Dent v. Dent, 2005 UT App 568
Case Summary
This appeal arose from a divorce action between Petitioner Brenda E. Dent (Wife) and Respondent Carl Mark Dent (Husband) in the First District Court. After the district court entered a divorce decree, Husband filed a timely motion to amend the judgment, but then filed a notice of appeal before the district court disposed of that motion. The district court later entered an amended decree, and Husband did not file a new notice of appeal until more than thirty days after its entry. The Utah Court of Appeals raised the question of its jurisdiction sua sponte, and the dispositive issues were whether the premature notice of appeal could be saved by a rule amendment that took effect after the appeal period had run, and whether an allegedly misplaced notice of appeal could establish appellate jurisdiction.
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Coverage
Facts
Divorce Decree and Post-Judgment Motion
- The district court entered the original decree of divorce on July 5, 2005.
- On July 12, 2005, Husband filed a timely motion to amend the judgment and decree of divorce.
Premature Notice of Appeal
- On August 1, 2005, while the motion to amend remained pending and undecided, Husband filed a notice of appeal.
- Following an August 4, 2005 hearing, the district court ruled orally on the motion to amend.
Amended Decree and Subsequent Filings
- On September 14, 2005, the district court entered an amended judgment and decree of divorce, which disposed of the motion to amend.
- Under the rule then in effect, a new notice of appeal was due on or before October 14, 2005.
- Husband filed an amended notice of appeal on November 8, 2005, more than thirty days after entry of the amended decree. The court referred to this filing as the “second amended notice of appeal.”
Rule Amendment
- By order dated August 30, 2005, the Utah Supreme Court adopted amendments to rules 4, 8A, 9, and 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective November 1, 2005. The amendment rewrote rule 4(b), including a new provision treating a premature notice of appeal as filed on the date the post-judgment motion is disposed of.
Jurisdictional Challenge and Husband’s Response
- The court of appeals issued a sua sponte motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
- Husband claimed his counsel timely delivered a “first amended notice of appeal” in early October by placing it in the district court’s “in box,” and that the district court misplaced it. He supported this claim with affidavits filed for the first time in the court of appeals.
- Husband also argued that the November 1, 2005 amendments to rule 4(b) should apply retroactively to save his appeal.
Issues of the Case
Appellant Carl Mark Dent (Husband), responding to the court’s sua sponte motion to dismiss, raised two arguments against dismissal, which together present three jurisdictional issues.
- Issue 1: Appellate Jurisdiction / Premature Notice of Appeal Under Former Rule 4(b)
- Issue 2: Retroactive Application of Amended Rule 4(b)(2)
- Issue 3: Allegedly Misplaced Notice of Appeal / Extension Under Rule 4(e)
Outcome: The court did not reach the merits of the divorce decree. It rejected each of Husband’s arguments and dismissed the appeal in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction; no issue was affirmed, reversed, or remanded.
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Civil Procedure — Appellate Jurisdiction
1. Appellate Jurisdiction / Premature Notice of Appeal Under Former Rule 4(b)
Claim on Appeal: The court raised, sua sponte, whether Husband’s August 1, 2005 notice of appeal, filed while his motion to amend was pending, and his November 8, 2005 amended notice conferred appellate jurisdiction.
Holding: — Appeal Dismissed. Under former rule 4(b), the premature notice had “no effect,” and the only subsequent notice was filed after the October 14, 2005 deadline, so the court lacked jurisdiction.
Statutory Authority: None. Governed by Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (thirty-day appeal period) and former Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (effect of post-judgment motions on the appeal period).
Standard of Review:
Not specified in opinion — the court determined its own jurisdiction sua sponte as a threshold question, applying the plain terms of rule 4.
Controlling Cases:
- Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, ¶ 7, 13 P.3d 616 (timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite; an untimely notice deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction)
Why It Matters: The decision illustrates the harsh operation of the pre-November 2005 version of rule 4(b), under which a notice of appeal filed while a post-judgment motion was pending was a nullity. Counsel who filed an early notice and failed to re-file after disposition of the motion lost the appeal entirely. Although the rule has since been amended, the case remains a clear statement that appeal deadlines are jurisdictional and are enforced without regard to the merits.
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Civil Procedure — Retroactivity
2. Retroactive Application of Amended Rule 4(b)(2)
Claim on Appeal: Husband argued that amended rule 4(b)(2), effective November 1, 2005, should apply retroactively so that his August 1 notice of appeal would be treated as filed on the date the amended decree was entered, preserving an appeal from the original decree.
Holding: — Rejected; Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court’s adopting order set a plain effective date of November 1, 2005, and because the appeal period had already expired under the former rule, the court declined to apply the amendment retroactively to create jurisdiction.
Statutory Authority: None. Governed by amended Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2) and the Utah Supreme Court’s August 30, 2005 order adopting the amendments.
Standard of Review:
Not specified in opinion — the court construed the plain language of the Supreme Court’s promulgation order.
Why It Matters: The holding establishes that a procedural amendment will not be applied retroactively to revive an appeal whose jurisdictional deadline expired under the prior rule before the amendment’s effective date. The court looked to the text of the adopting order rather than to general retroactivity principles. Practitioners should not rely on a pending or anticipated rule change to cure a defect under the rule currently in force.
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Civil Procedure — Appellate Jurisdiction
3. Allegedly Misplaced Notice of Appeal / Extension Under Rule 4(e)
Claim on Appeal: Husband argued that his counsel timely delivered a first amended notice of appeal to the district court “in box” in early October, that the district court misplaced it, and that the appeal should therefore proceed, relying on affidavits first filed in the court of appeals.
Holding: — Rejected; Appeal Dismissed. Only the district court may extend the time for appeal, so the misplaced-notice claim should have been presented to that court in a timely rule 4(e) motion, and rule 2 bars the appellate courts from suspending rules 4(b) and 4(e).
Statutory Authority: None. Governed by Utah R. App. P. 4(e) (extension of time to appeal) and Utah R. App. P. 2 (limits on appellate suspension of the rules).
Standard of Review:
Not specified in opinion — the court resolved the argument as a matter of allocation of authority under rules 2 and 4(e), without reaching the factual merits of the affidavits.
Why It Matters: The decision directs the forum for any claim that a notice of appeal was timely delivered but lost: the district court, through a rule 4(e) motion filed within thirty days after the original appeal period expires. Notably, Husband’s rule 4(e) window remained open when he filed his November 8 notice, so the remedy was available but not pursued. Affidavits presented for the first time on appeal cannot substitute for a district court extension order.
Rules of Evidence
Utah Codes
Rules of Civil Procedure
Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Appeal as of Right — Time for Filing Notice of Appeal
Governs:
Requires that a notice of appeal in a civil case be filed with the clerk of the trial court within thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
Application in Dent:
The court measured the thirty-day period from entry of the September 14, 2005 amended decree, fixing the deadline at October 14, 2005, and held the November 8, 2005 notice untimely.
Quote:
“A new notice of appeal must have been filed on or before October 14, 2005, so the second amended notice of appeal filed on November 8, 2005, was untimely. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a), (b).” Dent v. Dent, 2005 UT App 568, ¶ 4.
Utah Judiciary:
Effect of Post-Judgment Motions on Time for Appeal (Former Rule)
Governs:
Provided that a timely post-judgment motion (including a motion to alter or amend the judgment) tolled the time for appeal until entry of the order disposing of the motion, that a notice of appeal filed before disposition of such a motion “shall have no effect,” and that a new notice of appeal had to be filed within the prescribed time after entry of the disposing order.
Application in Dent:
Husband’s August 1, 2005 notice, filed while his motion to amend was pending, was a nullity under this rule, and he was required to file a new notice within thirty days after the September 14, 2005 amended decree.
Quote:
“Under that rule, the premature notice of appeal filed on August 1, 2005, had ‘no effect’ because it was filed before entry of the amended judgment.” Dent v. Dent, 2005 UT App 568, ¶ 4.
Utah Judiciary:
Premature Notice of Appeal Filed While Post-Judgment Motion Is Pending (Savings Provision)
Governs:
Provides that a notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of a listed post-judgment motion, is treated as filed on the date the disposing order is entered, but is effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment. A party seeking to challenge the order disposing of the motion, or any amendment to the judgment, must file a new or amended notice of appeal.
Application in Dent:
Husband argued the amendment should apply retroactively to validate his August 1 notice as an appeal from the original decree; the court declined because the appeal period had already expired under the former rule before the amendment’s effective date.
Quote:
“Because the time for appeal expired under former rule 4(b) before the effective date of the amendment, we decline to apply the amended rule retroactively to establish jurisdiction over the appeal.” Dent v. Dent, 2005 UT App 568, ¶ 6.
Utah Judiciary:
Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal
Governs:
Authorizes the trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon a motion filed not later than thirty days after expiration of the original appeal period.
Application in Dent:
The court held that Husband’s claim that the district court misplaced a timely first amended notice of appeal should have been presented to the district court in a rule 4(e) motion, which was still available when he filed his November 8, 2005 notice.
Quote:
“Only the district court has the authority to extend the time for appeal; accordingly, claims that a timely first amended notice of appeal was misplaced should have been presented to the district court in a timely motion under rule 4(e).” Dent v. Dent, 2005 UT App 568, ¶ 7.
Utah Judiciary:
Suspension of Rules
Governs:
Permits the appellate court, in the interest of expediting a decision or for other good cause, to suspend the requirements or provisions of the appellate rules in a particular case, but expressly excepts certain rules, including the time limits for filing a notice of appeal under rule 4, from that suspension power.
Application in Dent:
The court relied on rule 2 to hold that it had no authority to suspend or modify the operation of rules 4(b) and 4(e) to excuse Husband’s untimely notice.
Quote:
“The appellate courts are precluded by rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure from suspending or modifying the operation of rule 4(b) and rule 4(e).” Dent v. Dent, 2005 UT App 568, ¶ 7.
Utah Judiciary:
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
Case Cited
- Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, ¶ 7, 13 P.3d 616 (cited for the principle that timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and that an untimely notice leaves the appellate court without jurisdiction to consider the appeal)
Litigation and Appellate Strategy
Reversal Predictor (Jurisdictional Dismissal Risk)
Because the framework in Dent is jurisdictional, the relevant predictor is the risk of dismissal rather than reversal. Dismissal is most likely where:
- A notice of appeal is filed while a tolling post-judgment motion remains pending, and no new or amended notice follows entry of the disposing order when one is required.
- The appeal period is computed from an oral ruling or from the original decree rather than from entry of the amended judgment.
- A lost or misplaced filing is asserted for the first time in the appellate court rather than through a rule 4(e) motion in the district court.
- The appellant relies on a rule amendment whose effective date postdates expiration of the appeal period.
- The appellant asks the appellate court to suspend rule 4 under rule 2.
Mandatory Factor Checklist
No statutory factors were at issue. The court’s jurisdictional analysis instead required determination of the following:
- The date of entry of the original judgment.
- Whether a timely post-judgment motion of a type listed in rule 4(b) was filed.
- The date of entry (not oral announcement) of the order disposing of that motion.
- The date of each notice of appeal and whether it preceded or followed disposition of the motion.
- The version of rule 4(b) in effect when the appeal period ran.
- Whether a rule 4(e) extension motion was filed in the district court within thirty days after the original appeal period expired.
Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)
The following combination of factors, all present in Dent, together signals a high risk of jurisdictional dismissal:
- A post-judgment motion to amend filed shortly after entry of a divorce decree.
- A notice of appeal filed before disposition of that motion.
- An amended judgment entered weeks after an oral ruling.
- A later notice of appeal filed outside the thirty-day window measured from the amended judgment.
- An unverified claim of timely delivery supported only by affidavits filed on appeal.
- No motion for extension in the district court.
Strategy Insight
- Jurisdictional defects cannot be recharacterized as equitable or evidentiary disputes on appeal. The appellate court will not weigh affidavits or fairness arguments to overcome an untimely notice of appeal.
- The effective strategy is to treat any question of timeliness as a district court matter: seek a rule 4(e) extension on a showing of excusable neglect or good cause while the window remains open, and create a record there before the appellate court acts.
Teaching Value
- Dent is a concise per curiam illustration of three enduring principles: appeal deadlines are jurisdictional, rule amendments operate according to their stated effective dates, and the power to extend the time for appeal belongs exclusively to the trial court.
- The case also serves as a historical marker for the November 1, 2005 rewrite of URAP 4(b), which replaced the “no effect” rule for premature notices with the savings provision that governs today.
Insights
Utah-Only Jurisprudence
- The opinion rests entirely on Utah authority: the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court’s August 30, 2005 promulgation order, and a single Utah Court of Appeals decision.
- No federal or out-of-state authority is cited, including federal decisions construing the analogous Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(i), which contains a similar savings provision for premature notices.
Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)
- No Utah Supreme Court case is cited. The decision is anchored instead in the Utah Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority.
- Utah Supreme Court Order of August 30, 2005 — Established: adoption of the amendments to URAP 4, 8A, 9, and 19 with an express effective date of November 1, 2005. Role in this opinion: the plain language of the order’s effective date was the controlling basis for refusing retroactive application of amended rule 4(b)(2).
- Supporting Court of Appeals authority: Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299 — Established: the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Role in this opinion: supplied the jurisdictional premise requiring dismissal.
The Most Important Holding
- An amendment to an appellate rule governing the time for appeal will not be applied retroactively to confer jurisdiction where the appeal period expired under the prior rule before the amendment’s effective date.
- The court resolved retroactivity by reading the effective date in the Supreme Court’s adopting order, not by balancing fairness considerations, signaling that express effective dates in rule amendments will be applied according to their terms.
Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error
- There was no reversal and no merits review. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, so any legal or factual error in the divorce decree went unreviewed.
- What would have preserved the appeal: (1) filing a new notice of appeal on or before October 14, 2005, within thirty days after entry of the amended decree; or (2) filing a rule 4(e) motion in the district court within thirty days after that deadline, supported by the affidavits regarding the misplaced notice, to establish excusable neglect or good cause.
The Pre-2005 “No Effect” Trap and the Current Savings Rule
- Under former rule 4(b), a notice of appeal filed while a post-judgment motion was pending was void and had to be re-filed. Under the current savings provision, such a notice is treated as filed on the date the disposing order is entered.
- The savings provision remains limited: a premature notice is effective only as to the underlying judgment. A party who wishes to challenge the order disposing of the post-judgment motion, or the terms of an amended judgment, still must file a new or amended notice of appeal within the prescribed time.
The Proper Forum for “Lost Filing” Claims
- Claims that a notice of appeal was timely delivered but lost by the clerk must be presented to the district court, which alone may extend the appeal period under rule 4(e).
- Affidavits filed for the first time in the appellate court do not establish jurisdiction, and rule 2 prevents the appellate court from suspending rule 4 to accommodate them.
Practitioner Takeaways
Trial Lawyers:
- Calendar the appeal deadline from the date of entry of the order disposing of any post-judgment motion, not from the original decree or from an oral ruling at a hearing.
- Obtain a file-stamped copy or electronic filing confirmation for every notice of appeal; delivery to an “in box” without confirmation of filing is not proof of timely filing.
- If there is any doubt about whether a notice was received, file a protective rule 4(e) motion in the district court promptly, before the extension window closes.
Appellate Lawyers:
- When a post-judgment motion was filed, confirm whether a new or amended notice of appeal is required to reach the disposing order or any amended judgment, even under the current savings provision.
- When responding to a sua sponte motion to dismiss, recognize that the appellate court cannot extend the appeal period; the remedy, if any, lies in the district court.
- Do not rely on pending or recently adopted rule amendments to cure a jurisdictional defect that ripened under the prior rule.
Family Law Litigants and Self-Represented Parties:
- Filing a motion to amend a divorce decree changes when the appeal clock starts. A missed deadline forfeits the right to appeal regardless of the strength of the underlying arguments.
Majority Opinion
This memorandum decision is subject to revision before publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—-ooOoo—-
Brenda E. Dent, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Carl Mark Dent, Respondent and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (For Official Publication) Case No. 20050674-CA F I L E D (December 30, 2005) 2005 UT App 568
—– First District, Logan Department, 044100025 The Honorable Thomas Willmore
Attorneys: Lyle W. Hillyard and Brian G. Cannell, Logan, for Appellant Kelly J. Smith, Logan, for Appellee —– Before Judges Davis, McHugh, and Orme. PER CURIAM:
¶1 This case is before the court on a sua sponte motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
¶2 The district court entered a divorce decree on July 5, 2005. On July 12, 2005, Appellant Carl Mark Dent (Husband) filed a timely motion to amend the judgment and decree of divorce. On August 1, 2005, before the court ruled on the motion to amend, Husband filed a notice of appeal. Following an August 4, 2005 hearing, the district court orally ruled on the motion to amend. On September 14, 2005, the district court entered an amended judgment and decree of divorce. More than thirty days later, Husband filed an amended notice of appeal on November 8, 2005.
¶3 Husband makes two arguments opposing dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. First, he contends that his counsel timely delivered his first amended notice of appeal to the district court by placing it in the “in box,” but the district court allegedly misplaced the notice. The claim is supported by affidavits filed for the first time in this court. Second, Husband argues that amendments to rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of 20050674-CA 2 Appellate Procedure that became effective on November 1, 2005, should apply retroactively so as to save the appeal.
¶4 When the district court entered the original divorce decree on July 5, 2005, and the amended decree on September 14, 2005, rule 4(b) provided that a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a motion to amend the judgment “shall have no effect.” Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (amended effective Nov. 1, 2005). Rule 4(b) also required that “[a] new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.” Id. Under that rule, the premature notice of appeal filed on August 1, 2005, had “no effect” because it was filed before entry of the amended judgment. A new notice of appeal must have been filed on or before October 14, 2005, so the second amended notice of appeal filed on November 8, 2005, was untimely. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a), (b). Timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite; therefore, when a notice of appeal is untimely, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. See Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,¶7, 13 P.3d 616.
¶5 Effective November 1, 2005, rule 4(b) was revised. See Utah R. App. P. 4, Amendment Notes (“The 2005 amendment rewrote Subdivision (b).”). Amended rule 4(b)(2) states, in part: A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment. Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2) (amended effective Nov. 1, 2005). Husband argues that because his original notice of appeal was filed after the entry of the original divorce decree, but before entry of the amended judgment disposing of his motion to amend, it should be deemed timely under the new rule 4(b)(2) to allow an appeal of the original divorce decree. If the amendment is applied retroactively, it would revive the appeal despite the expiration of the jurisdictional time limits under the rule in effect at the time of the entry of both the original and amended divorce decrees.
¶6 The Utah Supreme Court’s August 30, 2005 Order adopting the amendments stated that, “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the proposed amendments to Rules 4, 8A, 9, and 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure are adopted and promulgated effective November 1, 2005.” The plain language of the order establishes 20050674-CA 3 an effective date of November 1, 2005. Because the time for appeal expired under former rule 4(b) before the effective date of the amendment, we decline to apply the amended rule retroactively to establish jurisdiction over the appeal.
¶7 Husband argues the new rule 4(b)(2) should be applied to this case because the district court allegedly misplaced his first amended notice of appeal, which he claims was timely delivered in early October. When Husband filed a second amended notice of appeal on November 8, 2005, the time for making a motion to extend the time for appeal under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure had not expired. See Utah R. App. P. 4(e) (allowing a motion to be filed within thirty days after expiration of the original appeal period). Only the district court has the authority to extend the time for appeal; accordingly, claims that a timely first amended notice of appeal was misplaced should have been presented to the district court in a timely motion under rule 4(e). The appellate courts are precluded by rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure from suspending or modifying the operation of rule 4(b) and rule 4(e). See Utah R. App. P. 2.
¶8 We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ______________________________ James Z. Davis, Judge ______________________________ Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge ______________________________ Gregory K. Orme, Judge