State v. G.C. (In re G.C.), 2025 UT App 182
Case Summary
This per curiam appeal arises from a child welfare proceeding in which the juvenile court placed G.C. (Child) under the permanent guardianship of a relative (Aunt) after terminating reunification services. Child’s father, S.C. (Father), and mother, J.H. (Mother) (collectively, Parents), appealed the guardianship order and, after Child’s younger sibling (Sister) was returned to Father’s custody in a separate proceeding, moved under rules 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to set the guardianship aside. The principal appellate questions were whether a permanent guardianship order has “prospective application” within the meaning of rule 60(b)(5), whether Sister’s return to Father constituted extraordinary circumstances under either subsection, and whether the juvenile court plainly erred, or counsel was ineffective, in not consolidating the siblings’ permanency timelines. The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects and declined to reach an unpreserved challenge to the parent-time award.
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Oral Argument
Briefing Documents
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Coverage
Facts
Removal and Adjudication
- Child was removed from Parents’ custody in 2022 at the age of three and was adjudicated abused and neglected as to both Parents.
- The juvenile court ordered concurrent permanency goals of reunification and permanent custody and guardianship.
Sister’s Birth and Separate Case
- Ten months after Child’s removal, Parents had another child together (Sister), who was also removed from Parents’ care.
- The two children’s cases proceeded on separate permanency timelines, and both children were placed with Aunt, their uncle’s sister-in-law.
Permanency Hearing and Guardianship Order
- At Child’s permanency hearing, the juvenile court determined that it was not safe to return Child to either Parent and terminated reunification services.
- The court then entered a permanent guardianship order appointing Aunt as Child’s permanent guardian.
Parent-Time and Sibling Contact
- The court ordered supervised virtual parent-time once per month and a supervised in-person visit four times per year for at least two hours, and directed Aunt to invite Parents to Child’s sporting events, school activities, and other events.
- The court described this as the “minimal parent-time requirement,” noted its understanding that Aunt was “willing to do more,” and explained that the minimum was fashioned to be sustainable for nearly fourteen years given that Aunt must facilitate visits with two separate parents.
- Father had requested weekly in-person visits.
- The court ordered Aunt to use reasonable efforts to allow Child contact with Sister, with three other half-siblings who are under the permanent guardianship of their grandparents, and with other extended family members.
Stay of Appeal and Sister’s Return
- Mother and Father each filed notices of appeal from the guardianship order and moved to stay the appeals until Sister’s permanency status was adjudicated.
- While the appeals were stayed, Sister was returned to Father’s custody.
Rule 60(b) Motion
- After the stay was lifted, Parents filed a joint motion to set aside Child’s guardianship order, arguing under rule 60(b)(5) that prospective application was no longer equitable because Sister had been returned to Father, and under rule 60(b)(6) that Father’s regaining custody of Sister was an extraordinary circumstance.
- The State asked the court to construe the motion as a petition for restoration of custody, which is barred while a permanent guardianship order exists under Utah Code § 78A-6-357(3)(d); the court declined to do so and analyzed the motion under rule 60(b).
- The court denied the motion, concluding that a permanent guardianship order does not have “prospective application” under rule 60(b)(5) and that the case did not present extraordinary circumstances; Parents filed amended notices of appeal.
Issues of the Case
Appellants S.C. (Father) and J.H. (Mother) raise four issues on appeal.
- Issue 1: Rule 60(b)(5) / Prospective Application and Extraordinary Circumstances
- Issue 2: Rule 60(b)(6) / Residual Relief from Judgment
- Issue 3: Consolidation of Sibling Permanency Timelines / Plain Error and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
- Issue 4: Parent-Time Award / Preservation
The Court of Appeals affirmed on all issues: no issue was reversed or remanded, the denial of the rule 60(b) motion and the permanent guardianship order were affirmed, and the parent-time challenge was not reached because it was unpreserved.
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Civil Procedure — Post-Judgment Relief
- Rule 60(b)(5) / Prospective Application and Extraordinary Circumstances
Claim on Appeal: Parents argued that a permanent guardianship order is analogous to a permanent injunction because it “permanently enjoins, in a sense, a parent from exercising . . . the right to parent their child,” that it limits the future parent-child relationship rather than remediating past wrongs, that continuing jurisdiction is not required for a judgment to be prospective, and that Sister’s return to Father was a change in the operative facts making continued enforcement inequitable.
Holding: — Affirmed. A permanent guardianship order lacks “prospective application” because it does not require the court to supervise changing conduct or conditions that are provisional or tentative; alternatively, Sister’s return to Father was not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable relief.
Statutory Authority: Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (relief where it is no longer equitable that a judgment have prospective application); Utah Code § 78A-6-357(3)(d) (bars parents from seeking restoration of custody while a permanent guardianship order exists); Utah Code § 80-3-409 (permanency timeline set by the legislature).
Standard of Review:
Category: Correctness
Specific Standard: “[W]e review the ‘application of our rules of civil procedure for correctness.’” In re G.C., 2025 UT App 182, ¶ 8 (quoting Sanders v. Sanders, 2021 UT App 122, ¶ 4, 502 P.3d 1230).
Applies To: The juvenile court’s conclusion that a permanent guardianship order is not a judgment with “prospective application” under rule 60(b)(5), and the related determination that Sister’s return to Father was not an extraordinary circumstance.
Controlling Cases:
- Utah Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Mark Techs. Corp., 2014 UT 60, 342 P.3d 779 (a judgment operates prospectively if it requires the court to supervise changing conduct or conditions that are provisional or tentative; movant bears a high burden to show extraordinary circumstances)
- In re A.F., 2007 UT 69, 167 P.3d 1070 (permanent guardianship effects a permanent change in the child’s status vis-à-vis the parent that is not subject to revision)
- Sanders v. Sanders, 2021 UT App 122, 502 P.3d 1230 (standard of review for rule 60(b) rulings)
Why It Matters: The opinion forecloses rule 60(b)(5) as a vehicle for unwinding a juvenile court permanent guardianship based on a parent’s post-order progress. The court tied its reading of the rule to the statutory bar on restoration petitions, reasoning that permitting such a motion would let parents circumvent the legislature’s intent. The alternative holding also establishes that a sibling’s reunification does not, standing alone, change the operative facts of another child’s permanency, because each child’s needs are individual.
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Civil Procedure — Post-Judgment Relief
- Rule 60(b)(6) / Residual Relief from Judgment
Claim on Appeal: Parents argued that Father’s regaining custody of Sister was an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief from the guardianship order under rule 60(b)(6)’s catch-all provision.
Holding: — Affirmed. Rule 60(b)(6) may not be invoked where the asserted grounds fall within another subsection, and Parents’ changed-circumstances argument was the same argument advanced under rule 60(b)(5); in any event, the circumstance was not extraordinary.
Statutory Authority: Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (relief from judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief”).
Standard of Review:
Category: Correctness
Specific Standard: “[W]e review the ‘application of our rules of civil procedure for correctness.’” In re G.C., 2025 UT App 182, ¶ 8 (quoting Sanders v. Sanders, 2021 UT App 122, ¶ 4, 502 P.3d 1230).
Applies To: The juvenile court’s determination that rule 60(b)(6) does not provide relief where the asserted grounds are the same changed-circumstance grounds governed by rule 60(b)(5).
Controlling Cases:
- Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480 (rule 60(b)(6) may not be relied upon if the asserted grounds fall within another subsection and is to be sparingly invoked in unusual and exceptional circumstances)
- Utah Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Mark Techs. Corp., 2014 UT 60, 342 P.3d 779 (rule 60(b) does not permit relitigation of issues resolved by the judgment)
Why It Matters: The holding closes the “back door” to rule 60(b)(5): a party whose changed-circumstance argument fails because the judgment lacks prospective application cannot repackage the same argument as an equitable plea under rule 60(b)(6). The court emphasized that nothing was inequitable about the guardianship order when entered. Footnote 3 also treats “extraordinary circumstances” and “exceptional circumstances” as interchangeable for rule 60(b) purposes.
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Juvenile Court — Permanent Guardianship
- Consolidation of Sibling Permanency Timelines / Plain Error and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claim on Appeal: Parents argued, without preservation, that the juvenile court plainly erred by not handling Child’s and Sister’s cases as a single case on the same permanency timeline, or alternatively that counsel was ineffective for failing to request consolidation.
Holding: — Affirmed. Any error was not obvious because no authority supports consolidation, and counsel was not deficient because existing law suggested separate timelines and a consolidation request would likely have been futile.
Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 80-3-409 (permanency timeline runs from the date the minor is initially removed from the minor’s home).
Standard of Review:
Category: Preservation
Specific Standard: “To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show that ‘(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant.’” In re G.C., 2025 UT App 182, ¶ 9 (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 13, 10 P.3d 346).
Applies To: Parents’ unpreserved claim that the juvenile court should have consolidated Child’s and Sister’s permanency timelines, reviewed under the plain error and ineffective assistance exceptions.
Controlling Cases:
- State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 (elements of plain error)
- State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46 (error is obvious only if the governing law was clear when the error was made)
- State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92 (two-part test for ineffective assistance)
- State v. Calata, 2022 UT App 127, 521 P.3d 920 (failure to raise an argument is deficient only if competent counsel would have fought that battle; counsel is not ineffective for a futile objection)
- In re P.M., 2025 UT App 154 (availability of plain error review in child welfare cases remains unresolved)
Why It Matters: Parents conceded that the child welfare statutes do not address how to handle a child born during a pending case, and that gap defeated both exceptions. Because § 80-3-409 keys the timeline to each child’s removal date, the opinion signals that separate timelines are the statutory default and that any change must come from the legislature or from a clearly presented, preserved request. The court again left open whether plain error review is available in child welfare appeals.
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Custody & Parent-Time — Parent-Time
- Parent-Time Award / Preservation
Claim on Appeal: Parents challenged the parent-time award as unreasonable and the juvenile court’s findings as inadequate, contending that Father’s request for weekly in-person visits preserved the issue.
Holding: — Affirmed (not reached). A request for a different amount of parent-time did not alert the court that Father considered the award unreasonable or the findings inadequate, and Parents argued no exception to preservation.
Statutory Authority: None specified in opinion.
Standard of Review:
Category: Preservation
Specific Standard: “[T]o preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” In re G.C., 2025 UT App 182, ¶ 9 n.2 (quoting In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 62, 201 P.3d 985).
Applies To: Whether Parents preserved their challenge to the reasonableness of the parent-time award and the adequacy of the juvenile court’s parent-time findings.
Controlling Cases:
- In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, 201 P.3d 985 (issue must be presented so the trial court has an opportunity to rule on it)
- State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443 (appellate courts will not typically reach an unpreserved issue absent a valid exception)
Why It Matters: Advocating for a particular outcome is not the same as objecting to the outcome the court actually orders or to the sufficiency of its findings. Counsel who intend to challenge a parent-time award on appeal must raise that specific objection below or affirmatively invoke a preservation exception in the opening brief.
Rules of Evidence
Utah Codes
Restriction on petitions to restore custody under a permanent guardianship
Governs:
Prohibits a parent from petitioning to restore custody of a child while the child is subject to a permanent guardianship order.
Application in In re G.C.:
The State urged the juvenile court to treat Parents’ rule 60(b) motion as a barred restoration petition; the Court of Appeals relied on the provision to conclude that allowing rule 60(b)(5) relief based on changed circumstances would be contrary to legislative intent.
Quote:
“[T]he Utah Code explicitly restricts parents from seeking to restore custody while a permanent guardianship order exists. See Utah Code § 78A-6-357(3)(d). Thus, it would be contrary to the legislature’s intent to permit a parent to circumvent this restriction by seeking to set aside a permanent guardianship order under rule 60(b)(5) based on changed circumstances.” In re G.C., 2025 UT App 182, ¶ 12.
Utah Legislature:
Permanency hearing and permanency timeline
Governs:
Establishes the permanency hearing and the statutory timeline for achieving permanency for a child in state custody, measured from the date the minor is initially removed from the minor’s home.
Application in In re G.C.:
The court cited the statute to describe the remedial purpose of permanent guardianship and to reject the consolidation argument, because Sister’s removal date was ten months after Child’s.
Quote:
“Utah law suggests otherwise, as the permanency timeline is based on the date ‘the minor is initially removed from the minor’s home’ and Sister’s removal date was ten months after Child’s. See Utah Code § 80-3-409.” In re G.C., 2025 UT App 182, ¶ 19.
Utah Legislature:
Rules of Civil Procedure
Relief from judgment: judgment no longer equitable in prospective application
Governs:
Permits relief from a judgment when it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application, on a showing of extraordinary circumstances arising from a change in law or operative facts.
Application in In re G.C.:
The court held that a permanent guardianship order lacks prospective application and, alternatively, that Sister’s return to Father was not an extraordinary circumstance.
Quote:
“[W]e agree with the juvenile court that an order of permanent guardianship does not have ‘prospective application,’ as that term is used in rule 60(b)(5), because it is a permanent order that does not require the court ‘to supervise changing conduct or conditions that are provisional or tentative.’” In re G.C., 2025 UT App 182, ¶ 12.
Utah Judiciary:
https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=60
Relief from judgment: any other reason that justifies relief
Governs:
Provides residual relief from a judgment for reasons not covered by the other subsections of rule 60(b), to be invoked sparingly and only in extraordinary circumstances.
Application in In re G.C.:
The court held that Parents could not rely on rule 60(b)(6) because their asserted grounds were the same changed-circumstance grounds governed by rule 60(b)(5).
Quote:
“[I]t would make no sense to allow parties to circumvent the prospective application requirement of rule 60(b)(5) by appealing to equity under rule 60(b)(6).” In re G.C., 2025 UT App 182, ¶ 16.
Utah Judiciary:
https://legacy.utcourts.gov/rules/view.php?type=urcp&rule=60
Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
Case Cited
- In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, 463 P.3d 66 (facts recited in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings)
- Sanders v. Sanders, 2021 UT App 122, 502 P.3d 1230 (denial of a rule 60(b) motion reviewed for abuse of discretion; application of the rules of civil procedure reviewed for correctness)
- State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346 (three elements of plain error)
- State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92 (deficient performance and prejudice test for ineffective assistance)
- In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, 201 P.3d 985 (preservation requires presenting the issue so the trial court can rule on it)
- State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443 (unpreserved issues not reached absent a valid exception)
- Utah Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Mark Techs. Corp., 2014 UT 60, 342 P.3d 779 (scope of rule 60(b)(5), meaning of prospective application, and extraordinary-circumstances burden)
- In re A.F., 2007 UT 69, 167 P.3d 1070 (permanent guardianship effects a permanent change in status not subject to revision)
- Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480 (rule 60(b)(6) unavailable where grounds fall within another subsection; sparingly invoked)
- In re P.M., 2025 UT App 154 (availability of plain error review in child welfare cases left unresolved)
- State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 229 P.3d 892 [as printed in the opinion; the Pacific Reporter citation appears to be 299 P.3d 892, so verify before citing] (error is obvious only if the governing law was clear when made)
- State v. Calata, 2022 UT App 127, 521 P.3d 920 (counsel not deficient for declining a battle competent counsel would not fight or for a futile objection)
Litigation and Appellate Strategy
Reversal Predictor
- A permanency or guardianship ruling that was legally defective at the time it was entered, challenged on direct appeal.
- A rule 60(b) motion grounded in mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or voidness under subsections (1) through (4), rather than post-judgment changed circumstances.
- A specific, on-the-record objection to the reasonableness of parent-time or the adequacy of findings after the ruling is announced.
- Clear statutory text or binding precedent supporting the procedural step the trial court allegedly failed to take, which is necessary for the obviousness element of plain error.
- A record showing that counsel’s omitted request had a realistic prospect of success, so that it was not futile.
Mandatory Factor Checklist
The opinion does not announce a new statutory factor list. It does identify the elements that a movant must establish and that a court must address:
- Rule 60(b)(5): a judgment with prospective application, meaning one requiring supervision of changing or provisional conduct or conditions; a highly significant change in law or operative facts; and extraordinary circumstances making continued enforcement inequitable.
- Rule 60(b)(6): grounds that do not fall within any other subsection of rule 60(b), and extraordinary circumstances.
- Utah Code § 78A-6-357(3)(d): no petition for restoration of custody while a permanent guardianship order exists.
- Utah Code § 80-3-409: each child’s permanency timeline runs from that child’s initial removal date.
- Plain error: an error, obviousness under law clear at the time, and harm.
- Ineffective assistance: objectively deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)
Appellate viability increases when several of the following converge: the claimed error existed when the order was entered; the objection was specifically raised and ruled upon below; the argument rests on clear statutory text or controlling precedent; the record demonstrates prejudice to the outcome; and the post-judgment motion is brought under the rule 60(b) subsection that actually fits the grounds. In re G.C. presented the opposite profile: a post-judgment change in facts, unpreserved issues, and an argument the parties conceded had no direct statutory support.
Strategy Insight
Parents framed their challenge as an appeal to equity based on changed circumstances, which the court treated as an attempt to relitigate a fully adjudicated best-interest determination. Challenges to permanent guardianship orders should be framed as legal error in the order as entered and pursued on direct appeal with preserved objections. Evidentiary improvement developed after the order, even if compelling, is not a basis for relief under this framework.
Sibling Permanency Timelines (Afterborn Children)
The court acknowledged Parents’ concession that the child welfare statutes do not address a child born during a pending case, and it declined to fill that gap judicially. Because each child’s timeline runs from that child’s removal, siblings may reach very different outcomes, and the court emphasized that each child’s permanency needs are individual. Any change to this result is likely a matter for the legislature.
Preservation of Parent-Time Challenges
A party’s request for more parent-time does not preserve a challenge to the reasonableness of the time awarded or to the sufficiency of the findings. The objection must be presented in a way that gives the trial court an opportunity to rule on that specific complaint.
Open Question: Plain Error in Child Welfare Appeals
Following In re P.M., 2025 UT App 154, the court again assumed without deciding that plain error review may be available in child welfare cases. Practitioners should continue to brief both plain error and ineffective assistance as alternative exceptions until the question is resolved.
Teaching Value
The opinion is a concise illustration of how rule 60(b) subsections interact: rule 60(b)(5) is limited to judgments with prospective application, and rule 60(b)(6) cannot serve as a fallback for grounds that belong under another subsection. Footnote 3 also confirms that “extraordinary circumstances” and “exceptional circumstances” are used interchangeably in this context.
Insights
Utah-Only Jurisprudence
The opinion relies exclusively on Utah authority: the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Code, and decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals. No federal or out-of-state authority is cited, and the court resolves the rule 60(b)(5) question by applying the Utah Supreme Court’s existing definition of prospective application to the juvenile code’s permanent guardianship scheme.
Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)
- Utah Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Mark Techs. Corp., 2014 UT 60, 342 P.3d 779. Defined a judgment with prospective application as one requiring the court to supervise changing conduct or provisional conditions, and placed a high extraordinary-circumstances burden on rule 60(b)(5) movants. It supplies the framework for Issues 1 and 2.
- In re A.F., 2007 UT 69, 167 P.3d 1070. Recognized that permanent guardianship effects a permanent change in the child’s status that is not subject to revision. It supports the characterization of the order as non-prospective.
- Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480. Held that rule 60(b)(6) is unavailable when the grounds fall within another subsection. It defeats the attempt to repackage the rule 60(b)(5) argument.
- In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, 201 P.3d 985; State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443. Established the preservation requirement and its exceptions. They bar review of the parent-time challenge.
- State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46. Set the plain error elements and the requirement that the governing law be clear. They defeat the consolidation argument.
- State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92. Set the ineffective assistance test. It frames the deficient-performance analysis on consolidation.
The Most Important Holding
A juvenile court order of permanent guardianship does not have “prospective application” under rule 60(b)(5), because it effects a permanent change in the child’s status and does not require the court to supervise provisional or tentative conditions. Paired with the holding that rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used to advance the same changed-circumstance argument, the opinion effectively closes rule 60(b) as a route for parents to undo a permanent guardianship based on improvement after the order is entered. The court grounded this result in the legislature’s express bar on restoration petitions under Utah Code § 78A-6-357(3)(d).
Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error
The court affirmed in full. Reversal would have required a different showing: a legal defect in the guardianship order at the time of entry raised on direct appeal, a ground under rule 60(b)(1) through (4) (such as mistake, fraud, or voidness) rather than post-judgment change, a preserved and record-supported challenge to the parent-time award or the adequacy of its findings, or clear statutory or precedential authority requiring sibling cases to share a permanency timeline. A post-order change in a parent’s circumstances, however significant, does not present legal error in the original order.
Practitioner Takeaways
- Trial Lawyers (Parents’ Counsel): Treat the older child’s permanency hearing as the decisive event, because progress demonstrated later in a sibling’s case will not reopen a permanent guardianship. When an afterborn sibling enters care, raise any request to coordinate timelines early and on the record. After the court rules on parent-time, object specifically to the reasonableness of the award and the adequacy of the findings rather than relying on the request made before the ruling.
- Trial Lawyers (State and Guardians ad Litem): In re G.C. supplies direct authority to oppose rule 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6) motions directed at permanent guardianship orders, whether or not the court treats the motion as a barred restoration petition.
- Appellate Lawyers: Identify and argue a preservation exception expressly in the opening brief; the parent-time issue failed in part because no exception was invoked. Plain error availability in child welfare appeals remains an open question, and ineffective assistance claims premised on novel arguments face a steep deficient-performance burden. A stay of the direct appeal pending a sibling’s case does not expand the grounds for relief from the older child’s order.
- Kinship Guardians: The ordered parent-time operates as a minimum, and the guardian’s obligation to use reasonable efforts to facilitate sibling and extended-family contact is a continuing duty under the order.
Majority Opinion
2025 UT App 182
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF G.C., A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE. S.C. AND J.H., Appellants, v. STATE OF UTAH, Appellee. Per Curiam
Opinion Nos. 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA Filed December 11, 2025
Fifth District Juvenile Court, Cedar City Department
The Honorable Troy A. Little No. 1207032
Sheleigh A. Harding, Attorney for Appellant S.C. Alexandra Mareschal, Kirstin H. Norman, and Debra M. Nelson, Attorneys for Appellant J.H. Derek E. Brown and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, and Heath Haacke, Guardians ad Litem Before J
UDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, DAVID N. MORTENSEN, and AMY J. OLIVER. PER CURIAM:
¶1 S.C. (Father) and J.H. (Mother) (collectively, Parents) appeal the juvenile court’s permanent guardianship order and its order denying Parents’ motion to set aside the guardianship order under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm. In re G.C. 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 2 2025 UT App 182
BACKGROUND1
¶2 G.C. (Child) was removed from Parents’ custody in 2022 at the age of three. Child was adjudicated to be abused and neglected as to both parents. The court ordered concurrent permanency goals of reunification and permanent custody and guardianship. Ten months after Child’s removal, Parents had another child together (Sister). Sister was also removed from Parents’ care. The two children’s cases continued on separate permanency timelines. Both children were placed with their uncle’s sister-in-law (Aunt).
¶3 At Child’s permanency hearing, the juvenile court determined that it was not safe to return Child to either Mother or Father and terminated reunification services. Thereafter, the court entered the permanent guardianship order at issue on appeal, appointing Aunt as Child’s permanent guardian.
¶4 The court ordered that Parents would have supervised virtual parent-time once per month and a supervised in-person visit four times per year for at least two hours. Aunt was also directed to “invite Parents to sporting events, school activities, and other events in which [Child] will participate.” The court stated that this was the “minimal parent-time requirement” and indicated its understanding that Aunt was “willing to do more.” The court explained that the minimum time was fashioned to “be sustainable for nearly 14 years, especially considering that [Aunt] is responsible for facilitating visits with two separate parents.” The court also ordered that Aunt “use reasonable efforts” to allow Child to have contact with Sister and with his three other half1. “We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile court findings.” In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, n.1, 463 P.3d 66 (cleaned up). In re G.C. 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 3 2025 UT App 182 siblings, who are under the permanent guardianship of their grandparents, as well as other extended family members.
¶5 Mother and Father each filed notices of appeal from the court’s permanent guardianship order. However, they moved to stay the appeals until Sister’s permanency status was adjudicated. While the appeals were stayed, Sister was returned to Father’s custody.
¶6 After the stay was lifted, Parents filed a joint motion to set aside the guardianship order for Child under rules 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Their rule 60(b)(5) argument asserted that it was “no longer equitable” for the order to “have prospective application” because Sister had been returned to Father. Their rule 60(b)(6) argument asserted that Father regaining custody of Sister was an extraordinary circumstance that justified relief from the guardianship order.
¶7 The State asked the court to construe the rule 60(b) motion as a petition for restoration of custody and deny it because such petitions are not permitted when a child is subject to a permanent guardianship order. See Utah Code § 78A-6-357(3)(d). The court declined to do so and analyzed the motion under rule 60(b). However, the court denied the motion. The court concluded that a permanent guardianship order is not an order that has “prospective application” as that term is used in rule 60(b)(5) and that the case did not present extraordinary circumstances that would justify setting aside the guardianship order. Parents then filed amended notices of appeal to challenge the court’s denial of their rule 60(b) motion.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶8 Parents first assert that the juvenile court erred in determining that a permanent guardianship order does not have In re G.C. 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 4 2025 UT App 182 prospective application as that term is used in rule 60(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Relatedly, they assert that the juvenile court erred in determining that Father’s regaining custody of Sister was not an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under rule 60(b)(5). They also challenge the court’s determination that the guardianship order should not be set aside under rule 60(b)(6). “Normally, we review a court’s denial of a [rule] 60(b) motion under an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Sanders v. Sanders, 2021 UT App 122, ¶ 4, 502 P.3d 1230 (cleaned up). Nevertheless, we review the “application of our rules of civil procedure for correctness.” Id.
¶9 Second, Parents argue that the juvenile court should have handled Child’s and Sister’s cases as a single case on the same permanency timeline. They acknowledge that this issue was not preserved and ask that we review it for plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel. To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show that “(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant.” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 13, 10 P.3d 346 (cleaned up). To demonstrate ineffective assistance, an appellant must show, first, “that counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,” and, second, “that counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 19, 12 P.3d 92.2 2. Parents also seek to challenge the juvenile court’s award of parent-time, asserting that the order was unreasonable. However, this issue was not preserved for appeal, and Parents do not argue that it should be reviewed under an exception to the preservation rule. Parents assert that Father’s counsel preserved the issue by (continued…) In re G.C. 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 5 2025 UT App 182 ANALYSIS I. Rule 60(b) Motion
¶10 Rule 60(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to seek relief from a judgment if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). “Rule 60(b)(5) applies to any judgment that has prospective effect but does not apply where a party seeks to alter a judgment that remedies a past wrong.” Utah Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Mark Techs. Corp., 2014 UT 60, ¶ 29, 342 P.3d 779 (cleaned up). In other words, the rule “does not allow relitigation of issues that have been resolved by the judgment. Instead, it refers to some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable.” Id. (cleaned up). A “judgment operates prospectively if it requires a court to supervise changing conduct or conditions that are provisional or tentative.” Id. (cleaned up). Furthermore, a “court’s power of equity is only to be applied asking the court to order in-person weekly visits. But “to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 62, 201 P.3d 985 (cleaned up). Father’s request for weekly parent-time was not sufficient to preserve a challenge to the reasonableness of the parent-time ultimately awarded or the adequacy of the juvenile court’s findings. The court was aware only that the ordered parent-time differed from the time Father wanted to have, not that Father considered the award to be unreasonable or the findings to be inadequate, as Parents now assert. Because the parent-time issue was not preserved, we are unable to review it on appeal. State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15, 416 P.3d 443 (“When a party fails to raise and argue an issue in the trial court, it has failed to preserve the issue, and an appellate court will not typically reach that issue absent a valid exception to preservation.”). In re G.C. 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 6 2025 UT App 182 under the rule when highly significant changes alter the landscape of a judgment—for instance, subsequent legislation, a change in the decisional law, or a change in the operative facts”— and “the burden will be high on those seeking relief on this ground as they must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying relief.” Id. ¶ 28 (cleaned up).
¶11 Parents argue that the permanent guardianship order is similar to a permanent injunction, which falls within the scope of rule 60(b)(5), because it “permanently enjoins, in a sense, a parent from exercising . . . the right to parent their child.” They further argue that such an order is prospective in nature because it does not “function to remediate past wrongs” but to limit the future relationship between the parent and child. They argue that “[c]ontinued jurisdiction of the court is not required to make a judgment prospective in nature” and that it is enough that the order “functions as a permanent limitation on Parents’ rights” and Child’s best interests “going forward.” Finally, they argue that not permitting review under rule 60(b)(5) would impermissibly hamper the juvenile court in its ability to do equity and act in Child’s best interests in the long-term.
¶12 However, we agree with the juvenile court that an order of permanent guardianship does not have “prospective application,” as that term is used in rule 60(b)(5), because it is a permanent order that does not require the court “to supervise changing conduct or conditions that are provisional or tentative.” Id. ¶ 29 (cleaned up). It serves the remedial purpose of establishing permanency for a child who is unable to be safely returned to the parents within the timeline set by the legislature, see Utah Code § 80-3-409, and is an order that effects a permanent change in the child’s status vis-à-vis the parent that is not subject to revision, see In re A.F., 2007 UT 69, ¶ 6, 167 P.3d 1070. Here, Child’s best interests were fully litigated at the time the court issued the guardianship order, and the juvenile court terminated In re G.C. 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 7 2025 UT App 182 its jurisdiction at that time. Furthermore, the Utah Code explicitly restricts parents from seeking to restore custody while a permanent guardianship order exists. See Utah Code § 78A-6- 357(3)(d). Thus, it would be contrary to the legislature’s intent to permit a parent to circumvent this restriction by seeking to set aside a permanent guardianship order under rule 60(b)(5) based on changed circumstances.
¶13 Even if a permanent guardianship order could be considered to have prospective application, we agree with the juvenile court that the circumstances presented here are not so extraordinary that the court should have employed its equitable powers to alter the judgment. Parents maintain that Sister being raised by Father constitutes a sufficiently significant “change in the operative facts” of the case to justify setting aside the decision. However, this may be the case for many siblings as their parents’ circumstances change over time. Moreover, the fact that it may be in one child’s best interest to return to their parent’s care does not necessarily mean that it is in their sibling’s best interest. Each child is an individual, whose unique permanency needs are the product of age, experiences, and other circumstances.
¶14 Additionally, the fact that the court found that it was safe for Sister to return to Father’s care does not make this case any more extraordinary than a similar case not involving a sibling. The only difference is that Sister’s case gave Father the opportunity to create a record of his improved parenting ability— an opportunity he would not have been given had Child not had a sibling who was removed soon after him. As the juvenile court observed, Child and Sibling are individuals with different child welfare timelines, and Parents were at different stages of progress in their reunification efforts at the time of Child’s permanency hearing compared to Sister’s permanency hearing. Given these circumstances, the findings at Sister’s permanency hearing do not change the operative facts relevant to Child’s permanence, which In re G.C. 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 8 2025 UT App 182 was necessarily litigated within his own permanency timeline. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in concluding that the circumstances here were not sufficiently extraordinary to justify relief under rule 60(b)(5). See Utah Res. Int’l, Inc., 2014 UT 60, ¶ 28.
¶15 The juvenile court also did not err in determining that relief was not available under rule 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief from judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief,” see Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)—in other words, a reason different from those listed in the other five subsections of the rule. Accordingly, rule 60(b)(6) “may not be relied upon if the asserted grounds for relief fall within any other subsection of rule 60(b).” Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 71, 150 P.3d 480. Moreover, rule 60(b)(6) is to be “sparingly invoked and used only in unusual and exceptional circumstances.”3 Id. (cleaned up).
¶16 Rule 60(b)(5) covers situations where extraordinary circumstances resulting from a change in the law or facts make it “no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5); see also Utah Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Mark Techs. Corp., 2014 UT 60, ¶ 28, 342 P.3d 779 (“The burden will be high on those seeking relief on [rule 60(b)(5)] ground[s] as they must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying relief.” (cleaned up)). While we have determined that rule 60(b)(5) does not apply here because a guardianship order does not have prospective application, that does not mean Parents may alternatively bring their extraordinary circumstances argument under rule 60(b)(6). The extraordinary circumstances alleged by Parents under rule 60(b)(6) are the same extraordinary circumstances alleged under rule 60(b)(5)—that Sister being 3. We see no meaningful distinction between “extraordinary circumstances” and “exceptional circumstances” as those terms are used in this discussion. Thus, going forward, we use the term “extraordinary circumstances” for consistency. In re G.C. 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 9 2025 UT App 182 returned to Father’s custody changed the operative facts in such an extraordinary way that the guardianship order should be set aside. The reason rule 60(b)(5) applies only to judgments that have prospective application is that rule 60(b) cannot be used as a means to relitigate issues that have already been decided. Utah Res. Int’l, 2014 UT 60, ¶ 29. There was nothing inequitable or unjust about the guardianship order at the time it was entered, and it would make no sense to allow parties to circumvent the prospective application requirement of rule 60(b)(5) by appealing to equity under rule 60(b)(6). Moreover, we have already determined that Sister being returned to Father is not an extraordinary circumstance to justify relief under rule 60(b)(5). For the same reasons, this fact does not justify relief under rule 60(b)(6). II. Plain Error and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶17 Parents also argue that the juvenile court plainly erred4 by not handling Child’s and Sister’s cases as a single case on the same permanency timeline or, alternatively, that counsel was ineffective for not requesting that the cases be combined.
¶18 Parents assert that it was inequitable, under the circumstances of this case, to treat the children separately. However, they recognize that “the child welfare statutes do not provide direction on how to handle a child born during the pendency of a child welfare case” and that “[i]t is unclear whether the older child should share the permanency timeline of the afterborn baby, or whether they should have separate timelines.” 4. Although it remains unclear whether plain error review is available in child welfare cases, we need not resolve that question today because even if the exception were to apply, we ultimately conclude that Parents cannot establish that the juvenile court committed plain error. See In re P.M., 2025 UT App 154, ¶ 28 n.4. In re G.C. 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 10 2025 UT App 182 Given the lack of authority in support of Parents’ position, they cannot establish that the alleged error would have been obvious to the juvenile court, and thus, they cannot prevail on grounds of plain error. See State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 37, 229 P.3d 892 (“An error is obvious only if the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made.” (cleaned up)).
¶19 For similar reasons, Parents cannot demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently by failing to request that the court treat the siblings as a unit. While “attorneys are not [categorically] excused from failure to raise an argument not supported by existing legal precedent,” a party alleging ineffective assistance must demonstrate that the attorney’s failure “was objectively unreasonable—i.e., a battle that competent counsel would have fought.” State v. Calata, 2022 UT App 127, ¶ 20, 521 P.3d 920 (cleaned up). Here, Parents’ counsel had no basis in existing law to believe that Child’s and Sister’s timelines should or even could be consolidated. In fact, Utah law suggests otherwise, as the permanency timeline is based on the date “the minor is initially removed from the minor’s home” and Sister’s removal date was ten months after Child’s. See Utah Code § 80-3-409. Moreover, it is unlikely counsel would have recognized at the outset of Sister’s case that the separate timelines would result in the drastically different outcomes between the children’s cases such that requesting consolidation would be important. Finally, given the strict permanency timelines set by the Utah Code, it is highly unlikely that the juvenile court would have extended Child’s timeline to stay on track with Sister’s even if counsel had made such a request, and counsel cannot be considered ineffective for not making a futile objection. See Calata, 2022 UT App 127, ¶ 20.
CONCLUSION
¶20 Because we agree with the juvenile court that a permanent guardianship order does not have prospective application, as that In re G.C. 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 11 2025 UT App 182 term is used in rule 60(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and because the circumstances presented here are not sufficiently extraordinary to justify setting aside the guardianship order, we affirm the juvenile court’s denial of Parents’ rule 60(b) motion. Furthermore, we conclude that the court did not plainly err by not consolidating Child’s and Sister’s permanency timelines and that Parents’ counsel was not ineffective for failing to request consolidation. Finally, we decline to consider Parents’ challenge to the court’s parent-time order because that challenge was not preserved. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s permanent guardianship order.