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Chesley v. Chesley, 2017 UT App 127

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Case Summary

Benjamin Wade Chesley appealed the alimony award entered in favor of Moriah Lee Chesley in the parties’ divorce decree. The trial court awarded Moriah $900 per month in alimony for 97 months — the length of the marriage — after finding that Benjamin had the ability to pay and discussing several statutory alimony factors. However, the trial court never made findings regarding Moriah’s monthly expenses or explained how it arrived at the $900 figure, even though the record showed her income and expenses were only $343 apart. The Utah Court of Appeals concluded it could not meaningfully review the alimony award on this record, and vacated the award and remanded for entry of more complete findings.

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Coverage

Facts

Marriage and Temporary Alimony:

  • Benjamin and Moriah married in August 2007 and had two children together; Moriah filed for divorce in July 2014.
  • In October 2014, Moriah moved for temporary alimony, submitting an affidavit claiming monthly expenses of $3,179.34 and monthly income of $2,249.67, a shortfall of $929.67; in November 2014 a commissioner ordered Benjamin to pay $900 per month in temporary alimony, which Benjamin failed to pay.

Trial Testimony — Moriah:

  • Moriah testified she was not employed during the marriage because she spent all her time at home with the children, that she was currently a full-time student pursuing a degree to double her pay, and that she worked part time because she was not hired full time and lacked time given school and child care.
  • Moriah’s updated financial declaration showed gross monthly income of $2,800 and monthly expenses of $3,933, including $1,200 per month in child care, and she testified she received roughly $1,700 per month in government subsidies and about $400 per month from her father.

Trial Testimony — Benjamin:

  • Benjamin testified he earned $31.64 per hour with income varying by overtime, totaling around $94,000 in 2014, and that his monthly expenses were approximately $5,400, including a $1,019 monthly child-support obligation.

Trial Court’s Alimony Findings:

  • The court imputed to Moriah income of $13 per hour for 40 hours per week ($2,253 per month), plus $318 per month in child support from her first husband and $1,019 per month from Benjamin, for total monthly income of $3,590.
  • The court found Benjamin’s income had been rising and could exceed $100,000 in 2015, but conservatively set his monthly income at $6,500 ($78,000 annually).
  • The court awarded Moriah $900 per month in alimony for 97 months (the length of the marriage), plus a judgment of $9,585 in past-due temporary alimony (reflecting ten months of $900 temporary alimony, less an offset of $315 for the value of Benjamin’s personal property that Moriah had sold).
  • The court explained that Moriah qualified for government subsidies only because she had basically no income, that those subsidies would change substantially, that Moriah needed a better job and needed to return to school, that she had supported Benjamin’s employment throughout the marriage, and that $900 would not equalize the parties’ incomes since Benjamin would continue to have considerably more income.

Post-Trial Motion:

  • Benjamin moved to amend the findings and for a new trial under rules 52(b) and 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the court made no finding as to Moriah’s needs and that her monthly expenses should have been reduced by $600 (half of her $1,200 child care expense, which he had been ordered to pay half of) to $3,333 — below her $3,590 income; the trial court denied the motion, stating the evidence clearly supported Moriah’s need and that the amount awarded was correct.

Issues of the Case

Benjamin raises two related issues concerning the sufficiency of the trial court’s alimony findings.

  1. Issue 1: Adequacy of the Findings on Moriah’s Financial Need
  2. Issue 2: Offset of Moriah’s Expenses for Shared Child Care Costs

The Utah Court of Appeals vacated the alimony award and remanded for entry of more complete findings on Issue 1, and declined to reach Issue 2, leaving it for the trial court to address on remand.

  • Alimony – Financial Needs

    Claim on Appeal: Benjamin contended that the trial court failed to properly consider and make adequate findings regarding Moriah’s financial needs in awarding her $900 per month in alimony.

    Holding: — Vacated and remanded. Although the trial court properly addressed several statutory alimony factors — Moriah’s earning capacity, the length of the marriage, and her custody of the parties’ children — it made no findings regarding Moriah’s monthly expenses and did not identify what it relied on in setting alimony at $900 per month. Because Moriah’s stated expenses ($3,933) and the court’s finding of her income ($3,590) differed by only $343, and the court did not detail the cost of the schooling or retraining it cited as justification, the court of appeals could not determine whether the award was proper and vacated it, remanding for entry of more complete findings.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code Ann. § 81-4-502 (Formerly: § 30-3-5(8)(a)) (LexisNexis 2013) (statutory alimony factors, including the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, the recipient’s earning capacity, the payor’s ability to provide support, the length of the marriage, custody of minor children, and contributions to the payor spouse’s earning capacity).

    Standard of Review:

    • Abuse of discretion — alimony determinations are given considerable discretion and will be upheld unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is shown; the failure to enter specific findings on the recipient spouse’s needs and condition, making effective review impossible, is itself an abuse of discretion.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Boyer v. Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, 259 P.3d 1063 (abuse-of-discretion standard for alimony determinations).
    • Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, 80 P.3d 153 (failure to enter specific findings on the recipient spouse’s needs and condition is an abuse of discretion; the absence of findings is a fundamental defect precluding meaningful review).
    • Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, 335 P.3d 378 (purposes of an initial alimony award; each statutory factor requires findings detailed enough to permit meaningful appellate review).
    • Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, 379 P.3d 890 (adequate findings must be sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the trial court reached its conclusion on each factual issue).
    • Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, 197 P.3d 117 (regardless of the payor spouse’s ability to pay more, the recipient spouse’s demonstrated need constitutes the maximum permissible alimony award).
    • Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT App 26, 321 P.3d 200 (facts on appeal from a bench trial are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings).

    Why It Matters: The decision reinforces that a trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings on each statutory alimony factor — particularly the recipient spouse’s demonstrated financial need — to permit meaningful appellate review, and that discussing several factors well is not a substitute for findings on the recipient’s actual monthly expenses and how the ultimate dollar figure was derived.

  • Alimony – Financial Needs

    Claim on Appeal: Benjamin contended, both in his post-trial motion and on appeal, that because he had been ordered to pay half of Moriah’s $1,200 monthly child care expenses, her monthly expenses should have been reduced by $600 to $3,333 — below her $3,590 monthly income — defeating any demonstrated need for alimony.

    Holding: — Not reached. Given its resolution vacating the alimony award for inadequate findings, the court of appeals declined to address this issue, leaving any determination regarding the parties’ child care expenses for the trial court to decide on remand.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code Ann. § 81-4-502 (Formerly: § 30-3-5(8)(a)) (LexisNexis 2013) (financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse remains the relevant factor on remand).

    Why It Matters: The court’s decision to leave this fact-intensive expense-offset question for the trial court on remand illustrates that appellate courts will avoid resolving subsidiary factual disputes once a case is already being returned for more complete findings on the central issue.

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

  • Earhart v. Earhart, 2015 UT App 308, 365 P.3d 719 (referring to same-surnamed parties by their first names for clarity).
  • Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT App 26, 321 P.3d 200 (facts on appeal from a bench trial are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings).
  • Boyer v. Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, 259 P.3d 1063 (alimony determinations are reviewed for a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion).
  • Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, 80 P.3d 153 (failure to enter specific findings on the recipient spouse’s needs and condition is an abuse of discretion; absence of findings is a fundamental defect precluding review).
  • Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, 335 P.3d 378 (purposes of an initial alimony award; findings must permit meaningful appellate review of each factor).
  • Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, 379 P.3d 890 (adequate findings must disclose the steps by which the trial court reached its conclusion).
  • Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, 197 P.3d 117 (the recipient spouse’s demonstrated need is the maximum permissible alimony award, regardless of the payor’s ability to pay more).

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

  • An alimony award where the trial court makes no findings on the recipient spouse’s monthly expenses.
  • A dollar amount of alimony that is not traceable to any specific calculation or finding in the record.
  • A gap between the recipient’s stated income and expenses that is far smaller than the alimony amount awarded, without explanation.
  • Reliance on future costs (education, retraining, licensing) as justification for an award, without any quantification of those costs.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

  • The financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, with findings identifying the recipient’s actual monthly expenses. Utah Code § 81-4-502(1)(a) (Formerly § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)).
  • The recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income.
  • The payor spouse’s ability to provide support, including findings on the payor’s own monthly expenses.
  • The length of the marriage, and whether the recipient has custody of minor children requiring support.
  • Sufficiently detailed subsidiary findings disclosing the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate alimony figure.

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

An alimony award is at heightened risk of vacatur where: (1) the trial court’s findings address several statutory factors well but are silent on the recipient’s actual expenses; (2) the calculated income-versus-expense gap is far smaller than the awarded amount; (3) the court’s rationale references future costs without quantifying them; and (4) the payor spouse specifically raised the findings gap in a post-trial Rule 52(b)/59(a)(6) motion that the trial court summarily denied without elaboration.

Strategy Insight

Because alimony determinations receive considerable deference on the merits, an appeal is far more likely to succeed when framed as a findings-sufficiency challenge — attacking the trial court’s failure to make the record reviewable — than as a request to reweigh the equities or the credibility of the parties’ testimony, which the trial court is far better positioned to assess.

 

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence

The opinion relies exclusively on Utah statutory and case authority governing alimony awards, with no reliance on out-of-state or federal law. It is a straightforward application of the settled requirement that a trial court’s alimony findings must be detailed enough to permit meaningful appellate review.

Doctrinal Anchors

  • Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, 80 P.3d 153 — established that a trial court’s failure to enter specific findings on the recipient spouse’s needs and condition is itself an abuse of discretion, and that the absence of findings is a fundamental defect precluding meaningful appellate review; the central doctrinal basis for vacatur here.
  • Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, 197 P.3d 117 — established that the recipient spouse’s demonstrated need — not the payor spouse’s ability to pay more — sets the ceiling on a permissible alimony award, underscoring why detailed need findings are indispensable.

The Most Important Holding

The opinion’s most significant holding is that a trial court cannot satisfy its alimony-findings obligation by discussing several statutory factors well while leaving the recipient spouse’s actual monthly expenses, and the derivation of the specific dollar amount awarded, unaddressed — even where the trial court’s general rationale (need for schooling, a better job, and continued income disparity) is otherwise sound and record-supported.

Partial Reversal — What Distinguished This Case from an Affirmance

Unlike a fully affirmed appeal, this case turned on a narrow but dispositive gap in the record: the trial court’s findings on earning capacity, marriage length, and child custody were adequate, but its findings on the recipient’s financial need — particularly her monthly expenses and how the $900 figure was calculated — were not. Where a recipient’s stated expenses and calculated income differ by only a few hundred dollars, and the court relies on future costs (schooling, retraining) without quantifying them, a reviewing court will be unable to conduct meaningful review and will vacate rather than affirm.

Teaching Value

Chesley is a useful teaching case for the distinction between a trial court adequately weighing the equities of an alimony award and adequately documenting that weighing in reviewable findings, and for the principle that the recipient spouse’s demonstrated need — not merely the payor’s ability to pay — caps the permissible award.

Practitioner Takeaways

  • Trial Lawyers Representing the Payor Spouse: When a court’s stated rationale for an alimony amount does not obviously reconcile with the recipient’s own income and expense figures, move for amended findings under Rule 52(b) or a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) and specifically request findings quantifying any future costs (schooling, retraining) relied upon — that gap is exactly what secured relief on appeal here.
  • Trial Lawyers Representing the Recipient Spouse: Even where the equities plainly favor an award, ensure the trial court enters specific findings on the client’s actual monthly expenses and shows its arithmetic for the final alimony figure; a favorable outcome at trial can still be vacated on appeal for lack of adequately detailed findings.
  • Appellate Lawyers: A sufficiency-of-findings challenge to an alimony award is strongest where the court’s own figures (income vs. expenses) do not obviously support the amount awarded, and where the court’s stated justifications (e.g., cost of schooling) are never quantified in the findings.

Majority Opinion

2017 UT App 127 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MORIAH LEE CHESLEY, Appellee, v. BENJAMIN WADE CHESLEY, Appellant.

Opinion No. 20160193-CA Filed July 28, 2017

Third District Court, Tooele Department

The Honorable Robert W. Adkins No. 144300327

David Pedrazas, Attorney for Appellant Mary C. Corporon, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES STEPHEN L. ROTH and JILL M. POHLMAN concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶1 Benjamin Wade Chesley appeals from a divorce decree, challenging the trial court’s alimony award in favor of Moriah Lee Chesley.1 Because we cannot discern from the record before us whether the trial court properly calculated alimony, we vacate the alimony award and remand for the entry of more complete findings. 1. Because the parties still share a last name, we refer to them by their first names for clarity, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality. See Earhart v. Earhart, 2015 UT App 308,

¶ 2 n.1, 365 P.3d 719. Chesley v. Chesley 20160193-CA 2 2017 UT App 127 ¶2 Benjamin and Moriah married in August 2007.2 They had two children together. Moriah filed for divorce in July 2014.

¶3 In October 2014, Moriah filed a motion for temporary alimony, accompanied by an affidavit in support of her motion. In her affidavit, Moriah claimed monthly expenses of $3,179.34 and a monthly income of $2,249.67, resulting in a shortfall of $929.67. In November 2014, after a hearing on the matter, a commissioner entered an order requiring Benjamin to pay Moriah $900 per month in temporary alimony. Benjamin failed to pay the temporary alimony.

¶4 Subsequently, during a day-long bench trial, the trial court considered, among other things, whether Benjamin should be required to pay permanent alimony to Moriah and in what amount. The court heard evidence that Moriah was not employed during the parties’ marriage “[b]ecause [she] spent all [of her] time at home with the kids.” Moriah testified that she was currently a full-time student and that she was getting a degree so that she could “double [her] pay.” She also explained that she was currently working part time instead of full time because she “wasn’t hired to work full time, and [did] not have the time going to school and taking care of the kids.” Moriah’s updated financial declaration indicated that she had a gross monthly income of $2,800 and monthly expenses of $3,933, which included $1,200 per month in child care expenses. In addition, Moriah testified that she had been receiving roughly $1,700 in government subsidies per month and around $400 per month from her father to help with bills. 2. “On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, and therefore recite the facts consistent with that standard.” Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT App 26, ¶ 2 n.1, 321 P.3d 200 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Chesley v. Chesley 20160193-CA 3 2017 UT App 127

¶5 Benjamin testified that he earned $31.64 per hour and that his monthly income varied depending on how much overtime he worked. He testified that his total income in 2014 was around $94,000. He further testified that his monthly expenses were approximately $5,400, which included his $1,019 monthly childsupport obligation.

¶6 For purposes of its alimony determination, the court imputed to Moriah income of $13 per hour for 40 hours per week, or $2,253 per month. In addition, the court found that Moriah’s income included $318 per month from her first husband for child support, and $1,019 per month from Benjamin for child support, bringing her total monthly income to $3,590. The court determined that Benjamin’s income “has been going up over the years” and that if it projected Benjamin’s income for 2015, “based on what [he’d] earned thus far, it would be above $100,000 a year.” Nevertheless, the court set Benjamin’s monthly income at $6,500 ($78,000 annually), observing that “that is very conservative based on his history that his income has gone up.”

¶7 The court concluded that, “under all of the circumstances in this case,” Moriah was entitled to an award of alimony and awarded her alimony in the amount of $900 per month for 97 months, the length of the parties’ marriage. 3 The court observed that Moriah had qualified for the level of government subsidies that she had been receiving only because she “basically had no income,” and that the benefits she had been receiving were “going to change substantially, and as to the child care, . . . it may be unfortunate for the parties that the State won’t be paying all of that that they’ve paid.” In addition, the court noted that Moriah “needs a better job” and that she “needs to go back to 3. The court also entered judgment in favor of Moriah for $9,585 in past-due alimony (10 months of temporary alimony at $900 per month, less $315 for the value of Benjamin’s personal property that Moriah had sold). Chesley v. Chesley 20160193-CA 4 2017 UT App 127 school to get a better job.” The court further observed that Moriah had supported Benjamin “throughout the marriage and his employment, in improving his employment, and that [Moriah] needs to be able to have greater earning capacity than she presently has.” The court clarified that, although it had imputed income to Moriah as though she were working full time, it was unsure that she would actually be able to work full time while going to school. The court also noted that $900 per month would not equalize the parties’ incomes and that Benjamin was “going to have considerably more income” than Moriah.

¶8 In response to the trial court’s ruling, Benjamin filed a motion to amend the trial court’s findings of fact and for a new trial pursuant to rules 52(b) and 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that “the Court made no finding as to the needs of [Moriah] in this matter.” Benjamin observed that Moriah’s updated financial declaration indicated that she had monthly expenses of $3,933 and that the court had found Moriah’s monthly income to be $3,590. Benjamin contended that Moriah’s monthly expenses included $1,200 per month in child care expenses “of which [he] was ordered to pay one-half.” Thus, according to Benjamin, Moriah’s monthly expenses should have been reduced to $3,333 per month. Benjamin also argued that “the Court failed to make any actual Findings of the need of [Moriah]” and that Moriah “failed to demonstrate to the Court her need of $900 per month in alimony.” Benjamin requested that alimony be terminated “as [Moriah’s] income exceed[s] her month[ly] expenses” or, alternatively, that “the Court make additional findings as to the need of [Moriah] in this matter based upon the evidence submitted before [the] Court.” The trial court denied the motion, stating that “[t]he Court believes that the evidence at trial clearly supported [Moriah’s] need for alimony, and that the amount awarded was correct.”

¶9 On appeal, Benjamin challenges the trial court’s alimony award. More specifically, he contends that the trial court failed Chesley v. Chesley 20160193-CA 5 2017 UT App 127 to properly consider and determine Moriah’s needs in awarding her alimony. “Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and determinations of alimony will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated.” Boyer v. Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, ¶ 9, 259 P.3d 1063 (brackets, ellipsis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]here a trial court fails to enter specific findings on the needs and condition of the recipient spouse, making effective review of the alimony award impossible, that omission is an abuse of discretion.” Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 10, 80 P.3d 153.

¶10 “The purposes of [an initial alimony award] are (1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same standard of living that existed during the marriage, (2) to equalize the standards of living of each party, and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge.” Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, ¶ 14, 335 P.3d 378 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining the amount and duration of alimony, trial courts consider at least the following factors: (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; (iv) the length of the marriage; (v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; (vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and Chesley v. Chesley 20160193-CA 6 2017 UT App 127 (vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse’s skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or enabling the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) (LexisNexis 2013).

¶11 In considering these factors, a trial court is required to “make adequate findings on all material issues of alimony to reveal the reasoning followed in making the award.” Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 14, 379 P.3d 890 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, ¶ 12 (“[A] trial court’s analysis of each factor must contain factual findings with enough detail to permit meaningful appellate review of its decision.”). Findings are adequate only when they are sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 14.

¶12 Benjamin contends that the trial court failed to make adequate findings as to Moriah’s needs in awarding alimony. Moriah, on the other hand, contends that “the [trial] court analyzed the facts under the applicable alimony factors, [and made] sufficient findings to properly award alimony to [her].”

¶13 In awarding Moriah alimony, the trial court found that Benjamin earned $6,500 per month and that, based on his income, he had the ability to pay alimony. The court found that Moriah had a monthly income of $3,590, which included $2,253 of imputed employment income and $1,337 in child support from Benjamin and Moriah’s first husband. The court further found that Moriah needed a better job; that she needed to go back to school to get a better job; and that she had supported Benjamin “throughout the marriage and his employment, in improving his employment, and that [Moriah] needs to be able to have greater earning capacity than she presently has.” The court observed that Benjamin was “going to have considerably Chesley v. Chesley 20160193-CA 7 2017 UT App 127 more income” than Moriah. The court was also skeptical that Moriah, who had custody of the parties’ two children, would be able to work full time while attending school. In addition, the court found that the benefits Moriah had been receiving from the government were going to “change substantially” because of the court’s alimony award.

¶14 Based on the foregoing, we agree with Moriah that the trial court properly considered several of the relevant statutory factors, including Moriah’s earning capacity, the length of the parties’ marriage, and the fact that Moriah had custody of the parties’ two children.4 See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(ii), (iv), (v). However, we ultimately conclude that, in considering Moriah’s needs, the trial court failed to make sufficiently detailed findings regarding her demonstrated financial need. See Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 13, 80 P.3d 153 (“The absence of findings of fact is a fundamental defect that makes it impossible to review the issues that were briefed without invading the trial court’s fact-finding domain.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Namely, the court failed to make any findings regarding Moriah’s monthly expenses and to specifically identify what it relied on in determining that $900 was a reasonable amount of alimony. Indeed, even after reviewing the record, we cannot determine how the $900 amount was calculated: Moriah’s updated financial declaration indicated that she had monthly expenses of $3,933, and the trial court found that Moriah had a monthly income of $3,590, a 4. Although the trial court found that Benjamin had the ability to provide support, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2013), the court did not make any findings regarding Benjamin’s monthly expenses. Benjamin testified that his monthly expenses were approximately $5,400, which included his $1,019 per month child-support obligation. Chesley v. Chesley 20160193-CA 8 2017 UT App 127 difference of only $343.5 See generally Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, ¶ 13, 197 P.3d 117 (observing that “regardless of the payor spouse’s ability to pay more, the recipient spouse’s demonstrated need must constitute the maximum permissible alimony award (brackets, ellipsis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). Although the court generally discussed Moriah’s need for more schooling and a better job as justification for its alimony award, the court failed to, for example, make any detailed findings regarding the cost of tuition or retraining. Given the lack of clarity in the findings and the record, we are simply unable to determine whether the $900 alimony award was proper.

¶15 We vacate the trial court’s alimony award and remand for the entry of more complete findings. 5. On appeal, Benjamin also repeats the argument from his motion to amend—that he was ordered to pay half of Moriah’s child care expenses and that her monthly expenses should therefore have been reduced by $600 (half of $1,200) to equal $3,333 per month, “which is less than her income of $3590.” Supra ¶ 8. Given our resolution of this appeal, we decline to address this issue. Any determination regarding the parties’ child care expenses is more appropriately left to the trial court to decide on remand.

Vacated

The reviewing court set aside the lower court's judgment, in whole or in part.

Remanded

The reviewing court returned the case to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.