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Cantrell v. Cantrell, 2013 UT App 296

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Case Summary

Ellen Cantrell (Wife) and James N. Cantrell (Husband) divorced in 2008 after a marriage of just over twenty-two years, resolving their case through a collaborative law process that produced a stipulated decree. The Decree required Husband to pay $8,000 per month in child support for the parties’ two daughters, an acknowledged upward deviation of $2,768 from the $5,232 guideline amount, but neither the Stipulation nor the Decree explained why the parties agreed to the deviation. After Wife relocated to New York with the daughters and sold the marital home, Husband petitioned to reduce support to the guideline amount, contending the deviation existed to keep the children in the marital home. The district court deemed the Decree ambiguous, took parol evidence of the parties’ intent, and reduced support without applying the statutory modification framework. The appeal presented whether an unexplained stipulated upward deviation violates the Child Support Act or renders a decree ambiguous, and whether the modification was supported by adequate findings.

 

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Facts

Marriage and Collaborative Divorce

  • The parties were married for just over twenty-two years and had three minor children: two daughters and one son.
  • In late 2007, the parties entered into a Collaborative Law Participation Agreement under which they agreed to pursue a divorce settlement without judicial intervention.
  • In April 2008, the parties memorialized their agreement in a written Stipulation and submitted it to the court for entry of a decree of divorce.

Custody, Residence, and Relocation Terms of the Stipulation

  • Husband received primary physical custody of the son, and Wife received primary physical custody of the daughters.
  • Wife was awarded the marital home and agreed to attempt to refinance it to remove Husband as a debtor; if the home were ever sold, Wife would receive the net proceeds, but the Stipulation did not otherwise address a sale.
  • The proposed parenting plan contemplated that each parent would reside in fairly close proximity to the other and required a relocating parent to give notice as soon as possible, after which each parent would submit proposed amended parenting plans.

Child Support and the Upward Deviation

  • The parties agreed that Husband would pay $8,000 per month in child support for the daughters and that Wife would pay no child support to Husband; the Stipulation gave no explanation for the upward deviation.
  • The Stipulation appears to have been drafted under the superseded Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act (Utah Code §§ 78-45-1 to -13), although the Decree properly relied on the renumbered Utah Child Support Act; the court held the discrepancy immaterial because the award was an upward deviation under either act.
  • The child support worksheet attached to the Decree reflected a guideline obligation of $5,232 per month, making the stipulated amount an upward deviation of $2,768 per month.
  • The Decree, entered in May 2008, recognized that the award constituted an upward deviation, and the worksheet stated only that it was an upward deviation in the base child support award; the Decree did not otherwise address the basis for the deviation.

Relocation and Petition to Modify

  • In August 2008, Wife relocated with the daughters to upstate New York, and the marital residence was subsequently sold.
  • In October 2008, Husband petitioned to modify the Decree, seeking to reduce child support to the guideline amount on the theory that he agreed to the deviation so that Wife could maintain the marital residence and the daughters would not have to move, and that Wife’s relocation was a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated in the Decree.

Summary Judgment and Evidentiary Hearing

  • In November 2010, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment; Husband argued that the absence of a finding explaining the deviation required recalculation under the guidelines and relied on pre-divorce emails, while Wife argued that no explanation was statutorily required and that parol evidence was inadmissible because the Decree was unambiguous.
  • The district court found the Stipulation and Decree ambiguous as to the reason for the deviation, reasoning that the Code requires an explanation for a deviation, and set an evidentiary hearing limited to the parties’ intent.
  • At the January 6, 2011 hearing, Husband testified that the deviation was for maintenance of the marital home and offered the parties’ emails; Wife testified that remaining in the home was never a condition of the deviation and that she was already contemplating moving in early 2008.

District Court Ruling

  • In April 2011, the district court found Husband’s testimony more credible, concluded that the deviation was intended to cover the substantial maintenance costs of the marital home, and found that Wife’s moving from and selling the home was a substantial change in circumstances.
  • The district court reduced child support to the guideline amount and expressly declined to conduct a full substantial-change and best-interest analysis, deeming it unnecessary in light of its ambiguity ruling.
  • Other rulings on Husband’s petition to modify were not challenged on appeal.

Issues of the Case

Appellant Ellen Cantrell (Wife) raises four issues on appeal, as organized by the court’s analysis of her two principal claims of error and her request for attorney fees.

Issue 1: Child Support / Statutory Explanation Requirement for a Stipulated Upward Deviation

Issue 2: Divorce Decree Interpretation / Ambiguity and Parol Evidence

Issue 3: Child Support Modification / Contemplated Change, Best Interests, and Adequacy of Findings

Issue 4: Attorney Fees at Trial and on Appeal

Outcome: Issues 1, 2, and 3 were resolved in Wife’s favor, and the order modifying child support was reversed and remanded for evaluation under Utah Code § 78B-12-210(9) (now § 81-6-212). The court did, however, uphold the district court’s substantial-change finding as within its discretion. On Issue 4, Wife’s request for appellate fees was denied, and her request for trial-level fees was left for the district court on remand.

  • Child Support — Support Calculation

    1. Child Support / Statutory Explanation Requirement for a Stipulated Upward Deviation

    Claim on Appeal: Wife argued that the district court erred in concluding that the Decree failed to comply with the Utah Child Support Act because it did not explain the upward deviation, and in treating that perceived noncompliance as an ambiguity that opened the door to parol evidence. Husband argued that, because no finding supported the deviation, support should be recalculated under the guidelines.

    Holding: — Reversed. Because the parties stipulated to an upward deviation, the decree court was not required to enter a specific finding rebutting the guideline presumption; the Decree therefore complied with § 78B-12-210(3), and the absence of an explanation did not render it ambiguous.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-6-202 (Formerly: § 78B-12-210(2)–(3)) (guideline amount is presumptively correct; a specific finding on the record is ordinarily required to rebut the presumption).

    Standard of Review:

    Correctness — the trial court’s legal determinations regarding entitlement to child support modification (Doyle).

    Correctness — questions of statutory interpretation (Diener).

    Controlling Cases:

    • Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, 263 P.3d 520 (a party may agree to pay support above the guidelines without a specific finding; a stipulation presumes the supporting facts would be sustained by evidence).
    • Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, 221 P.3d 888, aff’d, 2011 UT 42, 258 P.3d 553 (correctness review of legal determinations on modification entitlement).
    • Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, 98 P.3d 1178 (correctness review of statutory interpretation in support proceedings).

    Why It Matters: The opinion confirms that the specific-finding requirement of the guideline statute protects children against downward departures and is not triggered when parents stipulate to pay more than the guidelines require. A stipulated upward deviation incorporated into a decree is statutorily sufficient even without a stated rationale. In footnote 5, the court expressly reserved whether parties may stipulate to a downward deviation, but signaled that a court accepting such a stipulation should still enter specific findings.

  • Divorce — Decree Interpretation

    2. Divorce Decree Interpretation / Ambiguity and Parol Evidence

    Claim on Appeal: Husband argued that the Decree was ambiguous because of a missing term, namely an explanation of the reason for the upward deviation. Wife argued that a decree need contain only clear and unambiguous terms, not an explanation for every provision, so parol evidence was improper.

    Holding: — Reversed. The Decree unambiguously fixed Husband’s obligation at $8,000 per month and identified it as an upward deviation; the absence of a reason does not make the provision capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, so the Decree is silent, not ambiguous, on the reason for the deviation.

    Statutory Authority: None — resolved under contract-interpretation principles applicable to divorce decrees.

    Standard of Review:

    Correctness — interpretation of a divorce decree as a question of law (Gardner).

    Controlling Cases:

    • Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, 973 P.2d 431 (divorce decrees are interpreted under established rules of contract interpretation).
    • Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, 225 P.3d 185 (a term is ambiguous only if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies).
    • Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, 294 P.3d 600 (interpretation of a divorce decree is reviewed for correctness).

    Why It Matters: The distinction between silence and ambiguity is the doctrinal core of the opinion. A decree provision that clearly states what must be paid is not ambiguous merely because it does not state why, and a party cannot manufacture ambiguity from an unexplained motive in order to introduce extrinsic evidence of intent. Practitioners seeking to tie a support obligation to a condition must place that condition in the decree itself.

  • Child Support — Modification

    3. Child Support Modification / Contemplated Change, Best Interests, and Adequacy of Findings

    Claim on Appeal: Wife argued, alternatively, that the evidence was insufficient to support the findings underlying the grant of Husband’s petition to modify. Husband contended that Wife’s relocation and the sale of the home were a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated in the Decree.

    Holding: — Reversed and Remanded. Although the finding that Wife’s moving from and selling the home was a substantial change was not an abuse of discretion, the district court made no findings on whether that change was contemplated in the Decree or whether modification served the children’s best interests, so the findings were inadequate to sustain the modification.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-6-212 (Formerly: § 78B-12-210(9)) (petition to adjust a child support order upon a substantial change in circumstances, determined taking into account the best interests of the child).

    Standard of Review:

    Abuse of discretion — child support modification findings and the relief fashioned; substantial deference to the trial court (Diener).

    Correctness — whether the correct legal framework was applied to the modification petition (Doyle).

    Controlling Cases:

    • Gullickson v. Gullickson, 2013 UT App 83, 301 P.3d 1011 (the party seeking modification must show a substantial change of circumstances since entry of the decree that was not contemplated in the decree).
    • Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (a change is contemplated only if there is evidence, preferably a decree provision, that the trial court anticipated the specific change).
    • Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, 157 P.3d 341 (if the decree and record are bereft of any reference to the change, it was not contemplated).
    • Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, 98 P.3d 1178 (failure to make findings on all material issues in a modification ruling is reversible error unless the record is clear, uncontroverted, and supports only the judgment).

    Why It Matters: An ambiguity analysis cannot substitute for the statutory modification framework. Even where a substantial change is proven, the court must separately determine whether the decree court anticipated the specific change and whether modification serves the children’s best interests, and must articulate what changed and why that change supports the adjustment. On remand, the Stipulation’s relocation provision and its home-sale proceeds clause may bear on whether the change was contemplated, although the court of appeals did not decide that question.

  • Attorney Fees — Award

    4. Attorney Fees at Trial and on Appeal

    Claim on Appeal: Wife requested attorney fees incurred at trial and on appeal as the prevailing party on appeal.

    Holding: — Denied as to appellate fees; trial fees deferred to remand. An award of fees on appeal requires both a fee award below and success on appeal, and no fees were awarded below; the district court may reevaluate trial-level fees when it enters judgment after remand.

    Statutory Authority: Not specified in opinion.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Holladay Towne Ctr., LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LC, 2008 UT App 420, 198 P.3d 990, aff’d, 2011 UT 9, 248 P.3d 452 (an award of fees on appeal requires both a fee award below and success in the appellate court).

    Why It Matters: Prevailing on appeal alone does not entitle a party to appellate fees under this line of authority; the fee request must first succeed in the trial court. Because the underlying order was reversed, the trial-level fee question remains open for the district court on remand, and counsel should renew and support that request there.

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

  • Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, ¶ 17 n.11, 263 P.3d 520 (parties may stipulate to support above the guidelines without a specific finding; controls Issue 1).
  • Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, 98 P.3d 1178 (standards of review for statutory interpretation and support modification; findings on all material issues required in modification rulings; Issues 1 and 3).
  • Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, ¶ 9, 221 P.3d 888, aff’d, 2011 UT 42, 258 P.3d 553 (correctness review of legal determinations regarding entitlement to support modification; standard of review).
  • Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (a change is contemplated only where evidence, preferably a decree provision, shows the trial court anticipated the specific change; Issue 3).
  • Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ¶ 14, 294 P.3d 600 (interpretation of a divorce decree is a question of law reviewed for correctness; Issue 2).
  • Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, ¶ 10, 225 P.3d 185 (definition of contractual ambiguity; Issue 2).
  • Gullickson v. Gullickson, 2013 UT App 83, ¶ 21, 301 P.3d 1011 (modification requires a substantial change since the decree not contemplated in the decree; Issue 3).
  • Holladay Towne Ctr., LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LC, 2008 UT App 420, ¶ 25, 198 P.3d 990, aff’d, 2011 UT 9, 248 P.3d 452 (appellate fees require a fee award below and success on appeal; Issue 4).
  • Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ¶ 18, 973 P.2d 431 (divorce decrees are interpreted under contract principles; Issue 2).
  • Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, ¶ 12, 157 P.3d 341 (a change is not contemplated where the decree and record are bereft of any reference to it; Issue 3).

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

  • The trial court finds a decree ambiguous solely because it does not explain the reason for a term.
  • The trial court admits parol evidence of intent to interpret a support term that clearly states the amount owed.
  • The trial court treats the Act’s specific-finding requirement as applicable to a stipulated upward deviation.
  • The trial court resolves a petition to modify without determining whether the change was contemplated in the decree.
  • The modification order contains no best-interest analysis for the children receiving support.
  • The trial court expressly states that the substantial-change and best-interest analysis is unnecessary.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

Under Utah Code § 81-6-212 (formerly § 78B-12-210(9)) and the cases applied in Cantrell, a court ruling on a petition to modify child support must address:

  • Whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since entry of the decree.
  • Whether that change was contemplated in the decree, based on evidence, preferably a decree provision, that the decree court anticipated the specific change (Durfee; Wall).
  • The best interests of the children for whom support is paid.
  • Whether the substantial change justifies an adjustment of the obligor’s support, and in what amount.
  • Findings on all material issues that delineate what circumstances changed and why those changes support the modification (Diener).
  • For any stipulated downward deviation: specific findings that the deviation is warranted (dicta, footnote 5; see also § 81-6-202(3)).

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

The combination of the following factors substantially increases the viability of an appeal from a child support modification order:

  • A stipulated decree containing a clear, above-guideline support term with no stated rationale.
  • A trial court ruling that converts that silence into ambiguity.
  • An evidentiary hearing limited to the parties’ original intent rather than the statutory modification elements.
  • Findings that address substantial change but omit the contemplated-change and best-interest elements.
  • A decree or stipulation containing provisions that arguably anticipated the change, such as a relocation clause or a sale-proceeds clause, that the trial court never analyzed.

Strategy Insight

  • Cantrell shows that an appellant who has lost a credibility contest can still prevail by recasting the appeal as a challenge to the legal framework. Wife did not overturn the finding that the deviation was tied to the home; she prevailed because the court used an ambiguity analysis to bypass the statutory elements.
  • Conversely, an appellee defending a modification order is most vulnerable where the trial court’s findings rest on a legal shortcut. The safer course at trial is to obtain findings on every statutory element, even when an alternative theory appears dispositive.

Teaching Value

  • Cantrell is an effective teaching case on the difference between contract silence and contract ambiguity in the domestic relations context, and on why the purpose of a statutory safeguard (protecting children from below-guideline support) defines its scope.

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence

  • The opinion relies exclusively on Utah authority: the Utah Child Support Act and ten Utah appellate decisions. No out-of-state or federal authority is cited.
  • The analysis is anchored predominantly in Court of Appeals precedent (Davis, Durfee, Wall, Diener, Gullickson), with Utah Supreme Court authority supplying the general contract-ambiguity test and affirming two of the cited Court of Appeals decisions.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)

  • Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, 225 P.3d 185 — Established that a contractual term is ambiguous only if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies. Role: supplied the test the court applied to hold the Decree silent, not ambiguous, on the reason for the deviation.
  • Doyle v. Doyle, 2011 UT 42, 258 P.3d 553 — Affirmed the Court of Appeals decision cited for the correctness standard governing legal determinations on child support modification. Role: standard-of-review anchor for Issues 1 and 3.
  • Holladay Towne Ctr., LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LC, 2011 UT 9, 248 P.3d 452 — Affirmed the Court of Appeals decision holding that appellate fees require both a fee award below and appellate success. Role: basis for denying Wife’s request for fees on appeal.

The Most Important Holding

  • A stipulated upward deviation from the child support guidelines requires no explanatory finding, and a decree that states the amount owed without stating the reason is silent, not ambiguous.
  • Because silence is not ambiguity, a court may not use parol evidence of the parties’ unstated motives to reopen or recharacterize a stipulated support term; a party seeking relief must proceed under the statutory modification framework.

Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error

  • The reversal rests on legal error: the district court misread the statute as requiring an explanation, misapplied the ambiguity doctrine, and then applied the wrong analytical framework to the modification petition.
  • The court did not disturb the district court’s credibility determination or its substantial-change finding, which it held was within the court’s discretion. The defect was the absence of findings on the remaining statutory elements, which the district court had deemed unnecessary because of its legal error.

Downward Deviations Distinguished (Footnote 5)

  • The court expressly reserved whether and to what extent parties may stipulate to a downward deviation.
  • It signaled that a downward deviation has an obvious potential to harm the child’s best interest, so a court accepting such a stipulation should nevertheless enter specific findings supporting it. Counsel presenting a stipulated below-guideline amount should build a findings record rather than rely on Cantrell.

Statutory Developments Since Cantrell

  • The 2024 recodification now states expressly, in Utah Code § 81-6-202(9), that a stipulated child support amount is adequate under the guidelines if it equals or exceeds the base child support award, which is consistent with Cantrell‘s treatment of stipulated upward deviations.
  • Section 81-6-202(4) now defines when an order is considered a deviation, including where the order contains a written finding that it is a deviation, or the worksheet has the deviation box checked together with an explanation of the reason. Although a written finding of deviation alone satisfies the definition, including a reason on the worksheet is a low-cost drafting safeguard.
  • Modification of child support, formerly § 78B-12-210(9), is now governed by § 81-6-212. Practitioners citing Cantrell should cite the current section alongside the historical one.

Practitioner Takeaways

Trial Lawyers

  • When a support term is premised on a particular circumstance, such as retention of the marital home or the children’s continued residence in a school district, state that condition expressly in the stipulation and decree. Under Durfee, a decree provision is the preferred evidence that a change was contemplated, and Cantrell forecloses reconstructing an unstated condition through parol evidence.
  • When seeking modification, plead and prove every statutory element separately: a substantial change since entry of the decree, that the change was not contemplated in the decree, the best interests of the children, and why the change justifies the specific adjustment.
  • Resist any invitation to litigate original intent in lieu of the modification framework, even when a favorable ambiguity ruling appears to shorten the trial.
  • Collaborative law settlements often produce sparse records; counsel should consider including a brief recital of the purpose of any deviation, since the district court here described the evidence on the issue as scant.

Appellate Lawyers

  • Frame challenges to an ambiguity ruling and to the use of parol evidence as questions of law reviewed for correctness, not as attacks on credibility determinations.
  • Where a trial court skips statutory elements, frame the challenge as inadequate findings under Diener, which is reversible error unless the record is clear, uncontroverted, and supports only the judgment.
  • Appellate fees require a fee award below; if fees were not awarded at trial, preserve and renew the trial-level fee request on remand.

Parties to Collaborative or Stipulated Divorces

  • An agreement to pay above-guideline support will ordinarily be enforced as written. The obligor bears the risk of any unstated expectation about how the additional support will be used or what circumstances it assumes.

Majority Opinion

2013 UT App 296

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS JAMES N. CANTRELL,

Petitioner and Appellee, v. ELLEN CANTRELL, Respondent and Appellant. Opinion No. 20110433-CA Filed December 19, 2013 First District Court, Logan Department The Honorable Kevin K. Allen No. 084100008 Stephen W.

Jewell, Attorney for Appellant Lyle W. Hillyard and R. Christian Hansen, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred. JUDGE JAMES Z. DAVIS concurred in the result. CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶1 Ellen Cantrell (Wife) appeals from the district court’s order granting James N. Cantrell’s (Husband) petition to modify a decree of divorce. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In late 2007, after a marriage of just over twenty-two years, the parties entered into a Collaborative Law Participation Agreement in which they agreed to pursue a divorce settlement without judicial intervention. In April 2008, the parties Cantrell v. Cantrell 1. For clarity, we refer to the court in which the petition for divorce was filed and in which the decree of divorce was entered as the decree court. We refer to the court that adjudicated Husband’s petition to modify the decree of divorce and entered the order appealed from as the district court. 2. The Stipulation appears to have been drafted based on the parties’ understanding of the requirements of the Utah Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-1 to – (continued…) 20110433-CA 2 2013 UT App 296 memorialized their agreement regarding the terms of their divorce (the Stipulation) and submitted the Stipulation to the court for entry of a decree of divorce. The parties have three minor children, 1 two daughters and one son.

¶3 In the Stipulation, the parties agreed that Husband would have primary physical custody of their son and Wife would have primary physical custody of their daughters. The parties also agreed that Wife would be awarded the marital home and would attempt to refinance the home in order to eliminate Husband’s obligation as a debtor on the home. The Stipulation provided that if the marital home were sold at any time, Wife would be awarded the net proceeds of the sale, but it did not otherwise address a sale of the marital residence. The Stipulation also included a proposed parenting plan, which provided, [E]ach parent will continue to reside in fairly close proximity to the other. If either [parent] intends to relocate so that this plan would be impractical to maintain, then the relocating parent should give notice to the other parent as soon as possible. Each [parent] should then submit proposed amended parenting plans to take into account the proposed relocation.

¶4 The parties also “agreed to an upward deviation” from the child support amount required by statute. The Stipulation 2 Cantrell v. Cantrell 2. (…continued) 13 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2007). At the time the parties executed the Stipulation, that act had been renumbered and amended as the Utah Child Support Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-12-101 to -403 & amend. notes (LexisNexis 2008) (explaining that the 2008 amendments became effective February 7, 2008). However, the decree of divorce entered by the decree court properly relied upon the Utah Child Support Act as the law in effect at the time. And because the stipulated support amount is an upward deviation from the statutory guidelines under either act, the parties’ reliance on the superseded act in the Stipulation does not materially affect our analysis. 3. Based on the child support obligation worksheet attached to the Decree, Husband was obligated to pay $5,232 per month to Wife for child support for the daughters, consistent with the statutory guidelines. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-301 (LexisNexis 2008). The stipulated support amount of $8,000 was thus an upward deviation of $2,768 per month. 20110433-CA 3 2013 UT App 296 provided that Husband would “pay child support for [the daughters] to [Wife] in the amount of $8000.00 per month” and that Wife would not make any child support payments to Husband. The Stipulation did not provide any explanation for the upward deviation.

¶5 The decree court entered a decree of divorce (the Decree) in May 2008 based upon and incorporating the Stipulation. The Decree recognized that Husband’s child support obligation “constitutes an upward deviation from the amount required by [statute].” The attached child support obligation worksheet stated 3 only, “This is an upward deviation in the base child support award,” in the space provided for explanation of any deviation from the guideline amount. The Decree did not otherwise address the basis for the upward deviation.

¶6 In August 2008, Wife relocated with the daughters to upstate New York. In October 2008, Husband filed with the district court Cantrell v. Cantrell 4. Husband requested modification of other terms of the Decree in his petition to modify, but neither party has challenged the district court’s rulings on those issues in this appeal. We therefore do not review those rulings. 20110433-CA 4 2013 UT App 296 a petition to modify the Decree, in part to modify his child support to correspond to the guideline amount based on the parties’ thencurrent incomes and thereby eliminate the upward deviation.4 Husband claimed that the reason he had originally agreed to an upward deviation in the amount of his child support payment was “so that [Wife] could maintain the marital residence and [the daughters] would not have to move.” He asserted that the upward deviation was no longer necessary because “the purpose behind the upward deviation [was] defeated by [Wife’s] relocation to New York.” Accordingly, Husband argued that Wife’s relocation to New York constituted a substantial change in circumstances that was not contemplated in the Decree.

¶7 In November 2010, having settled some issues and reserved others for trial, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the remaining issues, including modification of child support. Husband argued that because no finding was made in the Decree regarding the reason for the upward deviation, his child support obligation should be recalculated according to the statutory guideline amounts. He also argued that the undisputed evidence—specifically, emails exchanged by the parties prior to their formal divorce proceedings—showed that the reason for the upward deviation was to provide for maintenance of the marital residence, and that the deviation was no longer necessary as a result of Wife’s sale of the marital residence. Wife argued that no further explanation for the upward deviation was required by statute and that the district court could not consider parol evidence to determine the reason for the upward deviation because the provisions of the Decree and Stipulation that provided for the upward deviation were not ambiguous.

¶8 After hearing oral argument on the parties’ motions for summary judgment, the district court resolved or deferred all of the issues raised except for child support. The district court Cantrell v. Cantrell 20110433-CA 5 2013 UT App 296 scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the child support issue because it found that the “stipulation and divorce decree upon which it is based are ambiguous regarding the reason that there was an upward deviation in the child support.” At the hearing on January 6, 2011, the district court elaborated, “[B]ecause there was never an explanation for the upward deviation in child support, as the code requires an explanation, [the court] found that [the Decree] was ambiguous on its face. . . . [The court] found it was ambiguous because the code requires an explanation be given.” The district court then received evidence and testimony from the parties as to the original purpose of the upward deviation. Husband testified that the purpose of the upward deviation was for maintenance of the marital home, and he offered the emails exchanged by the parties prior to their divorce as evidence of this intent. Wife testified that her remaining in the marital home was never a condition of the upward deviation and that she was already contemplating moving from the home in early 2008.

¶9 In April 2011, the district court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order granting Husband’s petition to modify child support. The court noted that “this is a difficult determination because of the scant evidence received regarding this issue because of the parties’ collaborative law agreement and their failure to articulate a reason for the upward deviation other than their ‘agreement’ to doing so.” The district court found that the evidence presented at the hearing “demonstrate[d] that the parties both desired that the minor children should remain in the marital home and that the marital home was going to take money to keep the house going.” The court found Husband’s testimony more credible as to the purpose for the upward deviation, concluding that “the reason for the upward deviation in child support was because of the substantial maintenance costs for keeping the [marital] home.” As a result, the district court found that Wife “moving from and selling the [marital] home constitutes a substantial change in circumstance[s].” The court granted Husband’s petition to modify as to child support, concluding that child support should be reduced to the amount required under the child support guidelines. Cantrell v. Cantrell 20110433-CA 6 2013 UT App 296

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶10 Wife first claims that the district court incorrectly determined that the Decree failed to comply with the requirements of the Utah Child Support Act and that this failure created an ambiguity in the Decree. Wife contends that the district court therefore erred in receiving parol evidence regarding the purpose for the upward deviation in child support and in granting Husband’s petition to modify the Decree on the basis of that evidence. “We review the trial court’s legal determinations regarding [Husband’s] entitlement to child support modification for correctness.” Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, ¶ 9, 221 P.3d 888, aff’d, 2011 UT 42, 258 P.3d 553. “Interpretation of a divorce decree presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.” Gardner v. Gardner, 2012 UT App 374, ¶ 14, 294 P.3d 600. And “we review the district court’s decision for correctness to the extent it involves questions of statutory interpretation.” Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, ¶ 4, 98 P.3d 1178 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶11 Alternatively, Wife argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the district court’s findings of fact supporting its grant of Husband’s petition to modify. “In reviewing child . . . support proceedings, we accord substantial deference to the trial court’s findings and give it considerable latitude in fashioning the appropriate relief. We will not disturb the district court’s actions unless the court exceeded the limits of its permitted discretion.” Id. (omission in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶12 The central issue in this case is whether the district court erred in granting Husband’s petition to modify the award of child support to eliminate the upward deviation. Entry and modification of child support orders are governed by section 210 of the Utah Child Support Act (the Act). Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-210 (LexisNexis 2008). To determine whether the district court properly Cantrell v. Cantrell 20110433-CA 7 2013 UT App 296 based its decision on a perceived ambiguity in the Decree we must first interpret the requirements for a deviated order under Utah Code section 78B-12-210(3). We then consider whether the district court’s ruling on Husband’s petition to modify complied with the requirements to modify a decree of divorce under Utah Code section 78B-12-210(9).

I. Under These Circumstances, No Explanation for the Upward Deviation in the Decree Was Required by Statute.

¶13 Wife challenges the district court’s determination that the Decree did not comply with the statutory requirements for an upward deviation because no explanation was given for the upward deviation in child support. The district court explained, “[T]here was never an explanation for the upward deviation . . . ; therefore, [the court] found it was ambiguous because the code requires an explanation be given.” Wife argues that the district court incorrectly concluded that the absence of such an explanation created an ambiguity in the Decree. We therefore consider the requirements for a deviated child support order under the Act.

¶14 The Act establishes specific guidelines for the calculation of child support obligations. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-12-205, -301 (LexisNexis 2008). The Act also establishes a presumption that the award amount resulting from application of the guidelines is the correct child support obligation to be imposed. Id. § 78B-12-210(2). Generally, to rebut the presumption that the guideline amount is correct, the district court must enter a “specific finding on the record” supporting its conclusion that the guideline award would be “unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child.” Id. § 78B-12-210(3). However, “a party may agree to pay child support in excess of the guidelines even if the trial court does not make a specific finding that such a deviation is warranted.” Davis v. Davis, 2011 UT App 311, ¶ 17 n.11, 263 P.3d 520 (emphasis added). Because an increase in ordered child support does not negatively implicate a child’s best interest in the obvious way that a decrease in child support would, a district court may accept the parties’ stipulation to an upward deviation without further findings under the principle that a “stipulation constitutes an agreement of the Cantrell v. Cantrell 5. This case does not present us with the question of whether and to what extent partiesmay stipulate to a downward deviation from the guideline child support amount, and we do not decide that question today. Clearly a decrease in child support from the guideline amount has an obvious potential to negatively affect the best interest of the child. Thus, if the district court accepts a stipulation by the parties to such a downward deviation from the guideline child support amount, it should nevertheless enter specific findings supporting its conclusion that such a downward deviation was warranted under the circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-210(3) (LexisNexis 2008). 20110433-CA 8 2013 UT App 296 parties that all the facts necessary to support it . . . pre-existed and would be sustained by available evidence, had not the agreement of the parties dispensed with the taking of evidence,” see id. (omission in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).5

¶15 Here, as a result of their collaborative law agreement, the parties stipulated to an upward deviation from the presumed guideline amount. The decree court accepted the parties’ stipulation and incorporated the stipulated deviation into the Decree without a separate finding by the decree court to rebut the presumption under Utah Code section 78B-12-210(3). However, because the parties had stipulated to an upward deviation from the guideline amount, the decree court was not required to make a specific finding that the deviation was warranted. See id. Thus, even absent such a finding by the decree court, the Decree complied with the requirements of Utah Code section 78B-12-210(3). The district court therefore erred in concluding that an explanation for the deviation was required by statute under these circumstances and that the absence of an explanation rendered the Decree ambiguous.

II. The Decree Is Not Otherwise Ambiguous as to the Reason for the Upward Deviation.

¶16 Our determination that the Act does not require an explanation for the upward deviation in this case is not dispositive Cantrell v. Cantrell 20110433-CA 9 2013 UT App 296 of the parties’ arguments regarding whether the Decree is ambiguous under a contract analysis. “We interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of contract interpretation . . . .” Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12, ¶ 18, 973 P.2d 431 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.” Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, ¶ 10, 225 P.3d 185 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Husband argues that the Decree is rendered ambiguous by a missing term—an explanation of the reason for the upward deviation. Wife argues that the language of the Decree is unambiguous because a contract need contain only clear and unambiguous terms, and not an explanation for every provision. We agree with Wife.

¶17 The Decree plainly states that Husband “shall pay to [Wife], as and for base child support, the sum of $8,000 per month for the support of [the daughters], commencing the month after the date of entry by the Court of this Decree of Divorce.” The Decree also notes that the child support award is an upward deviation from that required by statute. The partiesdo not dispute that these terms unambiguously define Husband’s child support obligation. The absence of an explanation for why the parties agreed to the upward deviation or the specific amount of child support has no bearing on the meaning or interpretation of the child support provision and does not render the terms of the Decree “capable of more than one reasonable interpretation.” See id. Accordingly, we conclude that the Decree is not ambiguous as to the reason for the upward deviation but that it is simply silent on the matter.

III. The District Court’s Findings Are Inadequate To Sustain Its Grant of Husband’s Petition To Modify the Decree with Respect to Child Support.

¶18 Having determined that the Decree is not ambiguous, we next consider whether the district court properly granted Husband’s petition to modify the Decree. The district court explained that as a result of its determination that the Decree was Cantrell v. Cantrell 20110433-CA 10 2013 UT App 296 ambiguous, the court was not required to “go through the whole analysis of a substantial change in circumstances, best interests of the child, because that’s not necessary.” We conclude, however, that the district court was required to evaluate Husband’s petition under the statutory framework for deciding a petition to modify child support.

¶19 Because the Decree is not ambiguous, the district court’s task was not to clarify the Decree by employing a contract analysis but to evaluate Husband’s petition under Utah Code section 78B-12- 210(9). “A parent, legal guardian, or the [Office of Recovery Services] may at any time petition the court to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-210(9)(a) (LexisNexis 2008). “Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into account the best interests of the child[,] . . . determine whether a substantial change has occurred” and whether that change justifies an adjustment of the payor’s child support obligations. See id. § 78B-12-210(9)(c). “[A] party requesting that a divorce decree be modified must demonstrate that there has been a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry of the decree [that was] not contemplated in the decree itself.” Gullickson v. Gullickson, 2013 UT App 83, ¶ 21, 301 P.3d 1011 (first alteration in original). However, it is not enough for the parties themselves to have contemplated the change in circumstances. “In order for a material change in circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence, preferably in the form of a provision within the decree itself, that the trial court anticipated the specific change.” Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). “Thus, if both the divorce decree and the record are bereft of any reference to the changed circumstance at issue in the petition to modify, then the subsequent changed circumstance was not contemplated in the original divorce decree.” Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, ¶ 12, 157 P.3d 341 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶20 Husband petitioned for a modification of the Decree on the basis that Wife’s “relocation to New York . . . constitutes a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated at the time Cantrell v. Cantrell 20110433-CA 11 2013 UT App 296 the Decree of Divorce was entered.” The district court’s focus thus should have been on subsection 78B-12-210(9) and determining whether there was a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated in the Decree. However,the district court focused on the question of ambiguity and the parties’ intent to the exclusion of an inquiry into whether the substantial change in circumstances it identified was contemplated by the decree court in entering the Decree and whether modification of Husband’s support obligation would be in the best interest of the children. The district court specifically explained that the only evidence that was to be received and considered on the issue of child support related to the intent of the parties as to the upward deviation and not to whether modification was appropriate under the Act.

¶21 “[W]hen explaining the outcome of a modification petition, the court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to delineate what circumstances have changed and why these changes support the modification made [to] the prior divorce decree constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment.” Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, ¶ 7, 98 P.3d 1178 (second alteration in original). Here, the district court received evidence and testimony from the parties and prepared factual findings based on that evidence. Notably, the district court found that Wife’s “moving from and selling the [marital] home constitutes a substantial change in circumstances.” Based upon the evidence in the record, including the email evidence and Husband’s testimony regarding the importance of maintaining the marital home for the children—which testimony the district court expressly found more credible than Wife’s on that issue—we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion. See id. ¶ 4.

¶22 However, the district court did not analyze or make any findings regarding whether Wife’s relocation or the sale of the marital home was contemplated in the Decree and whether modification of Husband’s child support obligation would be consistent with the best interest of the children for whom the child support payment is intended. See id. ¶¶ 13–14. As a result, the findings and record before this court are inadequate to sustain the Cantrell v. Cantrell 6. Wife also requests attorney fees incurred at trial and on appeal on the basis that she is the prevailing party on appeal. “An award of fees on appeal requires both a fee award below and success in the appellate court.” Holladay Towne Ctr., LLC v. Brown Family Holdings, LC, 2008 UT App 420, ¶ 25, 198 P.3d 990, aff’d, 2011 UT 9, 248 P.3d 452. We deny Wife’s request for attorney fees incurred on appeal because the district court did not award attorney fees below. And because we reverse the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings, the district court may reevaluate Wife’s request for attorney fees upon entering judgment at the conclusion of those proceedings. We therefore need not address Wife’s request for fees incurred below at this time. 20110433-CA 12 2013 UT App 296 district court’s grant of Husband’s petition to modify the Decree with respect to child support. See id. ¶ 7. We therefore reverse the district court’s order as it relates to Husband’s child support obligation and remand for the district court to evaluate Husband’s petition under Utah Code section 78B-12-210(9) and to make further factual findings on the issues discussed in this opinion.6

CONCLUSION

¶23 The district court erred in concluding that an explanation for the upward deviation in child support was required by the Act under these circumstances and that the absence of an explanation created an ambiguity in the Decree. Because the Decree was not ambiguous, the district court erred by failing to evaluate Husband’s petition to modify the Decree under the appropriate statutory framework and to make the required factual findings. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed

The reviewing court determined that the lower court committed reversible error and overturned the judgment.

Remanded

The reviewing court returned the case to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.