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Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App 19

Link to Official Court Opinion

Case Summary

Loren Price Anderson appealed a district court decision resolving his petition to modify child support and alimony following his 2008 divorce from Lynessa Michelle Anderson. After a bench trial, the district court imputed monthly income of $6,662 to Loren, awarded Lynessa $1,900 per month in alimony, $714.64 per month in child support for the parties’ remaining minor child, and $16,403.44 in attorney fees. Loren challenged all four determinations on appeal, arguing the imputed income figure was unsupported, that the alimony award exceeded Lynessa’s actual needs, that child support was consequently miscalculated, and that the attorney fee award lacked adequate consideration of the statutory factors. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on every issue except one narrow aspect of the alimony calculation, remanding solely for removal of a retirement-account expense that had been improperly included in Lynessa’s monthly needs.

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Oral Argument

Briefing Documents

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Coverage

Facts

Marriage and Family

  • Loren and Lynessa were married from 1989 to 2008, and Lynessa stayed home to raise the couple’s four children while Loren worked as a contractor installing carpet and countertops.
  • The family enjoyed a comfortable standard of living during the marriage, including funding two sons’ competitive travel hockey, which could cost more than $7,000 per year, and Loren sometimes covered hockey fees for other families who could not afford them.

Loren’s Employment and Business

  • After working for other companies early in the marriage, Loren started his own contracting business and primarily submitted subcontracting bids to Action Target, a company that installs gun ranges for military, law enforcement, and commercial clients.
  • Loren kept his business income in an account separate from Lynessa’s, paid workers in cash, and Lynessa was rarely told what he earned on any given project, though family members observed him carrying large amounts of cash.

Breakdown of the Marriage and the 2008 Divorce

  • The marriage began to break down in 2006 when Loren admitted to personal troubles and drug use, which Lynessa testified changed his behavior and ultimately led to the divorce.
  • In 2008 the district court entered a default divorce decree after Loren failed to respond to the petition; relying on Loren’s 2007 Form 1099 showing annual income of $219,246 (about $18,271 per month), the court ordered him to pay $2,945 in monthly child support and $2,719 in monthly alimony, with the alimony obligation to last as long as the marriage.

Post-Divorce Non-Payment and Incarceration

  • Following the divorce, Loren pleaded guilty to drug- and fraud-related crimes and was in and out of jail for approximately three years, during which he rarely paid his support obligations and, when he did, paid inconsistently and often in cash.
  • Even after the Office of Recovery Services became involved, Lynessa received only about $600 per month combined for child support and alimony, forcing her to rely on help from her church, friends, and family, and to sell personal items such as gold and jewelry to provide for herself and the children.

The 2011 Petition to Modify

  • In 2011 Loren filed a petition to modify child support and alimony, alleging a substantial change in circumstances and asserting he could not afford the existing obligations because his post-divorce income had decreased and he could no longer maintain his own construction business.

Financial Declarations

  • Lynessa’s financial declaration, supported by her 2014 tax return and 2015 pay stubs, reflected net monthly income of $2,572.01 and claimed monthly expenses of $5,496.21.
  • Loren submitted incomplete tax returns and pay stubs from one employer reflecting hourly rates between roughly $20 and $33 per hour, but claimed he was actually earning only $11 per hour, or about $2,000 per month.

Trial Testimony on Income and the Steelcoat Business

  • Around the time he filed the petition, Loren began a relationship with a new partner (New Wife) and helped her register a construction company, Steelcoat, though New Wife had no prior business experience and admitted she relied on Loren to operate the company.
  • Loren claimed to be merely a $11-per-hour Steelcoat employee but admitted at trial that he was the company’s public-facing contact with Action Target, which subcontracted most of Steelcoat’s work.
  • A representative of Action Target testified that preparing subcontracting bids is specialized, detailed work requiring prior installation experience, and that Action Target communicated with Loren, not New Wife, on Steelcoat projects; Loren also admitted Action Target had hired him personally for certain projects but provided no records of what he was paid.
  • The parties’ son Steele testified that when he asked Loren for help with hockey fees before trial, Loren indicated it would be easier for him “to not have to hide what he’s doing” if Lynessa stopped pursuing him for money, and Loren admitted he had not sought better-paying employment in the three or four years preceding trial.

The District Court’s Imputed-Income Determination

  • Finding Loren’s testimony about his income and New Wife’s ownership of Steelcoat incredible, and noting Loren’s failure to provide complete financial documentation, the district court relied on Loren’s 2004 tax return (from a period when he operated a business similar to Steelcoat) reflecting adjusted gross income of $41,317.
  • The court added $20,000 to that figure based on the hockey-related expenses Loren had been able to cover during the marriage, adjusted for inflation, and imputed annual income of $79,948, or $6,662 per month.

The District Court’s Alimony and Child Support Determination

  • The district court reduced Lynessa’s claimed monthly expenses of $5,496.21 to $4,400 by removing amounts spent on adult children, waivable school fees, and pet care, and, based on those expenses and her $2,513 monthly income, awarded $1,900 per month in alimony, applied retroactively and lasting for a period equal to the length of the marriage.
  • The court also reduced child support to $714.64 per month for the parties’ one remaining minor child and awarded Lynessa $16,403.44 in attorney fees based on her financial need and Loren’s ability to pay, given his imputed income.

 

Issues of the Case

Loren, as appellant, raised four issues on appeal.

  1. Issue 1: Imputed Income
  2. Issue 2: Alimony in Excess of Needs
  3. Issue 3: Child Support Based on Imputed Income
  4. Issue 4: Attorney Fees

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on Issues 1, 3, and 4 in their entirety, and affirmed Issue 2 in part, reversing and remanding only for removal of a $200 monthly retirement-account contribution improperly included in Lynessa’s necessary expenses.

  • Alimony — Imputed Income

    1. Imputed Income

    Claim on Appeal: Loren contended the district court abused its discretion by imputing $6,662 in monthly income to him, arguing the court should have relied on his more recent pay stubs or tax filings rather than his 2004 tax return, and that it improperly added $20,000 based on hockey-related expenses discussed at trial.

    Holding: — Affirmed. The Court of Appeals declined to reach the merits because Loren’s brief failed to apply the legal authority he cited to the specific facts of his case, as required by rule 24(a)(8), and he therefore failed to carry his burden of persuasion on appeal.

    Statutory Authority: Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8) (appellate briefing requirements — an appellant must develop a reasoned argument supported by citations to the record and to governing legal authority)

    Standard of Review:

    • Abuse of discretion — governs a district court’s financial determinations, including income imputation, in a divorce action, and such determinations carry a presumption of validity.
    • Adequacy of briefing under rule 24 — governs whether an appellate argument has been sufficiently developed to preserve the issue for merits review.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, 316 P.3d 455 (district courts have considerable discretion over financial and property determinations in divorce).
    • Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 299 P.3d 1079 (articulating the grounds on which a financial determination in a divorce action may be reversed).
    • Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, 391 P.3d 196 (a brief with bald citations to authority, undeveloped, fails to preserve an issue).
    • Rose v. Office of Prof’l Conduct, 2017 UT 50 (inadequate briefing under rule 24 is no longer an absolute bar to review but will ordinarily defeat the burden of persuasion).

    Why It Matters: This portion of the opinion is a reminder that even a well-marshaled factual record cannot substitute for applying legal authority to those facts. Practitioners challenging an income-imputation finding must connect each case or statute cited to the specific error alleged, or risk having an otherwise strong factual argument go unreviewed on the merits.

  • Alimony – Financial Needs

    2. Alimony in Excess of Needs

    Claim on Appeal: Loren argued that, even assuming the imputed income figure was correct, the $1,900 monthly alimony award exceeded Lynessa’s actual needs because it included anticipated (not currently incurred) expenses — a retirement account contribution, a car loan, and health insurance — and because it was awarded in addition to child support.

    Holding: — Affirmed in part; Reversed and Remanded in part. The court held it was not an abuse of discretion to include anticipated car-loan and health-insurance costs, or to award alimony alongside child support, but agreed the district court abused its discretion by including a $200 monthly retirement-account contribution without the detailed findings such an award requires, and remanded solely to remove that amount and adjust the alimony calculation.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-4-504 (Formerly: § 30-3-5(8)(h)(ii)) — a court may not address needs of a spouse that did not exist during the marriage or at the time the decree was entered unless it finds extenuating circumstances justifying that action.

    Standard of Review:

    • Abuse of discretion — applies to a district court’s determination of a spouse’s reasonable monthly needs and the resulting alimony award, which is entitled to a presumption of validity.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (alimony’s purpose is to let the receiving spouse maintain, as nearly as possible, the marital standard of living, and to prevent that spouse from becoming a public charge).
    • Woolums v. Woolums, 2013 UT App 232, 312 P.3d 939 (alimony maintains the marital standard of living rather than merely the amount actually being spent).
    • Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (standard of living is not determined by actual expenses alone).
    • Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, 80 P.3d 153 (retirement contributions ordinarily may not be factored into alimony absent detailed findings that such contributions were standard practice during the marriage).
    • Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT App 373, 294 P.3d 591 (best practice is to analyze alimony without factoring in child support obligations).
    • Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, 335 P.3d 378 (treating child support as the recipient’s income is permissible where the recipient combined her expenses with the children’s in her financial declaration).

    Why It Matters: The opinion reinforces that a spouse’s “needs” for alimony purposes are measured against the marital standard of living, not a ledger of expenses currently being paid — a distinction that matters for a lower-earning spouse who has had to forgo necessities like a working car or health coverage post-divorce. At the same time, the retirement-account holding confirms that some categories of anticipated expense (particularly retirement savings) require detailed, case-specific findings before they can be included, making this an area where thin findings are especially vulnerable on appeal.

  • Child Support – Income Imputation

    3. Child Support Based on Imputed Income

    Claim on Appeal: Loren contended the district court’s child support award was erroneous because it was calculated using the imputed monthly income of $6,662.

    Holding: — Affirmed (not reached on the merits). Because the challenge to the imputed-income finding itself was inadequately briefed, the derivative challenge to the resulting child support award was not addressed.

    Statutory Authority: Not independently addressed in the opinion; the child support award followed directly from the imputed-income determination discussed under Issue 1.

    Standard of Review:

    • Abuse of discretion — governs a district court’s child support and alimony determinations generally.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, 169 P.3d 754 (child support and alimony decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion).

    Why It Matters: This issue illustrates how a derivative claim rises or falls with its predicate: because the child support figure depended entirely on the imputed income the court declined to review, the child support challenge failed for the same briefing deficiency without any independent analysis.

  • Attorney Fees — Award

    4. Attorney Fees

    Claim on Appeal: Loren argued the district court erred in awarding Lynessa $16,403.44 in attorney fees without adequately considering the factors governing such awards in a divorce modification action.

    Holding: — Affirmed. The district court adequately considered Lynessa’s financial need and Loren’s ability to pay, the latter grounded in his imputed income; the Court of Appeals separately corrected the district court’s alternative reliance on the bad-faith fee-shifting statute but held that error did not affect the fee award under the domestic-relations fee statute. The court also awarded Lynessa her attorney fees incurred on appeal.

    Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-1-203 (Formerly: § 30-3-3(1)) (in an action to modify child support or alimony, the court may order a party to pay the other party’s costs, attorney fees, and witness fees); Utah Code § 78B-5-825(1) (bad-faith fee-shifting provision, held inapplicable on these facts).

    Standard of Review:

    • Abuse of discretion — the decision whether to award attorney fees, and in what amount, rests primarily in the district court’s sound discretion, subject to reversal if the court fails to make adequate findings on need, ability to pay, and reasonableness.

    Controlling Cases:

    • Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (attorney fee award must be based on evidence of the receiving spouse’s need, the payor’s ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees).
    • Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, 147 P.3d 464 (identifying the three required attorney-fee factors; prevailing party on appeal is generally entitled to fees on appeal).
    • Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (a party who substantially prevails on appeal in a domestic action where fees were awarded below is generally entitled to fees on appeal).

    Why It Matters: The decision confirms that a fee award in a modification action stands so long as the three statutory factors are addressed, even where the district court also cites an inapplicable statutory basis in the alternative — the surviving, properly grounded basis is sufficient. It also reflects the routine practice of extending fees on appeal to a party who both received fees below and substantially prevails on appeal.

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

  • Smith v. Smith, 2017 UT App 40, 392 P.3d 985 (source of the court’s practice of referring to same-surname parties by first name).
  • Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, 316 P.3d 455 (district courts have considerable discretion over financial and property determinations in divorce, entitled to a presumption of validity).
  • Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 299 P.3d 1079 (setting out the grounds for reversing a district court’s financial determinations in divorce).
  • Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, 169 P.3d 754 (child support and alimony decisions reviewed for abuse of discretion).
  • Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, 391 P.3d 196 (standard for inadequate briefing and the burden of persuasion on appeal).
  • Rose v. Office of Prof’l Conduct, 2017 UT 50 (clarifying that inadequate briefing under rule 24 is no longer an absolute bar to appellate review).
  • Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (defining the purposes of alimony and the three-factor test for determining it).
  • Woolums v. Woolums, 2013 UT App 232, 312 P.3d 939 (alimony maintains the marital standard of living rather than actual expenses alone).
  • Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (defining “standard of living” for alimony purposes).
  • Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, 80 P.3d 153 (retirement account contributions require detailed findings before inclusion in an alimony needs analysis).
  • Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT App 373, 294 P.3d 591 (best practice to analyze alimony without factoring in child support).
  • Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, 335 P.3d 378 (exception permitting child support to be treated as recipient income in certain circumstances).
  • Reick v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) (child support is a vested right of the minor child).
  • Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (three-factor test governing attorney fee awards in divorce actions).
  • Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, 147 P.3d 464 (attorney fee factors and entitlement to fees on appeal for the prevailing party).
  • Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (fees generally awarded on appeal to a party who received fees below and substantially prevails on appeal).

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

  • Alimony findings that include a category of expense (especially retirement contributions) without the heightened, case-specific findings Bakanowski requires.
  • Findings that are silent on why a post-decree or previously unenjoyed expense meets the extenuating-circumstances standard, particularly where the original decree affirmatively contradicts the claimed expense.
  • An underlying divorce decree or prior judicial finding that directly conflicts with a newly claimed expense or asset (here, the original decree’s finding that neither party had a retirement account).

Mandatory Factor Checklist

  • Alimony: (1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the receiving spouse’s ability to produce sufficient income; and (3) the responding spouse’s ability to provide support.
  • Attorney Fees in Divorce Actions: (1) the receiving spouse’s financial need; (2) the paying spouse’s ability to pay; and (3) the reasonableness of the requested fees.
  • Retirement-Account Expenses in Alimony: findings, more detailed than a standard needs analysis, showing that retirement contributions were standard practice during the marriage and formed part of the marital standard of living, or that extenuating circumstances otherwise justify the award.

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

  • A financial declaration that mixes clearly marriage-established expenses (car, health insurance) with a legally disfavored category (retirement contributions) without separately supported findings for the latter.
  • An underlying divorce decree containing findings that could be read to contradict a currently claimed expense or asset.
  • An appellant’s brief that cites governing case law but does not walk through how each case’s reasoning applies to the specific facts being challenged — this combination is what defeated three of Loren’s four issues before the merits were even reached.

Strategy Insight

Loren’s most successful argument (the retirement account) was framed as a discrete legal-standard failure — the absence of the heightened findings Bakanowski requires — rather than as a broad factual disagreement with the district court’s assessment of the evidence. His unsuccessful arguments (imputed income, combined alimony and child support) were framed more as invitations to reweigh the evidence or as general assertions of excess, without tying a specific legal rule to a specific gap in the findings. The lesson for future appeals under this framework: identify the precise finding the law requires, show it is missing or contradicted by the record, and build the argument around that gap rather than around a general claim that the result was unfair.

 

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence

The opinion relies exclusively on Utah authority — Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court decisions and the Utah Code and Rules of Appellate Procedure. No out-of-state or federal authority is cited, consistent with the highly state-specific nature of Utah’s alimony, child support, and fee-shifting framework.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)

  • Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 299 P.3d 1079 — establishes that a district court’s financial determinations in divorce carry a presumption of validity and are reversed only for misapplication of law, clear evidentiary preponderance against the finding, serious inequity, or inadequate findings; anchors the deferential standard applied throughout the opinion.
  • Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, 391 P.3d 196 — defines inadequate briefing and its consequences for the burden of persuasion; controls the disposition of the imputed-income and derivative child-support issues.
  • Rose v. Office of Prof’l Conduct, 2017 UT 50 — clarifies that a rule 24 briefing defect is no longer an automatic bar to review but will ordinarily still defeat the appellant’s burden of persuasion; frames how the court could decline the merits without declaring outright waiver.

The Most Important Holding

The most significant holding is the retirement-account ruling under Issue 2: absent detailed findings showing that retirement contributions were a standard, marriage-established practice, a district court may not include anticipated retirement savings in a needs-based alimony calculation. This is the only issue on which Loren prevailed, and it demonstrates that even highly deferential abuse-of-discretion review has real teeth where the district court’s findings do not match the heightened detail Bakanowski requires for this specific category of expense.

Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error

The partial reversal here rested on legal error, not a factual dispute: the district court’s findings did not address the extenuating-circumstances showing required before an unenjoyed-during-the-marriage expense like a retirement contribution can be included in an alimony needs analysis, and the original divorce decree affirmatively found no retirement account existed during the marriage. On every other issue, the court found no legal error and no evidentiary basis to disturb the district court’s findings, illustrating how a losing appellant’s best opportunities lie in identifying a specific, articulable gap in the required findings rather than simply re-arguing the weight of the evidence.

Continued Deference in Income Determinations

The opinion reaffirms that income imputation based on credibility determinations — here, disbelieving a party’s claimed hourly wage and a newly formed business’s ownership structure — receives strong deference on appeal, and will not be disturbed absent a well-developed legal argument identifying the specific error in the court’s approach.

Practitioner Takeaways

Trial Lawyers:

  • When claiming anticipated (not-yet-incurred) expenses such as a car loan, health insurance, or especially retirement contributions in a financial declaration, build a trial record connecting each expense to the marital standard of living, and request detailed findings on that connection — particularly for retirement accounts, which require more than a standard needs analysis.
  • Where a client’s income is difficult to verify (cash payments, closely held businesses, a spouse’s or partner’s company used as a conduit), develop testimony from third parties (such as a customer or subcontractor representative) about the client’s actual role and involvement, as this proved decisive to the imputed-income finding.

Appellate Lawyers:

  • An abuse-of-discretion challenge to income imputation or a needs-based expense finding must apply the cited cases and statutes directly to the specific facts being challenged — bald citations to authority, however numerous, will not preserve the issue under rule 24(a)(8).
  • When challenging a combined alimony and child support award as excessive, identify specific children’s expenses left in the recipient’s declaration; a generalized “combined award exceeds needs” argument was rejected where the district court had already removed adult-children and discretionary expenses.

Self-Employed Individuals / Business Owners:

  • Courts scrutinize newly formed businesses run by a party’s romantic partner where the party continues to perform the substantive work; documentation showing a genuine, independent ownership and operational role is important to avoid adverse income-imputation findings.

Majority Opinion

2018 UT App 19

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS LYNESSA MICHELLE ANDERSON, Appellee, v. LOREN PRICE ANDERSON, Appellant.

Opinion No. 20160507-CA Filed February 1, 2018 Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Samuel D. McVey No. 084400367

Rosemond G. Blakelock, Attorney for Appellant Jill L. Coil and Luke A. Shaw, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and JILL M. POHLMAN concurred. TOOMEY, Judge:

¶1 Following a bench trial for Loren Price Anderson’s petition to modify child support and alimony, the district court awarded Lynessa Michelle Anderson $1,900 per month for alimony, $714.64 for child support, and $16,403.44 in attorney fees. Loren1 appeals these awards, contending the district court abused its discretion by (1) imputing income to him in the amount of $6,662 per month; (2) awarding Lynessa alimony in excess of her actual needs; (3) awarding child support to Lynessa 1. “As is our practice in cases where both parties share a last name, we refer to the parties by their first name with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.” Smith v. Smith, 2017 UT App 40, ¶ 2 n.1, 392 P.3d 985. Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 2 2018 UT App 19 based on the improperly imputed income; and (4) awarding Lynessa attorney fees without “appropriate consideration of the relevant attorney fees factors.”

¶2 We agree with Loren that the court abused its discretion in awarding Lynessa alimony in the amount of $1,900 per month, but only to the extent that it erroneously considered retirement fund contributions in Lynessa’s monthly expenses, because they were not enjoyed during the marriage, and we remand solely for removal of that amount from the alimony award. But we conclude there was no abuse of discretion when the district court included anticipated car loan payments and health insurance in Lynessa’s monthly expenses, because alimony need not be based solely on current expenses.

¶3 We decline to address Loren’s claims of error with respect to his imputed income and the award of child support based on his imputed income because he failed to support his argument with reasoned analysis using legal precedent.

¶4 Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Lynessa based on her need and Loren’s ability to pay them.

BACKGROUND

¶5 Loren and Lynessa were married from 1989 to 2008. During their marriage, Lynessa stayed home to raise their four children while Loren worked as a contractor installing carpet and countertops. According to Lynessa, during the marriage Loren was “a workaholic,” “always looking for the next job,” and was a great provider for the family. Indeed, there was money for extras: two of their sons, Tyler and Steele, were on hockey teams that traveled for games, which could cost more than $7,000 in fees and other expenses per year, which the family was able to pay. Loren also “sometimes [paid] for other kids’ Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 3 2018 UT App 19 hockey tuition fees because their families couldn’t afford it themselves.” Tyler recounted that while his parents were married, “we never went without. . . . We had everything we needed.”

¶6 After working for different companies for a few years early on in the marriage, Loren started his own contracting business. He primarily submitted subcontracting bids to Action Target, a construction company that provided installations for military, law enforcement, and commercial gun ranges. The money he earned was deposited into a checking account separate from Lynessa’s checking account, and whenever Lynessa needed to pay bills or required funds for the children, Loren gave her cash. Lynessa was never privy to what Loren earned for each project and was rarely made aware of the identity of the contractor. But Tyler, Steele, and Lynessa each observed Loren carrying a great deal of cash. After a project’s completion, Loren paid cash to his workers.

¶7 In 2006, the Andersons’ marriage started to break down. Loren admitted he was “having some troubles at that time” and began using drugs. By Lynessa’s account, Loren was no longer “in his right mind set” and he became “very promiscuous” and she “didn’t want him around anymore.” Loren’s drug use rendered him incapable of earning an income for a time and it ultimately led to their divorce.

¶8 In 2008, the district court entered a default decree of divorce after Loren failed to respond to Lynessa’s petition. Because Loren did not respond and failed to assist the court with financial documents, the court relied on his 1099 Form from 2007 showing an annual income of $219,246 “or $18,271 per month” to determine his ability to pay child support and alimony. The court imputed income to Lynessa in the amount of $1,014 per month. Ultimately, Loren was ordered to pay $2,945 per month for child support and $2,719 per month for alimony. The child Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 4 2018 UT App 19 support obligation was to be reduced as each child reached the age of eighteen, and the alimony obligation was to continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage.

¶9 Beginning around the time of the divorce, Loren pleaded guilty to drug and fraud related crimes and was in and out of jail for three years. Though he was obligated to pay Lynessa a total of $5,664 each month for alimony and child support, he rarely paid and never in the full amount. When he did pay, it was always in cash, until the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) became involved. Lynessa testified, “We would go long periods of time without anything from [Loren]. For the longest time he was paying 200 a month, and he just recently changed it to paying [550].” Even after ORS became involved, Lynessa received only $600 per month for combined child support and alimony. This required Lynessa to receive financial assistance from her church, friends, and family. She also sold some of her gold, jewelry, and other items to provide for herself and the children. But even with this help, she was always behind on bills, and neither she nor the children lived a lifestyle similar to what they enjoyed during the marriage. Tyler testified that their living conditions changed after the divorce, that Lynessa could not fix things around the house, that they relied on their church for food, and that without the money for alimony or child support, Lynessa worked as often as she could “even if it meant not seeing [the children] as often.”

¶10 In 2011, Loren filed a petition to modify child support and alimony (the Petition) based on a substantial change in circumstances that resulted in a decrease in income from the time the divorce decree was entered. He alleged that he could not afford to pay child support or alimony because the amount he was ordered to pay was “in excess of [his] income.” Loren claimed he had no income during his incarceration and a decreased ability to earn an income similar to what he had Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 5 2018 UT App 19 earned during the marriage because he could no longer maintain his own construction business.

¶11 Lynessa and Loren each filed financial declarations and other documents related to their respective incomes and expenses. Lynessa provided her 2014 tax return and pay stubs from 2015, which supported her net monthly income of $2,572.01 as purported in her financial declaration, and claimed monthly expenses in the amount of $5,496.21. Loren provided incomplete tax returns for the years he had actually filed them and monthly pay stubs from one employer with hourly rates that varied from about $20 per hour to $33 per hour. But Loren claimed he was earning only $11 per hour, or $2000 per month.

¶12 The district court held a bench trial in 2015 to resolve the issues Loren raised in the Petition. At trial, most of the testimony related to Loren’s ability to earn income, whether he was actually earning only $2,000 per month, and whether he or his new wife (New Wife) owned a construction company.

¶13 Around the time Loren filed the Petition, he had initiated a romantic relationship with New Wife and helped her to register a construction company, Steelcoat. New Wife had never owned a business before, let alone a construction company, and both New Wife and Loren admitted that she relied on Loren to operate Steelcoat. Loren claimed he was only an employee of Steelcoat and made just $11 per hour, or $2,000 per month, but also admitted at trial that he was the “face [of Steelcoat] to a lot of people at Action Target”—the construction company that subcontracts most of Steelcoat’s work and with which Loren has had a long professional relationship.

¶14 Loren’s claimed income and whether New Wife was indeed the sole proprietor of Steelcoat were called into question when New Wife admitted that Loren helped create all of the bids Steelcoat sent to different companies and that she was not sure whether the bids needed to be signed before submission. In Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 6 2018 UT App 19 addition, a representative from Action Target testified that submitting bids is “pretty specific” and “detailed” work that requires a bidder to have “at least done some [installation] work before, or be guided in what it takes to do it.” The representative also testified that Action Target works closely with its subcontractors during projects and that when it accepts Steelcoat’s bids the company communicates with Loren and not with New Wife. Further, Loren admitted that Action Target has hired him, personally, to complete certain of its projects, but he did not provide any information related to the payments he received for those projects.

¶15 In addition to Loren’s failure to provide the court with a complete tax return, other than a 2004 tax return, to support his claimed monthly income of $2,000 per month, Lynessa’s attorney elicited testimony from Steele that further negated Loren’s claim about his income. Steele testified that when he asked Loren for financial help for hockey fees just before the trial, Loren responded that if Lynessa “would stop coming after him [for] money” that “it would be easier for him to not have to hide what he’s doing.” And when the court asked about his ability to earn a better income, Loren admitted he had not applied for employment that would pay more than $11 per hour “in the last three or four years” prior to the trial.

¶16 After trial, the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. It found that there had been a “material and substantial change in circumstance” with respect to the incomes of both parties that allowed for modification of the divorce decree. Because Loren failed to provide complete financial documents or tax returns, the court had to determine an appropriate amount of income to impute to him. It found incredible the testimony regarding Loren’s income and New Wife’s sole ownership of Steelcoat. Loren admitted that Action Target employed him personally for specific projects, yet provided the court with no documentation to show what he was Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 7 2018 UT App 19 paid or invoice records “from his prior relationship with Action Target” to give the court a general idea of the income Loren was making and could continue to make. The court also found that Steele’s testimony that Loren was “hid[ing] things” from Lynessa was a “refer[ence] to unreported income.” The court therefore relied on Loren’s 2004 tax return, which represented a period when Loren owned and operated a company similar to Steelcoat, to impute income to him. In 2004, Loren’s adjusted gross income was $41,317. The court added $20,000 to this amount based on what Loren paid for his sons’ hockey expenses and his ability to pay for other team members’ fees. The court also considered inflation rates and ultimately imputed income to him in the amount of $79,948 annually, or $6,662 monthly.

¶17 When determining the amount of alimony to award Lynessa, the court addressed her claimed monthly expenses. These amounted to $5,496.21, but the court removed “the amount spent on adult children, school fees which can be waived[,] and pet care” and found that her reasonable monthly expenses were $4,400. Based on these expenses and her monthly income of $2,513, the court awarded $1,900 per month for alimony. This amount was to be applied retroactively, subsuming the original $2,954 monthly award, starting from the time the divorce decree was entered and lasting for a period equal to the length of the marriage. The court also reduced the award of child support to $714.64 per month for the parties’ remaining minor child.

¶18 Loren timely appealed.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶19 Loren raises four issues on appeal. First, he contends the district court abused its discretion in imputing his monthly income at $6,662. In a divorce action, the district court “‘is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 8 2018 UT App 19 property interests of the parties, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.’” Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶¶ 4, 26, 316 P.3d 455 (quoting Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 44, 299 P.3d 1079). We will reverse only if “(1) there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2) the evidence clearly preponderated against the finding; . . . (3) such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion”; or (4) the district court “abuse[d] its discretion by failing to enter specific, detailed findings supporting its financial determinations.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶20 Second, Loren contends the district court erred in awarding Lynessa alimony in the amount of $1,900 per month, “even if [Loren’s] income should be imputed at $6,662,” because the award was “hundreds of dollars in excess of [Lynessa’s] stated monthly needs” because it included anticipated expenses and was combined with the award of child support.

¶21 Third, Loren contends the district court erred in “setting [his] child support obligation in an amount based upon his imputed income of $6,662” per month. We review the district court’s “decisions regarding child support and alimony under the abuse of discretion standard.” Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶ 9, 169 P.3d 754.

¶22 Finally, Loren contends the district court erred in awarding Lynessa attorney fees because it failed to consider the “relevant attorney fees factors.” Although the decision regarding attorney fees in divorce proceedings “rests primarily in the sound discretion of the [district] court,” we will reverse the award if the court fails to provide adequate findings of fact regarding the following factors: (1) the receiving spouse’s financial need, (2) the paying spouse’s ability to pay, and (3) the reasonableness of the requested amount of fees. See Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ¶ 30, 147 P.3d 464. Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 9 2018 UT App 19 ANALYSIS I. Imputed Income

¶23 Loren first contends the district court erred in imputing $6,662 in monthly income to him because the court used his 2004 tax return to determine the amount he was capable of making, rather than using the pay stubs or more recent tax returns, and added $20,000 to that amount based on expenses incurred during the marriage that were discussed at trial. But Loren has provided no reasoned analysis to support this contention and we therefore affirm with respect to this issue.

¶24 Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure identifies the briefing requirements on appeal. An appellant’s brief must assert contentions of error that occurred in the proceedings below and develop a reasoned argument for why the purported errors should be reversed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8). The appellant’s argument must be supported with citations to the record and legal authority that governs the issues presented. See id. An argument is inadequately briefed, and in violation of rule 24, when it “merely contains bald citations to authority [without] development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority.” Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 11, 391 P.3d 196 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶25 The Utah Supreme Court has recently clarified that the failure to comply with rule 24 is no longer “an absolute bar to review of an argument on appeal.” See Rose v. Office of Prof’l Conduct, 2017 UT 50, ¶ 64, petition for cert. filed, Dec. 4, 2017 (No. 17-7003). But failure to adequately brief an argument will almost certainly result in the failure to “‘carry [the] burden of persuasion on appeal.’” See id. (quoting Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 12).

¶26 Loren has marshaled the record facts he is challenging with respect to his imputed income—sixteen pages were Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 10 2018 UT App 19 devoted to this issue, alone. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6)(A); see also id. R. 24(a)(8). Loren also provided citations to a few cases and a statute. But he has failed to apply the legal authority he cited to any of the facts.

¶27 Because Loren failed to develop a reasoned argument with the use of legal authority to support his contention that the district court improperly imputed income to him, he has failed to meet his burden of persuasion on appeal with respect to this issue. See Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 12. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to impute to Loren a monthly income of $6,662. As a result, we likewise do not address his contention on appeal that the district court erred in “setting [his] child support obligation in an amount based upon his imputed income of $6,662” per month.

II. Alimony

¶28 Loren contends that “even if the court’s imputation of income” to him was correct, the alimony award of $1,900 per month was in excess of Lynessa’s needs. Loren makes two overarching arguments related to this contention. First, he takes issue with items listed in Lynessa’s financial declaration that “were not actual expenses,” “were not supported by any evidence,” and “did not exist” at the time of the marriage. Second, he argues the award was hundreds of dollars in excess of Lynessa’s needs because she was also awarded $714.64 in child support.

¶29 In divorce proceedings, the district court’s determinations related to financial interests of the parties “are entitled to a presumption of validity” and we will not reverse absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 26, 299 P.3d 1079 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The purposes of an alimony award include enabling the receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, and preventing the receiving Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 11 2018 UT App 19 spouse from becoming a public charge.” Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court must consider three factors when determining alimony: “(1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse, (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for him- or herself, and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support.” Id.

A. Lynessa’s Monthly Expenses

¶30 Loren challenges the following three expenses identified in Lynessa’s financial declaration: (1) a retirement account contribution, (2) a car loan, and (3) health insurance. He argues that these were not “actual expenses” or needs because Lynessa testified they were anticipated expenses rather than what she was presently paying.

¶31 An award of alimony is intended to help the parties “maintain the standard of living established over the course of the marriage rather than the amount that is actually being spent.” Woolums v. Woolums, 2013 UT App 232, ¶ 9, 312 P.3d 939. We have previously defined “standard of living” as “a minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances.” Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This court has therefore “disavowed the notion that ‘standard of living is determined by actual expenses alone.’” Woolums, 2013 UT App 232, ¶ 9 (quoting Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212). Actual expenses “may be necessarily lower than needed to maintain an appropriate standard of living for various reasons, including, possibly, lack of income.” Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212. It necessarily follows that if the court determines the receiving spouse’s actual and anticipated needs are reasonable, that they are consistent with the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, and that the paying spouse can afford to cover the shortfall of those Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 12 2018 UT App 19 needs, then the alimony award should be in an amount to accommodate that shortfall.

¶32 Here, the anticipated expenses of the car loan and health insurance were reasonable anticipated expenses for basic needs that were established as standard during the marriage. Loren, Lynessa, and Tyler each testified at trial that Lynessa had a car during the marriage, but that it broke down and she was without a car for two years leading up to the trial. Lynessa testified that she would have purchased a car to replace the old one if she had been receiving the alimony she was entitled to. Therefore, it was reasonable for the court to include the car loan in Lynessa’s monthly expenses.

¶33 The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion by including health insurance costs in Lynessa’s monthly expenses. Lynessa testified that she suffered from medical conditions both during and after the marriage for which she took medication and was under medical care. There was no suggestion at trial that her medical needs were not provided for during the marriage, and the original divorce decree indicated that Loren was providing some medical insurance at the time the marriage dissolved. 2 And although Lynessa was not asked at trial whether the parties had health insurance during the marriage, Loren was aware, prior to trial, that Lynessa identified health insurance as an expense in her financial declaration. He therefore left the issue for the district court to determine, using its broad discretion based on the evidence before it. See Woolums, 2013 UT App 232, ¶ 10 (holding “[t]he district court’s evaluation of and reliance on Wife’s testimony, along with its own determinations of the reasonableness of the claimed expenses, fell squarely within its 2. Our review of the record shows that the original divorce decree ordered Loren to continue to pay for the children’s health insurance. Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 13 2018 UT App 19 broad discretion to determine an appropriate alimony award”). Given the medical conditions Lynessa testified she suffered from both during and after the marriage, and that health insurance was at least provided for the children during the marriage, as well as Loren’s failure to contest whether health insurance for Lynessa was established during the marriage, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in considering anticipated health insurance costs in her monthly expenses.

¶34 As to Loren’s challenge regarding the retirement account, we agree that the district court exceeded the scope of its discretion when it included among Lynessa’s necessary monthly expenses $200 per month for retirement account contributions.

¶35 Utah Code section 30-3-5 allows the district court to address the needs of a spouse that did not exist during the marriage or at the time the divorce decree was entered only if “the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(h)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017). This court has previously explained that retirement accounts “may not ordinarily be factored into an alimony determination,” unless “funds for post-divorce . . . retirement accounts are necessary because contributing to such accounts was standard practice during the marriage and helped to form the couple’s marital standard of living.” Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16, 80 P.3d 153. If this circumstance exists and the district court determines that the retirement account “should be taken into account as part of the needs analysis, then the court’s findings must be even more detailed than those in a standard needs analysis,” because this award “is the exception, rather than the rule.” Id.; see also Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that in cases “where the evidence is severely conflicted, it is essential that the reviewing court clearly understand the findings on which the [district] court bases its conclusions”). Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 14 2018 UT App 19

¶36 Here, the district court made no findings related to Lynessa’s claim for $200 of monthly retirement contribution. At best, the order noted, “[Lynessa] included expenses that were reasonable, such as a car, insurance and health insurance, even though she does not presently have them but would have them if [Loren] paid support.” Though this statement could be read as a non-exhaustive list of reasonable expenses not yet incurred, failure to provide any factual findings related to the claimed retirement account expense is a violation of our explicit requirement that the court’s findings related to such accounts “must be even more detailed than those in a standard needs analysis.” See Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16. In addition, our review of the record shows that the initial divorce decree specifically stated, “Retirement and Savings. Neither party has a pension nor a profit sharing plan through his or her place of employment or otherwise.” The district court relied on this divorce decree for certain of its findings of facts and it was therefore an abuse of discretion to consider the anticipated retirement fund contribution in Lynessa’s monthly expenses.

¶37 We remand to the district court for the limited purpose of removing the $200 retirement fund contribution from Lynessa’s necessary monthly expenses and to adjust the award of alimony accordingly.

B. Awarding Alimony and Child Support

¶38 Loren contends the district court abused its discretion in awarding Lynessa $1,900 for alimony because she was also receiving approximately $715 per month in child support, and these combined awards exceed her stated monthly expenses. We disagree.

¶39 Child support is a “basic and unalienable right . . . vested in the minor.” See Reick v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916, 917 (Utah 1982) (per curiam). This court has previously explained that “[i]t is typically best practice for [district] courts to analyze alimony Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 15 2018 UT App 19 without factoring in child support obligations.” Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT App 373, ¶ 11, 294 P.3d 591. But we have held that “treating child support payments as the recipient spouse’s income is permissible where the recipient combine[s] her expenses with those of the children in her financial declaration.” Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, ¶ 17, 335 P.3d 378 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen at least some of the children’s expenses seem to have been factored into the alimony calculation already” then the district court must explain its decision not to include child support payments as income. See id.

¶40 Here, the district court specifically removed “the amount spent on adult children [and] school fees which can be waived” from Lynessa’s monthly expenses. Loren has not directed us to anything within Lynessa’s financial declaration that could be considered additional expenses spent solely on the minor child still residing with Lynessa. Without providing a reasoned analysis with respect to awarding child support in addition to alimony, Loren has failed to carry his burden of persuasion on appeal with respect to this issue. See Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶¶ 12–13, 391 P.3d 196 (providing that a party who “fails to devote adequate attention to an issue is almost certainly going to fail to meet its burden of persuasion” on appeal).

¶41 The court also explained that “although her current living style does not match what she enjoyed during the marriage, there are insufficient funds after the divorce . . . between the parties to allow her to live that lifestyle.” The court appears to imply that the award of alimony could have been higher if Loren’s income was similar to what he earned during the marriage.

¶42 The district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded alimony to Lynessa in addition to child support. Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 16 2018 UT App 19

III. Attorney Fees

¶43 Loren contends the district court erred in awarding attorney fees to Lynessa without “an appropriate consideration of the relevant attorney fees factors.” We disagree.

¶44 In the context of divorce, “[t]he decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the [district] court,” but the court must “base the award on evidence of the receiving spouse’s financial need, the payor spouse’s ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees.” Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (LexisNexis 2013) (providing that in an action to modify child support or alimony, “the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees . . . of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action”).

¶45 Here, the district court considered the required attorney fees factors when awarding fees to Lynessa. The court found that because Loren “has been able to get support and income modified from the [divorce] decree,” and “since [he] has not been paying adequate alimony or child support, [Lynessa] cannot afford attorney fees but [Loren] has the ability to pay them.”3 Loren’s ability to pay was also based on the income imputed to him. 3. The court also commented that Loren’s “hiding of income and failure to be forthcoming with complete records makes it inequitable to award him attorney[] fees” and that those same factors would allow an award of attorney fees to Lynessa “under the bad faith provision” of Utah Code section 78B-5-825. We agree with Loren that this was an incorrect application of section 78B-5-825, which allows a court to award attorney fees to the prevailing party “if the court determines that the action or (continued…) Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 17 2018 UT App 19

¶46 The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Lynessa.4

¶47 On appeal, Lynessa has requested that she be awarded attorney fees incurred in her defense of this appeal. “Generally, when the [district] court awards fees in a domestic action to the party who then substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal.” Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 872 (…continued) defense to the action was without merit or not brought or asserted in good faith.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825(1) (LexisNexis 2012). First, it is unclear who the prevailing party is in this situation. Although Loren was unable to persuade the court that he was making only $11 per hour, he successfully petitioned it to reduce his obligations of alimony and child support. Second, because of this success, we cannot agree that the action was without merit or brought in bad faith. Though we do not condone Loren’s failure to provide adequate financial documents to support his alleged income, we do not agree with the court that Lynessa deserves attorney fees under the bad faith provision of the attorney fees statute. But this analysis has no effect on the district court’s award of attorney fees under Utah Code section 30-3-3. 4. The court awarded attorney fees in the amount of $16,403.44 “as stated in Petitioner’s Affidavit of Attorney’s Fees.” This affidavit provided the various billing rates of attorneys from two law firms, and provided the total number of hours each firm spent on Lynessa’s case; the affidavit did not identify which attorneys spent what amount of time on the case in calculating the final amount. But Loren has not argued this was error and therefore we will not address whether it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to rely solely on this affidavit when determining the amount of attorney fees. Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 18 2018 UT App 19 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ¶ 32, 147 P.3d 464 (“[W]e will generally award attorney fees on appeal to the prevailing party if the [district] court awarded attorney fees and the receiving party prevails on the main issues on appeal.”). Because the district court properly awarded attorney fees to Lynessa in the action below and because she has substantially prevailed on appeal, we accordingly award her attorney fees on appeal and remand to the district court to calculate the reasonable amount of fees and costs she incurred in connection with this appeal. See Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d at 1059.

CONCLUSION

¶48 We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it included anticipated costs for health insurance and car loan payments in Lynessa’s necessary monthly expenses because they were reasonable expenses within the marriage standard of living and that she would have continued to incur if Loren had consistently paid her alimony and child support. The court also did not abuse its discretion in awarding child support in addition to alimony because child support is a vested right of the child and the court removed costs from Lynessa’s monthly expenses that related specifically to the children. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Lynessa under Utah Code section 30-3-3 because it gave appropriate consideration to the relevant attorney fees factors.

¶49 We further conclude the district court abused its discretion when it included retirement account contributions in Lynessa’s necessary monthly expenses because contribution to such an account did not exist during the marriage.

¶50 Accordingly, we remand to the district court for the removal of retirement account contribution expenses from the Anderson v. Anderson 20160507-CA 19 2018 UT App 19 alimony calculation and to calculate reasonable attorney fees incurred by Lynessa on appeal.

Affirmed

The reviewing court determined that the lower court committed no reversible error and upheld the judgment.