In re L.J. and J.J., 2026 UT App 14
Case Summary
T.J. (Father) appealed the Second District Juvenile Court’s order terminating his parental rights to his two biracial children, L.J. and J.J. The children’s mother’s rights were also terminated, and her separate appeal was resolved by an order of affirmance. Father challenged the best-interest determination, contending that the juvenile court disregarded his expert’s testimony on transracial adoption and relied on incorrect findings about his incarceration history, and he challenged the conclusion that the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) made reasonable reunification efforts. The Utah Court of Appeals rejected both challenges and affirmed. The guardians ad litem (Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, and Heath Haacke) participated on appeal, and amici curiae Adoption Mosaic, Dorothy Roberts, Elephant Circle, Movement for Family Power, and Legal Services for Prisoners with Children appeared through counsel Emily Adams.
Podcast Interviews and Other Sources
Podcast Interviews
Oral Argument
Briefing Documents
Plura pertinentia mox sequentur. Quaeso, redi mox.
Coverage
Facts
Family and Parties
- Father is Black and the children’s mother is White, and the children, L.J. and J.J., are biracial.
- J. was born during the pendency of the case; the DCFS caseworker encountered Father at the hospital during the birth, even though a protective order barred Father from contacting the mother.
- The mother’s parental rights were also terminated, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that termination by order in a separate appeal (Order, In re L.J., No. 20240966 (Utah Ct. App. May 7, 2025)).
Father’s Incarceration and Law Enforcement Contacts
- Father was jailed from September to December 2022 following the incident that initiated the case.
- After failing to appear on those charges, Father returned to jail in January 2023, and again in March 2023 for criminal trespassing, pretrial violation of a protective order, and threat of terrorism.
- Father was incarcerated from December 2023 to January 2024 for probation violations, and spent one day in jail in March 2024 after resisting arrest and fleeing from an officer.
- At the time of the May 2024 termination trial, Father had been incarcerated for another five days.
- Separately, and through no fault of his own, Father was once mistakenly identified and arrested for domestic violence committed by another individual.
DCFS Services and Contact
- The juvenile court found that the DCFS caseworker “made little effort to contact Father while he was incarcerated.”
- The court found that Father “behaves in a manner that others may view as unsafe under some circumstances,” and that the caseworker, though fearful of Father, arranged for continued contact by transferring it to an office with different security.
- The caseworker provided Father with several opportunities for services, including mental health assessment appointments that Father missed, and scheduled a case meeting after the hospital encounter that Father chose not to attend.
- The court found that Father “did not offer evidence he requested any accommodations or culturally sensitive treatment providers.”
Father’s Independent Conduct
- The court found that Father privately sought treatment and assistance, researched and enrolled in online education, attended probation appointments, regularly appeared at court hearings, and obtained employment.
- From this, the court found that Father had “shown his ability to comply when he wants to,” undercutting his claimed inability to meet DCFS obligations.
Placement
- Prior efforts to place the children with Father’s relatives in Georgia failed.
- The children were closely bonded with their foster family, which is White.
Expert Testimony on Transracial Adoption
- Father’s expert testified that the children might experience a transracial adoption if Father’s rights were terminated and identified harms including loss of identity and culture and a diminished sense of self.
- The expert testified that Father’s primary concern was adoption in general, but that he was also concerned about the children losing their identity if adopted into a White family; Father identified the significance of his family heritage in Georgia and a traditional card game played with his family.
- The expert testified that communal parenting or coparenting with birth parents may produce better outcomes for children of color, that occasional contact with Father’s relatives would not address her concerns, and that research supports keeping children with their families. She did not address the mother’s cultural identity.
Termination Ruling
- The juvenile court devoted several pages of its findings to the expert testimony and credited much of it, but concluded that permanent guardianship was not in the children’s best interest.
- The court found that a guardianship arrangement between the foster family and biological parents would be “forced contact” that would inject the chaos of the parents’ relationship into the children’s stability and routine.
- The court found that the expert offered no information about Father’s particular culture or history, or about the mother’s background, that raised concern about the children losing cultural identity, and that her testimony did not specifically address transracial adoption of biracial children.
Issues of the Case
Father (T.J.) raised two issues on appeal.
Issue 1: Best Interest / Expert Testimony and Incarceration Findings
Issue 2: Reasonable Reunification Efforts
Both issues were affirmed; no issue was reversed or remanded.
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Termination of Parental Rights — Best Interests of the Child
1. Best Interest / Expert Testimony and Incarceration Findings
Claim on Appeal: Father argued that the juvenile court erred in concluding that termination was in the children’s best interest because the court (1) disregarded his expert’s testimony regarding transracial adoption and (2) made and relied on incorrect findings about his incarceration history, in particular by misconstruing a wrongful arrest arising from mistaken identity.
Holding: — Affirmed. The juvenile court discussed and largely credited the expert testimony but permissibly weighed it against the other evidence, and its finding that Father had not gained the ability to avoid incarceration rested on multiple law enforcement encounters, not solely on the mistaken-identity arrest.
Statutory Authority: None cited in the opinion for this issue; the best-interest requirement was applied through case law (In re J.M., 2024 UT App 147).
Standard of Review:
- Category: Clear Error
- Specific Standard: “We review deferentially a lower court’s best-interest determination and will overturn it only if it either failed to consider all of the facts or considered all of the facts and its decision was nonetheless against the clear weight of the evidence.” In re L.J., 2026 UT App 14, ¶ 2 (quoting In re M.M., 2023 UT App 95, ¶ 19, 536 P.3d 102).
- Applies To: The juvenile court’s determination that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of L.J. and J.J., including its weighing of the expert testimony and its findings regarding Father’s incarceration history.
Controlling Cases:
- In re M.M., 2023 UT App 95, 536 P.3d 102, cert. denied, 544 P.3d 456 (Utah 2024) (deferential review of best-interest determinations).
- In re J.M., 2024 UT App 147, 559 P.3d 473 (two required findings for termination; best interest is a broad, holistic inquiry; termination must be strictly necessary from the child’s point of view).
- In re K.C., 2013 UT App 201, 309 P.3d 255 (factfinder is not bound to accept expert testimony and may give it whatever weight it deems proper).
Why It Matters: The opinion confirms that expert testimony on transracial adoption and systemic racism is relevant to the best-interest inquiry, but it does not control the outcome where the juvenile court considers it and explains why child-specific evidence points elsewhere. The court signaled agreement with the expert’s general observations while emphasizing that generalized testimony, untethered to the particular parent’s or children’s cultural background, carries limited weight. The opinion also shows that a factual error in one finding will not undermine a best-interest determination supported by other, independent findings.
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Termination of Parental Rights — Reunification Services
2. Reasonable Reunification Efforts
Claim on Appeal: Father argued that the juvenile court could not find that DCFS made reasonable reunification efforts because the agency “provided no meaningful support,” “compounded the systemic racism” he experienced, and “failed to use culturally appropriate service providers for the children and parents.” The guardians ad litem argued the issue was unpreserved.
Holding: — Affirmed. Although DCFS’s efforts were “perhaps not as fulsome as they should have been,” a reasonable effort is a fair and serious attempt rather than a perfect one, reunification is a two-way street, and the juvenile court acted within its broad discretion in finding DCFS’s efforts adequate.
Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 80-4-301(3)(a) (requires the juvenile court, where it has ordered reunification services, to find that reasonable efforts were made to provide those services before terminating parental rights).
Standard of Review:
- Category: Abuse of Discretion
- Specific Standard: “Because ‘reasonableness is an objective standard that depends upon a careful consideration of the facts of each individual case . . . , we afford the juvenile court broad discretion in determining whether reasonable reunification efforts were made.’” In re L.J., 2026 UT App 14, ¶ 3 (quoting In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, ¶ 17, 521 P.3d 887).
- Applies To: The juvenile court’s conclusion that DCFS made reasonable efforts to reunify Father with L.J. and J.J.
Controlling Cases:
- In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, 521 P.3d 887 (reasonable-efforts finding required before termination; a reasonable effort is a fair and serious attempt; reunification is a two-way street requiring parental commitment).
- State v. Kitches, 2021 UT App 24, 484 P.3d 415, cert. denied, 496 P.3d 718 (Utah 2021) (appellate court may bypass a preservation challenge where the issue can be readily resolved in favor of the party raising it).
Why It Matters: The opinion reaffirms that the reasonable-efforts standard tolerates imperfect agency performance, even where the court acknowledges DCFS fell short, so long as the overall effort was fair and serious. It places significant weight on the parent’s own non-participation and on evidence that the parent could comply when motivated. Practically, a parent asserting that services were not culturally appropriate should build a record of requesting accommodations or culturally specific providers; the absence of such requests was expressly noted against Father.
Rules of Evidence
Utah Codes
Grounds for termination of parental rights; findings regarding reasonable efforts
Governs:
Where the juvenile court has ordered DCFS to provide reunification services to a parent, the court must find that reasonable efforts were made to provide those services before it may terminate that parent’s rights. The opinion cites the 2022 supplement version of the statute.
Application in In re L.J.:
The court applied the statutory reasonable-efforts requirement, as construed in In re S.T., and held that the juvenile court did not exceed its broad discretion in finding DCFS’s efforts reasonable despite acknowledged shortcomings.
Quote:
“When the juvenile court orders DCFS to provide reunification services to a parent, the court must find that ‘reasonable efforts’ were made to provide those services before the court may terminate the parent’s rights.” In re L.J., 2026 UT App 14, ¶ 15 (quoting In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, ¶ 17, 521 P.3d 887).
Utah Legislature:
Rules of Civil Procedure
Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
Case Cited
- In re M.M., 2023 UT App 95, 536 P.3d 102, cert. denied, 544 P.3d 456 (Utah 2024) (supplied the deferential standard of review for best-interest determinations).
- In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, 521 P.3d 887 (supplied the standard of review, definition of reasonable effort, and two-way-street principle for reunification efforts).
- In re J.M., 2024 UT App 147, 559 P.3d 473 (set out the two required findings for termination and the holistic, strictly-necessary best-interest framework).
- In re K.C., 2013 UT App 201, 309 P.3d 255 (confirmed that the juvenile court may weigh expert testimony and is not bound to accept it).
- State v. Kitches, 2021 UT App 24, 484 P.3d 415, cert. denied, 496 P.3d 718 (Utah 2021) (authorized reaching the merits of an arguably unpreserved issue that could be readily resolved against the appellant).
- Order, In re L.J., No. 20240966 (Utah Ct. App. May 7, 2025) (affirmed the termination of the mother’s parental rights in a separate appeal).
Litigation and Appellate Strategy
Reversal Predictor
- Findings that do not mention or engage with material expert testimony.
- A best-interest conclusion that rests on a single disputed or erroneous factual finding.
- No explicit analysis of whether permanent guardianship or another less drastic alternative would serve the child.
- No reasonable-efforts finding where reunification services were ordered.
- A record showing the parent requested accommodations or culturally appropriate providers and DCFS ignored the request.
- A pattern of DCFS non-contact that, unlike here, is not offset by services offered and missed by the parent.
Mandatory Factor Checklist
The opinion does not enumerate statutory best-interest factors, but it requires the juvenile court to address the following explicitly:
- A finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least one statutory ground for termination exists.
- A finding that termination is in the child’s best interest, based on a holistic examination of all relevant circumstances.
- A determination that termination is strictly necessary from the child’s point of view, including consideration of alternatives such as permanent guardianship.
- Where reunification services were ordered, a finding under Utah Code § 80-4-301(3)(a) that DCFS made reasonable efforts to provide them.
- Engagement with material expert testimony, including reasons for the weight assigned to it.
Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)
Appellate viability increases when several of the following appear together:
- Expert testimony that is specific to the child’s and parent’s cultural background and that the findings do not address.
- A documented parental request for culturally appropriate services that DCFS declined or ignored.
- Minimal DCFS contact or services coupled with evidence that the parent consistently attempted to engage.
- A best-interest determination that depends on a demonstrably erroneous finding, such as an arrest attributable to someone else.
- Inadequate or conclusory treatment of permanent guardianship as a less drastic alternative.
Strategy Insight
Father framed both issues primarily as evidentiary disputes, arguing that the court ignored his expert and misread the record, and both arguments ran into deferential review. Because the juvenile court considered the testimony at length, the appeal became a request to reweigh evidence. A stronger framing would identify a legal deficiency, such as a failure to apply the strictly-necessary standard to the specific alternative of permanent guardianship or a failure to make a required finding, rather than disagreement with how the evidence was weighed.
Expert Testimony on Transracial Adoption
This opinion is a notable treatment of expert testimony about transracial adoption in a Utah termination case. The court acknowledged the “pervasive problem of racism in society and the disadvantages that Black children face when placed in transracial adoptions,” but held that such testimony remains subject to the factfinder’s weighing. The participation of national amici underscores that the issue is drawing attention, and future litigants should expect courts to require family-specific testimony.
Reasonable Efforts for Incarcerated Parents
The juvenile court found that the caseworker made little effort to contact Father while he was incarcerated, yet the reasonable-efforts finding was affirmed. The result turned on services offered and missed when Father was not incarcerated, his failure to attend a scheduled meeting, and evidence that he complied with other obligations when motivated. Practitioners representing incarcerated parents should develop a record of attempted engagement during custody.
Preservation Bypass
In a footnote, the court declined to resolve the guardians ad litem’s preservation argument and instead reached the merits because the issue could be readily resolved in the guardians’ favor, citing State v. Kitches. This is a recurring Court of Appeals practice, and appellees should not rely on preservation alone.
Teaching Value
In re L.J. is a useful teaching case on the limits of expert testimony under deferential review, the role of permanent guardianship as an alternative to termination, the two-way-street nature of reunification, and the difference between an evidentiary disagreement and a reviewable legal error.
Insights
Utah-Only Jurisprudence
The opinion relies exclusively on Utah authority. Every case cited is a Utah Court of Appeals decision, and the only statute is Utah Code § 80-4-301. Although Father and amici framed the appeal around systemic racism and transracial adoption research, the court resolved it entirely within Utah’s established termination framework without drawing on out-of-state or federal authority.
Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)
The opinion cites no Utah Supreme Court decisions; it rests on Court of Appeals precedent. Two Supreme Court decisions underlie the framework the court applied, though neither is cited in this opinion and both citations should be independently verified:
- In re B.T.B., 2020 UT 60, 472 P.3d 827: established that termination must be “strictly necessary” and that courts must consider whether less drastic alternatives, such as permanent guardianship, can equally protect the child. Role here: the source of the “strictly necessary” language quoted through In re J.M. and the framework for the juvenile court’s rejection of permanent guardianship.
- In re E.R., 2021 UT 36, 496 P.3d 58: addressed the best-interest inquiry and the deferential review of best-interest determinations. Role here: the deferential best-interest standard applied through In re M.M. traces to this line of authority.
The Most Important Holding
The most significant holding is that a juvenile court does not err by declining to adopt an expert’s conclusion favoring permanent guardianship over transracial adoption, so long as the court meaningfully considers the testimony and explains, on child-specific evidence, why it is less persuasive. Here the court expressly agreed with the expert’s general observations about racism and transracial adoption, yet deferred to the juvenile court’s finding that the testimony did not address this family’s particular cultural history or the circumstances of biracial children, and that forced contact under a guardianship would undermine the children’s stability.
Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error
The judgment was affirmed in full. Reversal would most plausibly have followed if:
- the juvenile court had failed to address the expert testimony at all, which would satisfy the “failed to consider all of the facts” prong of the best-interest standard;
- the finding that Father could not avoid incarceration had rested solely on the mistaken-identity arrest, rather than on numerous independent law enforcement encounters;
- the court had failed to make the reasonable-efforts finding required by Utah Code § 80-4-301(3)(a); or
- the record showed DCFS made no fair and serious attempt at reunification, rather than an imperfect one, particularly where the parent had requested accommodations or culturally appropriate providers and was refused.
Practitioner Takeaways
- Trial Lawyers: Tie cultural-identity expert testimony to the specific family. Generalized research on transracial adoption was credited but found unhelpful because it did not address Father’s particular heritage, the mother’s background, or biracial children specifically. Document requests to DCFS for accommodations and culturally appropriate providers in writing and introduce them at trial, since their absence was held against Father.
- Appellate Lawyers: An argument that the court “disregarded” evidence fails where the findings discuss it at length; reframe such arguments as a failure to address a specific, material point. When challenging a single erroneous finding, show that the ultimate determination depended on it, because independent supporting findings will sustain the ruling.
- Guardians ad Litem and the State: Preservation objections may be bypassed when the merits favor the appellee, so a merits defense should be fully briefed alongside any preservation argument. Caseworker shortfalls, such as minimal contact during incarceration, will not necessarily defeat a reasonable-efforts finding, but they invite appellate commentary.
- DCFS Caseworkers: Make and document contact attempts with incarcerated parents and offer culturally appropriate services proactively. The court’s observation that DCFS’s efforts were “perhaps not as fulsome as they should have been” signals limited tolerance for thin efforts.
Majority Opinion
2026 UT App 14
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF L.J. AND J.J., PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE. T.J., Appellant, v. STATE OF UTAH, Appellee.
Opinion No. 20241074-CA Filed February 5, 2026 Second District Juvenile Court, Farmington Department
The Honorable Sharon S. Sipes No. 1215224
Alexandra Mareschal and Jason B. Richards, Attorneys for Appellant Derek E. Brown, Deborah A. Wood, and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, and Heath Haacke, Guardians ad Litem Emily Adams, Attorney for Amici Curiae Adoption Mosaic, Dorothy Roberts, Elephant Circle, Movement for Family Power, and Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred. ORME, Judge:
¶1 T.J. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his children, L.J. and J.J. Given the lengthy history of the case In re L.J. 20241074-CA 2 2026 UT App 14 and the narrow focus of the issues on appeal, we discuss the relevant facts in the context of our analysis below. For the reasons discussed therein, we reject Father’s challenges and affirm.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶2 First, Father challenges the juvenile court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of L.J. and J.J. In particular, he argues that the court (1) disregarded the testimony of his expert witness regarding transracial adoption and (2) made and relied on incorrect findings about Father’s history of incarceration. “We review deferentially a lower court’s best-interest determination and will overturn it only if it either failed to consider all of the facts or considered all of the facts and its decision was nonetheless against the clear weight of the evidence.” In re M.M., 2023 UT App 95, ¶ 19, 536 P.3d 102 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 544 P.3d 456 (Utah 2024).
¶3 Second, Father challenges the juvenile court’s conclusion that the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children. Because “reasonableness is an objective standard that depends upon a careful consideration of the facts of each individual case . . . , we afford the juvenile court broad discretion in determining whether reasonable reunification efforts were made.” In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, ¶ 17, 521 P.3d 887 (quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS I. The Children’s Best Interest
¶4 “A court may terminate parental rights only after making two necessary findings—first, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least one statutory ground for termination exists, and second, the court must find that In re L.J. 20241074-CA 3 2026 UT App 14 termination of the parent’s rights is in the best interest of the child.” In re J.M., 2024 UT App 147, ¶ 25, 559 P.3d 473 (quotation simplified). Father’s appeal centers on the best-interest inquiry. “Because any number of factors can have bearing on the child,” this “inquiry is a broad-ranging, holistic examination of all the relevant circumstances that might affect a child’s situation.” Id. ¶ 26 (quotation simplified). “And termination must be strictly necessary from the child’s point of view.” Id. (quotation simplified).
¶5 Father argues that the juvenile court erred in concluding that termination was in his children’s best interest because the court (1) disregarded the testimony of his expert witness and (2) made and relied on incorrect findings about Father’s history of incarceration. We disagree on both counts. A. Expert Testimony
¶6 Father’s expert witness (Expert) testified at the termination trial about the effects of racism in the context of transracial adoptions, which occur when children “are adopted within a family that is different from their culture and ethnicity.” Expert testified that L.J. and J.J. might experience a transracial adoption should Father’s rights be terminated because they are biracial— Father being Black and their mother being White. 1 Expert identified several negative impacts of transracial adoption, including “[l]oss of identity and culture,” such as “family traditions, customs, and so forth.” And she testified about the “lack of sense of self and understanding of self” that transracially adopted children experience when they “no longer have a relationship with their family.” 1. The parental rights of the children’s mother were also terminated, and her separate appeal was resolved by an order affirming the termination. See Order, In re L.J., No. 20240966 (Utah Ct. App. May 7, 2025). In re L.J. 20241074-CA 4 2026 UT App 14
¶7 Expert testified that Father’s primary concern was not “just necessarily” that his children might be transracially adopted but that they may be “adopted in general,” which would constitute “the loss of his children.” But Expert also noted that Father was concerned about the children losing their identity if they were adopted into a White family, as seemed likely given their foster placement. She testified that it is “extremely difficult” to identify specific aspects of one’s own culture but that Father had identified the personal significance of “what Black culture means to him,” stemming from his family heritage in Georgia and his playing a “traditional historical Black” card game with his family.
¶8 Expert also testified that “communal parenting” or “coparenting”—where “adoptive parents are essentially sharing their adopted children with the birth parents”—might produce better outcomes and a “healthy identity” for “children of color.” And she testified that L.J. and J.J. having merely occasional contact with Father’s biological family was unlikely to address her concerns about the effects of their possible transracial adoption. Expert did not address the cultural identity of the children’s mother, but she emphasized that “[r]esearch supports that children are best with their families, and that agencies are to create safer environments for children to remain with their families to have healthier and better outcomes.”
¶9 Far from ignoring this testimony, as Father insists, the juvenile court spent several pages of its lengthy findings discussing and crediting much of the testimony. But the thrust of Expert’s conclusion was that permanent guardianship is preferable to transracial adoption. And despite taking Expert’s testimony into account, the court concluded that, in this case, permanent guardianship was not in the children’s best interest. The court found that a permanent guardianship and custody arrangement “between the foster family and biological parents will be a ‘forced contact’ which will not be helpful to the stability and permanency necessary for [the children’s] well being” but In re L.J. 20241074-CA 5 2026 UT App 14 would instead inject “the chaos of” the biological parents’ relationship “into the stability and routine the children experience” in their foster placement. And the court noted that prior efforts to place the children with Father’s relatives in Georgia had failed and that the children were closely bonded with their current foster family, which happens to be White.
¶10 Moreover, the court found that Expert offered “no information about Father’s particular culture or history that causes concern about the children losing their cultural identity if they are adopted by a white family,” nor did she offer any “information about relevant considerations for [the] cultural background or history” of the children’s mother. In the court’s view, Expert’s testimony did not specifically address “transracial adoptions of biracial children” in a way that was particularly helpful to the court in assessing the best interest of L.J. and J.J.
¶11 We certainly do not disagree with Expert’s testimony about the pervasive problem of racism in society and the disadvantages that Black children face when placed in transracial adoptions. But the juvenile court was ultimately “not bound to accept” Expert’s testimony in its entirety, and the court was “free to judge” Expert’s testimony and conclusions in terms of their “credibility and . . . persuasive influence in light of all of the other evidence in the case.” In re K.C., 2013 UT App 201, ¶ 13, 309 P.3d 255 (quotation simplified). See id. (further explaining that “the juvenile court, as a trier of fact, may accord” an expert’s “opinion whatever weight it deems proper”) (quotation simplified). And given the court’s careful consideration of Expert’s testimony, we cannot agree with Father’s suggestion that the court wholly disregarded or misunderstood the testimony. B. Father’s Incarceration
¶12 Father was incarcerated several times over the course of this case. He was in jail from September to December 2022 after the incident that initiated this case. After failing to appear on those In re L.J. 20241074-CA 6 2026 UT App 14 criminal charges, he returned to jail in January 2023 and then again in March 2023 for criminal trespassing, pretrial violation of a protective order, and threat of terrorism. He was again incarcerated from December 2023 to January 2024 for probation violations. And he spent one day in jail in March 2024 after resisting arrest and fleeing from an officer. At the time of the termination trial in May 2024, Father had been incarcerated for another five days. And, through no fault of his own, Father had once been mistakenly identified and arrested for domestic violence perpetrated by another individual.
¶13 Father faults the juvenile court for misconstruing the facts surrounding this wrongful arrest, arguing that the court’s finding that “he has not gained the ability to avoid incarceration” was “substantially” based on this alleged misconstruction on the court’s part. But the court made other findings regarding Father’s “frequent encounters with law enforcement.” Thus, it is simply incorrect to assert that the court relied solely on this one incident of mistaken identity or that the court’s findings about Father’s other periods of incarceration were against the clear weight of the evidence.
¶14 In sum, Father has not persuaded us that the juvenile court erred in concluding that termination of his parental rights was strictly necessary and in the best interest of the children.
II. Reasonable Reunification Efforts
¶15 “When the juvenile court orders DCFS to provide reunification services to a parent, the court must find that ‘reasonable efforts’ were made to provide those services before the court may terminate the parent’s rights.” In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, ¶ 17, 521 P.3d 887 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 80-4-301(3)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022)). “A reasonable effort is a fair and serious attempt to reunify a parent with a child prior to seeking to terminate parental rights.” Id. (quotation simplified). Father argues the juvenile court could not find that DCFS made In re L.J. 20241074-CA 7 2026 UT App 14 such an effort to reunify him with the children because, in his view, the agency “provided no meaningful support,” “compounded the systemic racism” he experienced, and “failed to use culturally appropriate service providers for the children and parents.” We disagree.2
¶16 In its findings, the juvenile court recognized that “Father was incarcerated numerous times throughout the case.” See supra ¶ 12. And it found that the DCFS caseworker “made little effort to contact Father while he was incarcerated.” The court also found that “Father behaves in a manner that others may view as unsafe under some circumstances.” But despite being “fearful” of Father, the caseworker “arranged for Father’s opportunity for ongoing contact [with DCFS] by transferring contact to an office providing different security.” And the court found that the caseworker had provided Father with several opportunities for services, including appointments for mental health assessments that Father missed. The court also chronicled an incident in which Father—despite a protective order preventing him from contacting the children’s mother—encountered the caseworker at the hospital during the birth of J.J., and the caseworker made an appointment to discuss the case with him, which Father “chose not to attend.”
¶17 The court further found that Father’s “decision to seek treatment and assistance” privately, “his research and enrollment in online education, his ability to get to appointments with his probation officer, his regular appearance at various court hearings, and his ability to obtain employment” all belied his claims of inability to meet his obligations with DCFS. The court specifically found that Father had “shown his ability to comply 2. The guardians ad litem argue that Father has not preserved this issue. But because the issue can be readily resolved in favor of the guardians’ position, we choose to address it anyway. See State v. Kitches, 2021 UT App 24, ¶ 28, 484 P.3d 415, cert. denied, 496 P.3d 718 (Utah 2021). In re L.J. 20241074-CA 8 2026 UT App 14 when he wants to.” Finally, the court recognized that “Father did not offer evidence he requested any accommodations or culturally sensitive treatment providers.”
¶18 With the benefit of hindsight, DCFS’s efforts in this case were perhaps not as fulsome as they should have been. But, again, “a reasonable effort is a fair and serious attempt” at reunification, not a perfect one. In re S.T., 2022 UT App 130, ¶ 17 (quotation simplified). And “reasonableness is an objective standard that depends upon a careful consideration of the facts of each individual case.” Id. (quotation simplified). Additionally, “the process of reunification is recognized as a two way street which requires commitment on the part of the parents, as well as the availability of services from the State,” and Father “bore the responsibility of participating in and completing those services” provided to him by DCFS. Id. ¶ 23 (quotation simplified).
¶19 Given the “broad discretion” we afford the juvenile court’s reasonableness determination, id. ¶ 17 (quotation simplified), we cannot say the court erred in concluding that DCFS made an adequate attempt to provide meaningful reunification services to Father under the circumstances of this case.
CONCLUSION
¶20 Because neither of Father’s challenges to the termination of his parental rights is availing, we affirm.