations Board,” but the website does not prominently feature
his name or qualifications. Drew is the Business’s sole equity
holder, officer, and employee, although consultants and
independent contractors contribute to the Business’s normal
operations. The court found that “the Business is a
single-operating entity” and that Drew “has at all times operated
the Business as a single, unified business with multiple streams of
revenue.”

¶18 In 2012, the Business began generating revenue by hosting
Google ads on the websites. In 2014, the family relocated to Utah,
and Drew began working exclusively on the Business. The trial
court found that Drew alone “designs [the] websites, redesigns
them, monitors them, maintains them, and troubleshoots them
when they are not working properly.” But because elh.com had
“been developed over several years,” by the time of the first bench
trial the website needed only “minor updates to pages or blog
posts to maintain its web traffic” and most of those updates “are
currently out-sourced to independent contractors and not done by
[Drew].” Drew also has “sole editorial responsibility for content
on the website, either authoring content himself or reviewing and
editing content generated by subcontractors and contributors.”
For the websites, Drew “has researched or caused to be researched
statutes for over 200 employment law topics for all 50 states and
the District of Columbia.” According to the trial court, “This
content has been and will continue to be critical to the success and
advertising revenue of the websites.” Indeed, the trial court noted
the acknowledgement of Megan’s expert that the content is
“something that cannot be easily replaced” and is “something you

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 9 2024 UT App 148
could only build up over time.” On the other hand, the court also
found that “the content of many of elh.com’s web pages have
remained static for many years, including specifically those web
pages that were indicated to be generating the most ad revenues.”

¶19 Also, in 2014 and 2015, the Business began offering human
resources consulting, ebooks, and “a membership area.” Drew
has published approximately 100 ebooks on employment law and
authored or edited numerous employment law handbooks. In
2018, Drew hired an employee to focus on the consulting side of
the Business so that he could direct his attention to other aspects
of the Business. But by the time of the first bench trial, the
employee had become an independent contractor.

¶20 One of the issues the trial court addressed in valuing the
Business was whether any of its value was attributable to Drew’s
personal goodwill. The parties each took all-or-nothing positions
on this issue, with Drew arguing that the Business’s goodwill was
“largely or entirely” attributable to Drew personally and Megan
arguing that the goodwill was entirely attributable to the Business
as an institution. The court concluded that the Business’s goodwill
was largely institutional, but it stated that although it did “not
believe, nor would it find, that there is absolutely zero personal
goodwill” in the Business, Drew’s all-or-nothing trial strategy left
the court with no evidence with which it could determine a
specific, diminished amount for the personal goodwill.
Accordingly, the court stated that “based upon [the] lack of
evidence,” Drew had “not met his burden as to personal
goodwill,” and it held “that any goodwill associated with the
Business should be considered institutional or enterprise
goodwill for purposes of division.”

¶21 In reaching this conclusion, the court addressed whether
the Business needed Drew to continue to operate, and the degree
to which the Business’s success was tied to Drew’s reputation for
competency. The court disagreed with Drew’s assertion that “his
personal relationships with the independent contractors, clients,
and vendors are critical to the Business’ success and
irreplaceable” because there was no evidence presented that the
company the Business uses to manage ads or the independent
contractors would not work with another person at the helm. But
the court did find that although elh.com did not offer legal advice,
the Business would not “be anywhere near as successful and
profitable if operated primarily by a non-attorney” and “that the
Business’s reputation, status, and success is enhanced to some
unspecified degree by having an experienced employment law
attorney at the helm.” The court further found that Drew’s
qualifications, education, training, and expertise in employment
law and human resources “have contributed to some degree in
the development, maintenance and success of elh.com.”

¶22 But the court also found that “the Business does not
depend on [Drew’s] reputation for competency to a significant or
quantified degree,” and it “wholly reject[ed]” Drew’s contentions
that the Business is dependent on him and that it would not be
able to continue operating without him. The court stated that
“given how the website is set up and constructed, it is highly
likely that very few, if any, of the users to elh.com,” which is
responsible for the “vast majority” of the Business’s revenue,
“even realize that [Drew] (or any attorney for that matter) is
involved.” Indeed, the court noted that in the last calendar year,
Drew had not been “the primary, or even secondary or tertiary,
blog post author for elh.com” and that he “spends very little time
on elh.com”—having authored only four blog posts for the
website in the past two years. The court further noted that elh.com
“is driven by web-based ads by website viewers that could be
anywhere in the world and have no relationship with [Drew]—let
alone even know his name.” The court agreed with Megan’s
expert that any goodwill associated with elh.com “is inherent
within the domain name and the historical content that has
existed on the site since 2008.” Accordingly, the court held that
elh.com “is established and has intangible value distinct from any
entity or any individual.”

¶23 For these reasons, in its initial findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the court concluded that the Business’s
goodwill was institutional and therefore subject to division as part
of the marital estate.

¶24 Following the second bench trial, at which the court heard
additional testimony from the parties’ expert witnesses, the court
amended its determination regarding Drew’s personal goodwill.
The court stated that its original valuation of the Business did not
allocate anything for personal goodwill because there was
“limited credible evidence that Drew’s personal presence (as
opposed to any other knowledgeable employment professional)
is necessary for the continued operation of the [B]usiness” and
because “there was no evidence presented from which the court
could reliably conclude how much [Drew’s] status as an attorney
adds to the [B]usiness.” But following the second bench trial, the
court “concluded that the evidence supports a finding that there
is some nominal value attributable to Drew’s personal goodwill,”
and it allocated 5% of the Business’s total value to Drew’s
personal goodwill.

¶25 Based on that and other adjustments, the court valued the
Business at $320,345, which reflected the 5% deduction for Drew’s
personal goodwill. The court then awarded half of the Business’s
value to Megan, subject to a secured payment plan.

¶26 Drew appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶27 Drew raises several challenges to the trial court’s
alimony and child support awards. “In divorce actions, a
district court is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting
the financial and property interests of the parties, and its
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.” Gardner v.
Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18, 452 P.3d 1134 (quotation simplified). A
court abuses its discretion “only if no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Id.
(quotation simplified). Under this standard, we will reverse if, as
relevant here, “there was a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error.” Id.
(quotation simplified).

¶28 Drew also challenges the court’s valuation of the Business,
specifically, its decision to allocate only 5% for Drew’s personal
goodwill, which he asserts also resulted in impermissible double
counting of his earning capacity. “In a divorce proceeding, the
trial court is accorded considerable discretion in its valuation . . .
of marital property,” Knowlton v. Knowlton, 2023 UT App 16, ¶ 43,
525 P.3d 898 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah
2023), and its decision is likewise “entitled to a presumption of
validity,” Erickson v. Erickson, 2022 UT App 27, ¶ 16, 507 P.3d 824
(quotation simplified). We will thus generally “uphold a district
court’s valuation of marital assets as long as the value is within
the range of values established by all the testimony, and as long
as the court’s findings are sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.” Rothwell
v. Rothwell, 2023 UT App 50, ¶ 49, 531 P.3d 225 (quotation
simplified), cert. denied, 537 P.3d 1011 (Utah 2023). We also “defer
to the district court’s findings of fact related to property valuation
. . . unless they are clearly erroneous.” Erickson, 2022 UT App 27,
¶ 16 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS
I. Alimony and Child Support

¶29 Drew disputes the trial court’s alimony and child support
awards, contending that the court abused its discretion when it
determined Megan’s financial needs and the parties’ incomes. The
financial needs determination concerns only the alimony award,
while the income determination is germane to both the alimony
and child support awards.

A. Megan’s Financial Needs

¶30 In evaluating a party’s alimony claim, trial courts must
engage in a multi-factor inquiry previously set forth in Utah Code
section 30-3-5(10)(a).7 Courts “must make sufficiently detailed
findings of fact on each statutory factor to enable a reviewing
court to ensure that the trial court’s discretionary determination
was rationally based upon these factors, which requires including
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate alimony conclusion was reached.” Rule v. Rule, 2017 UT
App 137, ¶ 11, 402 P.3d 153 (quotation simplified).

¶31 The first three factors listed in section 30-3-5(10)(a) are
frequently “referred to as the Jones factors.”8 Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT
79, ¶¶ 94–95, 459 P.3d 276 (quoting Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072,
1075 (Utah 1985)). They are (1) “the financial condition and needs
of the recipient spouse;”9 (2) “the recipient’s earning capacity or
ability to produce income, including the impact of diminished
workplace experience resulting from primarily caring for a child
of the payor spouse;” and (3) “the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10)(a)(i)–(iii)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2022). The “party seeking alimony bears the
burden of demonstrating to the court that the Jonesfactors support
an award of alimony.” Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 95. This burden is most
7. Effective September 1, 2024, our Legislature repealed Utah
Code section 30-3-5. The factors that trial courts must consider in
determining alimony are now set forth in Utah Code section
81-4-502(1).
8. The Jones factors are now found in Utah Code section
81-4-502(1)(b)–(d).
9. Section 81-4-502(1)(b) now provides that trial courts shall
consider “the financial condition and needs of the payee,
provided that the payee may show financial needs by itemizing
expenses present during the marriage rather than by itemizing
post petition expenses.”

commonly satisfied by providing “the court with a credible
financial declaration and supporting financial documentation.”
Wellman v. Kawasaki, 2023 UT App 11, ¶ 14, 525 P.3d 139
(quotation simplified). But in cases where the alimony claimant
does not provide proper documentation, and “where the evidence
and equity permit,” id. ¶ 24, a court should attempt to make
findings regarding the factors based on circumstantial and
testimonial evidence, id.; Munoz-Madrid v. Carlos-Moran, 2018 UT
App 95, ¶ 9, 427 P.3d 420. See Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 116.

¶32 At issue here is the first Jones factor, i.e., the court’s
determination—or lack thereof—regarding Megan’s financial
needs. Drew argues that the trial court abused its discretion when
it substituted the parties’ standard of living at the time of
separation (with a few minor adjustments) for Megan’s financial
needs.10 We agree.

¶33 An alimony award should “advance, as much as possible,
the primary purposes of alimony,” one of which is “to get the
parties as close as possible to the same standard of living that
existed during the marriage.” Rule, 2017 UT App 137, ¶ 14
(quotation simplified). As such, when evaluating the first Jones
factor, the trial court “should assess the needs of the parties, in
light of their marital standard of living.” Id. ¶ 19 (quotation
simplified). But because “[t]he receiving spouse’s needs
ultimately set the bounds for the maximum permissible alimony
award,” id. ¶ 17, “there is usually no need for a trial court to make
a separate specific finding regarding the overall marital standard
of living as measured by the total amount of money spent each
month by the couple while they were married,” Fox v. Fox, 2022
UT App 88, ¶ 19, 515 P.3d 481 (quotation simplified), cert. denied,
525 P.3d 1263 (Utah 2022). Rather, when assessing “the needs of
the parties, in light of their marital standard of living,” courts
10. Drew also argues that Megan failed to carry her burden of
proving her financial needs. Because we reverse the alimony
award based on the trial court’s erroneous reliance on the marital
standard of living, we do not reach this argument.

“must determine the parties’ needs reasonably incurred,
calculated upon the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage.” Id. ¶ 20 (quotation simplified).

¶34 This is not what the trial court did in this case.
Although each party proposed findings on their
individual financial needs, the court did not enter any findings
regarding their reasonable expenses as part of its alimony
award. Instead, the court largely adopted the valuation of the
parties’ marital standard of living provided by Drew’s
expert, with a few minor adjustments, and substituted it for
each party’s financial needs. The court then proceeded to the
equalization step of the alimony calculus, see Rule, 2017 UT App
137, ¶ 21, by subtracting each party’s net income from the marital
standard of living amount and equalizing the shortfall, leaving
each party with a monthly shortfall of $2,416. Based on this
calculation, the court awarded Megan $1,792 per month in
alimony.

¶35 As discussed above, because the recipient spouse’s
reasonable financial needs—not the marital standard of living—
represents the maximum allowable amount for an alimony
award, id. ¶ 17, courts must enter findings regarding “the parties’
needs reasonably incurred,” id. ¶ 19 (quotation simplified).
Accordingly, because the trial court’s alimony award was based
on the marital standard of living instead of the parties’ reasonable
expenses, the award is the result of a misapplication of law, which
constitutes an abuse of discretion.11 See Gardner v. Gardner, 2019
UT 61, ¶ 18, 452 P.3d 1134.

11. Although the focus is on the parties’ reasonable needs, as
measured by their reasonable expenses, the marital standard of
living—while not obviating the necessity to determine the needs
of the parties—is a key consideration in evaluating the
reasonableness of their expenses.

¶36 For this reason, we reverse the alimony award and remand
the matter to the trial court to enter appropriate findings
regarding the parties’ reasonable expenses and to reassess
alimony in light of those findings.
B. The Parties’ Incomes

¶37 Child support obligations are calculated using the parents’
adjusted gross incomes. Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, ¶ 11,
334 P.3d 994. Utah Code section 78B-12-203(1), which was in effect
at the relevant time,12 provided that
“gross income” includes prospective income from
any source, including earned and nonearned
income sources which may include salaries, wages,
commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from
anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions,
interest, trust income, alimony from previous
marriages, annuities, capital gains, Social Security
benefits, workers’ compensation benefits,
unemployment compensation, income replacement
disability insurance benefits, and payments from
“nonmeans-tested” government programs.
Additionally, section 78B-12-203(2) directed that “[i]ncome from
earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time
40-hour job” unless “during the time before the original support
order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 40
hours at the parents’ job,” in which case “the court may consider
this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent’s ability to
provide child support.”
¶38 For individuals such as Drew whose income is derived
from self-employment or the operation of a business, section

12. As previously noted, Utah Code section 78B-12-203 has since
been renumbered, with adjustments, as section 81-6-203.
78B-12-203(4)(a) directed that for child support purposes, the
gross income from such endeavors “shall be calculated by
subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or
business operation from gross receipts,” and that “[o]nly those
expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a
reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts.”

¶39 For alimony purposes, Utah caselaw directs that “it is
appropriate and necessary for trial courts to consider all sources
of income.” Hansen v. Hansen, 2014 UT App 96, ¶ 14, 325 P.3d 864
(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 337 P.3d 295 (Utah 2014). See
Eberhard v. Eberhard, 2019 UT App 114, ¶ 21, 449 P.3d 202 (“District
courts must be able to consider all sources of income that were
used by the parties during their marriage to meet their
self-defined needs, from whatever source—overtime, second job,
self-employment, etc., as well as unearned income.”) (quotation
simplified). But while the “caselaw directs district courts to
consider all sources of income when determining alimony, it does
not dictate that all sources of income be counted as income
received by a spouse for that purpose.” Eberhard, 2019 UT App
114, ¶ 21 (emphases in original).

¶40 In making both child support and alimony determinations,
“courts have broad discretion to select an appropriate method of
assessing a spouse’s income, including determinations of income
imputation,” under which standard “appellants bear a heavy
burden” of establishing that “no reasonable person would take
the view adopted by the trial court.” Pankhurst v. Pankhurst, 2022
UT App 36, ¶ 13, 508 P.3d 612 (quotation simplified).
1. Megan’s Income

¶41 Drew argues that the trial court erred, as a matter of law,
when it did not count the charitable donations Megan received
from her church, her summer camp income, and her
employer-paid benefits toward her gross income. We address
each argument in turn.

¶42 Charitable Donations. As part of her financial declaration,
Megan listed $1,000 monthly in donations from her church as
income, which she testified was a rental subsidy. When asked
whether she expected the charitable donations to cease in the
future, Megan replied, “Yes, . . . they’ve already talked about [it].”

¶43 Drew argues that the charitable donations were a “gift” as
contemplated under section 78B-12-203(1) and therefore were
eligible to be counted as part of Megan’s gross income. He further
asserts that none of the reasons the trial court gave for declining
to count the donations as part of Megan’s income are supported
by Utah law:
• Drew argues that the trial court erroneously stated that the
“inclusion of charitable donations received by either of the
parties from anyone let alone a church as income would
seemingly work to defeat one of the primary policy
purposes behind alimony,” that is, “to prevent the recipient
spouse from becoming a public charge,” Rule v. Rule, 2017
UT App 137, ¶ 14, 402 P.3d 153 (quotation simplified).
Drew contends that receiving charitable donations from a
church does not make the recipient a “public charge.”13
Rather, he argues, such donations are properly categorized
as gifts.
• Drew contends that the court’s statement that the
donations “are expected to stop in the future and . . . there
had already been discussions about them ceasing” is
“speculative and therefore irrelevant” because there is no
requirement that income be indefinite to be counted. He

13. Drew misperceives the trial court’s point, which was that the
temporary help provided by Megan’s church kept her from
becoming a public charge.

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 19 2024 UT App 148
further asserts that Megan could file a petition to modify
when the donations ended.
• Drew argues that the court incorrectly reasoned that
counting the $1,000 as income “may ultimately and
improperly make the donating party responsible for the
receiving party in perpetuity.” He again asserts that
Megan can file a petition to modify when the donations
cease, and he argues that counting the donations as
Megan’s income would not obligate the church to
continue making them.14

¶44 None of these points amount to an error of law. Although
we agree that the donations are properly characterized as gifts
under section 78B-12-203(1), the court was not obligated to count
them as part of Megan’s gross income. See Eberhard, 2019 UT App
114, ¶ 21. Overall, the court expressed unease with counting
short-term financial assistance offered by a church as income for
alimony and child support purposes. Based on Megan’s
testimony that there had already been discussion about the
donations coming to an end, it was reasonable for the court to
decide not to count the donations as part of Megan’s gross income
going forward—even in light of the option of filing a future
petition to modify once the donations ceased. The court also felt
uneasy with Megan possibly having to rely on future charitable
donations from the church as a result of those donations counting
toward her gross income. Although Drew is correct that counting
the donations as income would not legally obligate the church to
continue providing financial assistance, the church might
nonetheless feel duty-bound to aid a member of its congregation
in need. For these reasons, the trial court acted within its
14. Drew also asserts that the court’s reference to there being “no
other evidence” regarding the donations is incorrect. He points to
Megan’s bank statements showing she paid $950 (and not $1,950)
in rent, and to her financial declaration in which she specifically
listed the $1,000 as “income.” But this argument does not
implicate a potential legal error.

discretion, and did not commit legal error, when it decided
against counting the church’s charitable donations as part of
Megan’s gross income.

¶45 Summer Camp. Drew raises two challenges to the court’s
decision not to count the income Megan earned between 2016 and
2019 for operating an annual two-week summer science camp.
First, he argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law when
it stated that operating the summer camp “was always above and
beyond [Megan’s] normal, full-time job and, thus, by statute
excluded for child support purposes.” Citing Utah Code section
78B-12-203(2), Drew asserts that Utah law “plainly allows a court
to consider ‘overtime’ income if the parent historically earned
it.”15

¶46 Utah Code section 78B-12-203(2) provided that for child
support purposes, “[i]ncome from earned income sources is
limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job,” and that a
trial court “may consider” any time worked in excess of that “[i]f
and only if during the time before the original support order, the
parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at
the parent’s job.” Notably, the statute’s focus is on the number of
hours worked per week. And here, it is entirely unclear whether
Megan, a schoolteacher whose work responsibilities were
presumably reduced over the summer, even worked in excess of
40 hours per week during the two weeks that she operated the
summer camp. Moreover, even if she did work more than 40
hours per week during that time, there is also the question of
whether doing so for two weeks a year satisfies the statutory

15. Drew also argues that the caselaw holding that a court must
consider all sources of income for alimony purposes, which
includes a second job, likewise applies to the court’s child support
determination. But even assuming this is true, that is what the trial
court did here. It considered Megan’s summer camp income even
if it decided against counting it as part of her gross income. See
Eberhard v. Eberhard, 2019 UT App 114, ¶ 21, 449 P.3d 202.

requirement that she do so “normally and consistently” enough
to allow the court to count that income toward her gross income.

¶47 In any event, we need not decide that here. Even assuming
legal error on the trial court’s part, such error was harmless. See
Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT App 283, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 1242 (“Unless an
appellant demonstrates that an error is prejudicial, it will be
deemed harmless and no appellate relief is available.”) (quotation
simplified). If overtime work satisfies section 78B-12-203(2)’s
requirements to be counted toward gross income, the statute still
gives the trial court discretion in deciding whether to do so. Here,
at the beginning of its summer-camp discussion, the court
expressly stated that it “is not in the habit of ordering parties to
work more than one full-time job except under those very limited
circumstances identified in the law.” Such a position certainly
does not exceed the limits of reasonableness.16 Additionally, the
court was persuaded by the reasons Megan gave as to why she
did not operate the summer camp in 2020 and did not intend to
do so again in the future. The court therefore concluded that to
the extent Megan was underemployed, it was “not wholly
voluntary,” which it considered “highly relevant” to the income
imputation analysis.17 Accordingly, we are not persuaded that

16. For this reason, although Megan did receive income from the
summer camp in 2019, the trial court did not exceed its discretion
in not taking that income into account when it made the alimony
award retroactive to April 2019, when Megan filed the petition for
divorce.
17. A finding of whether underemployment is voluntary is no
longer a statutory requirement for imputing income. “The current
version of the Utah Code requires only that the judge enter
findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.”
Merrill v. Merrill, 2024 UT App 125, ¶ 33 (quotation simplified).
“Thus, while voluntary unemployment or underemployment
may be relevant when considering whether a party is concealing
income or shirking in his or her efforts to earn income, a finding
(continued…)

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 22 2024 UT App 148
absent the alleged legal error, the court would have decided to
count the summer camp income as part of Megan’s income
analysis.
¶48 Second, Drew argues that “[t]he exclusion of summer
camp income is inequitable and therefore an abuse of discretion.”
He asserts that because the marital standard of living the court
adopted when determining the alimony award was based on the
two-year period between March 2017 and March 2019, that
calculation included the summer camp income. Thus, Drew
contends that “[i]t is inequitable to allow Megan’s standard of
living to be based on income that includes it, and to simply shift
the burden of earning that money from Megan to [him].” But in
part I.A, we reversed and remanded the issue of the parties’
financial needs because the court’s determination on that point
was erroneously based entirely on the marital standard of living.
And, as explained, the marital standard of living, while not a
substitute for assessing the parties’ reasonable needs, is relevant
in that trial courts assess “the needs of the parties, in light of their
marital standard of living.” Fox v. Fox, 2022 UT App 88, ¶ 20, 515
P.3d 481 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1263 (Utah
2022). This is not the same as shifting the burden of making up the
income Megan historically earned from the summer camp to
Drew.
¶49 Employer-Paid Benefits. In declining to count Megan’s
retirement and health insurance employer-paid benefits as gross
income, the court stated that for child support purposes, Drew’s
“approach appears inconsistent with both the plain language and
legislative intent behind the exhaustive list of gross income
sources found in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203.” The court also
noted that many of the courts in other jurisdictions that permit

of voluntary unemployment or underemployment is not a
prerequisite to imputing income.” Id. (quotation simplified). The
trial court acknowledged this but nonetheless considered that
factor to be “highly relevant” to its gross-income analysis. See
supra note 4.

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 23 2024 UT App 148
employer-paid benefits to count toward income “rest their
analysis on the notion that certain benefits are received in lieu of
additional salary,” and the court indicated that there was no
evidence presented that this was the case here. See Hetherington v.
Hetherington, 202 P.3d 481, 487–88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (listing
jurisdictions that do and do not permit the counting of
employment-paid benefits for child support purposes). And for
alimony purposes, the court stated that it was not evident that the
benefits could be included under Utah law. It was also unclear to
the court whether “it would ultimately make any difference in the
alimony determinations as any additional ‘income’ regarding
these benefits would be offset directly by the corresponding
additional need created by considering the employer-paid benefit
to be income.” Drew asserts, with our emphasis, that section
78B-12-203(1) “is broad and invites a court to consider income
from ‘any’ source.”
¶50 But we need not definitively decide this issue. Notably, in
declining to count the employer-paid benefits, the court did not
conclusively hold that it was not permitted to do so under Utah
law. Rather, it expressed a reluctance to do so given the absence
of express precedent and statutory authority. This reluctance is
further emphasized by the court’s mention of the lack of evidence
as to whether Megan had the option to be paid in lieu of the
benefits, which consideration was not outside the realm of
reasonableness as such benefits would not constitute income that
could be used to directly assist with the care of children. Indeed,
the various sources of income listed in section 78B-12-203(1) result
in direct contributions to the parents’ bank accounts, whereas
employer-paid health insurance and retirement benefits are not
readily available to provide direct monetary support for the care
of children. As such, the court acted within its discretion when it
declined to count those benefits in calculating Megan’s gross
income.
¶51 The court also did not abuse its discretion when stating
that, for alimony purposes, it was uncertain whether considering
the health and retirement benefits would be helpful as they would

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 24 2024 UT App 148
then be offset by the reasonable-expenses factor the court is
statutorily required to consider. We cannot say that is a position
that “no reasonable person would take.” See Pankhurst v.
Pankhurst, 2022 UT App 36, ¶ 13, 508 P.3d 612 (quotation
simplified).
¶52 For these reasons, the trial court did not err as a matter of
law when it declined to count the charitable donations, summer
camp income, and employer-paid benefits as part of Megan’s
gross income.
2. Drew’s Income
¶53 In calculating Drew’s gross income, the court adopted the
calculation provided by Megan’s expert witness, which was based
on Drew’s 2019 total gross income. The expert’s calculations did
not take the COVID-19 pandemic into account. He testified there
were indications that “things are coming back and there’s still a
lot of employment related issues.”
¶54 Drew contends that in calculating his gross income, the
trial court erred by not taking the Business’s COVID-19-related
losses into account. At the first bench trial, held in October 2020,
Drew presented evidence that the Business’s gross revenue
significantly decreased in June, July, and August 2020.18 Drew’s
expert witness also testified that “by the date of the trial, we could
really see that pattern pan out, that the revenue wasn’t hitting as
high of growth” and “that revenue was stalling.”
¶55 But the court expressly adopted the calculations made by
Megan’s expert because they complied with the statutory
requirements of Utah Code section 78B-12-203(4)(a), which was in
effect at that time. The court rejected the methodology offered by

18. This was the most up-to-date information available at that
time. The September figures were still not available at the time of
the first bench trial.

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 25 2024 UT App 148
Drew’s expert that was based on Drew’s “unilateral decision that
his monthly salary should be set at $6,500 for tax purposes,” and
which the court stated bore “little, if any weight, in the court’s
determination based upon the statute.” Thus, to the extent the
calculations Drew offered took the pandemic into consideration,
the trial court declined to adopt them because it determined that
the calculations did not comply with statutory requirements.
Drew has not asserted that that he presented a calculation to the
court that fell more in line with the statute and that also took the
pandemic into consideration. Indeed, at the time of the first bench
trial, the court had been presented with evidence that revenue had
decreased for three months—and it was entirely uncertain
whether that trend would continue or whether revenue would
recover. Both experts presented differing predictions on this
question. Nor does Drew indicate that he presented any evidence
of continued declining revenue at the second bench trial held in
2022, which the court held specifically to revisit, among other
things, the alimony and child support awards. We thus do not see
an abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to adopt the
calculations made by Megan’s expert.
¶56 Drew also contends that the court’s error was exacerbated
because the court took the pandemic into account when it
declined to count Megan’s summer camp income as part of her
gross income, stating that while the pandemic’s “effects are
uncertain, it is speculative to assume that 2021 (or 2022 for that
matter) will look any different than 2020.” He asserts that because
the court took the pandemic into consideration when considering
Megan’s income but not his, the court’s findings were internally
inconsistent and its gross income determinations were
inequitable.
¶57 As an initial matter, the pandemic was one of several
reasons that Megan gave, and which the trial court accepted as
credible and reasonable, as to why she did not operate the
summer camp in 2020 and why she did not intend to do so again
going forward. Specifically, as summarized by the court, Megan
testified that in addition to the pandemic, “the camp name and

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 26 2024 UT App 148
logo had elicited a cease and desist letter, neither of her children
had any interest in helping with the camp any longer, she
currently lacked a physical location, [and Drew] would no longer
be able to help with the business and billing.” After listing these
reasons, the court stated that “[a]ny one of” them “would suffice
to credibly explain [Megan’s] assertion that she would not be
engaged in the camp.” Thus, even if the court had not considered
the effects of the pandemic, it is highly unlikely that the court’s
decision regarding the summer camp income would have been
different.
¶58 Furthermore, Drew’s employment and Megan’s
summer-camp employment are intrinsically different. The
summer camp was an in-person event at which the participants
gathered. The Business, on the other hand, was entirely online
and did not pose a risk of transmitting the virus. Additionally, it
was not unreasonable, as Megan’s expert suggested, that the
pandemic might even help the Business due to the novel
employment law implications the pandemic and the measures
taken to curb it had created.
¶59 For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it did not take the three-month decline in income
attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic into consideration when
it determined Drew’s gross income.

II. The Business’s Valuation

¶60 Drew challenges the trial court’s determination that only
5% of the Business’s value is attributable to his personal goodwill,
and thus not distributable as part of the marital estate. Relatedly,
he argues that the court’s valuation resulted in impermissible
double counting of his income.
A. Personal Goodwill
¶61 Drew argues that the trial court misapplied Utah law when
it determined that his personal goodwill constituted only 5% of

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 27 2024 UT App 148
the Business’s value. He asserts that the court “made up a test that
involved numerous factors, never discussed by Utah law,” and
that if the court had properly considered Utah law, it “would have
concluded that the [B]usiness’s value was all, or almost all, Drew’s
non-divisible personal goodwill.” But given the trial court’s
findings of fact related to goodwill—which Drew, who focuses on
the court’s legal analysis, has not challenged on appeal—we
conclude that the trial court did properly apply Utah law to this
case.
¶62 “Goodwill is the advantage acquired by an establishment,
beyond the mere value of the capital, stocks, funds or property
employed therein, in consequence of the general patronage it
receives from habitual customers on account of its location, or
local position or reputation for quality, skill, integrity or
punctuality.” Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 113, ¶ 35, 253 P.3d
1096 (quotation simplified). In simpler terms, “it is the probability
that old customers will resort to the old place or seek old friends,
and the likelihood of new customers being attracted to well
advertised and favorably known services or goods.” Id. (quotation
simplified). See Goodwill, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)
(defining goodwill, in part, as “the ability to earn income in excess
of the income that would be expected from the business viewed
as a mere collection of assets”). Utah recognizes two types of
goodwill: personal and institutional. Peterson, 2011 UT App 113,
¶ 38; Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 15, 440 P.3d 757.
In divorce proceedings, one of the determinations a trial court
must make when valuing a business for purposes of property
distribution is whether the business’s goodwill is personal or
institutional. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 15.
¶63 Personal (also known as “professional”) goodwill is the
“increased earning capacity that results from the reputation,
knowledge and skills of individual people.” Peterson, 2011 UT
App 113, ¶ 38 (quotation simplified). See Erickson v. Erickson, 2022
UT App 27, ¶ 19, 507 P.3d 824 (“Personal goodwill is based on an
individual’s reputation for competency.”) (quotation simplified).
In other words, personal goodwill depends “on the earning

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 28 2024 UT App 148
capacity of” an individual person. Peterson, 2011 UT App 113,
¶ 41. See Moore v. Moore, 779 S.E.2d 533, 544 (S.C. 2015) (stating
that personal goodwill “depends on the continued presence of a
particular individual”) (quotation simplified). It “has computable
value to the individual only to the extent that it promises
increased future earnings.” Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343,
355 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981), cited favorably by Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839
P.2d 774 (Utah 1992). See Sorensen, 839 P.2d at 776 (stating that
future earning capacity and personal goodwill “cannot be
separated” because “future earning capacity comes in large part
from goodwill and reputation”). Accordingly, personal goodwill
is not subject to distribution as part of the marital estate. Erickson,
2022 UT App 27, ¶ 19. Otherwise, it would result in double
counting. Sorensen, 839 P.2d at 776.
¶64 Conversely, institutional (also known as “enterprise”)
goodwill “attaches to a business entity and is associated
separately from the reputation of the owners.” Peterson, 2011 UT
App 113, ¶ 38 (quotation simplified). It “is based on the intangible,
but generally marketable, existence in a business of established
relations with employees, customers and suppliers, and may
include factors such as a business location, its name recognition
and its business reputation.” Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 15
(quotation simplified). “There can be no [institutional] good will
in a business that is dependent for its existence upon the
individual who conducts the enterprise and would vanish were
the individual to die, retire or quit work.” Peterson, 2011 UT App
113, ¶ 37 (quotation simplified). Unlike personal goodwill,
institutional goodwill is divisible as part of the marital estate.
Erickson, 2022 UT App 27, ¶ 19.
¶65 To further help distinguish between personal and
institutional goodwill, a brief overview of some of the few Utah
cases addressing this issue is helpful. In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839
P.2d 774 (Utah 1992), the division of a sole practitioner’s dental
office was at issue in a divorce action. Id. at 775. Our Supreme
Court held that “unless [a professional sole practitioner] retires
and his practice is sold, his reputation should not be treated

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 29 2024 UT App 148
differently from a professional degree or an advanced degree”
because “both simply enhance the earning ability of the holder,”
id. at 776, and “because the goodwill of a sole practitioner is
nothing more than his or her reputation for competency,” id. at
775. Indeed, the Court could not “justify drawing a distinction
between a party who holds an advanced degree that enables him
or her to command a substantial salary and one who holds an
advanced degree but has chosen to be self-employed and has
earned a good reputation for skill and competence.” Id. at 777.
Sole practitioners are distinguishable from businesses consisting
of a group of professionals because in the latter case, the goodwill
does “not rest on the reputation of any one person” and
“practitioners may come and go and the institution may have
goodwill separate and apart from any one practitioner.” Id. at 775.
¶66 In Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 176 P.3d 476,
this court clarified that personal goodwill is not limited to those
holding professional degrees. See id. ¶ 43. At issue in that divorce
action was the division of a used car dealership that the husband
had formed. Id. ¶¶ 5, 40. The trial court ruled that the dealership
was “in reality a sole proprietorship of Husband, dependent upon
his personal professional reputation,” id. ¶ 6, and that the
dealership’s goodwill was “solely attributable to Husband’s
personal, professional reputation,” id. ¶ 43 (quotation simplified).
In light of these findings, this court upheld “the trial court’s
decision to exclude goodwill from the calculation of [the
dealership’s] value.”19 Id. ¶ 44. In so ruling, this court stated that
“there can be no [institutional] good will in a business that is
dependent for its existence upon the individual who conducts the
enterprise and would vanish were the individual to die, retire or
quit work.” Id. (quotation simplified).

19. This court did, however, remand to the trial court to enter
more specific findings regarding the specific dollar value to be
attributed to the car dealership. See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008
UT App 11, ¶ 44, 176 P.3d 476.

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 30 2024 UT App 148
¶67 Similarly, in Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, 440
P.3d 757, this court held that a vending machine business, of
which the husband was the sole employee, was akin to the car
dealership at issue in Stonehocker. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. The trial court
found that the business’s goodwill was “solely attributable to [the
husband’s] work, his efforts, and his reputation for competency”
because he was “the face of the business” and he had “personal
relationships” with the owners of the properties on which the
business placed its vending machines, allowing “him to continue
to conduct business, largely on a month-to-month basis.” Id. ¶ 18
(emphasis in original; quotation otherwise simplified). Based on
those findings, this court held that the district court acted within
its discretion when it did not attribute some value of the business
to institutional goodwill. Id. ¶ 21.
¶68 In contrast, in Erickson v. Erickson, 2022 UT App 27, 507 P.3d
824, the trial court rejected a wife’s contention that she should be
attributed personal goodwill in her veterinary pharmaceutical
business. Id. ¶¶ 3, 20. In so ruling, the trial “court concluded that
[the business] was unlike sole proprietorships essentially run by
one person—where the value of the company rests primarily on
the work and professional reputation developed by the
proprietor—given the number of [the business’s] employees and
the extent of its operations.” Id. ¶ 21 (quotation simplified). In
affirming the trial court’s decision, this court noted that “there
was no evidence to suggest that placing someone else in [the
wife’s] role would diminish the value of the company.” Id. ¶ 22.
To the contrary, the trial court “specifically found that it had not
been provided any evidence from which it could draw the
conclusion that her presence at the business, given the point to
which it’s grown, is essential for that business to continue given
the number of employees and the extent of operations it has.” Id.
(quotation simplified).
¶69 Here, the trial court expressly rejected Drew’s claim that
“his personal relationships with the independent contractors,
clients, and vendors are critical to the Business’ success and
irreplaceable,” noting that it had not heard evidence that the

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 31 2024 UT App 148
company the Business hired to manage ads or the independent
contractors would refuse to continue working for the Business if
Drew were no longer involved. Accordingly, this case is
distinguishable from Marroquin, where the husband had personal
relationships with the owners of the properties on which he
placed the vending machines and with whom business was
largely done on a month-to-month basis. See 2019 UT App 38,
¶¶ 18, 20. Moreover, although the trial court in this case
acknowledged that the Business would be better off if run by an
attorney, the court expressly rejected the proposition that the
Business specifically depended on Drew’s reputation for
competency as an attorney. To the contrary, the court found that
“the Business does not depend on [Drew’s] reputation for
competency to a significant or quantified degree.” In so holding,
the court pointed to the fact that Drew was not prominently
featured on elh.com and that it was “highly likely that very few,
if any,” visitors to the website were even aware of Drew’s
involvement. The court also found that elh.com is “driven by
web-based ads by website viewers that could be anywhere in the
world and have no relationship with [Drew]—let alone even
know his name.”
¶70 More importantly, the court found, with our emphasis, that
“the content of many of elh.com’s web pages have remained static
for many years, including specifically those web pages that were
indicated to be generating the most ad revenues,” and the court
agreed with the conclusion offered by Megan’s expert that any
goodwill associated with elh.com “is inherent within the domain
name and the historical content that has existed on the site since
2008.” These findings indicate that the Business is well established
and that its existence is not tied to Drew’s future earning capacity
or dependent on his continued presence. See Peterson v. Jackson,
2011 UT App 113, ¶ 41, 253 P.3d 1096 (stating that personal
goodwill depends “on the earning capacity of” an individual); id.
¶ 37 (“There can be no [institutional] good will in a business that
is dependent for its existence upon the individual who conducts
the enterprise and would vanish were the individual to die, retire
or quit work.”) (quotation simplified); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 32 2024 UT App 148
P.2d 774, 776 (Utah 1992) (stating that an individual’s future
earning capacity and personal goodwill “cannot be separated”);
Moore v. Moore, 779 S.E.2d 533, 544 (S.C. 2015) (stating that
personal goodwill “depends on the continued presence of a
particular individual”) (quotation simplified).
¶71 This conclusion is further supported by the court’s finding
that although Drew is the Business’s sole employee, the Business’s
normal operation depends on contributions from consultants and
independent contractors. Unlike, for example, the dental office at
issue in Sorensen where the practice’s sole dentist presumably
employed a dental hygienist or at least a receptionist to perform
tasks ancillary to the practice of dentistry, here, the consultants
and independent contractors contributed to the Business in much
the same manner as Drew did: by writing articles for elh.com. In
fact, the trial court found that by the time of trial, Drew was no
longer “the primary, or even secondary or tertiary, blog post
author for elh.com”—he had authored only four blog posts in the
past two years. The Business also employs an independent
contractor who focuses on the consulting services the Business
offers. And although Drew was and continues to be the only
editor and is solely responsible for the website’s design,20 those
functions are not what would create personal goodwill for the
type of business at issue in this case. Thus, at least by the time of
trial, the Business had reached a point at which it no longer
“rest[ed] on the reputation of any one person.” Sorensen, 839 P.2d
at 775. See Erickson, 2022 UT App 27, ¶¶ 21–22 (affirming the trial
court’s conclusion that none of the veterinary pharmaceutical
business’s value was attributable to the wife’s personal goodwill
because, “given the number of . . . employees and the extent of its
operations,” the business’s value did not rest “on the work and
professional reputation developed by” the wife and “there was no
20. The court did, however, find that elh.com “has been developed
over several years and only needs minor updates to pages or blog
posts to maintain its web traffic,” and that “[m]ost of these
updates are currently out-sourced to independent contractors and
not done by [Drew].”

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 33 2024 UT App 148
evidence to suggest that placing someone else in [the wife’s] role
would diminish the value of the company”) (quotation
simplified).
¶72 Finally, in valuing the Business, the trial court made
extensive findings and provided a thorough analysis explaining
its conclusions. Specifically concerning the issue of personal
goodwill, as summarized above, in addition to entering findings
regarding the nature and operation of the Business, the trial court
also provided seven pages of analysis in support of its conclusion
that only 5% of the Business’s value is attributable to Drew’s
personal goodwill. Thus, the court’s findings are certainly
“sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
disclose the steps by which” the court reached its conclusion that
only 5% of the Business’s value is attributable to Drew’s personal
goodwill, which “is within the range of values established by all
the testimony.” Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2023 UT App 50, ¶ 49, 531
P.3d 225 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 537 P.3d 1011 (Utah
2023).
¶73 For these reasons, the trial court’s conclusions that most of
the “goodwill associated with the Business is [institutional]
goodwill” and that Drew’s personal goodwill amounts to the
“nominal value” of 5% of the Business’s total value are in line with
Utah precedent. The court therefore did not err as a matter of law
in so ruling. In light of this, because the court’s ultimate goodwill
determination is supported by sufficiently detailed findings, the
court’s valuation of the Business did not constitute an abuse of
discretion.
¶74 Drew resists this conclusion, arguing that the trial court
erroneously relied on certain factors that have no basis in Utah
law: burden, time, relationship with the end user, and practice.
We address each of these arguments in turn.
¶75 Burden. In the initial findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the trial court stated that Drew “has not met his burden as to
personal goodwill.” Based on this, Drew asserts that the court

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 34 2024 UT App 148
erroneously placed the burden of establishing that the Business’s
goodwill was not institutional on him, when Megan should have
carried the burden of showing that the goodwill was institutional.
Alternatively, he asserts that “the question should be simply a
factual finding for the court to make, independent of a ‘burden.’”
But based on our review of the trial court’s goodwill analysis as a
whole, we are not persuaded that the court squarely placed the
burden of proof on Drew. Rather, the court viewed the issue in
terms of Megan offering evidence in support of her position that
the Business’s goodwill was entirely institutional and Drew
offering evidence in support of his stance that the goodwill was
“largely or entirely” personal, the totality of which evidence the
court considered when making findings concerning goodwill.
¶76 Throughout its analysis, the court addressed each party’s
assertions and whether the evidence supported those positions.
For example, the court rejected Megan’s contention that she
“could run the Business as effectively as [Drew]” and it stated that
the evidence did not support her position that she “had consistent
or meaningful involvement in the Business operations or that she
or anyone other than [Drew] has at any time exerted any control
over the Business.” The court next rejected Drew’s contention that
“his personal relationships with the independent contractors,
clients, and vendors are critical to the Business’ success and
irreplaceable,” and also on the ground that the evidence did not
support such a finding. At a later point, the court also discussed
various aspects of the testimony offered by Megan’s expert
leading to his ultimate conclusion that elh.com “is established and
has intangible value distinct from any entity or any individual.”
The court stated that “this evidence was uncontroverted and
weighs against personal goodwill.” Accordingly, the court was
not evaluating the evidence from the standpoint of Drew having
the burden of disproving that the goodwill was institutional.
Rather, it evaluated the evidence offered by both parties as a
whole to determine whether the goodwill was institutional or
personal.

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 35 2024 UT App 148
¶77 Indeed, later in its findings, the court clarified its prior
statement regarding Drew not having met his burden. The court
stated, with our emphasis, that although it did “not believe, nor
would it find, that there is zero personal goodwill, it was [Drew’s]
burden,” as the party whose position it was that the goodwill was
personal, “to show an amount of personal goodwill”—not that the
goodwill was not institutional, as Drew asserts. Instead, Drew
took the position at trial that the goodwill was “largely or
entirely” personal, which conclusion the court stated was “wholly
unsupported by the evidence.” Thus, having been persuaded by
Megan that the majority of the Business’s goodwill was
institutional, due to Drew’s all-or-nothing trial strategy the court
had no basis in evidence with which to determine what amount—
other than the near-100% Drew advocated for at trial—to attribute
to personal goodwill, which was the reason it originally attributed
0% to personal goodwill. And, following the second bench trial,
the court amended this ruling, attributing the “nominal value” of
5% of the Business’s total value to Drew’s goodwill.
¶78 For these reasons, we disagree with Drew’s premise that
the court assigned him the burden of proving that the goodwill
was not institutional.
¶79 Time. As part of its goodwill analysis, the trial court noted
that Drew “spends very little time on elh.com.” Drew argues that
this was an improper consideration because “Utah law has never
recognized ‘time spent’ as a factor in assessing goodwill.” But the
trial court made this observation in the context of considering to
what extent the Business relies on Drew’s reputation for
competency. In addition to remarking on the amount of time
Drew spent on elh.com, the court also noted that Drew was no
longer a major contributor in terms of articles featured on
elh.com—having authored only four articles in the two years
prior to trial. Thus, the success of elh.com had, over time, become
more reliant on articles contributed by independent contractors
rather than by Drew himself. The court also considered that Drew
was not prominently featured on elh.com and that it was “highly
likely that very few, if any,” website visitors were aware of Drew’s

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 36 2024 UT App 148
involvement. In light of all this, the trial court certainly did not
base its decision on the amount of time Drew spent on elh.com
but merely included it as one of many considerations when
addressing the larger issue of whether the success of elh.com
depended on Drew’s reputation for competency. And in this
context, we cannot say that the court improperly considered the
amount of time Drew spent on the website.
¶80 End User Relationship. Also in the context of addressing
whether the Business depended on Drew’s reputation for
competency, the trial court’s initial findings of fact and
conclusions of law included the following short paragraph:
With respect to elh.com there is virtually no
relationship with the end users that are driving
revenue as it is driven by web-based ads by website
viewers that could be anywhere in the world and
have no relationship with [Drew]—let alone even
know his name. This factor alone is dispositive in
this matter.
Drew argues that a relationship with the end user is also not a
factor recognized by Utah law, let alone a dispositive one. But
following the second bench trial, the court stated that the last
sentence of the paragraph “is not a correct statement” and
directed that it be struck and replaced with a sentence indicating
that the relationship with the end user is a factor that in this case
weighs against a finding of personal goodwill. And this
amendment to the findings did not alter the court’s ultimate
decision that only a nominal amount of the Business’s goodwill
was personally attributable to Drew. Thus, as with the time factor,
we consider the propriety of this consideration as one of several
made in the larger context of addressing Drew’s reputation for
competency.
¶81 In support of his contention that the relationship with the
end user was an improper consideration, Drew points to

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 37 2024 UT App 148
Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, 440 P.3d 757, in which
the owner of the vending machine company did not have a
relationship with those who made purchases from the vending
machines but was nonetheless found to have personal goodwill in
the company. Id. ¶ 18. We agree that the end-user consideration
carried little weight in Marroquin. Instead, relevant relationships
at issue in that case were the owner’s relationships with the
entities who owned the properties on which he placed the
vending machines, which allowed the business to continue
operating largely on a month-to-month basis. Id. ¶ 20. But in
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992), the dentist’s
relationship with his patients played a significant role “because
the goodwill of a sole practitioner is nothing more than his or her
reputation for competency,” id. at 775, and the party to which that
reputation would matter is the patient of the dental practice.
Likewise, in Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 176 P.3d
476, the owner of the used car dealership dealt directly with the
customers, to whom his “personal, professional reputation”
would matter. Id. ¶ 43 (quotation simplified).

¶82 Accordingly, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the
relationship with the end user is a consideration that may never
be taken into account in the goodwill context, and the trial court
thus did not err as a matter of law by considering it—or, more
precisely, the lack of it—in this case.
¶83 Practice. Drew contends that the trial court improperly
considered whether the Business was a “practice.” Specifically,
the initial findings of fact and conclusions of law include the
following discussion:
The Business is not a “practice” within any meaning
associated with the personal goodwill analysis.
Indeed, [Drew] does not even currently “practice”
law as that term would be defined in a goodwill
analysis. . . . Also, analytically and legally, the

Lunt v. Lunt

20220596-CA 38 2024 UT App 148
existence of some clients[21] does not render the
Business a solo practitioner “practice” for purposes
of personal goodwill.
Drew asserts that Utah law neither limits personal goodwill to
“practices” nor defines the term “practices.” Although Drew is
correct that personal goodwill is not limited to “practices,” see
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 44 (affirming the trial court’s
allocation of personal goodwill to the owner of a used car
dealership), he misstates the purpose for which the court
addressed whether the Business was a “practice.”

¶84 Immediately prior to the quoted excerpt, the court stated
that “[a]lthough [Drew] has a professional degree and that
professional degree does enhance the [B]usiness, this is not akin
to the Sorensen case with a sole practitioner professional and their
practice.” In Sorensen, our Supreme Court stated that “the
goodwill of a sole practitioner is nothing more than his or her
reputation for competency,” 839 P.2d at 775, and it could not
“justify drawing a distinction between a party who holds an
advanced degree that enables him or her to command a
substantial salary”—which degree is not subject to distribution as
part of the marital estate—“and one who holds an advanced
degree but has chosen to be self-employed and has earned a good
reputation for skill and competence,” id. at 777. Here, because
Drew holds a law degree and the Business provides information
on employment law, the court felt it necessary to address whether
the Business constitutes a professional’s solo practice, as was
addressed in Sorensen. If the answer to that question was in the
affirmative, the personal goodwill inquiry (at least the issue of
whether there is any) would end there in Drew’s favor. But
because the court determined that the answer in this case was in
the negative, it continued to address other factors to determine
whether any of the Business’s goodwill was attributable
21. This discussion of clients is in reference to the consulting side
of the Business, for which the Business employs an independent
contractor.

personally to Drew. The court in no way indicated that being a
“practice” was a prerequisite to a finding of personal goodwill.
The court thus did not err as a matter of law in first addressing
whether the Business constituted a “practice.”
B. Double Counting

¶85 As discussed above, personal goodwill is not subject to
distribution as part of the marital estate because personal
goodwill and future earning capacity—which is utilized in
determining alimony awards—“cannot be separated.” Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774, 776 (Utah 1992). See id. (“Requiring
defendant to divide with his wife the value of his reputation
would not be an ‘equitable division,’ which is required by our
statute, but would constitute ‘double counting,’ which is
condemned in property division cases.”).

¶86 Drew argues that the trial court’s valuation of the Business
is problematic because “[o]ne of its most fundamental building
blocks is Drew’s earning capacity, but Drew’s earning capacity is
already divided with Megan via the alimony and child support
award[s].” But the trial court determined that only 5% of the
Business’s total value is attributable to Drew’s personal goodwill,
thus the equitable division of 95% of the Business’s value will not
result in double counting. To the extent that the court’s
adjustment of the personal goodwill determination from 0% to 5%
affects the alimony award, the court should make any necessary
adjustment on remand.

CONCLUSION

¶87 The trial court misapplied the law when, for alimony
purposes, it substituted the marital standard of living for the
parties’ individual financial needs. We therefore reverse the
court’s alimony award and remand the matter for the court to
enter findings regarding the parties’ reasonable expenses and to
reassess alimony based on those findings. We otherwise affirm
the court’s rulings regarding child support, the parties’ incomes,
and the percent of the Business’s value attributed to Drew’s
personal goodwill.