McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382
Case Summary
Gordon W. McPherson (Husband) and Cindi R. McPherson (Wife) divorced after nineteen years of marriage. Husband’s income spiked when he was promoted from diesel mechanic to a sales position, and temporary support of $4,390 per month was set on that higher income—but Husband had just been fired for misconduct and returned to work as a diesel mechanic at a fraction of the salary. The trial court refused to modify the temporary order retroactively, then at trial set alimony at $800 per month based on Husband’s gross income, leaving him with obligations exceeding his net income by more than $1,500 per month. The court of appeals reversed both rulings, requiring consideration of Husband’s tax obligations and actual ability to pay, and directing retroactive modification of temporary alimony to January 1, 2010.
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Oral Argument
Briefing Documents
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Coverage
Facts
Marriage and Employment
- The parties married on March 2, 1991, and had two children, born in 1992 and 1994.
- Husband, who has a high school education, worked as a diesel mechanic for the first sixteen years of the marriage, averaging about $47,000 per year ($3,917 per month) from 1991 through 2006.
- In 2007, Wheeler Machinery promoted Husband to Product Sales and Support Representative (PSSR); from 2007 through 2009 his income averaged $172,620 per year ($14,385 per month).
- Through his PSSR work, Husband apparently developed a romantic relationship with a young woman employed by a client.
Divorce Filing and Temporary Orders
- On September 25, 2009, Wife filed for divorce citing irreconcilable differences arising from Husband’s alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and an extramarital affair, and moved for temporary support.
- On October 30, 2009, the domestic relations commissioner recommended temporary child support of $1,965 and temporary alimony of $2,425 per month based on Husband’s PSSR income.
Husband’s Termination
- After a coworker of the woman tracked Husband’s contacts with her, Husband left the coworker a threatening voicemail. The client reported the incident, and Wheeler Machinery fired Husband on November 25, 2009, for violating company policy.
- On December 1, 2009, unaware of the termination, the trial court adopted the commissioner’s recommendation, ordering $4,390 per month in total temporary support effective November 1, 2009.
- On December 14, 2009, Husband found a new diesel-mechanic job paying $4,680 gross per month—less than his PSSR salary but more than he had previously earned as a mechanic. His net income was $3,074.57 per month, meaning his support obligations exceeded 140% of his net income.
Requests to Modify Temporary Support
- Husband moved on December 15, 2009, to amend the temporary order. The commissioner twice recommended denial (January 11 and February 26, 2010) for lack of evidence on whether Husband was voluntarily underemployed, and certified the issue for trial.
- Beginning January 13, 2010, the Office of Recovery Services garnished Husband’s income to collect the $4,390 monthly obligation.
- The trial court adopted the commissioner’s recommendations, reasoning that Husband’s income reduction resulted from his voluntary act and that he retained the ability to earn, citing Young v. Young and Proctor v. Proctor.
Trial and Amended Decision
- A bifurcated decree of divorce entered May 6, 2010. After a bench trial, the court issued a memorandum decision on July 1, 2010, amended on August 4, 2010.
- The trial court found that Husband’s termination resulted from his own conduct but was not for the purpose of reducing support, that Husband was not voluntarily underemployed, and that he was unlikely to earn a PSSR-level salary again. It expressly gave fault little weight.
- The court reduced future support to $1,651 per month ($851 child support and $800 alimony), calculating Husband’s ability to pay from his gross income, and denied retroactive modification, finding “no basis in law, fact, or equity” to reduce the temporary amounts.
- Husband’s reasonable monthly expenses were found to be $2,955; with child support and alimony, his obligations totaled $4,606, exceeding his net income by $1,531.43. During the temporary-order period, his obligations of $7,345 exceeded his net income by $4,270.43 per month.
Issues of the Case
Appellant Gordon W. McPherson raised two issues on appeal.
- Issue 1: Alimony / Use of Gross Rather Than Net Income and Payor’s Ability to Pay
- Issue 2: Temporary Support / Retroactive Modification
The court of appeals reversed and remanded on both issues, with instructions to modify temporary alimony retroactively to January 1, 2010.
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Alimony – Income Determination
- Use of Gross Rather Than Net Income and Payor’s Ability to Pay
Claim on Appeal: Husband argued that the trial court erred by calculating his alimony obligation using gross rather than net income and by failing to address his actual ability to pay.
Holding: — Reversed and Remanded. A sufficiently detailed finding on the payor’s ability to pay must account for tax obligations; absent findings justifying an obligation the payor cannot meet (such as fault or voluntary underemployment, both of which the trial court rejected), the award exceeded the trial court’s discretion.
Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-4-502(1) (Formerly: § 30-3-5(8)(a)) (mandatory alimony factors, including the recipient’s financial condition and needs, the recipient’s earning capacity, and the payor’s ability to provide support).
Standard of Review:
Abuse of Discretion — the trial court’s alimony determination (Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997)).
Controlling Cases:
- Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ¶ 6, 974 P.2d 306 (failure to consider statutory alimony factors is an abuse of discretion).
- Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶¶ 17–18, 169 P.3d 754 (reversing alimony calculated on gross rather than net income; inadequate findings reversible when facts are unclear).
- Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 102 (Utah 1986) (tax consequences relevant to payor’s ability to pay).
- Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (findings must be detailed and reflect a clear rationale).
- Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 506, ¶ 5, 153 P.3d 827 (where resources are insufficient, support calculated with an eye toward equalizing standards of living).
- Boyer v. Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, ¶ 12, 259 P.3d 1063; Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74, ¶ 11 n.3, 231 P.3d 815 (fault may justify a disproportionate burden; noting panel conflict on fault).
Why It Matters: Ability to pay is measured in after-tax dollars. A trial court may impose a disproportionate share of the shortfall on one spouse only with findings on a discretionary factor that justifies it. Where the court rejects fault and voluntary underemployment, an award exceeding the payor’s net income cannot stand. The court also reserved the trial court’s discretion to equalize standards of living or explain a disproportionate allocation on remand.
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Alimony — Temporary Alimony
- Retroactive Modification of Temporary Support
Claim on Appeal: Husband argued that the trial court erred in refusing to modify the temporary support order retroactively after finding he was not voluntarily underemployed. Wife argued that temporary support cannot be modified once due.
Holding: — Reversed with instructions. Courts are statutorily empowered to modify support retroactively to the date of service while a modification is pending; once the trial court found Husband was not voluntarily underemployed—eliminating the premise for the temporary award—there was no reasoned basis to maintain an obligation that was mathematically impossible to pay. The trial court must modify temporary alimony retroactively to January 1, 2010, based on Husband’s actual ability to pay.
Statutory Authority: Utah Code § 81-7-102(5)(a) (Formerly: § 78B-12-112(4); earlier § 78-45-9.3(4)) (support payments may be modified for any period during which a modification is pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading on the obligee when the obligor is the petitioner).
Standard of Review:
Abuse of Discretion — the decision whether to modify support retroactively (Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, ¶¶ 23, 30).
Correctness — conclusions of law, including whether retroactive modification is legally available (Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 6).
Controlling Cases:
- Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, ¶¶ 19–20, 157 P.3d 341 (courts are statutorily empowered to modify spousal support retroactively).
- Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (substantial deference to modification rulings).
- Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (relied on by Wife; abrogated by statute on retroactive modification).
- Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶¶ 13, 16, 80 P.3d 153 (harsh or disparate awards require findings on discretionary factors).
Why It Matters: Temporary support orders are not insulated from retroactive correction. Once a pending modification is served, the court may adjust payments back to the date of service, and when the factual premise for the temporary award (voluntary underemployment) is later disproved, continuing to enforce an impossible obligation is an abuse of discretion. Imputation must reflect a “present reality,” not merely serve as a penalty for a voluntary act.
Rules of Evidence
Utah Codes
Alimony — Factors
Governs:
Requires the court to consider at least the recipient’s financial condition and needs, the recipient’s earning capacity, the payor’s ability to provide support, the length of the marriage, whether the recipient has custody of minor children, whether the recipient worked in the payor’s business, and whether the recipient contributed to the payor’s education or skills. These factors now appear in § 81-4-502(1); the section was amended again in the 2026 General Session.
Application in McPherson:
The court held that a sufficiently detailed finding on the payor’s ability to pay must consider tax obligations, and that the trial court abused its discretion by setting alimony based on gross income without findings justifying an obligation Husband could not meet.
Quote:
“A sufficiently detailed finding regarding the statutory factor relevant to the present appeal—the payor spouse’s ability to pay—includes consideration of the payor spouse’s tax obligations.” McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, ¶ 13.
Utah Legislature:
Payment Under Child Support or Alimony Order — Judgment; Retroactive Modification
Governs:
Provides that a support payment may be modified with respect to any period during which a modification is pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading on the obligee if the obligor is the petitioner. The retroactivity provision formerly at § 78B-12-112(4) now appears at § 81-7-102(5)(a). The section was amended again in the 2026 General Session.
Application in McPherson:
The court rejected Wife’s argument that temporary support cannot be modified once due, held that the trial court had discretion to modify retroactively to the December 14, 2009 service date, and directed retroactive modification of temporary alimony to January 1, 2010.
Quote:
“[S]pousal support payment[s] under a support order may be modified with respect to any period during which a modification is pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner . . . .” McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, ¶ 17 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-112).
Utah Legislature:
Rules of Civil Procedure
Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
Case Cited
- Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997) (alimony reviewed for abuse of discretion).
- Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, ¶¶ 23, 30, 35 P.3d 341 (retroactive modification reviewed for abuse of discretion).
- Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 6, 233 P.3d 836 (conclusions of law reviewed for correctness).
- Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ¶ 6, 974 P.2d 306 (failure to consider alimony factors is an abuse of discretion).
- Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (findings must disclose steps to the ultimate conclusion).
- Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (source of the subsidiary-facts findings standard, quoted in Stevens).
- Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (alimony requires clear rationale consistent with statutory criteria).
- Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶¶ 17–18, 169 P.3d 754 (reversal of alimony based on gross income; inadequate findings) (cited later in the opinion as “2007 UT App 241”).
- Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 102 (Utah 1986) (tax effects relevant to ability to pay).
- Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 506, ¶ 5, 153 P.3d 827 (equalizing standards of living when resources are insufficient).
- Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., 123 Utah 215, 257 P.2d 540, 540 (1953) (appellate courts cannot consider facts stated in briefs but absent from the record).
- Boyer v. Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, ¶ 12, 259 P.3d 1063 (fault may be considered in support determinations).
- Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74, ¶ 11 n.3, 231 P.3d 815 (panel conflict on application of fault factor).
- Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, ¶¶ 19–20, 157 P.3d 341 (statutory authority for retroactive modification of spousal support).
- Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (temporary support not retroactively modifiable; abrogated by statute on that point).
- Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (deference to modification rulings).
- Young v. Young, 2009 UT App 3, ¶ 13, 201 P.3d 301 (relied on by trial court for imputation after voluntary income reduction).
- Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (relied on by trial court, via Young, for imputation).
- Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (considerable discretion in determining alimony).
- Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶¶ 13, 16, 80 P.3d 153 (discretionary factors may justify disparate awards if supported by clear findings).
Litigation and Appellate Strategy
Reversal Based on Legal Error vs. Factual Error
- Issue 1: Reversed for inadequate findings—the trial court did not address tax obligations or explain an obligation exceeding net income. This is a findings-based abuse of discretion rather than a challenge to the factual findings themselves.
- Issue 2: Reversed because the trial court’s own factual findings (no voluntary underemployment, insufficient net income) undermined the premise of the temporary award; the error was in failing to act on those findings.
The Record Figure and the Second Appeal
- Footnote 4 relied on the record figure of $3,074.57 in net income, declined to accept the $3,270 figure stated without record support in Husband’s brief, and expressly did not preclude the trial court from considering other evidence on remand.
- The case returned on a second appeal (McPherson v. McPherson, 2013 UT App 302), in which the court of appeals reversed again because the trial court treated the first opinion as having fixed Husband’s net income at $3,270, a figure the trial court itself doubted. The 2013 decision clarified that the 2011 opinion’s discussion of record evidence was not a finding of fact.
- Read together, the two opinions illustrate how appellate references to record figures can be misread on remand, and the importance of footnotes reserving the trial court’s fact-finding discretion.
Reversal Predictor
- Alimony calculated on gross income without addressing tax obligations.
- Payor’s combined expenses and support obligations exceed net income.
- Trial court rejects fault and voluntary underemployment yet imposes a disproportionate burden.
- Temporary support premised on voluntary underemployment that the trial court later rejects.
- Refusal to modify retroactively despite a timely served modification motion.
- Recipient relies on abrogated authority to oppose retroactive modification.
Mandatory Factor Checklist
Alimony (Utah Code § 81-4-502(1); formerly § 30-3-5(8)(a)):
- Financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse.
- Recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income.
- Payor’s ability to provide support, measured in after-tax income.
- Length of the marriage.
- Whether the recipient has custody of minor children requiring support.
- Whether the recipient worked in a business owned or operated by the payor.
- Whether the recipient contributed to the payor’s education or skills.
Retroactive Modification (Utah Code § 81-7-102(5)(a); formerly § 78B-12-112(4)):
- Date of service of the modification pleading on the obligee.
- Whether the premise for the existing support order remains accurate.
- Payor’s actual ability to pay during the pendency period.
Signal Cluster (High-Risk Appeal Profile)
An appeal is most viable under McPherson where (1) the payor’s income has dropped sharply after a temporary order; (2) the trial court ultimately finds no voluntary underemployment and gives fault little weight; (3) alimony is calculated on gross income; (4) the payor’s obligations exceed net income by a substantial margin; and (5) a modification motion was promptly served but retroactive relief was denied. When these combine, both the final award and the temporary order are vulnerable.
Strategy Insight
McPherson shows the power of turning the trial court’s own findings against its result. Husband did not need to overturn any factual findings; the trial court had already found he was not voluntarily underemployed and had discounted fault. By pairing those findings with simple arithmetic showing obligations exceeding net income, Husband reframed the appeal as an unexplained, mathematically impossible award—a discretionary decision without a supporting rationale—rather than a disagreement over the weight of the evidence.
Teaching Value
Read alongside the 2013 follow-up decision, this opinion is a useful case study in how appellate remand instructions are received and applied by trial courts. Footnote 4’s reliance on the record figure, its refusal to credit an unsupported figure in the briefs, and its reservation of the trial court’s discretion became central to the second appeal.
Insights
Utah-Only Jurisprudence
- The opinion relies exclusively on Utah statutes and Utah appellate decisions; no out-of-state authority is cited.
- The court corrects Wife’s reliance on Whitehead v. Whitehead, noting that it had been abrogated by statute on the precise point for which it was cited.
Doctrinal Anchors (Utah Supreme Court)
- Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997) — Established abuse-of-discretion review of alimony. Role: standard of review for Issue 1.
- Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) — Recognized that tax consequences bear on the payor’s ability to pay. Role: supports the net-income requirement.
- Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987) — Established that findings must include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps to the ultimate conclusion. Role: the findings standard (via Stevens).
- Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., 257 P.2d 540 (Utah 1953) — Established that appellate courts cannot consider facts asserted in briefs but absent from the record. Role: the reason the court used the record figure of $3,074.57 rather than the $3,270 asserted in Husband’s brief.
The Most Important Holding
A payor spouse’s ability to pay must be measured by net, after-tax income. Where the trial court rejects fault and voluntary underemployment as justifications, it may not impose support obligations that exceed the payor’s net income without detailed findings explaining why one party should bear a disproportionate share of the shortfall.
Retroactive Relief from Temporary Orders
- Temporary support orders can be modified retroactively to the date of service of a modification request; Whitehead no longer controls.
- When a temporary award rests on a premise (voluntary underemployment) that the trial court later rejects, refusing retroactive modification is an abuse of discretion if the obligation is mathematically impossible to pay.
- Imputation of income must reflect a “present reality”; a voluntary act causing a job loss does not automatically justify imputing the former salary.
Practitioner Takeaways
Trial Lawyers (Payor):
- Present clear evidence of net income—tax returns, updated financial declarations, and more than a single pay stub—and request explicit findings on ability to pay in after-tax dollars.
- File and serve a modification motion promptly after an income change; retroactive relief runs only from the date of service.
- Seek a trial-level finding on voluntary underemployment as early as possible, since the temporary order may rest on an untested assumption.
Trial Lawyers (Recipient):
- If seeking an award exceeding the payor’s net income, request findings on fault, voluntary underemployment, or other discretionary factors that justify a disproportionate allocation.
- Do not rely on Whitehead for the proposition that temporary support is immune from retroactive modification.
- Recognize exposure to retroactive reductions and overpayment judgments once a modification motion is served.
Appellate Lawyers:
- Show the arithmetic: comparing net income to expenses plus support obligations makes an inability-to-pay argument concrete.
- Use the trial court’s own findings (here, rejecting fault and voluntary underemployment) to show that no discretionary factor supports the disproportionate result.
- Cite only record evidence; figures asserted in briefs without record support will be disregarded.
Majority Opinion
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
‐‐‐‐ooOoo‐‐‐‐
Cindi R. McPherson, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Gordon W. McPherson, Respondent and Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) OPINION Case No. 20100823‐CA F I L E D (November 10, 2011) 2011 UT App 382 ‐‐‐‐‐
Third District, West Jordan Department, 094401941
The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck Attorneys: Joshua K. Peterman, Salt Lake City, for Appellant James H. Woodall, South Jordan, for Appellee ‐‐‐‐‐ Before Judges McHugh, Orme, and Voros. McHUGH, Associate Presiding Judge:
¶1 Appellant Gordon W. McPherson (Husband) appeals both the trial court’s calculation of his alimony obligation, and the trial court’s denial of his request for a retroactive modification of his temporary alimony obligation. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Husband and Cindi R. McPherson (Wife) were married on March 2, 1991. They soon celebrated the birth of two children, a daughter in 1992 and a son in 1994. Husband has a high school education and was employed as a diesel mechanic for the 20100823‐CA 2 first sixteen years of the marriage. In 2007, after Husband had been employed as a diesel mechanic by Wheeler Machinery for approximately twelve years, he was promoted to Product Sales and Support Representative (PSSR). In this new position, Husband received a dramatically higher salary than he had received as a diesel mechanic. For example, between 1991 and 2006, Husband’s average income was approximately $47,000 per year or $3,917 per month. However, between 2007 and 2009, Husband’s average income increased to $172,620 per year or $14,385 per month. As a PSSR, Husband maintained contact with clients of Wheeler Machinery, and in the course of this work he apparently developed a romantic relationship with a young woman employed by one such client.
¶3 On September 25, 2009, Wife filed for divorce, citing “irreconcilable differences resulting from [Husband’s] abuse of alcohol, domestic violence, and an extramarital affair.” That same day, Wife filed a motion for temporary orders on child support and alimony. On October 30, 2009, the domestic relations commissioner held a hearing on the matter. Based on the significant income Husband earned as a PSSR, the commissioner recommended that Husband pay temporary child support of $1,965 per month and temporary alimony of $2,425 per month.
¶4 At some point, Husband’s relationship with the client’s employee was discovered by one of her coworkers. As explained by the trial court, the coworker “became protective of the woman and . . . sought to track or trace the movements of [Husband] relative to [Husband’s] contacts with that woman, evidently believing that the woman and [Husband] were having some type of relationship of which [the coworker] did not approve.” This angered Husband, who called the woman’s coworker and left a threatening voicemail. The woman’s coworker informed his employer, and the company contacted Wheeler Machinery and reported the incident. As a result, on November 25, 2009, Husband was terminated for violating company policy.
¶5 On December 1, 2009, the court adopted the commissioner’s original recommendation and ordered Husband to pay a total of $4,390 per month in child support and alimony obligations effective November 1, 2009 (temporary support order). The trial court was unaware at that time that Husband had been fired recently.
¶6 On December 14, 2009, Husband obtained a new job as a diesel mechanic earning a gross monthly salary of $4,680. Although the new job pays significantly less than his former PSSR salary, his present salary is higher than what he previously received as a diesel mechanic. 1 Record evidence indicates that Husband’s net monthly income was $3,074.57 at that time. Therefore, the amount of Husband’s total support obligations was more than 140% of Husband’s net monthly income. 20100823‐CA 3
¶7 On December 15, 2009, Husband moved to amend the temporary support order in an attempt to recalculate his child support and alimony obligations in accordance with his decreased salary as a diesel mechanic. At a hearing on January 11, 2010, the commissioner recommended a denial of Husband’s request because the commissioner had insufficient evidence to determine whether Husband was voluntarily underemployed. The commissioner also recommended that the question be certified for trial. Husband filed an objection to the commissioner’s recommendation, arguing that he was not voluntarily underemployed and that it was impossible for him to comply with the temporary alimony and child support orders on his present income.
¶8 On January 13, 2010, Husband was notified by Utah’s Office of Recovery Services that his income would be garnished to collect the $4,390 in total monthly support obligations.1 On February 8, 2010, Husband requested oral argument regarding his objection to the commissioner’s January 11, 2010 recommendation. At a second hearing before the commissioner on February 26, 2010, the commissioner again denied Husband’s request for a recalculation of his support obligations. Husband filed a renewed objection to the commissioner’s recommendations.
¶9 On March 12, 2010, the trial court adopted the commissioner’s recommendation from January 11, 2010, ordered Husband to continue complying with the temporary support order, and certified for trial the issue of whether to amend Husband’s support obligations. Five days later, Husband requested a decision regarding his objection to the commissioner’s recommendation that Husband’s second request to modify his support obligation be denied. The trial court again rejected Husband’s request, explaining that Husband’s income had been reduced due to a voluntary act and that he therefore retained the ability to earn. Husband again filed an objection.
¶10 The trial court issued a bifurcated divorce decree on May 6, 2010, which awarded a decree of divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences but reserved all other issues for trial. After a bench trial, the trial court issued a memorandum decision on July 1, 2010, and then the trial court amended that decision on August 4, 2010. The trial court denied Husband’s request for retroactive modification of his support obligations, but reduced his future support obligations to a total of $1,651 per month ($851 in child 2 Utah Code section 30‐3‐5(8)(a) provides, The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; (iv) the length of the marriage; (v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; (vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and (continued…) 20100823‐CA 4 support and $800 in alimony). Husband appeals from the trial court’s amended decision.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶11 First, Husband claims that the trial court erred in calculating his alimony obligation using his gross income, rather than his net income. “When reviewing a trial court’s determination of alimony . . . an appellate court reviews [it] for abuse of discretion.” Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997).
¶12 Second, Husband claims that the trial court erred in denying his request for a retroactive modification of his temporary support obligations. A district court’s determination regarding the retroactive modification of a spousal support obligation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, ¶¶ 23, 30, 35 P.3d 341. However, conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. See Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 6, 233 P.3d 836.
ANALYSIS I. The Trial Court Was Required to Consider Husband’s Tax Obligations When Calculating Alimony.
¶13 Husband claims that the trial court erred by using his gross income to calculate alimony payments rather than his net income. Trial courts are required to consider certain statutory factors when calculating alimony obligations.2 See Utah Code Ann. 2 (…continued) (vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse’s skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. Utah Code Ann. § 30‐3‐5(8)(a) (Supp. 2011). 3 Because the material provisions of the statute have not changed, we cite the current version of the Utah Code as a convenience to the reader. 20100823‐CA 5 § 30‐3‐5(8)(a) (Supp. 2011).3 “Failure to consider these factors constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ¶ 6, 974 P.2d 306. In order to demonstrate adequate consideration of each factor, the trial court’s findings “‘should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.’” Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)); see also Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (“[T]here must be some clear rationale for the level of alimony consistent with the stated criteria.”). “A trial court’s failure to provide adequate findings is reversible error when the facts are not clear from the record.” Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶ 17, 169 P.3d 754. A sufficiently detailed finding regarding the statutory factor relevant to the present appeal—the payor spouse’s ability to pay—includes consideration of the payor spouse’s tax obligations. See id. ¶¶ 17‐18 (reversing the trial court’s calculation of alimony based on the payor spouse’s gross income instead of net income); see also Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 102 (Utah 1986) (finding that even possible tax benefits resulting from alimony payments are relevant to the court’s finding of the payor spouse’s ability to pay).
¶14 Husband objected to the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, arguing that the court had not appropriately considered his ability to pay. In response, the trial court explained that although it did not make an explicit finding regarding the payor spouse’s ability to pay, it was “inherent in the court’s findings and discussion.” However, we can find nowhere in the record where the trial court explains its failure to consider Husband’s tax obligations when making its alimony determination. In an attempt to justify the trial court’s use of Husband’s gross income to determine the alimony award, Wife asserts that Husband presented insufficient evidence to permit the trial court to use his net income in its calculations. Specifically, Wife notes that Husband provided only a single wage stub as evidence of his net income. However, Wife has not otherwise challenged Husband’s evidence of net income, which includes a 4 Without record support, Husband’s brief on appeal indicates that his net monthly income is approximately $3,270 per month. For purposes of our decision, we rely on the revised financial declaration that is part of the record on appeal. See Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., 123 Utah 215, 257 P.2d 540, 540 (1953) (“[Appellate courts] cannot consider facts stated in the briefs which may be true but [are] absent in the official record.”). By doing so, we do not intend to preclude the trial court from considering whatever evidence it deems appropriate on remand. 20100823‐CA 6 revised financial declaration. The declaration calculates Husband’s tax obligations and indicates that his net income is $3,074.57 per month.4
¶15 The trial court, in its amended ruling, found that Husband has reasonable monthly expenses in the amount of $2,955. In addition, Husband was ordered to pay $851 per month in child support and $800 per month in alimony. Husband’s reasonable monthly expenses plus his child support and alimony obligations total $4,606. This obligation exceeds his net monthly income by $1,531.43. The trial court also found that Husband was involuntarily terminated from his position as a PSSR and was unlikely to find employment in that salary range again. Given Husband’s lower salary as a diesel mechanic, there are not enough financial resources available to support the parties’ needs at their current standard of living. Under these circumstances, a trial court should calculate support obligations “with an eye towards equalizing the parties’ standards of living.” Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 506, ¶ 5, 153 P.3d 827. Here, in addition to the other statutory factors, the trial court considered the standard of living during the marriage both during the “normal” years when [Husband] was a diesel mechanic and the “higher earning” years when he was a PSSR . . . . Principally the court considers the need of [Wife] based largely on their standard of living at the time of trial and during [sixteen] of the [nineteen] years of the marriage, her own ability to meet those needs, and the ability of [Husband] to make up that difference. Based upon those considerations, the trial court calculated an alimony amount designed to cover Wife’s needs and determined Husband’s ability to pay that amount based on his gross monthly income. While we appreciate the difficult task a trial court faces in attempting to fashion an appropriate alimony award in circumstances like the present where there is not enough income to satisfy both parties’ reasonable needs, the award 5 Wife’s brief cites to a single case, Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), for the proposition that temporary support orders cannot be modified retroactively. However, Whitehead has been abrogated by statute on the very point for which Wife’s brief relies on it. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B‐12‐112 (2008). 20100823‐CA 7 must be within the payor spouse’s ability to pay. Here there is nothing in the trial court’s order that addresses the fact that Husband no longer nets enough income to support Wife and their children at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
¶16 Although trial courts have significant discretion in making support determinations, and may impose disproportionately burdensome obligations on one party based upon findings relating to certain discretionary factors, including fault, the trial court did not make a finding on any such factor here. See Boyer v. Boyer, 2011 UT App 141, ¶ 12, 259 P.3d 1063 (noting that trial courts may consider fault in making a support determination); see also Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74, ¶ 11 n.3, 231 P.3d 815 (discussing conflict between the panels of the Utah Court of Appeals concerning the application of the fault factor). Indeed, the trial court expressly rejected fault as a justification for the award, stating, “‘Fault’ is of course difficult, but in any event . . . fault is not considered much of a factor at this point or in this case.” (Citation omitted.) Likewise, the trial court found that Husband was not voluntarily underemployed, thereby eliminating a justification for imputing higher income to him. In the absence of detailed findings explaining the trial court’s rationale for imposing obligations that Husband has no ability to meet, the alimony award exceeds the discretion of the trial court. See Andrus, 2007 UT App 241, ¶ 17. Consequently, we reverse and remand for recalculation of Husband’s alimony obligation, taking into consideration his tax obligations and actual ability to pay. In doing so, we acknowledge the trial court’s discretion to make whatever other adjustments it deems necessary to achieve an equalization of the parties’ standards of living or to explain its rationale for assigning a disproportionate percentage of the shortfall to one party. II. The Trial Court Exceeded Its Discretion in Denying Husband’s Requests for Retroactive Modification of the Temporary Support Obligations.
¶17 Husband also claims that the trial court erred in declining to modify the alimony award in the temporary support order retroactively. In response, Wife argues that Utah courts are unable to modify temporary support obligations once they become due.5 Contrary to Wife’s assertion, trial courts are statutorily empowered to modify spousal support payments retroactively. See Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, ¶¶ 19‐20, 157 P.3d 20100823‐CA 8 341 (interpreting the 2006 version of Utah Code section 78‐45‐9.3(4)). Indeed, trial courts have broad discretion in this area. See Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (“Once the trial court has made a determination on modification, we accord its ruling substantial deference.”). Yet, the statute does limit the time period during which retroactive modification is available. “[S]pousal support payment[s] under a support order may be modified with respect to any period during which a modification is pending, but only from the date of service of the pleading on the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner . . . .” Utah Code Ann. § 78B‐12‐112.
¶18 Husband served Wife with his motion to amend the temporary support order on December 14, 2009. Yet, the temporary alimony award remained in effect until the trial court’s memorandum decision on July 1, 2010. Therefore, Husband contends that he is entitled to a retroactive adjustment of the temporary alimony award paid from January 1, 2010, through July 1, 2010. We agree that the trial court had discretion to grant Husband’s motion for retroactive modification for any or all of that period. See id. § 78B‐12‐112(4). Despite that discretion, the trial court refused to adjust the temporary alimony and child support awards.
¶19 On March 12, 2010, the trial court issued an order with regard to Husband’s initial request for modification of the temporary support order, explaining that the request was denied because “[a]lthough there has been a dramatic change in circumstance[s] in the parties’ incomes which impacts [Husband’s] ability to pay alimony and child support, the Court has very little evidence to make a determination as to what brought this about and whether [Husband] is voluntarily unemployed.” Then, on April 30, 2009, the trial court issued an order addressing Husband’s objection to the commissioner’s second recommendation that the temporary alimony award remain in effect. The trial court explained its reasoning for again denying Husband’s request for a retroactive modification of his temporary support obligations as follows: Although [Husband] has suffered a reduction in income, the reason for the reduction is [Husband’s] voluntary act. Although the court recognizes the current economic realities of the existing Order, case law on this issue is clear, and binding on this Court. See, e.g., Young v. Young, [2009 UT App 3, ¶ 13,] 201 P.3d 301[] (citing Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). [Husband] retains the ability to earn. His Motion to Amend is therefore denied. 20100823‐CA 9 Both denials of Husband’s request for modification were premised on the commissioner’s concern that Husband’s sudden decrease in income was due to his voluntary underemployment. After trial on that issue, however, the court resolved the question in favor of Husband, stating that the issue [is] whether the court should impute such a higher figure because he was terminated from that job “voluntarily,” that is, because of his own conduct. . . . . . . . The termination was in one sense “voluntary” in that [Husband] was terminated because of his own actions rather than a work force reduction, poor economy, closure of a business, or other reasons not associated with his conduct. The court does not believe simply that misdeeds at work justify a finding that the termination should result in an imputation of higher income. . . . . . . . . . . the court finds that the termination was NOT for the purpose of lowering payments to his children or lowering alimony payments to [Wife]. He acted voluntarily in getting terminated, though it was not his intent to be fired nor halt paying [Wife]. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court found that Husband was not voluntarily underemployed and reduced Husband’s future support obligations based on that finding. Notwithstanding that finding, the trial court refused to modify the temporary award on the grounds that there was “no basis in law, fact, or equity to retroactively reduce the amounts.” We disagree.
¶20 “Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony,” Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), and harsh awards or a disparity in obligations can be justified by a finding of one or more discretionary factors, see Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶¶ 13, 16, 80 P.3d 153 (recognizing the trial court’s discretion to consider additional factors when calculating alimony awards so long as such determinations are based on clearly understandable factual findings). However, here the trial court specifically foreclosed a finding of fault and did not 20100823‐CA 10 identify any other explanation for the imposition of a temporary award beyond Husband’s financial capability.
¶21 To the contrary, the trial court found that the commissioner’s recommendations regarding the temporary support obligations were based on an erroneous assumption that Husband had, through his volitional misdeeds, voluntarily abandoned his higher paying job. While an appropriate finding of voluntary underemployment and a resulting decision to impute income at a higher level may serve to motivate a spouse to seek employment more in line with his true earning capacity, this finding must be a statement of present reality. The trial court carefully considered the evidence and then found that Husband was not voluntarily underemployed and would likely never earn a salary in the range of what he enjoyed during his years as a PSSR. Thus, there was no justification for imputing a higher income to Husband.
¶22 Additionally, after Husband’s termination from his position as a PSSR, he returned to his prior profession as a diesel mechanic. Husband now earns a net income of $3,074.57 per month. The trial court found that Husband’s reasonable monthly expenses were $2,955 per month. Even setting aside Husband’s potential obligation for his children’s medical expenses, for the period between January 1, 2010, until July 1, 2010, his temporary child support and alimony obligations totaled $4,390 per month. If that amount is added to Husband’s reasonable monthly expenses, Husband’s obligations as determined by the trial court were $7,345 per month. Applying Husband’s net income to that obligation results in a monthly shortfall of $4,270.43. Husband simply does not earn enough after‐tax dollars to pay the temporary support amounts awarded by the trial court.
¶23 Under these circumstances, the trial court should have retroactively modified Husband’s temporary support obligation. Even if the commissioner’s recommendations seemed well founded at the time of the hearings, once the premise of that decision was proved inaccurate, there was no reasoned basis to impose temporary support obligations that were mathematically impossible for Husband to pay. We therefore conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion in refusing to modify the temporary award retroactively, and we reverse with instructions to modify the temporary alimony award retroactively to January 1, 2010, in an amount the trial court deems appropriate based on Husband’s actual ability to pay, as well as the other statutory factors as determined on remand. 20100823‐CA 11
CONCLUSION
¶24 The trial court’s findings of fact do not support a conclusion that Husband has the ability to pay the alimony obligation. Further, the trial court exceeded its discretion when it refused to modify Husband’s alimony obligations retroactively despite finding that the premise underlying the imputation of income to Husband was inaccurate. We reverse the trial court’s amended decision and remand for reconsideration of the alimony award in light of Husband’s ability to pay and for retroactive modification consistent with this decision. In doing so, we do not intend to limit the trial court’s ability to make whatever additional modifications it deems appropriate on remand.
¶25 Reversed and remanded. ____________________________________ Carolyn B. McHugh, Associate Presiding Judge ‐‐‐‐‐
¶26 WE CONCUR: ____________________________________ Gregory K. Orme, Judge ____________________________________ J. Frederic Voros Jr., Judge