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Funk v. Funk, 2026 UT App 28

Case Summary

Carol A. Funk and Samuel S. Funk divorced in 2017 and share two minor children. In 2025, the parties filed competing petitions to modify the divorce decree, each seeking sole physical custody and sole decision-making authority over the children’s schooling, and agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration under the Uniform Family Law Arbitration Act. The arbitrator issued a temporary decision that one child would remain at his current school pending resolution of the petitions, and the district court later granted Samuel’s motion to confirm that temporary award. Carol appealed the confirmation order, and the Court of Appeals, on its own motion for summary disposition, considered whether an order confirming a temporary arbitration award is a final, appealable order. The court held that it is not and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

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Coverage

Facts

Divorce and Petitions to Modify

  • The parties were divorced in 2017.
  • On May 12, 2025, Carol filed a petition to modify the divorce decree, stating her desire to relocate to California and requesting sole physical custody of the parties’ two minor children and sole decision-making authority concerning their schooling.
  • Samuel filed a counterpetition to modify, likewise seeking sole custody of the children and decision-making authority concerning their schooling.

Arbitration Agreement

  • The parties agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration and entered into an arbitration agreement on June 3, 2025.
  • Among the issues submitted to the arbitrator was a temporary decision regarding where one of the children would attend school pending resolution of the petition and counterpetition.

Arbitrator’s Temporary School Decision

  • On July 30, 2025, the parties participated in an evidentiary hearing before the arbitrator limited to where the child would attend school during the pendency of the case; the hearing did not address custody or parent-time.
  • The arbitrator determined that the child should remain at his current school until resolution of the petitions, describing the decision as governing where the child would attend school “on a temporary basis until the custody evaluation can be completed and the petitions to modify changing custody can be decided.”

District Court Proceedings

  • Carol returned to the district court and filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a temporary award of physical custody.
  • The domestic relations commissioner recommended that the motion be denied; Carol objected, and the district court overruled the objection on October 22, 2025.
  • Samuel filed a motion to confirm the temporary award issued by the arbitrator, and on November 7, 2025, the district court entered its Ruling and Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Confirm Temporary Award Issued by Arbitrator.

Appeal

  • Carol appealed from the November 7, 2025 confirmation order.
  • The Court of Appeals took up the matter on its own motion for summary disposition based on lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a final, appealable order.
  • Carol argued that Utah Code § 81-15-123(1)(c), which permits an appeal from “an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award,” rendered the confirmation order appealable notwithstanding its temporary nature.

Issues of the Case

Appellant Carol A. Funk’s appeal presented one issue, which the court raised on its own motion: whether the district court’s order confirming the arbitrator’s temporary award is a final, appealable order.

  1. Issue 1: Appellate Jurisdiction / Appealability of Order Confirming Temporary Arbitration Award

No issue was affirmed or reversed. The court did not reach the merits and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to a subsequent appeal after the district court enters a final, appealable order.

  • Civil Procedure — Appellate Jurisdiction

    1. Appellate Jurisdiction / Appealability of Order Confirming Temporary Arbitration Award

    Claim on Appeal: Carol argued that, despite the temporary nature of the arbitrator’s award and the unresolved issues in the competing petitions to modify, the district court’s order confirming the temporary award is final and appealable under the Uniform Family Law Arbitration Act, Utah Code § 81-15-123(1)(c).

    Holding: — Dismissed without prejudice. An order confirming a temporary arbitration award pending further arbitration is neither a final order nor among the categories of orders appealable as of right under Utah Code § 81-15-123(1), so the court lacked jurisdiction.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-15-123(1)(c) (Uniform Family Law Arbitration Act provision allowing an appeal from an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award); Utah Code § 81-15-110 (confirmation of temporary awards); Utah Code § 81-15-115 (confirmation of awards).

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Correctness

    Specific Standard: “Generally, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal unless it is taken from a final judgment or order.” Funk v. Funk, 2026 UT App 28, ¶ 5. [The court did not articulate a standard of review; it raised appellate jurisdiction, a question of law, on its own motion.]

    Applies To: Whether the district court’s November 7, 2025 order confirming the arbitrator’s temporary school-placement award is a final, appealable order within the court’s jurisdiction.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, 37 P.3d 1070 (appellate court generally lacks jurisdiction absent a final judgment or order and must dismiss when jurisdiction is lacking).
    • Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649 (an order is final only if it disposes of the case as to all parties and finally disposes of the subject matter on the merits).
    • LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, 215 P.3d 135 (statutes are read in harmony with other provisions in the same and related chapters).
    • Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2011 UT App 183, 257 P.3d 1049 (effect must be given to every word of a statute; no word is construed as superfluous).
    • Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, 267 P.3d 863 (omissions in statutory language are presumed purposeful).
    • Kelm v. Kelm, 639 N.E.2d 842 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (order confirming an arbitration award of temporary support was not final and appealable despite statutory language permitting appeals from orders confirming awards).

    Why It Matters: This appears to be an early appellate construction of the appeal provision of Utah’s Uniform Family Law Arbitration Act, and it establishes that the statutory right to appeal from an order “confirming or denying confirmation of an award” does not extend to orders confirming temporary awards. The decision aligns the arbitration context with ordinary practice, under which temporary orders in domestic litigation are not immediately appealable. Practitioners who arbitrate family law disputes must therefore wait for a final award, and its confirmation, before seeking appellate review as of right.

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

  • Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, 37 P.3d 1070 (cited for the rule that the court generally lacks jurisdiction over an appeal not taken from a final judgment or order, and for the requirement to dismiss when jurisdiction is lacking).
  • Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649 (cited for the definition of a final order as one disposing of the case as to all parties and finally disposing of the subject matter on the merits).
  • LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, 215 P.3d 135 (cited for reading a statute in harmony with other statutes in the same and related chapters).
  • Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2011 UT App 183, 257 P.3d 1049 (cited for the canon that every word of a statute must be given effect and none treated as superfluous).
  • Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, 267 P.3d 863 (cited for the presumption that statutory omissions are purposeful).
  • Kelm v. Kelm, 639 N.E.2d 842 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (persuasive out-of-state authority holding that an order confirming a temporary support arbitration award was not final and appealable).

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

Because the court did not reach the merits, the following characteristics identify when an appeal from a family law arbitration is likely to be dismissed rather than heard:

  • The underlying arbitrator’s ruling is expressly temporary or interim, operating only pending further proceedings or a custody evaluation.
  • Claims or issues submitted to the arbitrator, including custody, parent-time, or relocation, remain unresolved.
  • The order appealed from confirms a temporary award rather than a final award.
  • The appellant relies on the general language of § 81-15-123(1)(c) rather than demonstrating finality or another listed category.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

The opinion does not impose substantive statutory factors on the trial court. It does require the following jurisdictional inquiries before an appeal from a family law arbitration may proceed:

  • Whether the order disposes of the case as to all parties.
  • Whether the order finally disposes of the subject matter of the litigation on the merits.
  • Whether the arbitrator’s ruling is a “temporary award” or an “award” under the Act.
  • Whether the order falls within one of the six categories of orders appealable as of right under Utah Code § 81-15-123(1).

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

An appeal from a family law arbitration faces a high risk of jurisdictional dismissal when it combines:

  • A pending petition and counterpetition to modify that remain unresolved;
  • An arbitrator’s decision limited to an interim question (here, school placement) that expressly lasts only until the custody evaluation and petitions are decided;
  • An evidentiary hearing that did not address the core custody or parent-time issues; and
  • A district court order that merely confirms the temporary award.

Strategy Insight

This was neither a legal-error nor an evidentiary-dispute appeal on the merits; it failed at the threshold of appellate jurisdiction. The lesson is that the characterization of the order being appealed matters as much as the characterization of the error. Counsel should frame an appeal from family law arbitration around a final award, or an order squarely within a listed statutory category, rather than attempting to use the confirmation provision to obtain interlocutory review of a temporary ruling.

Teaching Value

  • The opinion is a compact illustration of two statutory-construction canons working together: distinct statutory terms carry distinct meanings, and omissions from an enumerated list are presumed purposeful.
  • It also demonstrates the Court of Appeals’ practice of raising jurisdiction on its own motion through summary disposition, and of dismissing without prejudice so that a party may appeal once a final, appealable order is entered.

Parallel Treatment of Arbitral and Judicial Temporary Orders

  • The court emphasized that its holding conforms with practice concerning temporary orders entered by district courts in domestic litigation, which are not final and appealable. Choosing arbitration therefore does not create a faster path to appellate review of interim rulings than litigation would.

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence

  • The opinion rests primarily on Utah authority: Utah Supreme Court finality and statutory-construction precedent, one Utah Court of Appeals decision, and the text of the Uniform Family Law Arbitration Act.
  • The court cited a single out-of-state decision, Kelm v. Kelm (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), only to confirm that its reading is consistent with how other jurisdictions treat similar arbitration appeal statutes. Because the Act is a uniform law, decisions from other adopting states may carry persuasive weight in future Utah cases.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)

  • Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, 37 P.3d 1070
    • Established: An appellate court generally lacks jurisdiction absent a final judgment or order and must dismiss when it lacks jurisdiction.
    • Role here: Supplied the threshold jurisdictional rule (¶ 5) and the mandate to dismiss (¶ 10).
  • Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649
    • Established: An order is final only if it disposes of the case as to all parties and finally disposes of the subject matter on the merits.
    • Role here: Provided the finality test that the temporary school-placement order failed.
  • LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, 215 P.3d 135
    • Established: Statutory provisions are interpreted in harmony with other statutes in the same and related chapters.
    • Role here: Justified reading the appeal provision together with the Act’s separate provisions on temporary awards and awards.
  • Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, 267 P.3d 863
    • Established: Omissions in statutory language are presumed purposeful.
    • Role here: Supported the conclusion that the Legislature’s omission of temporary awards from the list of appealable orders was deliberate.

The Most Important Holding

An order confirming or denying confirmation of a temporary award issued by an arbitrator pending further arbitration is not appealable as of right under Utah Code § 81-15-123(1)(c). Because the Act uses “temporary award” and “award” as distinct terms, the appeal provision’s reference to an “award” reaches only the latter. The holding closes off a potential route for immediate appeal of interim custody, school, or support rulings issued through family law arbitration.

Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error

There was no reversal and no merits review; the appeal was dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The court did not evaluate whether the arbitrator’s school-placement decision or the district court’s confirmation was correct. Merits review would have been available only had the appeal been taken from an order confirming or denying confirmation of a final award, or from another order within the categories listed in § 81-15-123(1), or from a final judgment resolving all issues submitted to the arbitrator.

Practitioner Takeaways

  • Trial Lawyers: Treat temporary arbitration awards as not immediately reviewable on appeal. Build the record and press objections before the arbitrator and in the district court, and preserve challenges for the appeal from the final award. Where interim relief is urgent, focus advocacy at the arbitration and trial-court levels rather than on an appeal that will be dismissed.
  • Appellate Lawyers: Before filing a notice of appeal from any order entered in a family law arbitration, confirm that the order resolves all issues submitted to the arbitrator or falls squarely within one of the six categories in § 81-15-123(1). The statutory reference to an “award” will be read narrowly. Where immediate review is essential, counsel should evaluate other avenues the opinion did not address, such as a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order.
  • Parties and Counsel Drafting Family Law Arbitration Agreements: Recognize that agreeing to arbitrate temporary issues, such as school placement pending a custody evaluation, means those rulings will generally remain in effect without appellate review until the arbitration concludes. Consider the scope and sequencing of issues submitted to the arbitrator accordingly.
  • Self-Represented Litigants: The appellant appeared both through counsel and pro se. The opinion illustrates that the statutory text permitting appeals from confirmation orders will not be read to include temporary awards, and an appeal filed prematurely will be dismissed without reaching the merits.

Majority Opinion

2026 UT App 28

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CAROL A. FUNK, Appellant, v. SAMUEL S. FUNK, Appellee. Per Curiam Opinion No. 20251383-CA

Filed February 26, 2026 Third District Court, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Laura Scott No. 174905083

J. Ramzi Hamady and Kayla Hope Quam, Attorneys for Appellant Carol A. Funk, Appellant Pro Se Daniel B. Garriott, Attorney for Appellee

Before JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN, RYAN M. HARRIS, and AMY J. OLIVER. PER CURIAM:

¶1 Carol A. Funk appeals from the district court’s November 7, 2025, Ruling and Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Confirm Temporary Award Issued by Arbitrator. This matter is before the court on its own motion for summary disposition based on lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a final, appealable order. Funk v. Funk 20251383-CA 2 2026 UT App 28

¶2 The parties to this case were divorced in 2017. On May 12, 2025, Carol1 filed a petition to modify the divorce decree, indicating her desire to relocate to California and requesting that she be awarded sole physical custody and be made the sole decision-maker concerning the schooling of her and Samuel’s two minor children. Samuel filed a counterpetition to modify, also seeking the sole custody of the children and decision-making authority concerning the children’s schooling. The parties agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration and entered into an arbitration agreement on June 3, 2025. Among the issues the parties agreed to have decided by the arbitrator was a temporary decision concerning where one of the children would attend school pending resolution of the petition and counterpetition.

¶3 On July 30, 2025, the parties participated in an evidentiary hearing before the arbitrator on the specific issue of where that child would attend school during the pendency of the case. The hearing did not address issues of custody or parent-time. The arbitrator ultimately determined that the child should remain at his current school until resolution of the petitions.

¶4 Carol then returned to court and filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a temporary award of physical custody. The domestic relations commissioner recommended that the motion be denied, and Carol filed an objection with the district court, which was overruled on October 22, 2025. Meanwhile, Samuel filed a motion to confirm the temporary award of physical custody issued by the arbitrator. The court issued an order on November 7, 2025, granting Samuel’s motion, and Carol now appeals from that order. 1. Because the parties share the same last name, we follow our normal practice and refer to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality. Funk v. Funk 20251383-CA 3 2026 UT App 28

¶5 Generally, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal unless it is taken from a final judgment or order. E.g., Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, ¶ 10, 37 P.3d 1070. An order is final only if it disposes of the case as to all parties and “finally dispose[s] of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the case.” Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 9, 5 P.3d 649 (cleaned up).

¶6 If the order Carol appeals from had been entered following a court’s order on a motion for temporary orders pending the outcome of domestic litigation, that order would not be considered final and appealable because it would not have disposed of all issues in the litigation. In this specific instance, the arbitrator’s order resolved only where one of the couple’s children “will go to school on a temporary basis until the custody evaluation can be completed and the petitions to modify changing custody can be decided.” Thus, the order was temporary in nature and did not fully resolve all issues related to the competing petitions to modify. Accordingly, numerous issues remain to be resolved by the arbitrator.

¶7 Carol contends that despite the temporary nature of the order, and despite the fact that other issues raised in the petitions to modify have not yet been resolved, the district court’s order confirming the arbitrator’s temporary award is final and appealable under the Uniform Family Law Arbitration Act (the Act). See Utah Code § 81-15-123(1)(c). As relevant here, the Act states that “[a]n appeal may be taken under this chapter from . . . an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award.” Id. But contrary to Carol’s argument, this provision does not transform a normally unappealable order into an appealable one when further issues remain to be resolved pursuant to the arbitration agreement.

¶8 To ascertain the meaning of the statute, we examine it “in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related Funk v. Funk 20251383-CA 4 2026 UT App 28 chapters.” LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 11, 215 P.3d 135 (cleaned up). Moreover, “effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute. No clause, sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute.” Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2011 UT App 183, ¶ 9, 257 P.3d 1049 (cleaned up). “We therefore seek to give effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming all omissions to be purposeful.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863.

¶9 Here, the Act specifically discusses—in different sections— both confirmation of “temporary award[s],” Utah Code § 81-15- 110, and confirmation of “award[s],” id. § 81-15-115. Thus, because the statute differentiates between the two terms, we must assume that the terms have different meanings. See Penunuri, 2011 UT App 183, ¶ 9. And under the Act, only orders “confirming or denying confirmation of an award” are immediately appealable as of right. See Utah Code § 81-15-123(1)(c) (emphasis added). Indeed, the provision of the Act that governs appeals lists six different categories of orders that are appealable as of right, and orders confirming temporary awards are not on that list. Id. § 81- 15-123(1). We thus conclude that, under the governing statutory text, orders confirming or denying confirmation of an award are appealable, but orders confirming a temporary award pending further arbitration are not. This conforms not only with practice concerning similar orders issued by a district court, but it also conforms with decisions from other jurisdictions interpreting similar statutes. See, e.g., Kelm v. Kelm, 639 N.E.2d 842, 844–45 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing a lack of appellate jurisdiction to review an order confirming an arbitration award for temporary spousal and child support because the order was not final and appealable even though the applicable statute stated that “an appeal may be taken from an order confirming, modifying, correcting, or vacating an award made in an arbitration Funk v. Funk 20251383-CA 5 2026 UT App 28 proceeding or from judgment entered upon an award” (cleaned up)).

¶10 Thus, because the Act does not allow for immediate appeals of district court orders confirming a temporary award made by an arbitrator pending resolution of all issues submitted to the arbitrator, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Carol’s appeal and must therefore dismiss it. See Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, ¶ 11, 37 P.3d 1070.

¶11 Accordingly, Carol’s appeal is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a subsequent appeal after the district court enters a final, appealable order.

Dismissed

The reviewing court dismissed the appeal or petition without reaching the merits of the issues presented.