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In re I.C., 2025 UT App 37

Case Summary

A.C. (Mother) appealed the Third District Juvenile Court’s order adjudicating her daughter, I.C. (Child), as abused and neglected, together with the court’s order denying Mother’s motion for a new trial. The adjudication followed Child’s disclosures of sexual abuse by her older brother, self-harm, and conduct by Mother that may have constituted abuse, after which the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) petitioned for protective services. On appeal, Mother challenged the exclusion of untimely disclosed witnesses, the neglect determination, the denial of her new trial motion on ineffective-assistance grounds, and the effectiveness of her post-trial counsel. In a per curiam decision, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed on every issue.

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Oral Argument

Briefing Documents

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Coverage

Facts

Disclosures and Placement

  • In September 2023, Child disclosed that she had been sexually abused by her older brother (Brother), with whom she lived along with Mother.
  • During subsequent forensic interviews, Child revealed that she had attempted or considered suicide, had otherwise harmed herself, and had experienced conduct by Mother over the years that may constitute abuse.
  • Child’s father (Father) placed Child in an in-patient therapeutic setting, and after her release Child went to live with Father.

Mother’s Response

  • When notified of the disclosures by DCFS and law enforcement, Mother stated that Child was fabricating the allegations in retaliation against Brother for getting Child into trouble.
  • Mother did not cooperate with DCFS in developing a safety plan, did not object to Child not returning home, but objected to Child living with Father and stated she would prefer that Child go to juvenile detention.
  • The court of appeals noted that Mother “expressed little concern for Child or her welfare.” In re I.C., 2025 UT App 37, ¶ 3.

Petition and Pretrial Proceedings

  • DCFS filed a petition for protective services, with allegations focused primarily on Mother’s conduct and Child’s disclosures of sexual abuse by Brother.
  • Approximately one week before the original late-January 2024 trial date, Mother’s initial counsel filed a witness and exhibit list; that counsel then withdrew and the trial was postponed.
  • Mother’s new trial counsel did not file a new witness or exhibit list.

Trial and Exclusion of Witnesses

  • Trial began in March 2024, was continued after the first day, and resumed for three additional days in April 2024.
  • On day three, Mother proffered the testimony of three previously undisclosed witnesses, and the State moved to exclude them as untimely disclosed.
  • On day four, the juvenile court permitted two of the witnesses to testify narrowly about a conversation that might impeach earlier testimony and excluded the third, observing that much of the proffered testimony was neither proper impeachment nor probative.
  • The juvenile court also accepted as a factual proffer that Mother did not nearly run anyone over when backing out of her driveway, and therefore did not admit related Ring camera video.
  • Throughout trial, the court ruled that evidence of alleged abuse by Father was irrelevant to the allegations against Mother.

Adjudication and Motion for New Trial

  • The juvenile court found the petition’s allegations proven and adjudicated Child as abused and neglected by Mother.
  • Represented by new post-trial counsel, Mother moved for a new trial, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely disclose more than 150 items of “unused evidence” summarized in a twenty-three-page chart, and that a medical condition had impaired trial counsel’s performance.
  • The juvenile court found trial counsel’s performance deficient for failing to timely disclose the evidence but denied the motion because Mother’s submissions were conclusory and failed to demonstrate prejudice; the court also rejected the medical-condition claim, which Mother did not pursue on appeal.

Issues of the Case

Mother, as Appellant, raised four issues on appeal.

  1. Issue 1: Exclusion of Untimely Disclosed Witness Testimony
  2. Issue 2: Neglect Determination
  3. Issue 3: Denial of Motion for New Trial / Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
  4. Issue 4: Ineffective Assistance of Post-Trial Counsel

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed on all four issues; no issue was reversed or remanded.

  • Evidence — Witness Exclusion

    1. Exclusion of Untimely Disclosed Witness Testimony

    Claim on Appeal: Mother argued that the juvenile court improperly excluded testimony from witnesses who would have stated that they never observed the specific conduct Child described, never observed similar conduct, and never saw Mother mistreat Child, which Mother contended would have undermined the credibility of Child and other witnesses.

    Holding: — Affirmed. Because the witnesses were untimely disclosed and thus limited to impeachment, and because testimony that witnesses did not observe the alleged conduct did not conflict with Child’s account of specific incidents, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it.

    Statutory Authority: No Utah Code section was cited. The governing rule was Utah R. Juv. P. 20A(b) (requiring timely disclosure of information necessary to support claims or defenses, except material offered solely for impeachment).

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Abuse of Discretion

    Specific Standard: “A juvenile court’s ruling on the admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” In re I.C., 2025 UT App 37, ¶ 9.

    Applies To: The juvenile court’s ruling excluding the proffered testimony of Mother’s untimely disclosed witnesses, except for the narrow impeachment testimony it permitted.

    Controlling Cases:

    • In re G.C., 2008 UT App 270, 191 P.3d 55 (juvenile court evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion)
    • Glacier Land Co. v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs., 2006 UT App 516, 154 P.3d 852 (defining impeachment evidence as evidence used to undermine a witness’s credibility and recognizing a trial court’s broad discretion over relevance and probative value)

    Why It Matters: The opinion confirms that rule 20A’s impeachment exception is narrow: testimony offered to show that a witness did not see something is not impeachment when it can coexist with the testimony it purports to rebut. Untimely disclosed witnesses will be confined to testimony that genuinely contradicts another witness, and broad “I never saw anything” testimony is substantive evidence subject to the disclosure deadline. The court also faulted Mother for not accurately presenting the posture and full basis of the juvenile court’s ruling.

  • Juvenile Court — Abuse and Neglect Adjudication

    2. Neglect Determination

    Claim on Appeal: Mother contended that the juvenile court erred in concluding that she neglected Child.

    Holding: — Affirmed. The court declined to reach the merits because Mother did not challenge the separate and independent abuse determination, which by itself supports the juvenile court’s continuing jurisdiction; alternatively, the evidence was sufficient to support the neglect adjudication.

    Statutory Authority: No Utah Code section was cited in the opinion. The court referred generally to the application of facts to the “statutory criteria” for abuse or neglect.

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Preservation

    Specific Standard: “We need not decide this challenge on its merits because Mother has not challenged the court’s separate and independent determination that she abused Child.” In re I.C., 2025 UT App 37, ¶ 13.

    Applies To: Mother’s challenge to the neglect adjudication, which the court resolved on the ground that the unchallenged abuse adjudication independently sustains juvenile court jurisdiction.

    Controlling Cases:

    • In re G.B., 2022 UT App 98, 516 P.3d 781 (appellate court need not reach a challenge where an unchallenged, independent determination supports the result)
    • In re K.J., 2024 UT App 47, 548 P.3d 886 (juvenile court jurisdiction may rest on either abuse or neglect; the ultimate abuse or neglect determination is reviewed for correctness and underlying findings for clear error)

    Why It Matters: An appellant who attacks only one of two independent grounds for jurisdiction cannot obtain relief, because the unchallenged ground sustains the order. In a footnote, the court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient, emphasizing that Mother’s callous response to Child’s suicide attempt demonstrated a failure to protect given its “potentially fatal consequences.” Practitioners must challenge every independent basis for an adjudication or the appeal will fail at the threshold.

  • Civil Procedure — New Trial

    3. Denial of Motion for New Trial / Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

    Claim on Appeal: Mother argued that she satisfied her burden on the new trial motion by identifying the ineffective-assistance standard, the evidence trial counsel failed to disclose, and why that evidence was important; she also disputed the juvenile court’s statement that its findings relied heavily on her own admissions.

    Holding: — Affirmed. Although trial counsel’s performance was deficient, Mother’s single conclusory paragraph asserting “total prejudice” did not address the evidentiary picture or show a reasonable probability of a different outcome, so the juvenile court properly denied the motion.

    Statutory Authority: No Utah Code section was cited. The claim was governed by the two-part ineffective-assistance framework of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Correctness

    Specific Standard: “A determination of ineffective assistance of counsel by a lower court is ‘a law-like mixed question, and therefore we review it for correctness.’” In re I.C., 2025 UT App 37, ¶ 14 (quoting State v. Torres-Orellana, 2024 UT 46, ¶ 47).

    Applies To: The juvenile court’s determination, in denying the motion for new trial, that Mother failed to establish prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to timely disclose evidence.

    Controlling Cases:

    • State v. Torres-Orellana, 2024 UT 46, 562 P.3d 706 (new trial rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, but ineffective-assistance-based rulings are reviewed for correctness, with deference to related factual findings)
    • In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, 201 P.3d 985 (appellate courts defer to juvenile courts on credibility)
    • In re C.M.R., 2020 UT App 114, 473 P.3d 184 (applying Strickland’s deficient-performance and prejudice prongs in juvenile proceedings and defining reasonable probability)
    • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test; prejudice is assessed against the totality of the evidence)

    Why It Matters: The opinion makes clear that identifying omitted evidence and asserting its importance does not establish prejudice. A movant must engage with the totality of the evidence and explain how the omitted material would likely have changed the result. A finding of deficient performance is of no value without a developed, evidence-specific prejudice analysis.

  • Juvenile Court — Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    4. Ineffective Assistance of Post-Trial Counsel

    Claim on Appeal: Mother argued, for the first time on appeal, that post-trial counsel was ineffective for failing to attach the actual proposed evidence to the new trial motion and for failing to argue sufficiently how the missing evidence harmed her, specifically identifying bank statements showing DoorDash use, Ring camera video, evidence of Father’s abuse, evidence of Child’s online behavior, and evidence about the age of a sleeping bag.

    Holding: — Affirmed. Mother could not show prejudice because the identified evidence was largely irrelevant, of little probative value, of questionable admissibility, previously addressed by the juvenile court, or contradicted by Mother’s own testimony.

    Statutory Authority: No Utah Code section was cited. The claim was governed by the Strickland framework.

    Standard of Review:

    Category: Correctness

    Specific Standard: “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law.” In re I.C., 2025 UT App 37, ¶ 18 (quoting In re A.H., 2021 UT App 57, ¶ 28).

    Applies To: Mother’s claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that post-trial counsel’s presentation of the new trial motion was constitutionally ineffective.

    Controlling Cases:

    • In re A.H., 2021 UT App 57, 493 P.3d 81 (ineffective-assistance claims raised first on appeal present questions of law; failure on either prong defeats the claim, so the court may decide under either prong)
    • In re C.M.R., 2020 UT App 114, 473 P.3d 184 (prejudice requires a reasonable probability of a different outcome)
    • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (prejudice assessed in light of the totality of the evidence)

    Why It Matters: The court reviewed each item Mother identified and explained why none could change the outcome: Child had already acknowledged DoorDash use, the juvenile court had accepted the Ring video proffer, evidence of Father’s abuse had been ruled irrelevant in unchallenged rulings, Mother’s own testimony contradicted her online-behavior theory, and a child’s report of a sleeping bag’s age was of minimal import. The decision shows that a layered ineffective-assistance claim fails where the underlying evidence itself lacks probative force, and that a party’s own trial testimony can foreclose a post-trial factual theory.

Rules of Evidence

Utah Codes

Rules of Civil Procedure

Utah Code of Judicial Administration

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Case Cited

  • In re K.J., 2024 UT App 47, 548 P.3d 886, cert. denied, 554 P.3d 924 (Utah 2024) (standards of review for abuse and neglect adjudications; jurisdiction may rest on either abuse or neglect)
  • In re G.C., 2008 UT App 270, 191 P.3d 55 (abuse-of-discretion review of juvenile court evidentiary rulings)
  • Glacier Land Co. v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs., 2006 UT App 516, 154 P.3d 852 (definition of impeachment evidence; trial court discretion over relevance and probative value)
  • In re G.B., 2022 UT App 98, 516 P.3d 781 (court need not reach a challenge when an unchallenged independent ground supports the ruling)
  • State v. Torres-Orellana, 2024 UT 46, 562 P.3d 706 (standards of review for new trial motions based on ineffective assistance of counsel)
  • In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, 201 P.3d 985 (deference to juvenile courts on credibility determinations)
  • In re C.M.R., 2020 UT App 114, 473 P.3d 184 (Strickland elements and reasonable-probability standard in juvenile proceedings)
  • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test; totality-of-the-evidence prejudice inquiry)
  • In re A.H., 2021 UT App 57, 493 P.3d 81, cert. denied, 496 P.3d 715 (Utah 2021) (ineffective-assistance claims raised first on appeal present questions of law and may be resolved on either prong)

Litigation and Appellate Strategy

Reversal Predictor

  • Exclusion of untimely disclosed testimony that directly contradicts a witness on a material, specific fact.
  • A challenge directed at every independent ground supporting the adjudication.
  • A prejudice argument tied to specific findings and the overall evidentiary picture, not a conclusory list.
  • Omitted evidence that is admissible, has foundation, and was not already addressed or excluded in unchallenged rulings.
  • Post-trial theories consistent with the appellant’s own trial testimony.

Mandatory Factor Checklist

  • The opinion does not identify statutory factors that a court must address explicitly; no Utah Code section was cited.
  • The opinion does require courts and litigants to address the following analytical elements:
    • Rule 20A timeliness: whether the evidence was timely disclosed, and if not, whether it is offered solely for impeachment.
    • Impeachment conflict: whether the proffered testimony actually conflicts with the testimony it targets.
    • Strickland deficient performance: whether counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard.
    • Strickland prejudice: whether there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome, considering the totality of the evidence.
    • Independent grounds: whether abuse and neglect each independently support jurisdiction.

Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)

  • Exclusion of evidence that is facially inconsistent with a key witness’s specific account.
  • A trial court finding of deficient performance paired with a detailed, record-based prejudice showing.
  • Challenges to all independent bases for the adjudication.
  • Evidence not previously ruled irrelevant or inadmissible in unchallenged rulings.
  • Taken together, these factors materially increase appellate viability; in In re I.C., none was present.

Strategy Insight

  • Mother framed her appeal largely as an evidentiary dispute, asserting that omitted or excluded evidence would have undermined Child’s credibility. Under deferential and correctness review alike, that framing failed because the evidence either did not contradict the testimony or could not alter the totality of the evidence. A stronger appeal would identify a discrete legal error, such as a misapplication of rule 20A to evidence that genuinely contradicts testimony, and demonstrate its concrete effect on specific findings.

Impeachment by Non-Observation

  • The opinion offers a clear statement that a witness’s failure to observe conduct does not impeach testimony that the conduct occurred when both accounts can be true. This principle will recur in abuse cases, where alleged conduct frequently occurs outside the presence of other household members.

Layered Ineffective-Assistance Claims

  • The court reached the claim against post-trial counsel and resolved it on the prejudice prong by evaluating the underlying evidence on its merits. A layered claim is only as strong as the evidence the earlier lawyer failed to present.

Teaching Value

  • In re I.C. is a concise teaching vehicle for the interaction among juvenile disclosure rules, the impeachment exception, the independent-grounds doctrine, and the Strickland prejudice requirement in child welfare appeals.

Insights

Utah-Only Jurisprudence

  • The opinion relies almost exclusively on Utah authority: Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals precedent and the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure.
  • The only non-Utah authority is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the federal constitutional standard that Utah courts apply to ineffective-assistance claims, including in child welfare proceedings.

Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)

  • State v. Torres-Orellana, 2024 UT 46, 562 P.3d 706
    • Established: When a new trial ruling rests on ineffective assistance, the ineffective-assistance standard of review governs; the ultimate determination is a law-like mixed question reviewed for correctness, while related factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
    • Role: Supplied the standard of review for Mother’s challenge to the denial of her new trial motion.
  • In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, 201 P.3d 985
    • Established: Juvenile courts are in the best position to evaluate witness credibility, and appellate courts defer to them on credibility matters.
    • Role: Reinforced the deference owed to the juvenile court’s assessment of the evidence underlying the new trial ruling.

The Most Important Holding

  • A conclusory assertion of prejudice is insufficient to obtain a new trial on ineffective-assistance grounds, even where the trial court has already found deficient performance. A party must engage with the totality of the evidence and show a reasonable probability of a different outcome; listing omitted evidence and asserting that it was important does not suffice.

Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error

  • The court affirmed in full, so no reversal occurred.
  • Reversal could have followed if the excluded testimony had directly contradicted Child’s account of a specific incident (making it genuine impeachment under rule 20A), if Mother had challenged both the abuse and neglect determinations and shown legal error in each, or if Mother had presented an evidence-specific prejudice analysis showing that the undisclosed evidence would likely have altered the juvenile court’s findings.

Practitioner Takeaways

  • Trial Lawyers:
    • Successor counsel must review and update witness and exhibit disclosures immediately; reliance on a predecessor’s list, or none at all, invites exclusion.
    • Late-disclosed witnesses are limited to true impeachment. Testimony that a witness “did not see” alleged conduct generally does not contradict testimony that the conduct occurred.
    • A client’s trial testimony fixes the factual record; post-trial theories inconsistent with it will be rejected.
  • Appellate Lawyers:
    • Challenge every independent basis for an adjudication. An unchallenged abuse finding sustains jurisdiction regardless of any error in the neglect finding.
    • Accurately present the procedural posture and full basis of the ruling under review; the court criticized the petition for omitting the rule 20A context.
    • Ineffective-assistance claims must be built item by item, connecting each piece of evidence to a specific finding and explaining why it would likely change the result.
  • Post-Trial and New Trial Counsel:
    • Attach the actual evidence, establish its foundation and time frame, and address its admissibility in light of the trial court’s prior rulings.
    • Summary charts without legal analysis will not carry the burden of persuasion.
  • Parents and Guardians in Child Welfare Proceedings:
    • A parent’s response to a child’s disclosures, including the response to a suicide attempt, can itself support a finding of neglect or failure to protect.

Majority Opinion

2025 UT App 37

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF I.C., A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE. A.C., Appellant, v. STATE OF UTAH, Appellee.

Per Curiam Decision No. 20240667-CA Filed March 13, 2025 Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Aaron Flater No. 1229910

Sara Pfrommer and Emily Adams, Attorneys for Appellant Derek E. Brown and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, and AMY J. OLIVER. PER CURIAM:

¶1 A.C. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order adjudicating I.C. (Child) as abused and neglected and its order denying Mother’s motion for a new trial. We affirm. In re I.C. 20240667-CA 2 2025 UT App 37

BACKGROUND ¶2 In September 2023, Child disclosed allegations that she had been sexually abused by her older brother (Brother). In the course of forensic interviews following the disclosure, Child also revealed that she had attempted or considered suicide and that she had otherwise harmed herself. She also revealed conduct by Mother over the years that may be abuse. At the time, Child lived with Mother and Brother. After the allegations, however, Child’s father (Father) placed Child in an in-patient therapeutic setting. After her release, she went to live with Father.

¶3 When Mother was notified of Child’s disclosures by the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) and law enforcement, Mother stated that Child was making things up as retaliation against Brother for getting Child into trouble. She was not cooperative with DCFS regarding making a safety plan for Child and did not mind that Child would not return home. However, she was unsatisfied with Child going to live with Father and would rather have Child go to juvenile detention instead. Overall, Mother expressed little concern for Child or her welfare.

¶4 DCFS filed a petition seeking protective services for Child. The allegations in the petition were primarily regarding Mother’s conduct and Child’s disclosures of sexual abuse by Brother. Trial on the petition was set for Mother in late January 2024. About one week before the trial date, Mother’s counsel filed a list of witnesses and exhibits expected to be presented at trial. Shortly before trial, Mother’s initial counsel withdrew, and the trial was postponed.

¶5 New counsel appeared, and Mother’s trial began in March 2024, but no new witness or exhibit list was filed. After day one of trial, another continuance was granted. Three additional days of trial were held in April 2024. On day three, Mother proffered testimony of three undisclosed witnesses she wanted to present In re I.C. 20240667-CA 3 2025 UT App 37 on day four of trial. Before day four, the State moved to exclude the witnesses as untimely disclosed.

¶6 On day four, Mother’s counsel explained further the anticipated scope of testimony from the three witnesses. After discussion in court, two witnesses were permitted to testify regarding a conversation that may have impeached earlier testimony, and the third witness was excluded. The court noted that much of the proposed testimony was not proper impeachment and was not probative.

¶7 After trial, the juvenile court determined that the allegations in the petition were proven and that Mother had abused and neglected Child. Mother obtained new counsel and filed a motion for new trial. In the motion, she asserted that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance, at least in part by failing to timely disclose a variety of exhibits in an extensive list. The juvenile court denied the motion. The court noted that the list of exhibits lacked sufficient information and that Mother had failed to demonstrate prejudice. Mother appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶8 Mother raises several issues in her petition, challenging both the denial of her motion for new trial and the underlying adjudication order. Regarding the adjudication order, Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred in excluding certain witness testimony discussed on day four of the trial. She also contends that the determination that she neglected Child was in error.

¶9 In the context of an adjudication trial, “we apply differing standards of review to findings of fact, conclusions of law, and determinations of mixed questions of law and fact.” In re K.J., 2024 UT App 47, ¶ 31, 548 P.3d 886 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 554 P.3d 924 (Utah 2024). “The factual findings underlying an abuse or In re I.C. 20240667-CA 4 2025 UT App 37 neglect adjudication are reviewed deferentially and are reversed only if clearly erroneous.” Id. The court’s “ultimate determination regarding abuse or neglect is reviewed for correctness, because making that determination, which involves applying a given set of facts to statutory criteria, is primarily a law-like endeavor.” Id. (cleaned up). A juvenile court’s ruling on the admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See In re G.C., 2008 UT App 270, ¶ 9, 191 P.3d 55.

¶10 Mother contends that the juvenile court inappropriately excluded witness testimony that she asserts would have affected the credibility of other witnesses, particularly Child’s testimony of specific instances of conduct by Mother. Mother’s witnesses would have testified that they did not see the identified conduct; more broadly, they would have testified that they did not see similar types of conduct, nor did they see Mother mistreat Child in general. The juvenile court determined that the proffered testimony was not probative and was not proper impeachment evidence. Mother cannot show that the juvenile court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony.

¶11 As an initial matter, Mother’s petition does not reflect the posture or full ruling of the juvenile court in excluding the testimony. The witnesses were not timely identified and were therefore limited to impeachment. Under rule 20A of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, disclosure of information necessary to support claims or defenses must be timely made “unless solely for impeachment.” Utah R. Juv. P. 20A(b). Impeachment evidence is “evidence used to undermine a witness’s credibility.” Glacier Land Co. v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs., 2006 UT App 516, ¶ 29, 154 P.3d 852 (cleaned up). Accordingly, the proffered witness testimony was appropriately excluded unless it was targeted solely to another witness’s credibility. Additionally, a juvenile court has broad discretion to determine the relevance and probative value of evidence. See id. ¶ 24. In re I.C. 20240667-CA 5 2025 UT App 37

¶12 The juvenile court determined that most of the proffered testimony was not proper impeachment evidence.1 The proffered testimony was that those witnesses did not observe the types of conduct testified to by Child. The court determined that such testimony was not probative and did not impeach Child’s testimony because it would not conflict with the testimony. Given that Child’s testimony of specific conduct and the proffered testimony that the witnesses did not see that conduct could both be true, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony.

¶13 Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s conclusion that she neglected Child. We need not decide this challenge on its merits because Mother has not challenged the court’s separate and independent determination that she abused Child. See In re G.B., 2022 UT App 98, ¶ 29, 516 P.3d 781. “Juvenile court jurisdiction over a child can be based on, among other things, either abuse or neglect.” In re K.J., 2024 UT App 47, ¶ 42. Because Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s abuse determination, the juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction over Child regardless of the neglect determination.2

¶14 Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s denial of her motion for new trial. Appellate courts “review a [juvenile] court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion 1. The juvenile court allowed two witnesses to testify narrowly regarding conversations that could have impeached earlier witness testimony. 2. Moreover, to the extent that the issue is a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we determine after a review of the record that the evidence was sufficient to support the neglect adjudication. Mother’s callous response to Child’s suicide attempt demonstrated a failure to protect as found by the juvenile court, given the “potentially fatal consequences” of the response. In re I.C. 20240667-CA 6 2025 UT App 37 standard.” State v. Torres-Orellana, 2024 UT 46, ¶ 42, 562 P.3d 706 (cleaned up). However, “when the basis of a new trial order is ineffective assistance, the standard of review for ineffective assistance claims applies.” Id. “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Id. ¶ 46 (cleaned up). A determination of ineffective assistance of counsel by a lower court is “a law-like mixed question, and therefore we review it for correctness.” Id. ¶ 47. However, “where a district court makes factual findings that are relevant to an ineffective assistance claim arising in a new trial motion, appellate courts will defer to those factual findings and overturn them only if they are clearly erroneous.” Id. ¶ 52 (cleaned up). Additionally, juvenile “courts are in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses,” and thus, “appellate courts defer to juvenile courts on matters of credibility.” In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 52, 201 P.3d 985.

¶15 “To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mother must show that (1) ‘counsel’s performance was deficient’ and (2) this ‘deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’” In re C.M.R., 2020 UT App 114, ¶ 19, 473 P.3d 184 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish prejudice, Mother “must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of her case would have been different absent counsel’s error. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. ¶ 21 (cleaned up). In evaluating the likelihood of a different result, we “consider the totality of the evidence before the judge,” bearing in mind that “[s]ome errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695–96.

¶16 Mother moved for a new trial, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to timely disclose a variety of In re I.C. 20240667-CA 7 2025 UT App 37 “unused evidence” set forth in a twenty-three-page chart.3 The juvenile court denied the motion. Although the court found that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to timely disclose the identified evidence, the court found that Mother did not show prejudice. The court’s order stated that the “summary charts do not contain the sufficient legal analysis upon which the court can rely in making its decision.” Additionally, the court noted that Mother had failed to carry her burden of persuasion in showing prejudice because “Mother’s briefs contain conclusory and summary statements alleging she was prejudiced by the actions of her attorney.”

¶17 Mother asserts that she met her burden for a motion for new trial because she identified the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, identified the missing evidence, and identified why it was important. However, identifying the evidence and why it was important does not demonstrate prejudice. Mother’s argument regarding prejudice consisted basically of a single paragraph listing some of the missing evidence and stating that “none of this was used by [trial counsel] and the result was total prejudice to [Mother] at trial as a result.” This conclusory statement is insufficient to show prejudice. It does not address the evidentiary picture at all, and it certainly does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome given the totality of the evidence before the juvenile court. In sum, the juvenile court did not err in finding that Mother 3. Mother also asserted that trial counsel was ineffective due to a medical condition that allegedly affected his performance. The juvenile court rejected that claim, and Mother does not pursue that ruling on appeal. In re I.C. 20240667-CA 8 2025 UT App 37 had not demonstrated prejudice. Therefore, the court properly denied Mother’s motion for new trial.4

¶18 Finally, Mother contends that her post-trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not attaching the actual proposed evidence to the motion for new trial and “by not sufficiently arguing how the missing evidence harmed Mother.” “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law.” In re A.H., 2021 UT App 57, ¶ 28, 493 P.3d 81 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 496 P.3d 715 (Utah 2021). Because the failure to establish either prong of an ineffective assistance claim defeats the claim, “we are free to address [Mother’s] claims under either prong.” Id. ¶ 35 (cleaned up). We determine that Mother cannot show prejudice because the “missing evidence” is largely irrelevant, of little probative value, and of questionable admissibility. The list of more than 150 items includes many that appear to lack foundation or time frames, and many items regard issues that were explicitly ruled on in some form by the juvenile court.5 However, we address the specific evidence listed in Mother’s petition. 4. Mother also asserts that the juvenile court was wrong in finding that “many of the court’s findings and conclusions relied heavily on Mother’s own admissions during her testimony.” Mother contends that she denied the many allegations that were the basis for the court’s finding of abuse. She is correct in that respect. However, her testimony supported many of the findings regarding neglect. Her petition asserts that her admissions did not “fully support” the court’s findings, but the court did not rely on Mother’s admissions for all of its findings. 5. For example, many of the items purport to show Father’s abuse of Child, but the juvenile court excluded evidence of Father’s alleged abuse as irrelevant to the allegations against Mother. In re I.C. 20240667-CA 9 2025 UT App 37

¶19 Mother first asserts that post-trial counsel should have attached bank statements that would have shown that Mother used DoorDash. She contends that this evidence refutes Child’s testimony that, over the course of time, there was a pattern of servitude, including cooking and shopping. Child also testified that sometimes DoorDash was used. Because Child acknowledged that DoorDash was used, further evidence of its use would not affect the validity of her testimony.

¶20 Mother next asserts that Ring camera evidence should have been presented to refute Child’s off-hand comment that Mother almost ran over someone when backing out of the driveway. The juvenile court addressed the matter of the Ring video on day four of trial when an effort to admit it was made. After discussion regarding what the video would show, the juvenile court accepted as a factual proffer that Mother did not almost run anyone over on the day that Child and others came to retrieve additional belongings. As a result, the video was not admitted. Mother does not challenge the court’s exclusion of the video.

¶21 Mother also asserts that evidence supporting that Father abused Child should have been submitted with the new trial motion. However, the juvenile court made multiple rulings over the course of the trial, none of which are challenged on appeal, that evidence regarding any abuse by Father was not relevant to adjudicating the allegations against Mother. See supra note 5.

¶22 Mother further contends that evidence of Child’s improper online behavior should have been attached to the new trial motion and argued as the reason that Mother took away Child’s electronics. But in the new trial motion, it was asserted that Child’s electronics were removed due to the online behavior. Similarly, in Mother’s petition she asserts that she took the electronics away after discovering the online behavior and that Child responded by making allegations that would remove her from Mother’s household. However, the assertions made in the In re I.C. 20240667-CA 10 2025 UT App 37 motion for new trial and in the petition are contrary to Mother’s own testimony.

¶23 Mother testified that after she learned of Child’s allegations, she “went home and . . . did not discuss it with [Child] at all.” Rather, she talked with Brother about the allegations. After that conversation, she stated that she went to Child and asked for Child’s phone and any other electronic devices and took them to her (Mother’s) room. Mother also stated that she took the devices to look at them for inappropriate online behavior and that the removal was not a suspension. Given Mother’s testimony, the post-trial assertion that she took Child’s electronics away as discipline for Child’s online behavior is not supported, and the specific evidence of Child’s online behavior is not relevant.

¶24 Finally, Mother argues that she provided evidence that would call into question a detail of the alleged sexual assaults. She argues that a discrepancy regarding the age of a sleeping bag in which Child alleged one of the assaults occurred disproves the assault. However, not only is the age of a sleeping bag as reported by a child of minimal import, it does not affect the total evidentiary picture regarding Mother’s conduct.

¶25 Overall, Mother cannot show prejudice resulting from post-trial counsel’s failure to attach these specific items to the motion for new trial or failing to argue specific prejudice. None of the items identified had sufficient evidentiary value such that a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome could be shown. Accordingly, her claim for ineffective assistance of post-trial counsel fails.

¶26 In sum, for the reasons stated above, we affirm both the juvenile court’s adjudication order and the denial of Mother’s motion for new trial.

Affirmed

The reviewing court determined that the lower court committed no reversible error and upheld the judgment.